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

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HANS PAUL BAHRDT

Zur Frage des Menschenbildes in der Soziologie

I

Auf den ersten Blick scheint es fast eine Selbstverständlichkeit zu sein, daß die Soziologie ein »Menschenbild« haben müsse; und es erscheint sogar als wahrscheinlich, daß die Soziologie ein besonderes, aus der Eigenart ihrer Themenstellung und ihrer epochalen Rolle bestimmtes »soziologisches Menschenbild« besitzen könnte (1). Die Soziologie ist eine der Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Muß deshalb ihren Bemühungen um die Erforschung und Deutung menschlichen Zusammenlebens nicht ein Bild von Menschen zugrunde liegen, auf dem alles weitere Denken und Forschen aufbaut? Freilich hat die Soziologie nur einen Teilaspekt menschlichen Lebens zum Thema : die sozialen Strukturen. Auch beschäftigt sich der Soziologe hauptberuflich nicht mit allen sozialen Erscheinungen. Die sogenannten »primitiven« Gesellschaften überläßt er — trotz mancher sehr wichtigen Querverbindungen, die zwischen den Disziplinen bestehen — den Ethnologen. Was die Gesellschaften der Vergangenheit anbelangt, so muß sich der Soziologe vielfach auf das Urteil der Historiker verlassen, so wünschenswert es ist, wenn er auch selbst etwas von der Geschichte und der Arbeitsweise der Historiker versteht. Im wesentlichen beschränkt sich die Forschungsarbeit der Soziologie und damit auch die Legitimität der speziell soziologischen Aussagen auf die nach abendländischem Muster hochzivilisierten Gesellschaften der Gegenwart. Das heißt : die eigentlichen soziologischen Aussagen beschränken sich auf einen bestimmten geschichtlich und geographisch lokalisierbaren Teilbereich des menschlichen Daseins. Ihre Aufgabe ist nicht, Aussagen über den Menschen zu machen,

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(1) Der vorliegende Aufsatz beruht auf einem Vortragsmanuskript, dessen unmittelbarer Charakter beibehalten wurde.

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 1-17.

sondern nur über Ausschnitte aus dem Leben bestimmter Menschen. Aber kann sie das, wenn sie nicht von einem Menschenbild ausgeht, wenn nicht gewisse Vorstellungen über die Eigenschaften vorliegen, die allen Menschen zukommen, mögen diese nun aus der eigenen Werkstatt, etwa der soziologischen Grundlagenforschung, oder aus anderen Disziplinen stammen : etwa der Philosophie, der Theologie oder auch aus der Biologie? Könnten sich, wenn es diese gemeinsame und für alle Soziologen geltende Grundlage aller soziologischen Detailaussagen nicht gäbe, die Soziologen überhaupt miteinander unterhalten? Müßte es nicht ein babylonisches Sprachwirrwarr geben, das keine Verständigung mehr erlaubt?

Nun ist die Sprachverwirrung innerhalb der Soziologie in der Tat recht groß. Ferner — dies lehrt die Erfahrung — gibt es in der Soziologie sehr viele Menschenbilder, vielfach in mehr oder weniger wissenschaftlicher Ausformung, die sich aber gleichwohl widersprechen. Wir wollen jetzt nicht die Frage erörtern, ob ein »Menschenbild«, d. h. eine Vorstellung von dem Gesamtmenschen durch rein wissenschaftliche Bemühungen allein überhaupt gewonnen werden kann. Immerhin gibt es eine Reihe von »Menschenbildern«, die eine wissenschaftliche Systematisierung erfahren haben, die Anspruch auf Richtigkeit im wissenschaftlichen Sinn erheben und somit nicht nur verschiedenen Inhalt haben, sondern auch einander widersprechen können. Sie alle finden wir in der Soziologie vertreten ; Grundvorstellungen darüber, was der Mensch ist, was er sein könnte, was er eigentlich ist, wohin er tendiert, wovon er entfremdet ist ; Vorstellungen aus dem Geiste des Christentums, des Biologismus, des Marxismus und den verschiedenen sonstigen Humanismen, aus der Existenzphilosophie, der Psychoanalyse, der philosophischen Anthropologie, die natürlich alle mehr oder weniger die Weichen für das weitere Denken des Soziologen stellen. Dennoch glaube ich nicht, daß das in der Tat schlimme Aneinander-Vorbeireden in der Soziologie seine Hauptursache in den unterschiedlichen »Menschenbildern« der Soziologen hat, obwohl — dies läßt sich gar nicht vermeiden — bei fast jedem Soziologen erkennbar ist, welche anthropologischen Voraussetzungen er macht, und obwohl nicht zu leugnen ist, daß sich hieraus Konsequenzen für die Beurteilung von speziellen Fachfragen und demnach auch Meinungsverschiedenheiten ergeben, die schwer auszuräumen sind. Die wichtigsten, auch die giftigsten Kontroversen haben meines Erachtens aber andere, weniger tiefliegende Ursachen. Zum Teil sind sie außerwissenschaftlicher

Natur, z. B. politischer Herkunft; z.T. wurzeln sie in der Bevorzugung bestimmter Themen und Methoden und der damit verbundenen Neigung, Einzelergebnisse zu verallgemeinern, wobei jeder auf eine andere Weise verallgemeinert. Die Kontroversen schleppen sich dann ungelöst durch die Jahrzehnte hindurch, weil es in der Soziologie — ähnlich wie in den anderen Geisteswissenschaften — oft sehr schwer ist, endültig die Richtigkeit oder Falschheit einer Hypothese oder Theorie zu beweisen. Gelänge es in der täglichen Forschungsarbeit, die verwendeten Methoden und Terminologien besser aufeinander abzustimmen — was allerdings angesichts der Unvermeidbarkeit des Methodenpluralismus in der Soziologie nicht einfach ist —, so würde meines Erachtens der Streit und die Verwirrung auf ein Bruchteil zusammenschrumpfen, trotz unterschiedlicher Menschenbilder.

Ich glaube, daß Schelsky recht hat, wenn er Gespräche zwischen Soziologen verschiedener weltanschaulicher Observanz auf der Ebene der »mittleren Allgemeinheit« (d.h. doch wohl auch unter Ausklammerung der »Menschenbilder«) für möglich und fruchtbar hält (2). Vielleicht überschätzt er ein wenig diese Möglichkeiten. (Eine solche Überschätzung würde jedenfalls gut zu seiner These passen, daß wir im Nachkriegsdeutschland und auch in einer Reihe anderer Länder in einer »nachideologischen Phase« leben.) Jedoch : er kann sich auf Erfahrungen berufen. Und auch andere Soziologen haben ja erlebt, daß man z.B. sehr gut mit jugoslawischen und polnischen Soziologen, manchmal auch mit Russen Fachgespräche führen kann, auch wenn diese stramme Marxisten, vielleicht sogar nicht-stalinistische Kommunisten sind. (Bei Stalinisten gelangt freilich das Fachgespräch meist nicht über eine gegenseitige Klärung der Standpunkte hinaus; aber bei ihnen ist Gesellschaftswissenschaft ja etwas grundsätzlich anderes als das, was wir heute im allgemeinen unter Soziologie verstehen, nämlich eine bis in die Einzelheiten dogmatisch gesteuerte Exegese kanonischer Schriften.) Es bleibt jedoch das Faktum bestehen : Soziologen, die ein christliches oder positivistisches oder marxistisches Menschenbild haben, können sich unterhalten, und zwar nicht nur über Detail-Ergebnisse der Sozialforschung, sondern auch über Probleme recht allgemeinen Charakters. Ich könnte mir vorstellen, daß sie sogar vergleichend über die soziale Schichtung östlicher und westlicher Industrie-Gesellschaften diskutieren könnten. Zweifellos würden sich terminologische Eigenarten nicht ganz koordinieren lassen. Der Marxist wird auf den Begriff der »Klasse« nicht verzichten wollen, wo ein westlicher Soziologe lieber vorsichtig von sozialen Schichten spricht, weil er den Klassenbegriff zwar nicht ganz ablehnt, aber sparsamer verwenden möchte. Aber nachdem jeder sich in die Sprechweise des andern hineingehört hat, ist ein Gespräch eben auf der Ebene mittlerer Allgemeinheit möglich. Gewichtige, den ganzen Körper der Gesellschaft betreffende Strukturtendenzen können erörtert werden.

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(2) Vgl. H. Schelsky, *Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie* (Düsseldorf, Diederichs, 1959).

II

Wenn es wahr ist, daß solche Gespräche geführt werden könnten, trotz verschiedener »Menschenbilder«, d.h. konkret gesprochen : wenn sie von Partnern geführt werden können, von denen der eine den Menschen als ein sich selbst entfremdetes Wesen ansieht, das auf dem Wege ist, in dieser Welt die Entfremdung zu überwinden, der andere im Menschen den Sünder sieht, der sein Heil in dieser Welt auf keinen Fall finden kann, der dritte die Frage nach Entfremdung oder Sünde als sinnlose, als falsch gestellte Frage erklärt, weil sie mit wissenschaftlichen Mitteln nicht zu beantworten ist —, wenn diese Menschen sich also sinnvoll über gesellschaftliche Strukturprobleme unterhalten können, so müssen sie doch — so möchte man denken — von irgendetwas abstrahiert haben. Es muß möglich sein, die jeweiligen Menschenbilder — bis zu einem gewissen Grade — auszuklammern, ohne daß das wissenschaftliche Gespräch den Boden unter den Füßen verliert. Oder aber — dies wäre ebenfalls möglich — es funktioniert gerade deshalb, weil es in einem gewissen Sinn bodenlos ist.

Der Verdacht liegt natürlich nahe, daß bei solchen gelungenen Gesprächen nur ein oberflächlicher Tagungskonformismus vorliegt, auf den sich viele Wissenschaftler ja recht gut verstehen. Dennoch lohnt es sich zu fragen, ob die angedeutete Abstraktion (Ausklammerung) nicht vielleicht konstitutiv für das soziologische Denken überhaupt ist. Das würde bedeuten : Die Verständigung, die für diejenigen, die sie erlebt haben, ein verblüffendes Erlebnis war, kommt deshalb zustande, weil der Soziologe gerade das ausklammern muß, was ihn von seinem Fachkollegen, der ein anderes Menschenbild hat, trennt, und zwar nicht, um gut Freund mit ihm zu sein, sondern weil es die Denkweise der Disziplin sowieso erfordert. Mit anderen Worten : Der Soziologe muß von Gesamtaspekten des Menschen abstrahieren, d.h. aber auch, er muß den Menschen umstilisieren, weil sonst das soziologische Denken nicht schlüssig, präzis und systematisch abläuft, und dies — wie gesagt — nicht deshalb, weil die inhaltliche Pluralität der ausgeklammerten Aspekte sonst Verwirrung stiften würde, sondern weil der Denkansatz und die Methodik der Disziplin es erfordern, auch dann, wenn alle Soziologen das gleiche Menschenbild hätten. D.h. : der Soziologe muß mit einem Modellmenschen arbeiten, von dem er weiß, daß dieser nicht der ganze Mensch ist, mit dem er sich aber bescheidet, um im Rahmen der Möglichkeiten seines Fachs exakt arbeiten zu können, wobei ihm freisteht, nebenbei philosophisch über die Begrenztheit soziologischer Aussagen zu reflektieren.

Dies behauptet Ralf Dahrendorf in seinem Aufsatz *Homo sociologicus* (3). Sowohl zu Beginn als auch gegen Ende des Aufsatzes ist er immer wieder bemüht, den Modellcharakter dieses »homo sociologicus«, d.h. des Menschen, wie er sich als Forschungsgegenstand der Soziologie darstellt, aufzuzeigen. Gleichzeitig weist er auch immer wieder auf die Problematik solchen Denkens hin : auf die Paradoxie, die darin liegt, daß man es nunmehr mit einem »gedoppelten Menschen« zu tun hat, weil der Forscher, der selbst ein Mensch ist, auf eine Vorstellung vom Menschen überhaupt nicht verzichten kann, ja daß wir mit fortschreitender Entwicklung der Wissenschaften es nicht nur mit einem gedoppelten, sondern mit einer Vielzahl von »homines« zu tun haben. Vor dem »homo sociologicus« gab es ja schon lange den »homo oeconomicus«, jenen ökonomisch rationalen Übermenschen, von dem kein Wirtschaftswissenschaftler je behauptet hat, es habe ihn jemals gegeben, der aber als Modellmensch im Rahmen eines Modellsystems unentbehrlich ist. Ferner gibt es den »homo psychologicus«, der »homo politicus« taucht schon am Horizont auf : oder hatte ihn nicht vielleicht schon Macchiavelli konzipiert? (Sein »principe« war doch nicht als Programm der Bosheit gemeint, sondern doch wohl als so etwas wie ein »Modellfürst«). Dahrendorf gibt auch deutlich zu erkennen, daß sein »homo sociologicus« niemals, selbst wenn er sich mit den »homines« der anderen Disziplinen vereinigt, den ganzen Menschen abgibt.

Wir sind jetzt in unserem Gedankengang an einem ganz anderen Ort angelangt, als an dem, den wir zu Anfang anzusteuern glaubten. Zuerst meinten wir, die Soziologie müsse ein Menschenbild voraussetzen, wenn sie in ihren einzelnen Teilaussagen nicht auseinanderflattern will. Dann stellten wir fest, daß dies nicht der Fall ist, daß es vielmehr eine Vielzahl von Menschenbildern gibt, aber gleichwohl eine wissenschaftliche Verständigung auf einer Stufe mittlerer Allgemeinheit möglich ist. Schließlich erörterten wir die Möglichkeit, daß es vielleicht sogar nötig sei, nicht nur von der tatsächlichen Vielzahl der Menschenbilder, sondern auch — wenn es dieses gäbe — von einem gemeinsamen Menschenbild zu abstrahieren, weil sonst die Geschlossenheit, Stringenz und Systematik soziologischen Denkens nicht gelingt. D.h. die Soziologie darf gar kein Menschenbild voraussetzen, wenn sie als Wissenschaft funktionieren soll. Wir können freilich — und dies geht aus den allerletzten Betrachtungen hervor — diesen Sachverhalt auch folgendermaßen formulieren : Die Soziologie besitzt doch so etwas wie ein Menschenbild, das sie voraussetzt. Dieses ist aber etwas ganz anderes, als wir sonst unter einem »Menschenbild« verstehen : nicht ein religiös oder philosophisch geformtes Bild vom Menschen überhaupt, sondern ein »Kunstprodukt«, ein »homunculus«, ein Modell, das durch einen Reduktionsprozeß zustande kommt und das sich wie alle methodischen Kunstgriffe allein durch den Erfolg bei späteren Einzelaussagen rechtfertigt, das aber niemals hypostasiert werden darf, d.h. das niemals als Aussage über den Menschen überhaupt, sondern nur als Regulativ für Erfahrungsurteile über empirisch erforschte Teilaspekte des menschlichen Lebens verwendet werden darf.

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(3) Ralf Dahrendorf, *Homo sociologicus*, 3. Aufl. (Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961).

III

Bleiben wir zunächst noch einmal bei Dahrendorfs »homo sociologicus«, der mir in der Tat ein wichtiger Vorschlag der angedeuteten Richtung zu sein scheint. Was leistet diese Theorie? Zunächst — darauf weist Dahrendorf mit Recht hin — schafft sie einen Elementarbegriff, der auch dem Individuum gerecht wird bzw. der Tatsache, daß es Individuen gibt. Die Soziologie setzt nicht gleich an mit »Primärgruppen« oder mit »Beziehungen«, wodurch die Tatsache des Individuums gleichsam bereits von Anfang an übersprungen wird. Vielmehr beginnt sie »am Schnittpunkt des Einzelnen und der Gesellschaft«, da, wo der Mensch der

»ärgerlichen Tatsache der Gesellschaft« begegnet. Hier darf man, ohne Dahrendorf Unrecht zu tun, ruhig die mehrschichtige Bedeutung des Wortes »ärgerlich« heraushören : die vordergründige, daß man sich über sie ärgert, aber auch die an den theologischen Gebrauch des Wortes »Ärgernis« gemahnende.

Weiterhin verspricht sich Dahrendorf von der Theorie des »homo sociologicus« eine klare und ehrliche Abgrenzung der Soziologie als Einzelwissenschaft von der Philosophie wie auch von anderen Einzelwissenschaften. Somit ergibt sich anscheinend endlich eine säuberliche Grenzziehung und Arbeitsteilung zwischen Soziologie und Psychologie. Man möchte aufatmen, weil nunmehr die Demarkationslinie gefunden ist, die den ewigen Heckenschützenkrieg zwischen den Disziplinen beendet.

Noch ein weiteres scheint gewonnen zu sein : Der Mensch als »homo sociologicus«, d.h. als einer, der die ihm angetragenen Rollen verinnerlicht und spielt — er ist ja so definiert, daß er dies auch tut — wird zu einer rationalisierbaren und kalkulierbaren Größe. Es wird zwar nicht von ihm behauptet, daß er wie sein älterer Bruder aus der Nachbar-Retorte, der »homo œconomicus«, stets selbst auf höchstem rationalen Niveau handelt, wohl aber, daß er sich stets nach den Regeln, die der Wissenschaftler erforschen kann, verhält. Man kann also Verhaltensschemata entwerfen, sie zu größeren Gebilden zusammenfügen, die durch das Gesetz von Ursache und Wirkung zusammengehalten werden. Mit anderen Worten : Der »homo sociologicus« eignet sich als Aufbau-Element großer Sozialmechanismen, die eine unübersehbare Zahl von Individuen umfassen. Das klingt im ersten Augenblick viel schrecklicher, als es ist. Diese Mechanismen sind zunächst nämlich genau so nur Modelle wie ihre Aufbauelemente, die »homunculi sociologici«. Jeder vernünftige Soziologe, ob er an die Freiheit des Menschen glaubt oder einem Determinismus huldigt, weiß, daß diese umfassenden mechanistischen Gebilde, die er erdenkt, nicht die soziale Wirklichkeit in ihrem ganzen Reichtum abbilden können. Andererseits benötigt er solche mechanistischen Großmodelle, wenn es überhaupt Theoriebildung, ja, wenn es nur Hypothesenbildung für die empirische Forschung geben soll. Freilich gibt es nicht wenige Soziologen, die sich an dieser Frage nach der Rolle des kausalen Denkens in der Soziologie vorbeizudrücken versuchen. Den kausalen Charakter, die mechanistische Struktur, die auftritt, wenn das soziologische Denken über die bloße Deskription hinaus zu den Zusammenhängen der Phänomene vorstößt — dieses Kausaldenken, das gar nicht vermeidbar ist, wenn gesellschaftliche

Massenerscheinungen erklärt werden sollen, bei denen Hunderttausende von Individualitäten aufsummiert und eingeebnet werden, möchten manche Soziologen nicht wahrhaben. Sie sprechen dann etwa von Motivationszusammenhängen, die angeblich etwas ganz anderes als Kausalzusammenhänge sein sollen (was mir zweifelhaft erscheint), während sie diese Motivationszusammenhänge in Wahrheit angesichts der Vielzahl der eingeebneten Einzelfälle gar nicht vergegenwärtigen können. Oder sie stellen neben in Wahrheit kausal verknüpfte Gedankenketten immer wieder die bloße Behauptung, es handele sich hier natürlich nicht um Kausalität, oder nicht um wirkliche Kausalität, und beteuern die Freiheit des Menschen, der alles auch anders tun könnte, als er es — gottseidank für die Forschung — mit hoher statistischer Wahrscheinlichkeit tut. Mir scheint, daß hier die Theorie vom kausal verwendbaren »homo sociologicus« Klarheit verbreiten hilft. Bei dem Herumreden und Vorbeidrücken an der Frage, ob der Soziologe, wenn er umfassende Sozialerscheinungen und Prozesse erklärt bzw. hypothetisch vorklärt, kausal denkt, macht man sich in der Regel eines nicht klar, nämlich daß man die menschliche Freiheit (die Fähigkeit, eine neue Kausalreihe zu beginnen) gar nicht in den wissenschaftlichen Ansatz hineinnehmen kann. Es liegt hier das vor, was ich manchmal eine negative Koffertheorie nenne. Nicolai Hartmann nannte manche Theorien in der Philsophie polemisch »Koffertheorien«. Man packt zunächst in einen Koffer alle möglichen Gedanken ein, begibt sich mit ihm auf eine Gedankenreise und ist stolz, wenn man, am Ergebnisort angelangt, alles, was man in den Koffer eingepackt hat, auch wieder auspacken kann. In unserem Fall liegt der umgekehrte Fall vor : Was ich in meinen Koffer nicht eingepackt habe — und die menschliche Freiheit, verstanden als die Fähigkeit jedes einzelnen, so oder so zu handeln, paßt nicht in den Ansatz der Erklärung sozialer Massenphänomene — kann ich nicht wieder auspacken. Auch ein statistischer Kausalitätsbegriff würde das Problem verschmieren. Die Theorie vom »homo sociologicus« schafft hier klare Verhältnisse. Wir sind uns von Anfang an darüber im klaren, daß wir es mit einem Menschen zu tun haben, der den verhüllten oder unverhüllten Ansprüchen kausaler Erklärung von Sozialphänomenen entspricht : dieser Modellmensch ist kalkulierbar : er entspricht den empirisch erforschbaren Rollenerwartungen, die die Gesellschaft an ihn heranträgt. Wie er das macht, ist Sache der Psychologie. Und den Zweifel daran, ob der wirkliche Mensch es auch so hält wie unser Modellmensch, delegieren wir an die Philosophie, nicht unbedingt an die Fachvertreter für Philosophie im Institut nebenan : möglicherweise philosophiert der Soziologe ja auch selbst und bewahrt sich damit die Chance, die Bedingungen seiner eigenen Disziplin zu relativieren.

Nun sind die Gedanken Dahrendorfs und die Konsequenzen, die ich daraus zog, keineswegs Gemeingut aller Soziologen. Immerhin, der Begriff der »sozialen Rolle« und die Betrachtung des Menschen als Träger von sozialen Rollen scheint sich zu verbreiten. Es scheint auch so, als ob das Bedürfnis, eine Abgrenzung zur Philosophie und zur Psychologie zu suchen und die Meinung, daß diese zu finden sei, recht häufig anzutreffen ist. Und ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, daß die Rollentheorie, die meines Erachtens von Dahrendorf recht konsequent weitergedacht ist, dazu beiträgt, daß ein Teil der jüngeren Soziologengeneration bald zu der Ansicht gelangt, endlich habe die Soziologie die Mutterbindung an die Philosophie gelöst und sei nun eine erwachsene autonome Wissenschaft geworden.

IV

Ich hege aber Zweifel, ob dieses Ziel wirklich auf diesem Wege erreicht wird, ja, daß es überhaupt erreicht werden kann. Ich möchte diesen Zweifel durch die Darlegung einer Frage erläutern, auf die Dahrendorf in seinem Aufsatz nicht eingegangen ist. Diese Frage zeigt meines Erachtens, daß die Theorie vom »homo sociologicus« nicht geschlossen ist, ja wohl auch nicht zu schließen ist. Die Frage, wie das Individuum es macht, daß es eine Rolle sich zu eigen macht (durch »Verinnerlichung« — »internalization«) wird als innerpsychischer Vorgang, wenn ich Dahrendorf recht verstehe, dem Psychologen überlassen. Ich glaube, daß es ein Fehler wäre, dem Psychologen die Klärung dieser Frage ganz allein zu überlassen. In diesem Zusammenhang taucht nämlich noch eine zweite Frage auf, nämlich in welcher Weise Rollenerwartungen dem Individuum gegeben sind. Wir wollen jetzt einmal eine Situation annehmen, in der kein Anlaß besteht, daß das betroffene Individuum den vorher vorsorglich ausgeklammerten »zehnten Charakter« Musils oder den »intelligiblen Charakter« Kants ins Spiel bringt. Es soll kein Rollenkonflikt vorliegen, in dem vielleicht plötzlich doch das Individuum auf sich selbst zurückgeworfen wird und im Vollzug einer Entscheidung das Vorhandensein eines freien Willens erlebt. Wir wollen eine ganz banale Situation annehmen, in der ein Individuum nichts anderes vorhat, als einer recht alltäglichen Verhaltenserwartung gemäß der ihm vorgegebenen Rolle ganz bieder und konformistisch zu entsprechen. Nehmen wir an, ein Privatdozent hat die Absicht, ein Fakultätsfest zu besuchen, bei dem es tunlich ist, einen dunklen, jedoch nicht einen schwarzen Anzug zu tragen. Er besitzt den entsprechenden Anzug, jedoch benötigt er eine neue Krawatte. Er geht in ein Herrenmodengeschäft und muß nun unter vielleicht hundert Schlipsen den richtigen auswählen. Ästhetische Momente spielen eine nur geringe Rolle : Es ist rasch geklärt, daß alle Krawatten mit Blau- oder Grünelementen zu seinem Anzug nicht passen. Alle andern kommen rein farblich betrachtet in Frage. Schwieriger ist eine andere Frage : Was für eine Krawatte erwartet man (d.h. die Bezugsgruppe der Fakultät) bei einem Privatdozenten, der bei einer feierlichen Gelegenheit — wie andere auch — einen dunklen, jedoch nicht schwarzen Anzug trägt. Was hier erwartet wird, weiß der Privatdozent recht gut : Die Krawatte soll dezent sein. Der Dozent hat nicht die geringste Absicht, eine nichtdezente Krawatte zu wählen. Weder ein geheimes Oppositionsbedürfnis, noch der Wunsch, durch einen snobistischen Umweg über eine auffallende Krawatte um die Gunst der Fakultät bzw. der Fakultätsdamen zu buhlen, regt sich in seinem Herzen. Aber welche Krawatte unter den 40 Krawatten, die nach Ausschalten der farblich unpassenden übriggeblieben sind, ist dezent? Das ist gar nicht so leicht zu entscheiden. Der Krawatteneinkauf wird zur Qual. Aber was soll das heißen : Findet hier denn eine Entscheidung statt? Es geht doch nur um die Erfüllung einer Rollenerwartung. Unser Privatdozent ist in diesem Augenblick anscheinend mit dem »homunculus sociologicus« völlig identisch. Er reagiert wie eine Marionette, bzw. er möchte wie eine Marionette reagieren, aber leider sind die Fäden, an denen er hängt, unvollständig. Die Rollenerwartung, die Norm, dezente Krawatten zu tragen, ist ihm nur abstrakt gegeben. Wohl kann er sich Dezenz auch konkretisiert vorstellen : Er hat es längst gelernt, wie man als Nachwuchskollege auf einem Kongreß mit Ordinarien verkehrt. Aber leider weiß er nicht, wie dezente Krawatten aussehen. Er hat noch nie darauf geachtet. Er kann sich nur auf die Krawatten seines sonst ebenfalls recht dezent auftretenden jüngeren Institutskollegen besinnen. Dieser ist aber ein ganz weltfremder Gelehrter, der unbesehen die grellbunten Krawatten trägt, die ihm seine Braut schenkt. Er hat also keine anschaulichen Vorbilder.

Es liegt also eine Rollenerwartung vor. Das Individuum will ihr entsprechen. Um ihr zu entsprechen, muß es aber erst die Erwartung, die nur abstrakt gegeben ist, konkretisieren. Diese Rollenkonkretisierung ist seine eigene Leistung; sie ist nahezu ein Stück Arbeit, die ihm von niemand abgenommen wird. Er wird diese Leistung der Rollenkonkretisierung vollbringen und — das ist jetzt wichtig — damit selbst ein Stück gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit schaffen. Die Rollenerwartung, dezente Schlipse bei Fakultätsfesten zum dunklen Anzug zu tragen, wurde in der abstrakten Form nämlich nicht nur an ihn herangetragen, sondern auch an andere Kollegen. Indem er nun für seine Person die konkrete dezente Krawatte findet und umbindet, schafft er möglicherweise für einen anderen, der der gleichen abstrakten Forderung entsprechen muß, eine neue Situation : Fürderhin gibt es für diesen nicht nur allein die abstrakte Forderung : Man trägt bei der Gelegenheit x eine dezente Krawatte, sondern dazu noch ein anschauliches Vorbild : »... etwa eine solche, wie der Privatdozent y beim letzten Fakultätsfest getragen hat.«

Damit wird die Krawattenwahl des Kollegen ohne Zweifel erleichtert, möglicherweise aber auch inhaltlich beeinflußt. Es könnte nämlich sein, daß er bei dem Akt der Rollenkonkretisierung, bei dem er ja doch die recht dürftige Rollenanweisung vervollständigen, auffüllen mußte, ganz unbewußt ein neues Moment ins Spiel gebracht hat, vielleicht ein neues Pünktchen-Muster, das zwar keineswegs auffallend ist — sonst hätte er es nicht gewählt —, aber das doch gerade erst in diesem Jahr auf den Markt gekommen ist. Indem er es wählt, führt er es ein und trägt dazu bei, daß sein Kollege, der ebenfalls ängstlich um Dezenz bemüht ist, das nächste Mal nicht eines der bisher vorherrschenden Streifenmuster wählt. Das würde aber bedeuten : auch das konformistischste Verhalten, das nur die Intention hat, den angetragenen Rollenerwartungen zu entsprechen, kann — weil es gelegentlich für den Bedarf der aktuellen Situation die Rolle erst vervollständigen muß — nicht umhin, durch konkrete Veranschaulichung neue Elemente in das soziale Verhalten anderer Menschen hineinzubringen. Ein Verhaltensmuster wird gewissermaßen durch ein neues Pünktchenornament bereichert.

Was wir jetzt an dem scheinbar abseitigen Beispiel des Krawattenkaufs durchgespielt haben, hat aber eine ganz allgemeine Bedeutung. Vorgeformte Rollenerwartungen sind fast niemals so ausgeformt, daß sich aus ihnen das vollständige Verhalten in einer aktuellen Situation abziehen läßt. Im Gegenteil : Ein Teil der Erwartungen, der in Gestalt von Normen tradiert wird, muß, um überhaupt tradierbar zu sein, auf einer gewissen Abstraktionsstufe in einfache kurze Formeln gefaßt sein.

Andere Erwartungen sind anschaulicher gegeben, z.B. als lebende Vorbilder. Aber diese kann man nicht genau kopieren. Es ist jedesmal ein Umsetzungsprozeß nötig. Meist gibt es keine Antwort auf die Frage : Was hat dieser Mensch in der gleichen Situation getan? Man muß vielmehr die Phantasie bemühen und fragen : Was würde er in dieser Situation tun? Andere Erwartungen formulieren sich überhaupt nicht positiv. Sie sind nur mühsam zu erschließen aus abfälligen Urteilen und unfreundlichem Verhalten, die auftreten, wenn den Erwartungen nicht entsprochen wird.

V

Wir wollen hier noch an einen weiteren Fall denken, der in unserer stark industriell und bürokratisch geprägten Welt recht häufig vorkommt. Manche Rollenerwartungen sind nicht nur allgemein und abstrakt, sondern gleichzeitig auch außerordentlich ausführlich formuliert, so daß anscheinend jede einzelne zur Rolle gehörige Handlung des Individuums ausdrücklich geregelt ist. Wir kennen viele industrielle und bürokratische Arbeitsvollzüge, bei denen jeder Handgriff und die Sekundenzahl, die für ihn gebraucht wird, vorgeschrieben ist. In Dienstvorschriften, Arbeitsordnungen und Akkordplänen wird dies festgelegt, gleichzeitig auch ein Verbot ausgesprochen, die Arbeit in anderer Weise durchzuführen. Nun könnte man allerdings fragen, ob detaillierte Vorschriften dieser Art noch als Verhaltenserwartungen im Sinne der soziologischen Rollentheorie anzusprechen sind, ob sich nicht der Soziologe mit der allgemeinen Verhaltenserwartung, die an die Rolle eines fleißigen Arbeiters oder Büroangestellten geknüpft wird, begnügen soll. Ich glaube, daß man diese Frage hier nicht zu beantworten braucht. Es läßt sich nämlich nicht leugnen, daß die soziale Grundsituation, nach Dahrendorf die »Begegnung des Individuums mit der ärgerlichen Tatsache der Gesellschaft«, ganz verschieden aussieht, je nachdem, ob die Rollenerwartung in Gestalt einer einfachen abstrakten Norm, oder, wie in dem obengenannten Fall, zwar auch aus allgemeinen abstrakten Forderungen besteht, die aber mit beinhalten, daß die Nichtbeachtung zahlloser Detailvorschriften ein Verstoß gegen die Norm überhaupt ist. Der Eigenbeitrag, den das Individuum in der Absicht, den Erwartungen zu entsprechen, zu leisten hat, besitzt jeweils verschiedenen Umfang und verschiedene Qualität. Einmal muß es Phantasie haben, um die Erwartungen zu vervollständigen; das andere Mal muß es die Gabe der Transposition von einer anschaulich vorgegebenen Situation auf eine andere besitzen, wozu eine Abstraktionsgabe gehört. Das dritte Mal muß es spezielle Einübungen vornehmen, eine Fülle von Einzelanweisungen in Fleisch und Blut übergehen lassen, sie habitualisieren und dann vergessen, da es sonst der Gesamterwartung gar nicht in der routinierten und flüssigen Weise entsprechen kann, wie von ihm erwartet wird. Es gibt, wenn wir an industrielle Arbeitsvollzüge denken, aber noch eine weitere Möglichkeit, die gar nicht so selten auftritt. Es gibt Akkordpläne, ja ganze Akkordsysteme, die so detailliert und gleichzeitig so voller Unkenntnis der betrieblichen Wirklichkeit sind, daß kein Arbeiter sich genau nach allen Vorschriften richten kann, wenn er in der erwarteten Zeit mit der Arbeit fertig werden will (4). Die Pläne setzen einen Grad von Störungsfreiheit sowohl im organisatorischen als auch im technischen Bereich des Betriebes voraus, der fast nie gegeben ist. Aber selbst wenn ausnahmsweise alles so reibungslos zugeht, wie im Akkordplan, der mit Hundertsteln von Minuten rechnet, vorgesehen ist, könnte kein Mensch, ohne nervlich oder physisch oder seelisch zusammenzubrechen, so gleichmäßig und kontinuierlich arbeiten, wie es bei diesen hypermodernen Methoden der Arbeitsvorbereitung vorgesehen ist. Die Folge ist : Die Arbeiter arbeiten anders. Sie haben zwar keine reale Chance, durch Beschwerde oder Widerstand das System zu ändern. Jedoch gewöhnen sie sich an zahllose Tricks, Heimlichkeiten, gegenseitige Hilfen, Verschleierungen, Übertretungen von Unfallvorschriften und verdienen schließlich — freilich auf ganz andere Weise — das Geld, das ihnen der Akkordplan verspricht. Da sie in der vorgesehenen Zeit stets das Arbeitsergebnis vorlegen, das verlangt wird, glauben die Vorgesesetzten, daß auch nach Plan gearbeitet wurde und daß das System sich bewährt hat. In Wahrheit zieht sich mitten durch den Betrieb eine unsichtbare Wand, durch die keine Informationen dringen. Manchmal steht der Meister oder Abteilungsleiter diesseits der Wand und hält dicht nach oben. Manchmal steht er jenseits der Wand und ahnt nur ein wenig von den Tatsachen. Jedenfalls gibt es zwei betriebliche Wirklichkeiten : die eine, auf die das gesamte Betriebssystem aufgebaut ist, die von den Trägern des Systems und auch von der Öffentlichkeit und den meisten Betriebssoziologen für wirklich gehalten wird, und die deshalb ja auch einen gewissen Wirklichkeitsgehalt hat, denn ihr entspricht Stellenwert und Funktion des Industriebetriebes im Gesamtsystem der Gesellschaft. Und dann gibt es eine zweite Wirklichkeit : nämlich die tatsächlichen Geschehnisse am Arbeitsplatz.

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(4) Der Verfasser verdankt Herrn Konrad Thomas aus Mannheim, der seine Industrieerfahrungen als Arbeiter z.Zt. in einem Manuskript ausarbeitet, viele Hinweise und Mitteilungen über die Situation des Akkordarbeiters in der Metallindustrie.

Um jetzt auf unser Thema zurückzulenken : Die soziale Grundsituation des Arbeiters, der unter solchen Bedingungen arbeitet, ist von der Art, daß er den vorgeformten Verhaltenserwartungen nur dann entsprechen kann, wenn er sich ständig gegen die mit den Erwartungen verbundenen Vorschriften vergeht. Für diese Übertretungen gibt es längst vorgeformte Verhaltensmuster, die im Kollegenkreis gelten und fleißig tradiert werden. Gleichwohl befindet er sich in einem Zwiespalt. Er kann sich zwar bis zu einem gewissen Grade an den Zwiespalt gewöhnen. Er kann das Bewußtsein von der Absurdität seines alltäglichen Lebens verdrängen. Er muß es vielleicht sogar, denn kein Mensch kann auf die Dauer in der Absurdität leben. Der eine oder andere Arbeiter ist möglicherweise so vital, daß er aus dem innerbetrieblichen Waldgängertum einen Sport macht. Andere werden durch den Zwiespalt bzw. den Zwang zur Verdrängung und zur Gewöhnung an Absurdes allmählich aufgerieben. Auf jeden Fall trägt eine solche Existenz nicht gerade dazu bei, sich als voll integriertes Mitglied des Betriebes und der Gesellschaft zu fühlen. Und mir scheint, daß hier eine Ursache dafür zu suchen ist, daß so viele Arbeiter ein nach wie vor dichotomisches Bild der Gesamtgesellschaft haben, daß sie trotz vieler sozialer Fortschritte, trotz der Überwindung der ökonomischen Proletarität, trotz der Übernahme bürgerlicher Konsumgewohnheiten zum mindesten in ihrer Mentalität bisher nicht Kleinbürger der nivellierten Mittelstandsgesellschaft sind.

VI

Um jetzt zusammenzufassen : Die Unterschiedlichkeit der Gegebenheitsweise, vor allem die verschiedene Ausführlichkeit der Formulierung von Rollenvorschriften bringt das Individuum in unterschiedliche Ausgangspositionen bei der jeweiligen Übernahme einer Rolle. Je nach Lage muß es einen größeren oder geringeren Eigenbeitrag leisten, um die vorgeformte Rolle überhaupt übernehmen zu können. In welcher Weise diese Übernahme geschieht, ist ohne Zweifel auch ein Thema der Psychologie. Ich würde sogar behaupten, daß dieser Vorgang ohne psychologische Kategorien gar nicht ausreichend im konkreten Fall beschrieben werden kann. »Verdrängung«, »Habitualisierung«, »Einübung«, »Phantasie zur Veranschaulichung«, »Abstraktionsleistung«, all diese Begriffe rufen nach dem Psychologen. Ohne seine Hilfe läßt sich wohl auch nur schwer die emotionale Befindlichkeit des jeweiligen Rollenträgers beschreiben, die ihm eigen ist, wenn er die Rolle schließlich hat, wenn er sie »verinnerlicht« hat und nun »sozialisiert« ist. Andererseits ist aber der Vorgang der »Rollenübernahme« ebensosehr ein Zentralthema der Soziologie. Denn nach unseren bisherigen Betrachtungen ergibt sich, daß das weitere Verhalten des sozialisierten Rollenträgers in starkem Maße davon mitbestimmt ist :

erstens dadurch, wie groß seine Eigenleistung bei der Konkretisierung der Rollenerwartung war,

zweitens durch die Art der Eigenleistung, ob sie z.B. mehr den Charakter der Entfaltung oder Spezialisierung der eigenen Kräfte hatte,

drittens durch die Frage, inwieweit die Rollenerwartungen überhaupt von der Art sind, daß ihnen ein Mensch vollständig entsprechen kann, oder ob sie den Menschen zur Verschleierung, Umdeutung oder Verdrängung zwingen, damit entweder nur nach außen hin oder auch für ihn selbst halbwegs eine Erfüllung der Rollenerwartungen zustande kommt.

Je nachdem, was der nicht voll anpassungsfähige Mensch, der nur begrenzt spezialisierbar ist, der Mensch als das Wesen, das die speziellen Fragen des Lebens niemals genau und speziell beantworten kann, sondern immer mehr antworten muß, als er gefragt wird — je nachdem, was dieser unbequeme Mensch, wie er sich uns im Licht der philosophischen Anthropologie darstellt, erlebt, wenn er die ihm angetragenen Rollen übernimmt, je nachdem, was er mit einbringt und auf was er verzichtet, wird er eine Quelle sozialer Dynamik sein. Schon die völlig konformistische Konkretisierung und Transposition von Rollenerwartungen in konkretes Verhalten formt und modifiziert selbst die Erwartungen in ihrer Gegebenheitsweise für die Allgemeinheit und beeinflußt damit indirekt das Verhalten anderer Menschen. Am stärksten ist die Modifikation selbstverständlich dort, wo die totale Erfüllung der Rollenerwartungen nicht möglich ist. Dies tritt — wie gesagt — nicht nur im Fall des Rollenkonflikts ein, der als Quelle sozialer Dynamik unbestritten ist, sondern mitunter schon im Fall der Sozialisierung im Hinblick auf eine einzige Rolle. D.h., ein zwingender Anlaß zur Veränderung sozialer Verhaltensweisen liegt nicht nur da vor, wo widersprechende soziale Kräfte in Gestalt entgegengesetzter Rollenvorschriften aufeinandertreffen, sondern mitunter bereits dort, wo überhaupt das Individuum eine Rolle übernehmen muß. Es ist richtig, die Soziologie dort beginnen zu lassen, wo das Individuum der »ärgerlichen Tatsache der Gesellschaft begegnet«. Diese Begegnung istaber ein Vorgang. Dieser Vorgang muß auch den Soziologen interessieren, denn in dem Vorgang liegt sehr oft die Quelle für neuartige soziale Verhaltensweisen, und zwar nicht nur der Einzelnen, sondern auch ganzer Gruppen, da der Prozeß der Rollenübernahme sehr oft gruppentypisches Gepräge hat.

Daraus ergibt sich, daß die säuberliche Trennung von Soziologie, Psychologie und Philosophie, wie sie scheinbar durch die Theorie des »homo sociologicus« angeboten wird, nicht durchgehalten werden kann. Die Grenzkämpfe zwischen den Disziplinen werden also wohl weitergehen.

Das Ergebnis unserer Betrachtung ist für unsere Disziplin nicht eigentlich erfreulich : Es scheint so, als ob der schon lange andauernde Zustand der halben Autonomie bei verbleibender starker Mutterbindung an die Philosophie nicht so rasch beendet werden kann. Auch der Methodenpluralismus, der die innere Konsolidierung der Soziologie verhindert, wird sich nicht beseitigen lassen. Ein eindeutiges Menschenbild besitzt die Soziologie ebenfalls nicht. Sicher werden auch weiterhin höchst unterschiedliche Menschenbilder durch die Soziologie geistern : Dafür sorgt die oben erwähnte Verknüpfung mit der Philosophie wie auch die unvermeidliche politische Relevanz vieler soziologischer Fragestellungen. Ein wenig Ordnung in die Diskussion vieler Fragen könnte das geschilderte »instrumentale Menschenbild«, der zu Forschungszwecken entwickelte »homo sociologicus«, bringen. Er erweist sich als nützlich, wenn es darum geht, soziale Großphänomene in ein kausales Erklärungsschema zu bringen. Und ich deutete an, daß wir ohne solche Schemata nicht auskommen und uns deshalb auch zu ihnen bekennen sollten. Aber dieses Modell läßt uns wieder im Stich, wenn wir einzelne soziale Verhaltensweisen genau analysieren wollen. Dazu sind wir jedoch gezwungen, wenn wir der eigentümlichen Explosivität und Unberechenbarkeit gesellschaftlicher Bewegungsvorgänge auf die Spur kommen wollen. Dann gleitet die soziologische Betrachtungsweise hinüber in die anthropologische : Ein anderes Menschenbild wird bemüht, das uns wiederum nichts nützt, wo wir kausal denken müssen.

MICHEL CROZIER

De la bureaucratie comme système d'organisation

Depuis longtemps, pour beaucoup d'auteurs et non des moindres, le phénomène bureaucratique constitue un des problèmes clefs de la sociologie et de la science politique moderne. Et pourtant la bureaucratie reste toujours une zone d'incertitude rebelle à l'analyse scientifique et l'un des terrains d'élection des professions de foi et des mythes idéologiques de notre temps. Une telle situation surprend d'autant plus à première vue que très tôt, il y a cinquante ans déjà, Max Weber avait donné une brillante description du « type idéal » de la bureaucratie et une analyse suggestive de son développement historique qui semblaient avoir parfaitement préparé le terrain pour une sociologie de la bureaucratie débarrassée de tout jugement de valeur.

En fait, l'objectivité et le détachement rationaliste du célèbre chapitre de *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* cachaient beaucoup d'inquiétude et même d'incertitude. Tout en affirmant la supériorité des organisations rationnelles modernes qui correspondaient à son « type idéal », Weber ne laissait pas d'être effrayé par les conséquences au moins dans l'ordre politique de la standardisation et de l'obéissance nécessaires à leur fonctionnement. Si bien qu'on peut trouver aussi chez lui le reflet de l'hostilité du grand public à la lourdeur, à l'anonymat, à la routine et à la régimentation que semble entraîner le développement d'appareils bureaucratiques (1).

A la même époque, Robert Michels, en démontant le mécanisme du pouvoir oligarchique des dirigeants de la sociale-démocratie et des syndicats allemands et en *désenchantant* ainsi cruellement l'enthousiasme *charismatique* du mouvement socialiste, soulignait le premier le dilemme dans lequel le développement du phéno-

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(1) Voir par exemple les remarques de Weber au Congrès du Verein für Sozialpolitik (1909) citées par J.-P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics* (London, Faber and Faber, 1943), pp. 127-128, et Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait* (New York, Doubleday, 1960), pp. 455-456.

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 18-50.

mène bureaucratique plaçait la pensée socialiste révolutionnaire et finalement toute volonté de transformation sociale. Sa démonstration simpliste apparaissait rigoureuse : toute action sociale crée une organisation, donc une bureaucratie, et la bureaucratie est incompatible avec les valeurs démocratiques (2).

C'est cette contradiction profonde de la pensée occidentale devant le phénomène bureaucratique qui a paralysé jusqu'ici le développement de toute analyse positive. Si en effet la bureaucratie constitue une forme plus rationnelle de direction des activités humaines, donc plus efficace et supérieure aux formes antérieures, sa réussite est inéluctable. Mais si en même temps on doit la considérer, à cause de ses défauts, comme un possible instrument d'oppression et une menace pour l'avenir, tous les éléments se trouvent réunis pour une vision catastrophique du progrès. Certes, la rigueur héroïque de Weber l'empêcha de s'y abandonner. Mais le grand courant pessimiste de la pensée révolutionnaire moderne n'a pas besoin de gauchir beaucoup ses perspectives pour démontrer que seule la foi mystique, le saut dialectique, permettent de dépasser la contradiction. De Rosa Luxemburg à Bruno Rizzi, à Simone Weil, à C. Wright Mills et à *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (3), c'est par les excès mêmes de l'attaque contre ce que l'on juge par ailleurs inéluctable que l'on s'efforce de conjurer la menace qui pèse sur l'humanité. En grossissant la contradiction on pense en fait appeler au dépassement.

Rarement, cependant, on s'est demandé si dans les faits, en dehors des craintes et des résistances soulevées par le changement, il y avait une telle opposition entre l'efficacité « organisationnelle » et l'oppression de l'individu. Un grand progrès a été accompli quand des sociologues comme Merton et Gouldner ont réussi à relier dans un premier schéma organique les deux réactions jusque-là juxtaposées et contradictoires, l'admiration devant l'efficacité de la bureaucratie et la crainte de l'impuissance de l'individu devant elle. La théorie des « conséquences inattendues » (4) fait apparaître les traits routiniers et oppressifs de la bureaucratie comme les éléments d'un « cercle vicieux » qui tient à la résistance humaine au schéma théorique qu'elle finit cependant par renforcer. Elle démontre finalement de cette manière qu'une organisation correspondant au « type idéal » n'est pas, comme on le croit, parfaitement efficiente.

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(2) Robert MICHELS, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie* (Leipzig, 1912). Traduit en français sous le titre *Les partis politiques.*

(3) Voir par exemple le numéro d'*Arguments* sur la bureaucratie, *Arguments*, IV (1960), nº 17, avec de nombreuses citations de Trotsky, Bruno Rizzi et Simone Weil, et C. Wright MILLS, *White Collar* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1951).

(4) Robert K. MERTON, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, *American Sociological Review*, I (1936), pp. 894-904, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, *Social Forces*, XVIII (1940), pp. 560-568, et Alvin W. GOULDNER, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1953).

Il s'agit cependant d'une démonstration négative, d'une critique statique qui ne nous permet pas de répondre aux problèmes fondamentaux posés par l'évolution des sociétés industrielles. L'on démontre que la bureaucratie – organisation rationnelle ne peut se séparer de la bureaucratie – « dysfonction », mais on n'aborde pas encore les lois de leur symbiose. Pour échapper vraiment à la contradiction il faudrait montrer quelles sont les conditions de développement et les limites de la bureaucratie « routine et oppression » et dans quelle mesure le développement de la bureaucratie, en tant qu'organisation rationnelle, s'en trouve affecté.

Nous voudrions dans cet article explorer les possibilités de renouvellement qui s'offrent si l'on considère les traits de comportement bureaucratique non plus comme les dysfonctions, même nécessaires, d'organisations par ailleurs rationnelles mais comme les éléments eux-mêmes rationnels d'un « système bureaucratique » d'organisation, et si l'on analyse les limites qu'un tel système impose à la croissance des grandes organisations pour montrer finalement que cette évolution que Weber avait crue inexorable dépend, en partie au moins, de la capacité même de l'homme à dominer et à briser les cercles vicieux bureaucratiques.

Cette nouvelle orientation suppose que l'on traite du phénomène bureaucratique non plus seulement en termes institutionnels et politiques dans le cadre d'un système de références historiques, mais aussi dans la perspective plus abstraite de la théorie des organisations. Elle implique donc un effort pour rapprocher deux perspectives et deux méthodes d'analyse qui ont été presque toujours assez éloignées.

Les points de vue sur le fonctionnement des organisations enfin ont beaucoup évolué ; on est passé de l'analyse rationaliste étroite, presque mécaniste, des Taylor et des Fayol, qui dominait dans les années 1920, à l'étude des organisations en termes de relations humaines dont la mode commence tout juste à décliner et l'on assiste maintenant, avec le développement de l'analyse stratégique et de l'étude des prises de décisions, à un retour du rationalisme, mais sous une forme entièrement différente de l'analyse mécaniste classique qui cherche à intégrer tout l'acquis des travaux sur les relations humaines. A chacune des deux premières étapes a correspondu un certain type de théorie bureaucratique, au rationalisme mécaniste classique, les schémas rigoureux de Weber et de Michels, à la découverte du facteur humain, l'analyse des cercles vicieux bureaucratiques effectuée par Merton et Gouldner. Les possibilités de renouvellement que nous voudrions discuter correspondent à la prise de conscience de cette interdépendance soulignée très pertinemment par March et Simon dans un ouvrage récent (5) et à un premier essai d'exploration des ressources offertes par l'analyse stratégique et plus généralement le néo-rationalisme pour la compréhension du phénomène bureaucratique.

I. *L'analyse rationaliste classique.*

Revenons tout d'abord à cette comparaison tentée par March et Simon entre le « type idéal » webérien et les idées de Taylor et de ses émules. Elle nous permettra de mieux comprendre le dilemme posé par Michels et qui tourmente maintenant encore la plupart des penseurs révolutionnaires occidentaux.

S'il est vrai que l'analyse de Weber ne doit rien directement aux efforts des pionniers de l'organisation scientifique du travail, que ceux-ci s'occupent comme Taylor de la rationalisation des activités d'exécution ou comme Fayol et Gulick de la rationalisation de la structure des entreprises et de leurs méthodes de direction, il est frappant de constater comment, à un certain niveau du moins, elle procède du même esprit et converge vers les mêmes solutions. Les promoteurs de l'organisation scientifique du travail ne retiennent en effet dans le comportement humain que les motivations économiques les plus simples, ce qui leur permet de considérer le travailleur comme un outil interchangeable dont la réponse aux stimuli de l'organisation est exactement prévisible. Or, c'est cette notion de prévisibilité et de prévisibilité obtenue par standardisation qui constitue le critère essentiel de supériorité de la bureaucratie pour Weber, et en même temps la source de ses inquiétudes. En d'autres termes, la bureaucratie n'est une forme d'organisation plus efficace que dans la mesure où les comportements de ses membres correspondent au schéma mécaniste taylorien, c'est-à-dire se rapprochent d'un modèle d'homme standardisé qui répugne à la tradition occidentale. Dans leur aspect positif cependant,

(5) James C. MARCH and Herbert SIMON, *Organizations* (New York, Wiley, 1958).

les valeurs auxquelles participent les tayloriens sont tout à fait compatibles avec les idées-force de Weber. Leur justification philosophique en effet c'est de travailler comme Saint-Simon au remplacement « du gouvernement des hommes par l'administration des choses ». Si nous poussons un peu l'analogie : gouvernement des hommes / « pouvoir charismatique » (6) et : administration des choses / « bureaucratie », leur action s'insère parfaitement dans le devenir webérien.

Certes, Weber, tout nourri d'histoire, est bien loin de l'ignorance et du mépris des valeurs préindustrielles que partagèrent Taylor et Henry Ford. Il n'esquive pas complètement, comme le font ceux-ci, l'ordre hiérarchique et le système punitif qu'il recouvre. Enfin, bien sûr, il craint les conséquences de la prolifération de l'homme mécanisé bureaucratique. Mais s'il tempère le rigide optimisme des rationalisateurs de l'industrie par une interrogation angoissée sur les conséquences de leur action, il ne se rend pas compte qu'il a partagé avec eux leur illusion fondamentale, à savoir que le comportement humain peut être effectivement ainsi simplifié et que c'est dans la mesure où elle le simplifie et le mutile en le simplifiant que l'organisation rationnelle moderne est efficace.

En fait, son incertitude et son angoisse devant la menace du Leviathan tiennent à ce qu'il identifie, comme Taylor, prévisibilité et automatisme et qu'il ne se rend pas compte que dans les organisations rationnelles modernes on est plus éloigné du drill prussien que dans les manufactures du XVIIIe siècle. La part du contrôle social, la part du « gouvernement des hommes », la part de l'initiative humaine ont tendance à augmenter dans les sociétés industrielles modernes tandis que recule de plus en plus celle des manipulations simples du type récompense / punition, auxquelles on avait cru trop vite que se réduirait l'administration des choses dans le paradis ou l'enfer bureaucratique.

Certes, dans une telle perspective nous n'abordons qu'un aspect seulement de la pensée de Weber, celui qui tient aux illusions qui marquèrent son époque et qu'on retrouve aussi bien dans les affirmations tranchantes de Henry Ford que dans les impatiences qu'exprime la définition célèbre de Lénine : « le socialisme c'est les Soviets plus l'électrification » (7). Mais si l'apport le plus original de Weber sur le problème de la bureaucratie concerne un passé dont il a illuminé l'évolution, la fascination qu'a exercée son schéma est due avant tout à ce guide, rassurant parce que rigoureux et effrayant parce que pessimiste, qu'il offrait pour la compréhension du présent et de l'évolution à venir.

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(6) Nous emploierons tout au long de cet article les termes « charisme » et « pouvoir charismatique » au sens plus large qu'ils ont acquis dans la discussion sociologique et non pas au sens étroit qu'ils gardent chez Max Weber.

(7) La France, patrie de Fayol, sacrifia en théorie autant que l'Amérique aux illu-

2. *La critique de l'analyse classique et l'apport des « relations humaines ».*

Le recul du temps nous permet depuis longtemps de prendre une vue assez claire des apports positifs et des illusions des années 1920. Il nous a été jusqu'ici plus difficile par contre de nous rendre compte de la portée de la contribution des générations suivantes. Cependant il apparaît maintenant qu'elle fut tout entière dirigée contre cette vue schématique, mécaniste, partielle, de l'homme au travail et en conséquence de l'homme tout court. Tout l'effort scientifique des psychologues, des sociologues, des pédagogues et des expérimentateurs sociaux des années 1930-1950 s'est développé en effet en réaction contre l'organisation scientifique du travail. On retrouve chez tous les auteurs de l'époque, quelles que soient leurs sources et leurs orientations — et elles furent rarement convergentes — un dénominateur commun qui fut aussi bien celui du syndicalisme de masse que celui des « relations humaines » : le refus du schéma mécaniste du comportement humain sur lequel on avait jusqu'alors vécu, refus qui a finalement remis en cause toutes les vues traditionnelles sur le fonctionnement des entreprises (8).

C'est dans ce climat que les analyses modernes de la bureaucratie prennent leur sens. Une rapide analyse des travaux suscités par la découverte du « facteur humain » est nécessaire pour comprendre leur portée et leurs limites. Deux courants l'ont succes-

sions de l'O.S.T., si en pratique elle ne les appliqua que modérément. Il suffit de lire les conclusions, rédigées en 1926, d'une commission d'enquête sur le fonctionnement de la Régie nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes, dont les deux personnalités marquantes étaient Henri Fayol lui-même et André Citroën, pour se rendre compte à quel point les préjugés mécanistes et utilitaires sur le comportement humain pouvaient aveugler des esprits, même éminents. Pas une fois il n'est question des problèmes humains qui paralysaient cette organisation.

(8) Georges Friedmann s'est fait en France l'éloquent avocat de ce bouleversement des perspectives, notamment dans *Problèmes humains du machinisme industriel* (Paris, Gallimard, 1946).

sivement et parallèlement animée, le courant interactionniste et le courant lewinien.

Le courant interactionniste procède directement des célèbres expériences de Mayo et Rœthlisberger à Hawthorne (9) et des travaux du groupe rassemblé à Harvard à la fin des années 30 (Elton Mayo, T. N. Whitehead, Fritz Rœthlisberger, Elliott Chapple, William Foote Whyte, George Homans, Conrad Arensberg). C'est un courant d'inspiration ethnologique, plus positiviste et empirique que théorique. Il a donné naissance pourtant aux plaidoyers moralistes de Mayo (10) en faveur d'une société mieux intégrée (aux relents corporatistes) et il a nourri sur le plan idéologique le grand mouvement néopaternaliste du patronat américain des années 40 et sa signification en a été tout à fait dénaturée (11). Avec le recul dont nous pouvons maintenant disposer et après la publication de l'essai de systématisation modeste et mesuré de George Homans (12), il semble que ce dont nous soyons essentiellement redevables au groupe de Harvard, c'est finalement une sorte de révolution de la sensibilité. Il nous a révélé tout un monde jusqu'alors ignoré de sentiments complexes qui gouvernent les réponses et les refus des individus aux exigences de la production. De nombreuses études empiriques ont permis d'explorer ce monde parallèle et d'examiner les conséquences que son existence entraînait pour les systèmes de salaire au rendement, pour les relations entre employeurs et syndicats, pour l'équilibre et la hiérarchie des groupes humains dans l'entreprise (13). Tout leur effort théorique et méthodologique autour de la trilogie sentiments / interactions / activités, leur quête d'un instrument de mesure efficace des « interactions » procèdent du même effort pour prévoir le montant et les formes des activités humaines qui échappent à la contrainte.

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(9) Pour une vue en perspective des expériences de Hawthorne, voir H. A. LANDSBERGER, *Hawthorne Revisited* (Ithaca, Cornell U. P., 1958).

(10) Elton MAYO, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston, Harvard Business School, 1945).

(11) Nous avons nous-mêmes commis l'erreur d'attribuer trop d'importance à l'idéologie de Mayo et pas assez à la révolution psychologique et à cette vue différente de l'homme au travail dont elle procédait. Il apparaît maintenant avec le recul que les différences entre syndicalisme et « relations humaines », pour vives qu'elles aient été, furent moins profondes en fait qu'on ne le crut. Voir Michel CROZIER, Human Engineering, *Les temps modernes*, VII (1951), pp. 44-75.

(12) George HOMANS, *The Human Group* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1950).

(13) Aucune d'entre elles peut-être n'est plus significative que celle de William Foote Whyte sur le groupe d'adolescents de Boston décrit dans *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1943). Toutes les activités des membres du *gang* sont déterminées par les rapports humains entre ses membres et à la limite, des performances aussi matérielles que le succès au jeu de *bowling* dépendent de la situation de chaque joueur dans la hiérarchie affective du groupe. Ce cas limite qui porte sur une situation non industrielle où les individus échappent à la contrainte de la production met remarquablement en valeur la vigueur de l'organisation informelle, qui constitue l'objet essentiel d'étude des interactionnistes.

Le courant lewinien, lui, est tout différent. Il n'est pas le fruit d'une découverte empirique, il n'apporte pas la révélation d'un monde nouveau qu'on explore comme les ethnologues explorent la mentalité « primitive ». Il constitue une tentative systématique d'analyse des motivations du comportement humain dans les organisations. Son inspiration est psychologique et positiviste mais s'il n'a jamais donné naissance, comme le courant interactionniste, à des thèses philosophiques et morales, il ne manque pas d'une coloration normative. On pourrait l'appeler en fait courant « participationniste » dans la mesure où son apport fondamental a consisté à démontrer que le leader le plus efficace est le leader « permissif », celui qui permet la participation de ses subordonnés aux décisions (14) et que la résistance au changement dépend directement des possibilités de participation au changement (15). C'est ce courant lewinien qui a inspiré toutes les techniques de formation de l'encadrement qui se sont développées en Amérique puis en Europe pendant les vingt dernières années et cette philosophie de la participation qui, au moins en Amérique, sous-tend un énorme mécanisme de discussion et de consultation à tous les échelons des entreprises et des administrations.

3. *L'analyse de la bureaucratie en termes de « relations humaines ».*

Si l'on accepte les conclusions des interactionnistes ou celles des lewiniens ou les unes et les autres à la fois, il devient difficile de soutenir la théorie de Weber tout aussi bien que l'organisation scientifique du travail. Si, en effet, les activités humaines dépendent aussi des sentiments engendrés chez les individus par leur appartenance à un groupe, les demandes faites à l'individu ne suffisent pas à déterminer des résultats constants et prévisibles et l'efficacité d'une organisation ne peut se résumer à la combinaison d'expertise, d'impersonnalité et de hiérarchie du « type idéal ». Si, d'autre part, le leader le plus efficace est un leader permissif, ce n'est pas l'organisation la plus rationnelle au sens webérien qui obtiendra les meilleurs résultats mais l'organisation la plus vivante, c'est-à-dire où les subordonnés seront amenés à participer le plus aux décisions qu'ils auront à appliquer.

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(14) C'est le sens des fameuses expériences de Lewin lui-même sur des groupes d'enfants soumis à un leadership « autoritaire », « démocratique » et « laissez faire », et des nombreuses recherches du Survey Research Center de l'université du Michigan.

(15) L'expérience classique en la matière est celle de Coch et French. Voir Lester Coch and J. R. P. French, Overcoming Resistance to Change, *Human Relations*, I (1948), pp. 512-533.

Les sociologues de la bureaucratie, cependant, n'ont pas quitté sans réticences la belle construction webérienne. C'est Merton qui a ouvert la voie dans ses deux articles célèbres de 1936 et 1940. On connaît son raisonnement ; résumons-le au risque de schématiser : la discipline nécessaire pour obtenir dans le cadre bureaucratique le comportement standardisé souhaité a pour conséquence chez les fonctionnaires un déplacement des buts — l'attitude ritualiste — et la rigidité qui en résulte leur rend difficile l'adaptation à leur tâche elle-même ; parallèlement au niveau du groupe, cette rigidité développe l'esprit de caste, ce qui crée un fossé avec le public et rend de ce fait la bureaucratie d'autant moins efficace.

Cette analyse repose sur le postulat implicite suivant : la rigidité de comportement, les difficultés d'adaptation et les conflits avec le public renforcent le besoin de contrôle et de réglementation si bien que les conséquences inattendues et dysfonctionnelles du mode d'action bureaucratique tendent finalement à renforcer son emprise. Et finalement, si l'on reprend le schéma de Merton en termes de relations humaines, la dysfonction apparaît comme la résistance du facteur humain à un comportement qu'on essaie d'obtenir mécaniquement. Le problème qui reste posé évidemment est celui de la nécessité même du mode d'action mécanique bureaucratique. Merton ne remet pas en cause l'analyse de Weber. Il se contente de montrer la part d'inefficacité inhérente au système défini par le type idéal.

Un certain nombre d'auteurs ont suivi la voie ouverte par Merton : Bendix, Selznick, Blau, Gouldner, Dubin (16). Ils ont poussé l'analyse du cercle vicieux bureaucratique beaucoup plus loin. Un examen des deux thèses les mieux élaborées, celles de

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(16) Reinhard BENDIX, Bureaucracy, the Problem and its Setting, *American Sociological Review*, XII (1947), pp. 493 et suivantes. Philip SELZNICK, Foundations of the Theory of Organization, *American Sociological Review*, XIII (1948), pp. 25-35, et *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, 1949). Alvin GOULDNER, *op. cit.*, Peter BLAU, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago, 1955). Robert DUBIN, Stability of Human Organizations, *in* Mason HAIRE, *Modern Organization Theory* (New York, Wiley, 1959), pp. 218 et suivantes.

Selznick et de Gouldner, nous montrera bien les progrès qu'ils ont réalisés et leurs limites.

L'étude de Selznick, qui date de 1949, porte sur la T.V.A., ce modèle d'organisation démocratique, ce symbole des espoirs du New Deal. Elle se rapproche donc au départ d'une certaine façon du type de réflexion de Michels montrant le développement de l'oligarchie bureaucratique derrière le vernis démocratique. Mais la pression bureaucratique en fait est considérée comme allant de soi et le problème traité est celui de la valeur des efforts tentés pour s'y soustraire. Selznick semble accepter plus ou moins explicitement le raisonnement de Merton sur le contrôle et la prévisibilité. Mais il l'étend à un autre point fondamental du « type idéal » de Weber, l'expertise. Il montre comment peut se développer le même cercle vicieux de dysfonction au niveau de l'expertise et de la spécialisation. L'on spécialise et l'on fragmente les rôles pour rendre l'expert plus neutre, plus indépendant, mais l'on crée ainsi un esprit de caste et des tentations d'alliance avec certains intérêts cristallisés autour de ces rôles ; la dysfonction qui se développe sera combattue naturellement par un renforcement de la spécialisation (17). Mais Selznick ne s'arrête pas à ce point, il se pose le problème des moyens de contrôle dont l'organisation dispose pour empêcher ce processus d'aller trop loin. Il en a observé et analysé deux, le mécanisme de cooptation qui consiste à faire participer au pouvoir de décision les intérêts spécialisés et l'endoctrinement idéologique qui permet d'assurer un minimum de loyauté à tous les échelons. La bureaucratie dans cette perspective apparaît comme quelque chose de beaucoup plus diffus. C'est la rigidité même de l'organisation qui se manifeste aussi bien dans la logique de la décentralisation par fonctions que dans celle de la centralisation. Mais ce n'est pas seulement la résistance du facteur humain à un autre type de répartition mécaniste des fonctions et des responsabilités qui est invoquée. Un nouveau problème est soulevé, celui de la participation et du pouvoir. Il est envisagé seulement, il est vrai, à propos de la solution à donner aux difficultés rencontrées et non pas comme la source même de ces difficultés. Le cadre webérien n'est pas remis en cause.

Il le sera un peu plus par Gouldner dont l'analyse pourtant plus limitée fait mieux voir les contradictions du modèle. Gouldner distingue la bureaucratie centrée sur l'expertise et la bureaucratie de type punitif. Il passe rapidement sur la bureaucratie-expertise dont il accepte trop facilement, à partir du seul exemple de l'application des règles de sécurité, qu'elle puisse échapper à la dysfonction dans la mesure où les valeurs sur lesquelles repose l'expertise sont acceptées par tous et où l'élaboration des règles s'effectue avec la participation de ceux qui devront les suivre. Son véritable sujet c'est la bureaucratie-punition. Il la voit sous trois angles différents comme un cercle vicieux centré autour de la subordination et du contrôle, comme un mode de comportement ayant des fonctions latentes et finalement comme une réponse à une situation accidentelle mais nécessaire, la succession.

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(17) Nous sommes redevables à March et Simon de cette interprétation de l'analyse de Selznick. Voir March and Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-43.

Le cercle vicieux bureaucratique est très clairement schématisé : les règles impersonnelles bureaucratiques réduisent les tensions créées par la subordination et le contrôle, mais en même temps, elles protègent et renforcent les tensions qui rendent indispensable le recours à la subordination et au contrôle.

Les fonctions latentes sont recherchées dans la réduction des tensions dues entre autres aux différences de valeurs entre groupes, à l'impossibilité d'avoir des normes acceptables par tous et au déclin des interactions amicales informelles. L'explication à ce niveau reste confuse. Mais l'apport décisif de Gouldner c'est d'avoir bien montré d'une part que la punition fonctionne dans les deux sens, que la règle bureaucratique est utilisée par les ouvriers aussi bien que par l'ordre hiérarchique et d'autre part que la règle bureaucratique procure un moyen de pression extrêmement important dans la mesure où son application peut être suspendue, son rôle étant alors de constituer un moyen de négociation et un instrument de pouvoir.

Le dernier angle d'attaque de Gouldner c'est l'interprétation de l'impersonnalité du système bureaucratique comme une réponse au problème de la succession. Son recours à une explication événementielle, à un *deus ex machina* extérieur, semble une facilité en retrait sur son interprétation fonctionnaliste qu'il n'a pu mener à son terme faute d'avoir réussi à intégrer les problèmes des relations de pouvoir et de la négociation entre groupes qu'il a très bien aperçus mais n'a pas utilisés.

De toutes façons, le schéma de Weber cette fois est au moins partiellement dépassé, puisque les raisons du développement de la bureaucratie sont recherchées non plus dans son efficacité mais dans les tensions qu'elle sert à réduire. Les ratés du système ne sont plus des dysfonctions mais des fonctions latentes.

Nous avons vu dans ces trois exemples, les plus marquants et les plus suggestifs des recherches sur la bureaucratie, une progression dans la part faite aux aspects de routine et d'oppression ou, si l'on veut, de dysfonction. Mais la relation entre cet aspect de l'organisation moderne et son aspect rationnel efficace n'est que très imparfaitement abordé. Surtout aucun effort n'est fait pour essayer de comprendre à la fois l'évolution que l'on doit supposer efficace vers la rationalisation et cette résistance du facteur humain dont on nous montre l'ampleur. L'analyse de Gouldner reste statique. Au mieux, en la poussant, on la verrait cyclique, les phases de bureaucratisation puis de repersonnalisation des rapports humains alternant en fonction des accidents de succession. C'est que malgré des intuitions qui les dépassent, toutes ces analyses sont limitées par les théories du comportement humain — interactionniste ou participationniste — sur lesquelles elles reposent. C'est la limitation de ces théories qu'il nous faut maintenant examiner pour comprendre dans quelle voie un nouveau progrès est possible.

4. *Les limites de l'analyse des comportements en termes de « relations humaines ».*

La découverte des problèmes de relations humaines dans les organisations a permis de faire une utile et dévastatrice critique des illusions de l'organisation scientifique du travail mais les théories « interactionnistes » ou « participationnistes » n'ont pas vraiment réussi à se détacher de cet aspect critique et négatif qu'elles avaient eu à leurs débuts. Elles ne sont jamais sérieusement préoccupées d'intégrer l'aspect rationnel du fonctionnement des organisations et de ce fait ont échoué finalement à assigner sa part réelle à ce monde des sentiments, à ce monde du non-rationnel sur lequel elles concentraient leurs efforts. Et au bout d'une quinzaine d'années on constate un certain essoufflement.

C'est très net pour le courant interactionniste. Il suffit d'examiner la dernière recherche conduite par le groupe le plus orthodoxe : Homans, Rœthlisberger, Zaleznick, Christensen, pour constater que très peu de progrès ont été accomplis depuis l'expérience du *test room* (18). La systématisation effectuée par Homans ne

(18) A. Zaleznik, C.B. Christensen and F. J. Rœthlisberger, *The Motivations, Productivity and Satisfaction of Workers, A Predictive Study* (Cambridge, Harvard Business School, 1958).

fournit pas un instrument opérationnel efficace. Les auteurs ont recueilli toutes les données possibles en termes d'interactions sur un groupe de cinquante ouvriers et ils ont essayé de prédire en fonction de la théorie les sentiments (satisfaction) et les activités (productivité). Ils réussissent en partie pour les sentiments mais ils échouent pour le problème test, la productivité. Les hypothèses qu'ils utilisent sur la justice distributive (tendance à l'équilibre entre les investissements individuels et les revenus matériels et moraux qu'on en tire) et sur la sécurité du status (les disparités entre les différents éléments du status constituent un des éléments essentiels qui gouvernent les aspirations individuelles) ne suffisent pas à expliquer les rapports complexes et dynamiques entre l'organisation et ses membres. En fait, il semble que ce soit surtout dans l'étude du contexte culturel et technologique des « sentiments » et « interactions » que les interactionnistes aient apporté une contribution positive. Ils ont analysé par exemple les attitudes des ouvriers à l'égard des normes et montré à quelles différences d'origine socioculturelle et de mode de vie pouvaient correspondre l'attitude restrictive (populaire catholique urbaine) et le comportement briseur des normes (rural, classe moyenne, protestant) (19). Mais c'est surtout dans l'étude des conséquences des changements technologiques que leurs efforts de prédiction ont été efficaces, car le conditionnement physique se trouve être la variable la plus claire et la plus efficace par rapport à la donnée qu'ils étudient, les interactions (elle seule en effet est mesurable de façon satisfaisante). C'est le sens de nombreux travaux de W. F. Whyte, de Walker et Guest et de Leonard Sayles. Le paradoxe c'est que, dans cette perspective, le comportement humain apparaît comme déterminé de façon presque aussi mécaniste que dans la théorie classique. La réponse interactions-sentiments au conditionnement physique devient presque aussi simple que la réponse productivité au conditionnement économique du salaire au rendement. Elle ne reprend une autonomie suffisante que quand des chercheurs comme Sayles cessent de considérer ce déterminisme comme contraignant et en viennent à l'envisager comme le cadre qui définit les stratégies possibles pour les groupes et pour les individus (20).

Finalement, avec le recul, la réaction qui vingt ans plus tôt marqua un progrès indispensable et salutaire semble maintenant associée à une vue conservatrice n'ayant plus guère de prise sur la réalité. C'est le sens des critiques fort pertinentes récemment portées par Clark Kerr sur les interactionnistes attachés à une vision statique de la société industrielle et dont le système de valeurs qui est au fond celui de la société traditionnelle ne leur rend pas possible la compréhension des problèmes d'une société ouverte et progressive au sein de laquelle mécontentements, divisions et conflits sont le prix et la condition du progrès (21).

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(19) Donald Roy, Restricters and Rate Busters, *in* William Foote Whyte, *Money and Motivation* (New York, Harper, 1955), pp. 38-49.

(20) Leonard Sayles, *Behavior of Industrial Work Groups* (New York, Wiley, 1960).

Les lewiniens ne tombent pas, eux, sous le coup de cet argument, mais l'optimisme naïf des débuts de leurs travaux a dû faire place petit à petit à un scepticisme plus averti, un peu plus sensible à la complexité des systèmes institutionnels et un peu moins confiant dans les possibilités apparentes d'action rapide sur les individus. Au début il s'agissait de montrer la liaison entre la satisfaction individuelle, la productivité, et un style de leadership permissif. Mais si les premiers résultats au niveau individuel furent encourageants, il apparut bientôt qu'il était impossible de les répéter de façon convaincante dans le cadre d'une organisation complexe. Il a fallu reconnaître que le contremaître qui réussit le mieux dans la pratique n'est pas le contremaître le plus libéral, mais celui qui a le plus d'influence au sein de l'organisation (22). Des études de contrôle rigoureuses ont montré en même temps les effets dérisoires des programmes de formation en relations humaines ne tenant pas compte des réalités institutionnelles (23). Une vaste expérience de comparaison d'un système d'encadrement autoritaire avec un système participationniste s'avéra décevante. Le coût du système autoritaire était élevé certes sur le plan du moral mais les objectifs étaient au moins aussi facilement atteints que dans le système libéral. En conséquence on a pu assister à une évolution sensible des perspectives et des sujets d'étude. Aux expériences sur le leadership et les communications succèdent désormais des travaux sur le contrôle et les systèmes de pouvoir et d'influence (24).

Certes, en attirant l'attention sur le problème de la participation, les lewiniens ont introduit une ligne de recherches qui s'est révélée extrêmement féconde. Mais ils se sont eux aussi trouvés enfermés dans un modèle de comportement trop étroit, trop mécaniste, ne leur permettant pas de comprendre dans ses contrastes blanc et noir trop grossiers les forces à l'œuvre au sein des organisations et dans la société industrielle. Eux aussi offraient au sociologue une perspective statique où le changement ne pouvait plus apparaître que sous la forme d'une conversion morale.

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(21) Clark KERR and Lloyd FISHER, Plant Sociology, the Elite and the Aborigines, *in* Mirra KOMAROVSKY, *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1957).

(22) Donald PELZ, Influence, a Key to Effective Leadership, *Personnel*, III (1952), p. 3.

(23) E. A. FLEISHMANN, E. F. HARRIS and H. E. BURT, *Leadership and Supervision in Industry* (Columbus, Ohio State University, 1955).

(24) Dorwin CARTWRIGHT, *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan, 1959).

5. *Les possibilités du renouvellement : problèmes du pouvoir et analyse stratégique.*

Le problème auquel les chercheurs qui ont tenté un renouvellement se sont finalement heurtés aussi bien du côté interactionniste que du côté lewinien est celui du pouvoir. Car c'est là que tout naturellement menait la logique de la recherche, une fois écartées ces illusions d'une possible restructuration des organisations à partir des relations informelles ou celles de leur démocratisation par simple action psychologique. Des deux côtés, aussi bien sur le plan ethnologique que sur le plan psychologique (interactionniste et lewinien) des travaux significatifs ont été accomplis.

Deux exemples à cet égard peuvent être intéressants à examiner, celui d'Arnold Tannenbaum et celui de Melville Dalton. Tannenbaum, en partant des données de l'école lewinienne, aborde les problèmes beaucoup plus complexes qu'il n'avait paru aux premiers lewiniens entre la participation et le pouvoir. Ceux-ci s'étaient limités à la forme de l'autorité sans se préoccuper du montant de la contrainte. Tannenbaum redécouvre qu'il peut y avoir plus de contrainte dans un système démocratique à forte participation que dans un système autoritaire à faible participation, mettant ainsi indirectement en évidence l'étroitesse de la théorie des motivations sur laquelle on travaillait jusque-là. Car si la participation peut s'accompagner d'une plus grande contrainte, elle peut devenir dangereuse pour le subordonné qui trouve ainsi des raisons positives de se réfugier dans l'apathie et il devient impossible de se contenter de traiter les rapports hiérarchiques comme des rapports où la possibilité de choix existe seulement du côté du supérieur (25).

Dalton, qui est un ancien élève de Whyte, aborde le problème du rôle du *manager* dans une perspective ethnologique (26). Mais il le fait en prenant le contrepied de la tradition interactionniste. Au lieu de lui apparaître dans une perspective d'harmonie et d'intégration, l'entreprise est pour lui avant tout un système de relations conflictuelles et le rôle du *manager* consiste à effectuer dans une atmosphère d'ambiguïté, et grâce à cette atmosphère même, les compromis nécessaires à la survie de l'organisation et la qualité essentielle qu'il requiert c'est la force de caractère nécessaire pour surmonter les incertitudes et l'ambiguïté morale.

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(25) Arnold TANNENBAUM and R. L. KAHN, *Participation in Local Unions* (Chicago, Row Peterson, 1958) et, en français, Arnold TANNENBAUM, La participation aux activités syndicales, *Sociologie du Travail*, II (1960), pp. 141-150.

Ces deux apports sont importants pour le renouvellement de la théorie de la bureaucratie. L'un et l'autre jettent une lumière nouvelle sur le problème du pouvoir dont nous avons vu qu'il était essentiel à la compréhension du cercle vicieux bureaucratique. Mais si leur champ de vision est plus vaste, ils ne permettent ni l'un ni l'autre d'intégrer l'aspect rationnel et instrumental d'une organisation. Et pourtant le problème du but devient prépondérant si l'on veut creuser aussi bien le sens de la participation que les moyens de faire face aux conflits et à l'ambiguïté. Quand on l'oublie on aboutit comme Dalton à une véritable caricature : son obsession de ne pas s'en laisser compter est telle, il accorde une telle attention aux luttes de clan, aux irrégularités administratives et aux négociations subtiles de la lutte pour le pouvoir que finalement il semble difficile d'imaginer que l'entreprise qu'il nous décrit puisse effectivement produire à des conditions satisfaisantes. En fait, l'analyse des relations de pouvoir avec comme seule méthode d'approche les traditions psychologiques et ethnologiques des relations humaines a pour conséquences d'abandonner le problème des buts et le terrain de la rationalité à la théorie mécaniste classique.

Ce n'est pas seulement en effet le pouvoir, domaine et sujet de recherche, qui est en cause mais la façon même de l'aborder. Certes, le thème du pouvoir, comme le remarque Parsons (27), constitue bien le point de jonction entre l'aspect fonctionnel de l'organisation et son aspect politique, encore faut-il pouvoir l'étudier sur les deux plans à la fois. Le développement d'une nouvelle méthode d'approche du comportement humain, l'analyse stratégique devrait permettre enfin d'opérer cette synthèse.

L'analyse stratégique en effet nous propose une nouvelle version de la rationalité qui permet d'intégrer à la fois le fonctionnement formel, ouvert, apparent, des organisations et les rapports informels entre ses membres. Elle suppose, comme la théorie classique, l'existence d'un agent rationnel. Mais au lieu d'un agent passif répondant de façon stéréotypée aux choix dans lesquels on l'a enfermé, il s'agit d'un agent libre, ayant sa propre stratégie et pouvant donc, si nécessaire, jouer sur plusieurs tableaux pour échapper aux choix qu'on lui impose. Le problème est relativement simplifié en même temps qu'il est faussé du fait que l'homme dans les conditions de l'action ne peut rechercher *le* choix optimum mais doit se contenter d'*un* choix satisfaisant (28). Les critères de satisfaction dépendent de la situation et de la perception qu'en a le sujet en même temps que des objectifs qu'il poursuit. C'est dans l'analyse de ces critères que nous retrouvons le poids des « relations humaines » mais, si le comportement qui en résulte peut paraître irrationnel, la stratégie du sujet, compte tenu de sa situation et des limites de sa connaissance, reste rationnelle.

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(26) Melville Dalton, *Men Who Manage* (New York, Wiley, 1960).

(27) Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1960), pp. 41-44.

Dans la perspective de l'analyse stratégique, le pouvoir ne peut plus être éliminé ou ignoré comme dans la théorie classique ou chez Weber, avec l'apparition du parfait agencement de l'administration des choses. Il reste lié à l'impossibilité d'éliminer l'incertitude dans le cadre d'une rationalité limitée. Le pouvoir de A sur B dépend de la prévisibilité du comportement de B pour A et de l'incertitude où B se trouve du comportement de A. Tant que les besoins mêmes de l'action créent des situations d'incertitude, les individus qui doivent y faire face se trouvent disposer de pouvoir sur ceux qui seront affectés par le résultat de leurs choix. Et la stratégie des relations de pouvoir vise avant tout au contrôle des sources d'incertitude.

Mais ces rapports de dépendance auxquels on ne peut échapper sont vécus par les intéressés comme des relations affectives avec tous les problèmes affectifs — frustration, agression, transfert, etc. — qui leur sont naturellement associés. Et leur acuité qui dépend en dernière analyse de variables culturelles, puisque les normes d'autorité et les réactions aux figures d'autorité sont des éléments fondamentaux de la culture d'une civilisation, constitue un des facteurs décisifs qui déterminent les critères de satisfaction des individus et en conséquence leur stratégie personnelle. Les systèmes d'organisation bureaucratique peuvent donc être considérés également comme des réponses données par les groupes humains en fonction de leur civilisation propre aux problèmes que pose la persistance de zones d'incertitude dans la conduite des organisations.

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(28) March and Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

6. *Les données élémentaires d'un « cercle vicieux » bureaucratique.*

Essayons maintenant dans la perspective que nous nous sommes tracée de reprendre l'analyse d'un certain nombre de traits de comportement bureaucratique et de les analyser non plus comme s'ils étaient les dysfonctions d'un système rationnel idéal mais comme s'ils étaient les éléments d'un système bureaucratique dont tous les aspects, même ceux qui expriment la résistance du facteur humain, sont rationnels. Les traits que nous allons discuter sont empruntés à des exemples français (29) et le modèle qu'ils vont nous permettre de construire est seulement l'un des modèles possibles de « système bureaucratique ». Mais nous nous efforcerons de dégager à partir de ce modèle les traits communs aux divers « systèmes bureaucratiques » imaginables.

Examinons tout d'abord les données élémentaires du cercle vicieux bureaucratique :

1) Des règles impersonnelles définissent les diverses fonctions et prescrivent la conduite à tenir par leurs occupants dans le plus grand nombre possible d'éventualités. Des règles également impersonnelles président au choix des personnes appelées à remplir ces fonctions : le concours pour le passage d'une grande catégorie hiérarchique à l'autre, la loi de l'ancienneté à l'intérieur de chaque grande catégorie. A la limite ce modèle de « système bureaucratique » implique que rien dans la carrière personnelle du fonctionnaire comme dans l'exercice de sa fonction ne puisse être laissé à l'arbitraire et à l'initiative individuelle. Le comportement journalier de chacun et la courbe de ses promotions sont exactement prévisibles. Dans un tel système, les rapports de dépendance personnelles tendent à disparaître. Si tout arbitraire et même toute initiative individuelle dans la définition des fonctions de ses subordonnés et dans leur affectation aux diverses fonctions sont inter-

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(29) On trouvera une analyse de ces exemples dans Michel Crozier, Les relations de pouvoir dans un système d'organisation bureaucratique, *Sociologie du travail*, II (1960), pp. 61-75, et Human Relations at the Management Level in a Bureaucratic System of Organization, *Human Organization*, XX (1961), sous presse.

dits, le chef hiérarchique perd tout pouvoir sur eux. Son rôle se borne à contrôler l'application des règles. En contrepartie les subordonnés n'ont aucun pouvoir de pression ou de négociation sur leurs supérieurs dans la mesure où leur comportement se trouve entièrement déterminé par les règles (30). Chaque individu se trouve donc protégé à la fois de ses supérieurs et de ses subordonnés, il est privé de toute initiative et totalement soumis à la règle d'une part, complètement libre de toute dépendance personnelle de l'autre. Ce type de rapports humains fait perdre aux relations entre supérieurs et subordonnés leur importance affective aussi bien pour les supérieurs que pour les subordonnés. Nous ne trouvons entre les diverses catégories hiérarchiques que des relations conventionnelles (31).

2) Le pouvoir de décision à l'intérieur de l'organisation est situé aux endroits où la stabilité du système interne « politique » aura la préférence sur les buts fonctionnels de l'organisation. Ce trait est le corollaire du précédent. Si l'on veut sauvegarder les relations d'impersonnalité, il est indispensable que toutes les décisions qui n'ont pas été éliminées par l'établissement de règles soient prises à un niveau où l'on soit à l'abri des pressions trop personnelles de ceux qui seront affectés par ces décisions. Le pouvoir de prendre des décisions et aussi bien celui de changer les règles et d'en édicter de nouvelles aura donc tendance à s'éloigner le plus possible des cellules d'exécution. Si la pression en faveur de l'impersonnalité est forte, cette tendance à la centralisation sera irrésistible. Elle se traduira concrètement par une priorité donnée aux problèmes « politiques » internes — lutte contre le favoritisme et l'arbitraire, sauvegarde de l'équilibre entre les différentes parties du système — par rapport aux problèmes d'adaptation à l'environnement qui demanderaient que les décisions soient prises à un niveau où l'on connaisse mieux ses particularités et son évolution. L'arbitraire et l'initiative individuelle sur le plan de la fonction, de l'activité économique, des rapports avec le public ne pourraient manquer en effet d'entraîner des différences, donc de l'arbitraire sur le plan des rapports humains. La centralisation est le second moyen d'éliminer l'arbitraire dans une organisation. Le prix en

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(30) Pratiquement, bien sûr, ce n'est jamais le cas, il reste toujours un peu d'incertitude, ce qui laisse aux protagonistes un certain jeu. Le rapport de dépendance et la négociation ne sont jamais supprimés. La pratique de la grève du zèle constitue pour de nombreuses catégories de fonctionnaires le meilleur moyen de montrer que la soumission à la règle ne peut suffire à assurer la fonction qui leur est impartie.

(31) Voir Michel Crozier, article cité, *Sociologie du travail*, II (1960), pp. 64 et 70.

est une plus grande rigidité. Ceux qui décident ne connaissent pas directement les problèmes qu'ils ont à trancher ; ceux qui sont sur le terrain et connaissent ces problèmes n'ont pas les pouvoirs nécessaires pour effectuer les adaptations ou pour expérimenter les innovations indispensables.

3) La suppression de l'arbitraire et des rapports de dépendance grâce à la centralisation et à un système de règles impersonnelles a pour conséquence que chaque catégorie hiérarchique se trouve complètement isolée des autres catégories supérieures ou subordonnées. Une organisation bureaucratique de ce type se trouvera composée d'une série de strates superposées communiquant très mal entre elles. Les barrières sont telles qu'il y a très peu de place pour le développement de clans qui pourraient regrouper les membres de plusieurs catégories. Par contre, la pression du groupe des pairs, des membres de la même catégorie devient absolument prépondérante. Toute velléité d'indépendance sur les points qui touchent aux intérêts du groupe se trouve impitoyablement sanctionnée (32). Cette pression du groupe des pairs devient le seul facteur de régulation du comportement en dehors des règles, puisque la pression hiérarchique et la sanction des résultats individuels se trouvent réduites sinon éliminées. Les individus se conforment à la règle impersonnelle et aux normes du groupe qui se superposent à cette règle pour l'interpréter et la compléter.

Cette pression du groupe constitue beaucoup plus encore que les particularités de la tâche dépersonnalisée, comme semblait le penser Merton (33), la source de l'esprit de caste des fonctionnaires. La réglementation et l'impersonnalité de la tâche sont poussées fort loin dans de nombreux secteurs des grandes organisations rationnelles modernes sans que le « ritualisme » et l'esprit de caste se développent de façon sensible. S'ils prennent tant d'importance dans notre modèle de système bureaucratique c'est qu'avec la coupure des liens entre catégories, l'isolement de chaque strate lui permet de contrôler complètement son domaine, donc d'ériger en fin les moyens partiels qui sont de son ressort. Et ce déplacement des buts, ce ritualisme ne peuvent être considérés seulement comme la conséquence automatique de la situation faite à l'individu. Ils constituent aussi une réaction de groupe et comme telle, au niveau des intérêts du groupe, une réaction rationnelle qui donne au groupe, un indispensable moyen de défense dans sa lutte avec les autres groupes (34).

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(32) Ceci se marque dans des résultats d'enquête par la remarquable conformité de certaines des réponses des membres d'un même groupe et par ce fait que, quand les mêmes questions sont discutées en groupe, la petite minorité qui s'était manifestée dans des réponses individuelles abandonne toute opposition.

(33) Robert K. Merton, article cité, *Social Forces*, XVIII (1940), pp. 563-564.

4) Comme il est malgré tout impossible de prévoir le règlement de toutes les éventualités, soit par l'établissement de règles impersonnelles, soit par des procédures de centralisation, des zones d'incertitude subsistent au sein de l'organisation. Autour de ces zones d'incertitude, des relations de pouvoir parallèles se reconstituent avec des phénomènes de dépendance et de conflit. Les individus ou les groupes qui contrôlent une de ces sources d'incertitude dans un ensemble où tout est prévisible se trouvent de ce fait disposer d'un pouvoir considérable sur tous ceux qui sont affectés par cette incertitude. Leur situation stratégique est en effet d'autant meilleure qu'il y a très peu de sources d'incertitude et que, par conséquent, il n'y a pas à lutter avec autant de « pouvoirs concurrents » que dans des systèmes d'organisation moins réglementés. Toutes les organisations bureaucratiques françaises connaissent ces exemples d'employés subalternes dont la volonté sera finalement décisive dans des affaires où pourtant ils n'ont théoriquement aucun pouvoir et de groupes particuliers qui disposent de privilèges exorbitants auxquels il est interdit de toucher. Ces pouvoirs parallèles peuvent se développer dans le cadre de la ligne hiérarchique normale mais le plus souvent ils se manifesteront en dehors d'elle avec pour conséquence une réorganisation des rapports humains autour des situations de force de certains individus et de certains groupes.

Les strates d'experts sont souvent de ce point de vue des groupes privilégiés dans la mesure où la tâche qui leur est impartie ne peut être prévue et réglementée que de façon fort vague. La décentralisation au profit de ces groupes telle qu'elle a été analysée par Selznick constitue la conséquence logique du développement de cette tendance. Mais une telle décentralisation qui consiste à fractionner et à isoler les fonctions n'est pas incompatible avec la centralisation administrative des carrières et des règlements qui l'englobe. C'est dans le cadre général du système impersonnel et centralisé, et à cause même de la rigidité de ce cadre, que les privilèges des experts peuvent se maintenir et éventuellement se développer. A l'intérieur du système bureaucratique on assiste alors à une lutte constante entre la volonté centralisatrice de la direction soutenue par tous les autres groupes qui fait pression sur les groupes d'experts pour les forcer à rationaliser leurs fonctions et la résistance généralement efficace de ces groupes qui s'efforcent de conserver à leur profession l'incertitude indispensable à la défense de leur indépendance. On peut retrouver les éléments d'un tel conflit si l'on considère la situation de ces professions dans l'ensemble de la société. Mais ce qu'il est important de mettre en lumière c'est que la position des groupes d'experts est plus forte dans le cadre d'un système bureaucratique. Paradoxalement, plus l'ensemble dont ils font partie est réglementé et contrôlé, plus leur indépendance est grande.

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(34) Ce point demanderait naturellement à être développé. La lutte entre les diverses strates n'est pas la simple conséquence de leur isolement. Elle se développe de façon aiguë dans la mesure où la faiblesse de la pression hiérarchique affaiblit l'unité organique de l'ensemble et où il reste un champ suffisant de lutte et de négociation.

5) Les difficultés, les mauvais résultats et les frustrations qui sont les conséquences de tous les traits que nous venons d'examiner tendent finalement à développer de nouvelles pressions en faveur de l'impersonnalité et de la centralisation qui leur ont donné naissance. Autrement dit, ce modèle de système bureaucratique est avant tout caractérisé par l'existence d'une série de cercles vicieux relativement stables. Les schémas suggérés par Merton et par Gouldner en offrent déjà des exemples. Mais il est possible d'en élaborer d'autres et de les intégrer dans un schéma plus large.

Nous avons déjà traité du déplacement des buts et montré qu'il ne mettait pas seulement en cause la rigidité de la personnalité humaine, déformée par le moule auquel on la soumet, mais pouvait s'expliquer aussi par le jeu des relations entre strates isolées et, d'une certaine façon, concurrentes. Les conséquences dysfonctionnelles du déplacement des buts, c'est-à-dire des difficultés avec la clientèle, un manque de communication, une mauvaise adaptation à l'environnement ou, s'il n'y a pas de clientèle, des difficultés dans l'accomplissement de la tâche et une moindre productivité ne peuvent conduire à un assouplissement du système car la seule arme dont disposent ceux qui sont en mesure d'effectuer des changements c'est une plus minutieuse élaboration des règles et un renforcement de la centralisation. Par ailleurs, dans le cadre même du système dont ils font partie, les individus et les groupes qui sont en contact direct avec ces conséquences dysfonctionnelles ne font pas pression pour une décentralisation mais s'efforcent simplement de se servir des difficultés qui surviennent pour renforcer leur position vis-à-vis du public et au sein de l'organisation ; ils lutteront certes contre la centralisation ; cependant ce ne sera pas pour faciliter l'adaptation de l'organisation à ses tâches mais bien plutôt pour conserver la part de rigidité qui les protège.

Le problème de la subordination et du contrôle si bien analysé par Gouldner peut, lui aussi, être élargi. La prolifération des règles impersonnelles réduit les tensions créées par la subordination et le contrôle mais en même temps les frustrations qu'elles développent renforcent le besoin de subordination et de contrôle auquel on doit faire face par le développement d'un système impersonnel. Si l'impersonnalité est poussée plus loin que dans l'exemple de Gouldner et si une combinaison de centralisation et d'impersonnalité enlève tout pouvoir de négociation et d'arbitraire au supérieur vis-à-vis de ses subordonnés immédiats, nous pouvons apercevoir que le cercle vicieux qui n'affectait que certains aspects des rapports humains au niveau subalterne (contremaîtres, ouvriers) englobe maintenant tous les rapports humains de l'ensemble de l'organisation.

Les frustrations des différents échelons qui ne peuvent discuter les décisions qui les concernent constituent une force de pression considérable que les supérieurs ne se sentent pas en mesure d'affronter. Tout le système de prise de décisions tend à se déplacer de plus en plus vers le haut pour réduire les tensions qui naissent des rapports de subordination. Mais comme ces rapports ne sont pas allégés et que leurs conséquences vexatoires pour les individus et les groupes subsistent, la pression pour la centralisation continue. On pourrait concevoir un effort en sens inverse pour « débloquer » un tel système mais on se heurterait à la peur que subordonnés comme supérieurs éprouvent à assumer directement des rapports de dépendance. Cette peur est d'ailleurs entretenue par le foyer permanent de mécontentement que constitue la persistance de relations de pouvoir parallèles et de privilèges spéciaux. L'existence de ces privilèges qui sont, nous l'avons vu, la conséquence indirecte de la centralisation et de l'impersonnalité tend donc à renforcer la pression pour la centralisation et l'impersonnalité.

Très généralement on peut donc dire que la caractéristique de notre modèle de système bureaucratique, caractéristique qu'il partage avec les modèles que Merton, Gouldner et aussi Selznick ont tirés des exemples qu'ils ont analysés, c'est que la rigidité de l'organisation des tâches et des rapports humains qui leur est à quelque degré commune a pour conséquence un manque de communications avec l'environnement et un manque de communications entre les différents groupes, et que les difficultés qui en résultent, loin de provoquer un réajustement du modèle dans le sens d'un assouplissement des règles, sont utilisées par les individus et les groupes qui en ont la possibilité pour améliorer leur position, ce qui a pour dernière conséquence de renforcer la pression pour l'impersonnalité, cause même de la rigidité. En d'autres termes, il s'agit d'un modèle d'organisation trop rigide pour se corriger en fonction de ses erreurs.

6) Cette rigidité enfin a pour conséquence que le changement ne peut se produire qu'en bloc et à partir du sommet. Une organisation quelle qu'elle soit doit forcément s'adapter à des transformations de toutes sortes — transformations de l'environnement, transformations des techniques, transformations du personnel. L'adaptation peut être constante et graduelle si les individus qui perçoivent les transformations au niveau auquel elles apparaissent, c'est-à-dire au niveau de l'exécution (35), ont la possibilité d'introduire les innovations nécessaires. Mais nous avons vu que ce ne pouvait être le cas dans un système d'organisation dominé par l'impersonnalité des règles et par la centralisation. La concentration du pouvoir de décision entre les mains des dirigeants et l'isolement de ceux-ci rend impossible un tel type de changement. Le système bureaucratique tend donc tout naturellement à résister aux transformations de son environnement et de toutes les autres données de son action. Ces transformations il ne les perçoit habituellement pas, protégé qu'il est par les barrières aux communications que nous avons décrites. Il n'en reconnaît finalement l'importance que quand elles sont devenues la cause de dysfonctions particulièrement graves. A ce moment des changements finiront par se produire mais ces changements viendront d'en haut, ils pourront éventuellement même conduire à un renforcement de la centralisation qui seule permettra de les imposer. Enfin ces changements s'étendront à l'ensemble de l'organisation et non pas seulement aux secteurs où les dysfonctions sont les plus marquées car ils se traduiront par une refonte des règles impersonnelles applicables par tous.

Du fait à la fois des délais considérables qu'il nécessite, de l'ampleur qu'il doit revêtir et des résistances qu'il doit vaincre, le changement constitue toujours pour des organisations bureaucratiques une crise très profonde et le rythme essentiel qu'on rencontre chez elles c'est l'alternance de longues périodes de stabilité et de courtes périodes de crise. Contrairement à ce que pourrait faire penser une analyse limitée à l'étude du schéma d'un cercle vicieux en dehors de toute contingence temporelle, la crise est un élément inhérent au système bureaucratique car seule elle peut permettre d'effectuer les ajustements nécessaires. La crise se caractérise par des interventions arbitraires individuelles, par l'établissement momentané de rapports de dépendance contraignants et la révélation d'une autorité oubliée. Malgré son caractère exceptionnel elle joue un rôle très important car d'une part elle perpétue la crainte de l'autorité et d'autre part elle suscite, même aux moments de plus tranquille routine, des vocations de réformateur autoritaire à l'exact opposé du modèle de personnalité bureaucratique décrit par Merton (36).

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(35) Par niveau de l'exécution, nous entendons unités de production, par opposition à unités de direction ou d'état-major, et non pas seulement les exécutants.

Tout l'effort du système bureaucratique français pour réussir à dominer le problème du changement a consisté à domestiquer et à assouplir ces rôles d'agents du changement de façon à régulariser sinon à éviter les crises. On a tendu ainsi à constituer des castes de hauts fonctionnaires plus particulièrement isolées et protégées de toute influence extérieure dont le rôle consiste à fournir au moment opportun les personnalités capables d'imposer aux unités administratives les réformes nécessaires tout en respectant leurs règles et en réduisant au minimum les aspects autoritaires du rôle qui leur est imparti grâce à leur impartialité et au prestige que leur vaut leur éloignement (37).

De telles pratiques sont naturellement particulières à notre propre civilisation. Mais c'est certainement à propos du problème du changement et de l'adaptation à l'évolution générale de la société que tout système d'organisation bureaucratique prend sa signification profonde. Une organisation bureaucratique n'est pas seulement une organisation trop rigide pour se corriger en fonction de ses erreurs, c'est aussi et surtout une organisation trop rigide pour s'adapter sans crise ou sans substitut de crise aux transformations que l'accélération de l'évolution sociale rend de plus en plus rapidement impératives.

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(36) Robert K. Merton, article cité, *Social Forces*, XVIII (1940).

(37) C'est le rôle dans lequel se sont peu à peu installés les Grands Corps de l'État qui sont passés de la fonction de stabilisation et d'unification de l'action administrative à la fonction de réforme à mesure que la pression du changement devenait plus forte. Mais cette domestication est seulement partielle et les facteurs de crise se trouvent reportés au plan politique.

7. *Les avantages d'un système d'organisation bureaucratique.*

En analysant tout un ensemble des traits bureaucratiques dans la perspective d'un système autonome d'organisation nous avons cherché à dépasser l'optique trop étroite des relations humaines qui faisait de ces traits les conséquences non prévues de la résistance du « facteur humain » aux objectifs et aux méthodes de l'organisation. La perspective stratégique que nous avons adoptée nous a permis de suggérer par exemple que le ritualisme et l'esprit de caste n'étaient pas déterminés par les déformations de la personnalité, mais s'interprétaient comme les comportements rationnels d'individus que la pression collective du groupe auquel ils appartiennent oblige à jouer le jeu que commande leur situation stratégique dans le système de relations de pouvoir au sein de l'organisation (38). Elle nous aurait permis de montrer de la même manière que c'est pour conserver le pouvoir dont ils disposent que les groupes d'experts résistent au changement et non pas à cause de la routine ou de l'isolement qui caractérise leurs activités.

En procédant ainsi nous avons déjà progressé car le modèle que nous avons construit est plus ouvert, plus contingent, il n'apparaît plus comme une nouvelle loi d'airain. Il peut rendre compte déjà de sa propre adaptation au changement. Mais il reste cependant un modèle statique, un cercle vicieux dont on ne comprend ni les conditions d'apparition ni les possibles mutations. L'analyse d'un phénomène d'un tel point de vue statique que symbolise parfaitement l'image du cercle vicieux est indispensable à un premier stade de compréhension. Mais rester à ce premier stade justifie les critiques habituellement portées contre le fonctionnalisme (39).

La première possibilité du dépassement apparaît avec l'introduction du problème du changement. On se souvient de l'interprétation de Gouldner qui consiste à faire de certains traits bureaucratiques une réponse au problème posé par la succession, les règles bureaucratiques constituant le moyen d'assurer la permanence de l'organisation à travers les difficiles problèmes posés par la disparition de ses fondateurs et de ses dirigeants. Mais si cette hypothèse suggestive complète heureusement l'analyse de Weber sur le passage du charisme à la bureaucratie, elle ne nous est guère utile pour rendre compte des différences entre grandes organisations parvenues au même degré de détachement des formes patrimoniales et qui peuvent cependant constituer des systèmes plus ou moins bureaucratiques.

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(38) Pour une discussion plus serrée de ce problème, voir Michel CROZIER, article cité, *Human Organization*, XX (1961), sous presse.

(39) Voir, par exemple, Ralf DAHRENDORF, Out of Utopia : Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis, *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1958), pp. 115-127.

Notre analyse des méthodes d'adaptation au changement d'un système bureaucratique pourrait être utilisée elle aussi. Un mode de raisonnement parsonien permettrait de montrer par exemple qu'un système d'organisation est d'autant plus bureaucratique que ceux qui y participent ont plus ou moins bien intériorisé les valeurs de changement et de croissance. Mais si un tel raisonnement nous indique des domaines où la recherche serait intéressante, il est condamné à rester beaucoup trop vague car il embrasse une suite de relations dont nous ne pouvons suivre les chaînons.

La première question décisive à poser devrait être, à notre avis, une question sur les limites mêmes de la pression bureaucratique. Si éloignées que soient les instances dirigeantes des problèmes à résoudre sur le terrain, si difficile que soit la communication entre les strates, si désastreuses que puissent devenir les conséquences de la lutte entre les groupes et du maintien de privilèges anachroniques, il reste que les organisations bureaucratiques que nous avons l'occasion d'examiner fonctionnent et donnent des résultats relativement acceptables. Les cercles vicieux que nous avons décrits correspondent à des équilibres stables et non pas à des processus cumulatifs de détérioration. Le problème que les sociologues de la bureaucratie devraient donc maintenant aborder est celui des conditions de l'équilibre, le problème des formes de contrôle social qui maintiennent dans certaines limites le jeu des facteurs qui ont donné naissance aux cercles vicieux.

Notre hypothèse fondamentale dans ce domaine c'est qu'il n'y a pas d'opposition entre les forces d'intégration d'un côté, les forces de disruption de l'autre mais que ce sont les formes mêmes du contrôle social que l'on utilise qui sont à l'origine des cercles vicieux bureaucratiques. Si l'on admet que pour toute organisation le premier problème à résoudre est celui de la conformité des comportements de ses membres à un minimum de normes (soumission aux objectifs, aux nécessités de la coordination et de la coopération), on peut caractériser les types d'organisation en fonction des moyens divers ou plutôt de la combinaison de moyens divers qu'elles emploient. On peut obtenir la conformité en se servant de la contrainte, en se servant de moyens idéologiques ou en réussissant à obtenir que les individus intériorisent eux-mêmes les normes prescrites. Dans les organisations modernes il semble clair que d'une part on peut tolérer une moins grande conformité dans la mesure où l'amélioration des moyens de prévision permet de s'accommoder de différences individuelles autrefois inadmissibles et que d'autre part la part des moyens indirects dans la combinaison utilisée devient beaucoup plus considérable. Dans un tel cadre il semble que les caractéristiques plus ou moins bureaucratiques du système d'organisation sont fonction de l'équilibre entre le type de combinaison employé et les modes de réaction du groupe humain auquel il s'applique, les deux pôles considérés étant bien entendu interdépendants puisqu'ils participent tous deux du même ensemble culturel.

Nous ne pouvons pas pour le moment pousser l'analyse plus loin en l'absence de recherches portant directement sur ce thème. Mais nous voudrions pour illustrer notre hypothèse et délimiter les problèmes à résoudre reprendre ce thème de l'équilibre entre contrôle social et privilège bureaucratique dans la perspective de la stratégie individuelle des membres du système.

Le premier point à considérer pour comprendre toute stratégie individuelle c'est le caractère ambigu des attitudes des membres d'une organisation face au problème de leur participation. Nous l'avons déjà noté en citant les recherches d'Arnold Tannenbaum, participer à une décision constitue certes un moyen de mieux contrôler son propre environnement mais en même temps entraîne le risque d'être contrôlé par ceux avec qui on participe et qui influenceront eux aussi la décision. Il est beaucoup plus facile de sauvegarder son indépendance à l'égard d'une décision d'une organisation ou d'un groupe humain quand on s'y soumet sans y avoir participé que quand on a accepté de la discuter. Il est rationnel pour chaque individu de négocier sa participation et une attitude de retrait, et même de fuite peut bien être considérée comme une attitude rationnelle dans la mesure où un individu a des raisons de croire que ce qu'on lui offre n'est pas satisfaisant et qu'il a de fortes chances d'être manipulé. La volonté de participation des membres d'une organisation dépendra donc, dans une certaine mesure tout au moins, du degré de confiance, d'ouverture à autrui qui caractérise la culture dont ils font partie (40).

La participation de toute façon restera limitée, une contrainte imposée de l'extérieur devra s'exercer et nous en venons au deuxième point de la stratégie individuelle, l'attitude vis-à-vis du rapport d'autorité, autre donnée culturelle fondamentale. Si le nécessaire rapport d'autorité n'est pas accepté facilement la pression pour la centralisation sera forte et un certain type de rigidité caractérisera le système d'organisation. D'autres types de rigidité sont concevables si le rapport d'autorité est accepté avec soumission mais provoque une résistance passive. On risque d'avoir alors des cercles vicieux de contrôles successifs (41).

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(40) Elle dépend aussi, bien sûr, de leur place dans l'ordre hiérarchique et des modèles de rapport entre catégories sociales qu'offre la civilisation à laquelle ils participent.

De toutes façons, l'équilibre général du système doit dépendre des termes possibles de négociation pour l'individu, termes qui dépendent de ses aspirations et de ses valeurs et des exigences de l'organisation, exigences qui sont fonction à leur tour des données techniques qui permettent à l'homme de contrôler son univers et en même temps des mêmes données culturelles qui façonnent les réactions individuelles.

Des systèmes bureaucratiques comme celui que nous avons étudié offrent aux individus une combinaison relativement heureuse d'indépendance et de sécurité. Certes, nous sommes sensibles à leurs aspects dysfonctionnels et nous mesurons le prix élevé que chaque individu doit payer pour ce résultat. Mais nous avons parfois tendance à oublier que tout compte fait le marché n'est pas mauvais. Les règles protègent ceux qui y sont soumis ; à l'intérieur du cadre qu'elles définissent ils peuvent mesurer leur propre contribution en toute liberté, ils peuvent participer ou ne pas participer aux buts de l'organisation, réserver leurs forces et leurs sentiments pour des entreprises plus personnelles. Certes, s'il s'agit d'un système d'organisation très bureaucratique, ils n'ont aucune chance de se distinguer de leurs collègues et d'obtenir des succès marquants dans leur travail mais ils ne courent en même temps et de ce fait aucun risque et cette sécurité a un prix considérable dans un univers fortement marqué par l'insécurité. On peut penser d'ailleurs que plus nos sociétés industrielles deviennent capables d'assurer à tous un minimum de sécurité moins l'individu sera prêt à payer un prix élevé pour obtenir le type de sécurité offert par un système bureaucratique.

On peut soutenir finalement que ce modèle bureaucratique,

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(41) Le système bureaucratique soviétique paraît caractéristique d'un tel type d'équilibre : des rapports autoritaires, une très grande soumission de la part des subordonnés, mais en même temps beaucoup de résistance passive de la part de groupes informels très vigoureux et un cercle vicieux de contrôles bureaucratiques se superposant les uns aux autres, dont le poids oppressif suscite forcément la résistance passive qui renforce justement la suspicion et le besoin de contrôle.

que nous avons analysé, constitue un excellent moyen de maintenir dans notre monde moderne quelques-unes des valeurs individualistes du monde préindustriel et que son développement par exemple en France est lié à la résistance de modes de vie anciens. Opposition à toute participation, préférence pour une autorité centralisée, stabilité et rigidité bureaucratiques assurent à chaque membre de l'organisation bureaucratique une autonomie, un arbitraire individuel qui procèdent des mêmes valeurs que les modes de vie artisanaux et paysans antérieurs. Mais cette résistance, bien sûr, ne peut jamais être que partielle. Les compromis auxquels individus et organisations se résignent constituent une des données fondamentales de cet équilibre entre contrôle social et pression bureaucratique qu'il faudrait analyser pour comprendre l'évolution d'un système bureaucratique.

8. *Les systèmes bureaucratiques et l'évolution générale de la société industrielle.*

L'analyse des fonctions latentes d'un système bureaucratique ne suffit pas. Il nous reste à replacer ce modèle d'organisation dans le contexte général de l'évolution de la société industrielle pour pouvoir explorer la dernière dimension, celle qu'avait retenue d'abord Weber, la dimension historique.

De ce point de vue, l'évolution des formes d'organisation dans nos sociétés industrielles semble marquée d'abord par deux grands facteurs. D'une part, nous l'avons vu, les progrès constants des techniques de prévision dans tous les domaines permettent une beaucoup plus grande tolérance vis-à-vis des particularités personnelles et des besoins propres de chaque individu. D'autre part, l'évolution de la civilisation rend les individus eux-mêmes de plus en plus complexes et de plus en plus sensibles à de multiples et contradictoires influences sociales ; toute participation est pour eux moins dangereuse car elle les engage moins totalement et ils sont plus facilement capables de s'en dégager et de trouver des solutions de remplacement matérielles et morales. En conséquence, alors qu'au Moyen Age seules des organisations de formes rigides sinon monacales, engageant l'individu jusque dans son comportement le plus intime, pouvaient parvenir à une efficacité raisonnable (42), dans notre société industrielle nous avons affaire à des organisations beaucoup plus souples, capables de se contenter de la part de leurs membres, même aux plus hauts échelons, d'une loyauté tout à fait temporaire sans que leur efficacité en soit atteinte.

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(42) Il vaudrait la peine d'étudier les analogies sur le plan des formes d'organisation entre les ordres religieux dont les fonctions furent d'ailleurs souvent écono-

De ces tendances générales on devrait naturellement conclure que les systèmes bureaucratiques fondés sur les cercles vicieux dysfonctionnels que nous avons analysés devraient perdre de leur importance et que, contrairement aux craintes formulées constamment par les penseurs humanistes et révolutionnaires, l'avenir nous offre plus de promesses de libération que de menaces de « robotisation » de l'homme.

Cet optimisme doit être tempéré cependant car si une organisation moderne est certainement plus souple et plus tolérante qu'une organisation ancienne de même taille, le nombre des organisations s'est accru de façon extraordinaire, au point que la part des activités exercées individuellement est devenue extrêmement restreinte. En d'autres termes, la souplesse plus grande qui rend la participation des individus à des activités standardisées et contrôlées plus supportable a permis à celles-ci de se développer au maximum.

Finalement l'avenir n'est ni aussi favorable ni aussi défavorable que les deux logiques opposées de la standardisation croissante des activités humaines et de leur libéralisation sembleraient le laisser prévoir. Un nouvel équilibre se reconstitue constamment à partir de l'équilibre ancien et cet équilibre est avant tout déterminé par les exigences profondes de chaque système culturel.

Si l'on prend maintenant le problème au niveau même de chaque grande organisation, on pourrait montrer parallèlement que c'est seulement dans la mesure où elle s'assouplit et se libéralise qu'une organisation peut grandir et que c'est la persistance chez elle d'un système bureaucratique qui constitue le principal obstacle à ses progrès.

Dans cette dernière perspective de résistance aux progrès de la rationalité on peut comprendre l'apparition et le maintien de systèmes bureaucratiques comme le résultat de deux forces contradictoires et cependant convergentes. D'une part chaque individu, chaque groupe, chaque catégorie au sein d'une organisation y lutte constamment pour préserver les caractères imprévisibles, impossibles à rationaliser, de l'activité dont il a la charge ; le pouvoir de ces individus, l'influence qu'ils peuvent exercer au sein de

miques et les premières grandes organisations commerciales comme celles des marchands hanséatiques.

l'organisation dépendant essentiellement, nous l'avons vu, de l'incertitude de leur comportement, ils s'opposeront naturellement à la rationalisation de leur propre secteur tout en luttant, bien sûr, pour la rationalisation des autres secteurs. D'autre part, les progrès de la rationalisation qui permettent de retirer aux individus leur part d'arbitraire et de pouvoir offrent à ceux qui réussissent à l'imposer la constante tentation de pousser la planification plus loin qu'il ne serait rationnellement souhaitable. Deux formes de privilèges et de cercles vicieux ont donc tendance à se développer ; ils correspondent les uns à la résistance de groupes cherchant à préserver des situations de pouvoir dépassées par les progrès des techniques et les autres à la volonté d'autres groupes d'imposer une rationalisation que ne légitiment pas encore ces progrès. Ces deux forces s'appuient d'ailleurs souvent l'une sur l'autre dans la mesure où une centralisation prématurée peut constituer la meilleure protection pour des privilèges locaux et où des combinaisons de tels privilèges peuvent fort bien lutter pour imposer une rationalisation qui, en éliminant d'autres privilèges, les protège temporairement.

Le succès de ces deux forces dépend de la capacité qu'a l'organisation elle-même de s'isoler du reste de la société. Puisque la persistance de cercles vicieux bureaucratiques a pour première conséquence de permettre d'échapper à la réalité du contact avec le monde extérieur, il est naturel que ce soient les activités qui peuvent le plus s'isoler de la pression du reste de la société qui soient le plus atteintes par les déformations bureaucratiques. Les administrations publiques deviennent évidemment plus facilement bureaucratiques et parmi les administrations publiques, celles qui sont le moins soumises aux pressions du public et des organes politiques qui le représentent ; parmi les activités industrielles privées, celles qui présentent la rencontre paradoxale d'une technologie stable et d'une concentration très grande. Au niveau de la société dans son ensemble, la relative prédominance de systèmes bureaucratiques d'organisation apparaît liée à des constantes culturelles (les contradictions françaises sur le problème de l'autorité) et à des rencontres historiques (rôle joué par l'État centralisé en France dans le développement politique et technique).

On pourrait en conclure peut-être que les craintes que l'on manifeste si souvent devant la montée de la technocratie sont peu fondées. Plus le progrès s'accélère et plus le pouvoir de l'expert est temporaire, à la limite il se détruit lui-même dans la mesure où il s'exerce. Le pouvoir des *managers* qui a tant fasciné Burnham est beaucoup plus un pouvoir politique et judiciaire qu'un pouvoir d'expert. Leur réussite dépend de qualités politiques et non pas de la possession d'une science et, dans la mesure où certains aspects de leur rôle deviennent plus rationnels et plus scientifiques, ces aspects perdent de leur importance dans la lutte pour le pouvoir. Finalement, si paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, il serait possible de soutenir que les formes bureaucratiques — au sens péjoratif du terme — correspondent à la nécessaire persistance d'un élément de pouvoir charismatique dans le fonctionnement des grandes organisations et au développement de privilèges et de cercles vicieux, centrés sur ces privilèges et qui en découlent.

LE SABRE ET LA LOI

STANISLAV ANDRESKI

Conservatism and Radicalism of the Military

THE majority of European critics of the traditional social order have taken it as self-evident that military officers, by the very nature of their profession, were bound to be conservative, that is to say, always inclined to throw their weight on the side of the established social order and the privileged classes. The idea that an army could become a chief engine of social revolution would seem to them absurd. This opinion was not—and is not—without foundations, yet it cannot claim absolute validity. In the Near East we saw recently social revolution carried out by army officers. In Ancient Rome traditional aristocracy was decimated and despoiled by the soldiers on more than one occasion. This poses the question of the factors which determine whether the influence of the army will be conservative or radical, or even subversive.

Subversiveness is a rather loose and emotive term, and for this reason some terminological clarification might be useful. An established order of privileges may be altered in three possible ways. The first is a transformation which changes the whole nature of the privileges, besides producing vertical mobility on a large scale. A thorough industrialization of a rural society, or a replacement of private by state ownership of the means of production are examples to the point. The second type of change is a process of levelling. Almost needless to say, this means that the inequalities diminish—not that they disappear altogether—for no case of complete abolition of all privileges has so far been noted. The third possibility is the replacement of the incumbents without any profound changes in either the nature of the privileges or in their span. We can safely leave out of consideration profound transformations for the simple reason that in no case have they been produced by an army's intervention in politics. The social reforms which ensued from the recent military revolutions in the Near East do not really amount to basic transformations. The

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 53-61.

Meiji reforms in Japan, though precipitated by a show of military helplessness, were a complex and comprehensive process, and cannot be cited as a case to the point. We are left, then, with the processes of levelling of privileges and of displacement of the incumbents. By subversiveness I mean the inclination to bring about either of these modifications of the social circumstances. Our judgment on the ethical value of subversiveness as thus defined will depend on how we evaluate the established order and the alternatives.

An army may be employed against the enemies outside or against their own civilian population. Both of these modes of employment produce modifications of the social structure, but they do it in entirely different ways. A war, particularly when the very survival of the state is at stake, produces an adaptation to the requirements of bellic efficiency, whose nature depends above all on the technique of warfare. The need for efficiency may impose considerable levelling of social inequalities, as well as an increase in vertical mobility ; but it may also have an opposite effect. I cannot attempt here to analyse the factors which determine the directions of this mode of influence (1). What I wish to emphasize here is the difference between the two modes of influence. In the cases of adaptation to bellic efficiency the impact of the army does not consist of sheer compulsion, and in the extreme cases may even be backed by the enthusiasm pervading the whole population. This mode of influence of the armed forces on society might be called consociative. The other mode of influence, the essence of which is the forcing of an unwanted social order upon the civilian population by the use of the threat of violence, might be termed schismic. Almost needless to say, these concepts are ideal types, and any concrete case presents an intermixture of both, though in widely differing proportions. Both modes of influence are largely determined by the military participation ratio, which has been defined as the ratio of militarily utilized individuals to the total adult masculine population. In order not to repeat what I wrote in the work mentioned above, I shall treat this factor here as one of the "other things" which are taken as "being equal".

I shall only remark that where the armed forces constitute the ruling class there can be no question of their subversiveness. Neither in medieval Europe nor in the Ottoman Empire, nor in any other society of similar type, did the warriors menace the social order in spite of their frequent rebellions. They fought among themselves for spoils and glory, but never took the side of the humble against the rich. The possibility of assault upon the social order arises only when there is a differentiation between the civilian and the military sectors.

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(1) I have done it in my *Military Organization and Society* (London, Routledge, 1954).

Gaetano Mosca considered the subordination of the armed forces to the civilian authority to have been one of the most distinctive and crucial features of the European civilization. Although many military dictatorships have arisen since he wrote *Elementi di Scienza Politica,* there can be little doubt that, in comparison with what went on in other parts of the world, ever since the end of the Middle Ages, the European armies were on the whole very obedient. The number of European monarchs who have been killed by their troops is negligible in comparison with what happened elsewhere in the world. In spite (or perhaps because) of its anti-militaristic ideology, China suffered a number of military rebellions on a scale unparaleled in Europe : the revolt of An Lu-Shan during the reign of the T'ang dynasty was a social cataclysm of the first magnitude. Mosca's explanation of this peculiarity of the Occident was that it was due to the integration of the armed forces in the body politic, and particularly, to the integration of the officers' corps with the ruling class. Let us for the moment disregard the other ranks and examine the validity of Mosca's thesis in so far as it concerns the officers. In a way it seems paradoxical to explain somebody's subordination by the fact that he belongs to the ruling class. Moreover, everywhere and always the commanders of armies enjoyed opulence and other privileges, and in this sense they belonged to the top layer of society. The question is whether in addition to this they were united with the rest of the ruling stratum by the bonds of kinship, common outlook and habits, and of common economic interest. Mosca's explanation does appear to hold if we compare Europe with Asia. Naturally, one must be very careful when speaking of the whole of Asia, for the circumstances varied enormously in time and space, but it does seem that, unlike Europe, Asia was not free from the phenomenon which might be described as the alienation of the officers. In Europe, the monarchy and the nobility found on the whole a *modus vivendi,* and created a code of rights and obligations which was fairly well observed, whereas in the Orient (with the partial exception of China) a violent struggle went on continuously between the rulers and the magnates. I cannot attempt to give here an explanation of the causes of this difference, for which I must, once again, refer the reader to my *Military Organization and Society*. What is important for the present argument is that in the deadly struggle against the magnates, the rulers often employed slaves and mercenaries recruited from the lowest strata. These troops revolted frequently and on some occasions deposed the rulers, decimated and despoiled the nobility, and put themselves in their place. In this way, even before the Ottoman conquest the Turks replaced the Arabs as the ruling ethnic element in the Near East. By a similar process the Slave dynasty established its rule in Northern India, and the Mamluks in Egypt. Such a thing never occurred in Europe since the times of Ancient Rome. What did occur in Rome fits perfectly Mosca's thesis—which is not surprising in view of the high standard of his classical scholarship. So long as the senatorial nobility furnished officers it was secure. Marius and his soldiers were proletarians, or at least of proletarian origins. The generals and the soldiers who exterminated the Roman nobility in the third century A.D. began their lives as sons of peasants in the outlying provinces. Here, however, it was not so much the ruler's tactics which excluded the nobles from the higher military posts as their own inaptitude and preference for more pleasant ways of life. It must be remembered that ancient wars were much harder and more dangerous than the wars waged in modern Europe until 1914.

Unless an army is too weak to be able to impose its will on the civilian population, as in the United States in the last century, the integration of the officers' corps in the ruling layer appears to be a necessary condition of some measure of political neutralization; but the evidence from Latin America shows that it is not a sufficient condition, for there pretorianism flourished notwithstanding the monopolisation of the higher military posts by the landowning families. This was due in the first place to the uncristallized character of the political order; to the lack of any accepted code of behaviour on political matters, to disorderly administration and the absence of well organized political parties, which made violence inevitable. In Chile, where the ruling class was cohesive and more orderly, the military remained at the back of the stage. The second cause of the predominance of the military in Latin American politics has been the bitter class warfare raging there ever since the days of the conquest. A very important factor here was the absence of the need for united effort in a common struggle against foreigners, which did so much to infuse a strong dose of supra-class solidarity into the European nations. It is sad to find that the absence of concern for the common good might be the result of relatively unwarlike existence. Apart from warranting the foregoing qualification, the data on Latin America do not contradict Mosca's thesis : the armies did not remain in the background of politics, but they were very far from being subversive. On the contrary, they invariably intervened in the class struggle when the ruling classes were losing their grip on the masses. The exceptions to this rule also fit Mosca's thesis. The very few attempts at some levelling of social inequalities made by the military were initiated or led by officers who were not closely related to the very rich ; and who were, moreover, below the rank of the general. "The social identification with the urban groups where he originated was probably the fundamental cause of the junior-officer uprising that occurred in Latin America's armies in the second quarter of the twentieth century" (2).

The case of Egypt fits perfectly Mosca's thesis. Nasser and his colleagues did not belong to the hereditary rich, who shunned military service. The honorific as well as economic position of an army officer was low, so that the officers shared, and later canalized, popular discontent. The Iraqi revolution was headed by Kassem, a general and a man of somewhat more substantial family background than Nasser, and yet his government was and is more radical than the Egyptian in the way in which it attacked the old ruling class. However it is well known that social determination of attitudes has only a statistical validity, and always admits individual exceptions. The social origins of the majority of Kassem's assistants seem to be even more demotic than those of Nasser's.

"Almost invariably, Latin America's popular revolutions of this century were led by the young officers. They became the sponsors of fundamental change and reform, the underminers of traditional institutions, the proponents of public-welfare measures [...] These young officers thought of themselves as enlightened members of a new, modern generation. Regarding the generals as unimaginative and behind the times, they sought to bring the armed forces into more sympathetic relations with the rest of the society. They were also interested in power, which could be had by gaining popular support, by playing the role of saviours of the downtrodden masses" (3). There are examples from other areas of the world (the young Turks, the Decembrists in Russia, Nasser's team), which show that, on the whole, the political interventions of younger officers tend to be less on the conservative side than those of their seniors. This may be due to the natural conservatism of old age, or to greater satiety induced by having reached the summit of the hierarchy. However, there are good grounds to believe that youth as such infuses a certain rashness and extremism into political action, but does not decide whether it will be carried out for the benefit of the privileged or of the hampered. Young men are, no doubt, not only more rebellious, but also more susceptible to the appeal of impersonal ideas, than their elders, yet they can very well rebel against social equality, and the ideals which they uphold might be elitarian in the extreme. In Japan in the thirties the young officers terrorized their seniors as well as the civilian politicians into adopting a policy of aggression outside coupled with the repression of the liberal and pro-labour elements at home. The differences in rank and age are particularly likely to foster socially subversive ideas when accompanied by differences in class affiliations, especially if demotic affiliations constitute an impediment to promotion. Apart from the cases mentioned above, this was the situation of Napoleon Bonaparte and of a considerable number of other officers of the French army on the eve of the Great Revolution.

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(2) Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, Praeger, 1960).

(3) Lieuwen, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9.

Integration or alienation may determine the attitudes of the officers, but for effective action they must have control over their men. There are examples of *coups d'État* which failed because the soldiers did not obey the orders, and remained loyal to the existing government. This was notably the case with the Generals' Revolt against Hitler in 1944. The second danger is that, by ordering the soldiers to disobey the established authority, the commanders may provoke a general rebellion which might turn against them as well. There were examples of this during the wars of Independence in Latin America. Let us examine the circumstances which make either of these dangers more or less imminent.

The first factor to be considered is the strength of the factors which bind the soldiers to the civilian society. Other things being equal, the weaker they are, the more absolute is the control of the officers over the men in political matters. The alienation of the soldiers from the civilian society may be the result of long term service, or of foreign origins, or of methods of recruitment which select a special psychological type, or of stationment in distant lands or in the midst of a cultural environment with a distinctive ethos. One or more of these features characterized all military formations renowned for incursions into politics: the Roman pretorians, the mercenaries of the Islamic monarchs, the French parachutists in Algeria. In Ancient Rome military revolts began when the army acquired these characteristics. Psychologically unselected short-term conscripts can be used for this purpose when either the whole population is ignorant or politically apathetic or when they are drawn from an unassimilated ethnic minority. The troops which Pilsudski used for destroying the constitutional government in Poland came from the eastern territories which were not ethnically Polish; the troops which opposed him came from Western Poland where there was only a German minority which was able to evade military service. In Latin America the lowest ranks are either mercenary (as they were in Cuba) or recruited among illiterate peasants. In Peru, Colombia and other 'mestizo' countries these peasants have the further advantage of being Indians who have to be taught Spanish.

The alienation of the army largely determines whether it can serve as an instrument of rebellion without the danger of a chain reaction which would spread into the civilian population. The same applies to the internal struggles within the army. When in 1934 the N.C.O.'s and privates of the Cuban army, led by sergeant Fulgencio Batista, imprisoned or killed their seniors, and replaced them as the rulers of Cuba, the civilian population stood aside: the affairs of the mercenaries were of no concern to them.

The strength of any social body depends on its solidarity, which is not fostered by extreme inequalities and the absence of upward mobility. That the latter circumstances weaken the nations has been noticed long ago. At the beginning of the last century a Polish historian Joachim Lelewel attributed the fall of Poland to this cause (without, of course, using these terms). It was the proof of Mosca's genius that, diverging from all current opinions, he put forward the view that the relative docility of the European armies depended on the rigidity of class divisions in their midst. He reached this conclusion by comparing them with the armies of the Roman empire. Military commanders of modern Europe could not easily defy their rulers because, being divided from their men by an impassable economic and cultural abyss, they did not enjoy the popularity of their Roman counterparts. To put it into psychological parlance, there was no basis for projective identification. The uniting force of common hopes of enrichment was lacking too.

To the foregoing arguments a proviso must be added that the internal horizontal chasm only hampers the intrusions into politics of the armed forces, it does not make them altogether impossible. In the same way the integration of the rank and file in civilian society make them less suitable as an instrument of *coups d'État,* yet they can be so used if the issues do not arouse strong passions among the population. Other factors which neutralize the importance of the soldier's convictions are the discipline, the efficiency of the organization and the unanimity among their commanders.

An important question which must be considered is whether wars or preparations for them foster or impede military intrusions into politics. The chief difficulty in answering this question stems from the ways in which the impact of war is connected with other factors such as the growth and vertical unification of the armed forces, which strengthen an army's internal position irrespectively of whether a war is being waged or not.

Thus it frequently happens that when a war ends, the balance of power between the military and the civilian authorities finds itself strongly tilted in favour of the former. Moreover, the after-glow of the apotheosis of the military chiefs which normally takes place during a war, endows them with political prestige which they could not acquire in the time of peace. This is the origin of the father-figures of Hindenburg, Wellington, Eisenhower, de Gaulle. If a defeat has undermined the standing of the rulers, or if the country is infested by ex-combattant desperados who could find no satisfactory places in civilian life, an aftermath of war might generate disorders which automatically bring the armed forces into the arena. In these ways, then, wars stimulate military interventions in politics. On the other hand, however, 'the devil finds work for idle hands' : the soldiers who have no wars to fight or prepare for will be tempted to interfere in politics. Taking a long term view, it seems that there is an inverse connection between strenuous warfare and pretorianism. In Rome the civil wars began when Carthage—the last enemy who could threaten the very existence of the empire—had been destroyed. In modern Europe the country which was most plagued by revolutions—Spain —did not take part in any major war since the times of Napoleon. What is even more telling is that it acquired this propensity only when it ceased to conquer and to send colonial expeditions. On the other hand, in Russia, which was nearly always at war and conquering, the army remained remarkably obedient. The Japanese, who remained confined to their islands nearly throughout their history by the overwhelming might of the Chinese Empire, have an unrivalled record of civil wars. Latin America, where very few wars were fought, experienced more military revolts during the last century and a half than the rest of the world together. The inverse connection between outward militancy and proneness to revolts, which the foregoing evidence suggests, is explained, apart from the factors discussed above, by the fact that external and civil wars provide alternative releases of the pressure of population on resources.

GINO GERMANI *and* KALMAN SILVERT

Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America

THE recent politico-military events of Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and even France demonstrate that the application of unabashed armed might to the solution of civic problems is not peculiar to Latin America, nor indeed a phenomenon to be correlated only with economic underdevelopment. Public violence and political instability in Latin America have all too often been treated either as merely comic or else a manifestation of "spirit", "temperament", or "Latin blood". Riots in the streets of Buenos Aires are no less tragic than riots in the streets of Algiers—and no less related to the basic facts of social disorganization as they may be reflected in crises of political legitimacy and consensus.

Military intromission in the political power structure always indicates, of course, at least a relative inability of other social institutions to marshal their power effectively, and at most an advanced state of institutional decomposition. This is to say, if the armed forces are viewed as having a limited and specialized set of functions having only to do with internal order and external defense, then a widening of castrensic activities into other social domains implies a generally weakened and sick social system, no matter the country or even the special cultural conditions concerned. This premise suggests several ways of constructing typologies of civil-military relations : one possibility is to order the types of social pathology to be found, and then to relate them to the historical facts of politico-military action ; another is to order types of public violence, and once again to relate these to the real types of military interventions ; and still a third alternative suggests itself in the direct listing of the institutional arrangements between the military establishment and the political institution treated as a variable dependent upon other social factors. This article will employ the latter procedure as being of the most immediate analytical utility, even though direct correlations between military action and the

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general state of social and economic development are at best vague.

Most Latin American countries have reached their first century and half of independent existence. However, their social development into national states lagged behind formal independence and it is only now that a few of them are reaching a stage of full nationhood. While in some countries the breakdown of the traditional structure began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in many others a similar process of structural change did not start until the last two or three decades of the present century. Furthermore, one must remember that nowhere, not even in the most "advanced" Latin American nations, may it be said that the transition is complete.

In this transitional process we shall distinguish a series of successive 'stages' so that the degree of development reached by any single Latin American country can then be described and compared with others. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the intrinsic limitations of such a procedure : nevertheless, it seems the most convenient one to yield a short-hand description of the present situation, while at the same time retaining a clear awareness of the total dynamics of the process. It must be added that this "model" of the transition is the result of a schematization of the actual historical process as it has been observed to take place in Latin America.

A tentative simple typology of the social structure of the twenty Republics has been summarized in Table 1. In constructing it we have taken into account those traits which we consider most relevant to the problem at hand: namely, economic structure ; the social stratification system (especially the existence of a self-identifying middle stratum) ; the degree of economic and cultural homogeneity and of participation in a common culture and in national life ; the degree of national identification ; and geographical discontinuities in the socio-economic level of the various regions within each country (1). While we do not identify the successive

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(1) The table appeared in a slightly modified form in Gino Germani, "The strategy of fostering social mobility", paper prepared for the Seminar on *The Social Impact of Economic Development in Latin America* (Proceedings publ. by the UNESCO, forthcoming). Only part of the basic data are shown in the table.

For the main concepts used in formulating the scheme, see : G. Germani, *Integración política de las masas* (Buenos Aires, CLES, 1956) ; "El autoritarismo y las clases populares", in *Actas IV Congreso Latino Americano de Sociologia* (Santiago, Chile, 1957) ; *Politica e Massa* (Minas Gerais, Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1960) ; K. Silvert, "Nationalism in Latin America" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 334 (1961), 1-9 ; of the relevant bibliography on this subject we

[...] *No data.* * 1940.

TABLE I

(1950 *circa*)

COUNTRIES		% middle and upper strata	% in primary activities	% in cities of 20,000 and more inhabitants	% middle and upper urban strata	% literates	university students per 1,000 inhabitants
Group A: (a) *Middle strata: 20% and more;* (b) *cultural, psychological and political existence of a middle class;* (c) *ethnic and cultural homogeneity; national identification and considerable level of participation in different spheres;* (d) *urban/rural differences and geographical discontinuity exist, but to a lesser extent than in other Latin American countries.*							
Argentina	urban predominance	36	25	48	28	87	7.7
Uruguay		...	22	50	...	95	5.2
Chile		22	35	43	21	80	3.9
Costa Rica	rural predominance	22	57	18	14	80	3.9
Group B: (a) *Middle strata: between 15 and 20% (approx.) heavily concentrated in some areas of the country;* (b) *cultural, psychological and political existence of a middle class;* (c) *ethnic and cultural heterogeneity; pronounced inequalities in the degree of participation in national society and in other aspects;* (d) *strong regional inequalities with concentration of urbanization and industrialization in certain areas and rural predominance in the greater part of the country.*							
Mexico	lesser survival of traditional pattern	17*	56	24	...	59	0.9
Brazil	greater survival of traditional pattern	15	62	20	13	49	1.2
Group C: (a) *Middle strata between 15 and 20% (approx.);* (b) *emerging middle class (but there is no agreement as to its degree of auto-identification);* (c) *ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, pronounced inequalities in the degree of participation in national society and other aspects;* (d) *pronounced discontinuity between rural/urban areas and strong regional inequalities:*							
Cuba	urban predominance	22	44	37	21	76	3.9
Venezuela		18	44	31	16	52	1.3
Colombia	rural predominance	22	58	22	12	62	1.0
Group D: (a) *Middle strata: less than 15%; emergent middle strata in some countries, but clear persistence in all, in varying degrees, of the traditional pattern;* (b) *ethnic and cultural heterogeneity in almost all;* (c) *vast sectors of the population still marginal;* (d) *rural predominance in general; regional inequalities.*							
Panama		15	55	22	15	70	2.6
Paraguay		14	54	15	12	66	1.3
Peru		...	60	14	...	42	1.6
Ecuador		10	51	18	10	56	1.4
El Salvador		10	64	13	9	57	0.5
Bolivia		8	68	20	7	32	2.0
Guatemala		8	75	11	6	29	0.1
Nicaragua		...	71	15	...	38	0.7
Dominican Republic		...	70	11	...	43	1.2
Honduras		4	76	7	4	35	0.7
Haïti		3	77	5	2	11	〃

"stages" of the historical scheme with the different "types" of social structure described in the Table, we suggest that various degrees of 'delayed development' may have resulted in situations similar to those indicated in the typology.

STAGES 1 AND 2. *Predominance of the traditional social structure. Formal national independence and civil wars.*

The common trait of these first two stages of Latin American development is the persistence of the "traditional" society which maintained its essential features throughout the political upheaval and radical changes in formal political organization.

STAGE 1. *Revolutions and wars for national independence.*

At the time when they gained their independence (in most cases *circa* 1810) the Latin American countries may be said to have approximated the "ideal type" of the "traditional society": subsistence economy marginal to the world market and a two strata system characterized by little or no mobility and caste-like relationships. The Spaniards and Portuguese were the ruling group, and immediately below them we find the small élite of the *créoles*, of European descent and mainly urban, who while deprived of political power still belonged (subjectively as well as objectively) to the higher stratum and retained a dominant position from the economic and cultural point of view. It was this creole élite who brought about the revolutions and achieved national independence with support of the lower strata, including the *Mestizos* and even part of the outcast group of the Negroes and the Indians who filled the armies of the independence wars. The creoles were inspired mainly by the American model, the French revolution and seventeenth century illuminism. They attempted to establish modern democratic states with their corresponding symbols: the 'constitution', the 'parliament', the elected rulers, and so on. There were, however, two basic limitations to their action. The first may be found in the creole elite itself: it was the expression of a traditional structure and in spite of its ideology, it still perceived itself as an aristocracy widely separated from the popular strata. The democracy they dreamed of was the "limited" democracy of

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took especially into account: S. M. LIPSET, *Political Man* (New York, Doubleday, 1960), and D. LERNER, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1958).

the wealthy, the educated, the well-bred of proper descent. On the other hand, the prevailing state of the society was scarcely adequate to the establishment of a representative democracy : powerful geographical as well as ethnic, cultural and economic factors made such an undertaking simply utopian.

STAGE 2. *Anarchy, "caudillismo" and civil wars.*

The outcome of such a situation was simply that, even before the end of the long and cruel wars of independence against the Spaniards, the constitutional "fictions" created by the urban élites broke down. The political and institutional vacuum resulting from the disappearance of the colonial administration and the failure of the "constitutional fictions" resulted in the geographical fragmentation of political power : the rise of local "caudillos" often of *mestizo* or even Indian origin, frequent local wars, and a rapid succession of military coups.

The army of the "caudillos" was seldom anything more than an armed band, under the leadership of a self-appointed "general". At this stage we do not find in Latin America any professional army, but the political rule of the caudillos often adopted some symbols both of the army and of the democratic regimes : the geographical fragmentation took the form of a "federal" state, the absolute rule of the caudillo that of the "president" and, at the same time, "general" of the army. During this stage the social structure remained very much the same. This was especially true of the primitive state of the economy, the stratification system, and the isolation, both economic and social, of most of the population.

STAGES 3 TO 6. *Transition of the social structure from the "traditional" to the "industrial" pattern.*

While some countries show a clear succession of these four stages, in the majority of the cases there is much overlapping. Nevertheless the scheme is useful as a conceptualization of the transition towards a mature national state : that is, toward political unification and organization, attainment of certain preconditions of economic growth, changes in the social structure and progressive enlargement of social participation (including political participation).

There is one very important and well known feature of this process which must be emphasized here; the unevenness of the transition, the fact that some groups within the society and some areas within each country remained unchanged and underdeveloped while others underwent great changes. This is a familiar fact in most countries, but in Latin America (as in other underdeveloped areas) it acquired a particular intensity. The typical *dual* character of the countries both from the *social* and the *geographical* points of view is expressed in the contrasts between the socially "developed" higher and middle strata and the "backward", more primitive, lower strata; the cleavage between certain areas in which most of the urban population, industrial production, educated people, wealth and political power are concentrated, and the rest of the country, predominantly rural, with a subsistence economy, illiterate, and politically inactive and powerless. The transition, in Latin America, cannot be understood without taking into full account the repercussions of this dual structure.

Social development involves first the extension of the modern way of life to a growing proportion of the people living in the most favored areas (the emergence of an urban middle class and a modern industrial proletariat in the "central" sector of a country), and second the incorporation— by way of massive internal migration or by geographical diffusion of industrialization and modernization — of the marginal population living in "peripheral" areas. The circumstances of the process, and especially its speed, are of the utmost importance for the political equilibrium of the country.

STAGE 3. *Unifying Dictatorships.*

The struggle between the caudillos within a given country was eventually replaced by the hegemony of one among them. The unity of the state was restored and a degree of order and stability achieved. However, the character of these "unifying dictatorships" differed very widely. For our present purpose they may perhaps be classified into two main categories: "regressive" dictatorships, which maintained completely intact the traditional pattern, and "enlightened" dictatorships, which introduced at least some modernizing measures. The most important difference between the two lies in the economic sphere. While the former maintained their countries isolated from the world market, and the old subsistence economy continued to predominate, the latter fostered at least a minimum degree of economic development, through the construction of means of transport and communication, some modernization of agriculture, some educational measures, organization of the public bureaucracy, and so forth.

Generally it was these relatively more enlightened authoritarian regimes, as well as the "limited democracies", which marked the beginning of the transformation of the Latin American countries into producers of raw materials and their integration into the world market. Foreign capital was introduced, the beginnings of industrialization took place, and these changes began to produce some impact on the social structure. While they left untouched the main features of the traditional pattern—the concentration of land ownership, the two class system, the isolation of the great majority of the population—they created certain dynamic factors which in time produced further changes making for transition. The integration of the country into the world market and the degree of economic modernization often fostered the emergence of new urban middle occupational strata. While they remained a relatively small proportion of the total population, and significantly, continued to be identified with the traditional upper class, these urban strata also represented an essential precondition for further changes.

One important feature of the enlightened dictatorships is the attempt at a "professionalization" of the army and the fact that while the dictators were often military men they tried to control the army itself, submitting the unruly military caudillos to the central political authority of the state.

STAGE 4. *"Representative Democracy with Limited Participation"*.

The changes in the social structure under a "limited democracy" were often only slightly more pronounced than those induced by the "enlightened" dictatorships. In other cases, however, the modification was more substantial. This happened chiefly when the modernizing attitudes of the elites were bolder and the resulting economic and cultural changes more profound. In some cases the contribution of massive immigration from Europe—a part of the modernizing policy of the elite—was a decisive element in the transformation of the social structure.

The most significant feature of this stage is the formal functioning of democracy, the existence of a party system, the periodical replacement of the government through elections, freedom of the press and other "constitutional" guarantees. Another and no less essential feature is the "limitation" of democracy to only a fraction of the total population. This limitation is twofold. On the one hand the existing deep cleavage between developed and backward areas within a given country involved the almost complete exclusion of a substantial proportion of the population, practically all those living in the "peripheral" areas. On the other hand, a similar cleavage existed within the "central" areas, between the elites and the emerging middle strata, on the one side, and the lower groups on the other. Often the cleavage had also an ethnic basis even if we cannot speak of "racial" discrimination in Latin America. Both kinds of cleavage—geographical and social—meant the lack of a common basis for a real national identification on the part of a substantial proportion of the population, and of course a lack of cultural and economic participation. In consequence, the functioning of democracy was really limited in the sense that only the higher strata and the small newly formed middle groups (which identified themselves with the elite) living in the "central areas" did participate in one way or another in the political process (even at the lowest level of simple voting).

However, in those countries where the middle occupational strata could expand to a higher proportion of the total population, and because of their immigrant origin, or their economic and cultural significance or some other causes, were able to acquire a greater psychological and social autonomy, strong political movements appeared which strove for a more real and enlarged democracy. In general such a situation was reached only in the most advanced areas of the country.

STAGE 5. *"Representative Democracy with Enlarged Participation"*.

The typical structure corresponding to this stage is still that of the dual society referred to previously, involving the geographical juxtaposition of a modern "central region" and "backward" peripheral regions. The former comprising most of the urban population, the industry, the literates, the middle strata and the modern urban proletariat, including, of course, the industrial workers. This region would contrast sharply with other regions which still remained—even though to a lesser degree—outside this development. Democracy,. social, cultural and political participation, as well as national identification, included mostly people residing in the "advanced" areas. The difference from the previous stage of "limited" democracy is that now not only the middle strata would usually participate directly in the government or even control it, but the urban proletariat of the "central" region would also be included through the unions and political parties. The spread of nationalism—right and left—and of different "ideologies of industrialization" are characteristic of this phase.

STAGE 6 (A). *"Representative Democracy with Total Participation".*

With the growing integration of previously marginal social groups and geographical areas into the cultural, economic and political life of the nation as a whole, with the acquisition of national loyalties and identification by all the inhabitants, and with the resulting higher degree of cultural and economic homogeneity of the various groups in society, we reach a new stage which we may call, for lack of a better term, that of "full nationhood". A high degree of urbanization, total literacy and a high average education, a high degree of occupational differentiation and a high proportion of the urban occupational middle strata which may now well be nearly 50 % of the active urban employed population, are the other well known traits which characterize such a stage.

While in older nations, cultural homogeneity and national loyalty may not be accompanied by a high degree of economic development, in most instances "mass consumption"—that is, mass participation in the material culture of the industrial society—may also be regarded as one of the traits of the phase of "total participation democracy". From the political point of view it means effective full citizenship for the entire population, irrespective of area of residence or of socio-economic or ethnic affiliation. As a result, an important indicator of this stage is that of political participation at the level of voting of a substantial majority of the adult population of both sexes (2).

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(2) The phenomenon of 'non-voting' and 'political apathy' which appear in some developed countries (as the U.S.A. for instance) has a different meaning from the non-participation of the marginal and isolated sectors in underdeveloped countries.

Stage 6 (B). *Total Participation through "National-Popular" Revolutions.*

This pattern, which is increasingly typical of many underdeveloped countries—either under the form of communist totalitarianism or under the form of nationalistic authoritarianism—has also appeared in Latin America. It is obvious that the kind of "political participation" which takes place in the framework of such "national-popular" regimes is quite different from that of "representative democracy". However, it would be a mistake not to recognize the tremendous change involved for the marginal strata of the "dual" underdeveloped society.

While the national popular regime negates the very values which are the basis of participation in "representative democracy" —such as civil liberties—it does incorporate the marginal strata into the economic, cultural and political life of the nation. It induces their forceful "nationalization", and results in a change from passive acceptance (through internalized norms) to "compulsory participation". In Latin America, perhaps more than in other countries, "national-popular" regimes appear to be the outcome of the failure to develop into a full "representative democracy". From this point of view such an outcome appears to be connected with the failure in the formation of adequate channels of political expression for the social groups which successively emerge from the isolation and marginality in which they lived within the traditional social structure.

Such seems to have been the role of both "limited" and "enlarged" democracy : to prepare the institutional means and adequate outlets for the political pressure of the emerging larger strata of the population, within the framework of "representative democracy". Obviously, this is not only a political problem. The successful integration into such a framework also requires an expanding and modernizing economy, at least sufficient to give, even at a very modest level, an increasing degree of participation in the material culture of the industrial civilisation, and this latter requirement is certainly more acute today than it was in the countries of Europe in which development occurred earlier.

If "limited democracy" is to succeed in the role we have mentioned, at least two conditions must be met. Firstly, the regime must be stable enough and last long enough to allow the establishment of a party system adequate for the expression of the increasing popular participation. Secondly, the "revolution in aspiration" must be to a certain extent synchronous with the economic and technical possibility of raising the level of living of the population. If both conditions are not satisfied, the chances are very high that political participation will be reached through one kind or another of "national-popular" revolutions. The marginality or the complete isolation of these larger strata of the population explains the greater stability achieved in the past by "limited" democracy both in Latin America and elsewhere. The chances of such stability are decreasing very sharply today and for a country whose socio-economic development has been retarded for one reason or another, political participation is more likely to take the form of a "national-popular revolution" than that of a "limited" or even "enlarged" democracy.

Considering now the present situation of the 20 Latin American Republics we find examples of most of the "stages" just described, with the obvious exception of the first, and (perhaps) the second, stage. The "contemporaneity of the non contemporaneous" certainly does apply to present Latin America, even if qualifications must be made for the peculiar historical circumstances of each country; and for the fact that certain changes would affect every country irrespective of their general socio-economic conditions. It is true, furthermore, that we do not find here a strict correlation between the political and the total social structure, or, as was pointed out earlier, with the type and extent of military intervention. But let us insist on the purely descriptive character of our typologies. They are no more than devices for introducing some order in a rather confusing and contradictory picture.

There can be little doubt that while "representative democracy" did reach—at least during certain periods of their history—a fairly high degree of stability in the countries we have classified at the top of Table I (Groups *A* and *B*), it never appeared or else it failed to attain a comparable duration and stability in the other two groups (*C* and *D*). But, of course, many inconsistencies both apparent and real appear all along the continuum from minimum to maximum national and socio-economic development as defined according to the criteria adopted.

With the possible exception of Colombia, and to a lesser degree and more recently, of Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador, it can be safely stated that most of the 14 countries included in the two lower groups have failed to escape the vicious circle of dictatorships, brief attempts (or none at all) at "limited" democracy, succession crises (in general under the form of military "coups"), even if at one time or another some more "enlightened" autocracy may have introduced a certain degree of "modernization", at least in opening the country to foreign capital and enterprises to exploit the local resources in raw materials. These combinations have often proved to be stable enough—small groups of big landowners, mainly military autocrats, and foreign investors. Such is clearly the case of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Paraguay, and we may note that their present social structure is fairly consistent with their political history and actual situation. Of the other countries, Colombia—with a relatively high proportion of middle occupational strata—has managed to maintain for a longer time a more stable "limited democracy", but even so gravely perturbed by the chronic civil wars between political factions. Venezuela showed the first symptom of changes towards representative democracy after the long dictatorship of Gomez. Its first freely elected government (1946) had a short duration and only in recent years a new attempt at a "representative democracy" is being made. Similar processes can be seen in the other countries.

It is not surprising that it is precisely in this area that in the last decade there have been at least three "national-popular" revolutions (Bolivia, Cuba and Guatemala), and that presently the attempts at "representative democracy" of the new civilian regimes of Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia encounter such great difficulties in the face of the growing pressure of the previously marginal strata, which the rapid urbanization and the growth in communication media are so swiftly displacing from a passive to an active role. While the ruling class may perhaps be ready to accept the functioning of a "limited" democracy, they are certainly not disposed or prepared to accept an enlarged participation with all its economic and social implications. The chances of incorporating the new strata—statistically the great majority of the population—into the framework of a representative democracy are greatly impaired not only by this opposition, but also by the relatively politically "anomic" situation in which these vast social groups find themselves because of the lack of adequate channels of expression of their political aims within the existing party system. The legitimacy of the regime is frequently at stake and its stability greatly diminished.

The six countries of the first two groups fit rather closely into our scheme of the transition. All of them had their period of anarchy, centralizing autocracies, limited democracies and, now, enlarged democracies. The modern urban proletariat and the urban middle strata form the human basis of such regimes. In Mexico and Brazil, while both groups only constitute a relatively low proportion of the total population, their heavy concentration in the cities and in certain regions within each country explains their dominant role in political life. But although with many peculiarities "representative democracy" can be said to function at present in these countries, they do offer contrasts as to the degree of stability and degree of interference of the military in civilian affairs.

Perhaps the contrast between Argentina and the other countries is the most disturbing fact. While Argentina may be considered as the most "advanced" as a national state on the basis of the usual indicators, it is also the most unstable and disturbed. After more than 60 years of continued functioning of a representative democracy, and having passed from a limited to an enlarged level without major troubles, it has relapsed in the last three decades into military revolutions, a decennial dictatorship and the very uneasy democracy of the post-Peronian period. There is, however, a difference. While most of these countries are certainly to be considered as "enlarged" democracies, the situation of Argentina can be better described as one of recent transition into a—as yet unstable—"total participation" democracy. Its very instability as compared with the greater stability of the other countries can be interpreted, at least partially, as one effect of this difficult transition. The level of voting is certainly suggestive of such an interpretation. If we consider the proportion of voters in the total adult population we find a sharp contrast between Argentina on the one hand and Mexico, Chile and Brazil on the other. While in Argentina the percentage of voters in the total adult population (20 years and more) is over 80 % (and if we take, according to the legal definition, persons of 18 years and older it is still 75 %), in Mexico (1958) it is 48 %, in Brazil (1960) 40 % , in Chile (1958) 34 %. We must also remember that if we discount the foreign residents, who in Argentina are around 15 % (adult age groups), the proportion of participants would be even higher. In the remaining countries the foreign residents are a very low proportion and would not make any significant difference.

We are not assuming that the proportion of voters is a cause of instability; we are using it as an indicator of the level of functioning of democracy and of integration into national society:

here it is sufficient to mention countries such as England (80 %, 1951), Australia (86 %, 1949) or Canada (74 %, 1949). We have used as a uniform basis for comparison: percentage of voters on total population of 20 years and more. It cannot be denied that the low proportion of voters in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile simply means that a considerable sector of the adult population is not yet integrated into the national body. The rural dweller, the peasant isolated in his small community, is certainly less politically relevant than the industrial worker in the cities, and his role continues to be more a passive than an active one. This integration is certainly a fact in contemporary Argentina and here we must take into account the historical circumstances which caused the partial failure of the "enlarged" democracy to create an institutional framework for the smooth functioning of a representative regime at a total level of participation, in order to understand the apparent "paradox" of this country, relatively so advanced (within the Latin American continent) and still in the grip of continuous military intervention.

While it would not be safe to make any prediction, it is reasonable to think that the greater stability enjoyed by both "limited" and, later on, "enlarged" representative democracy in Chile, the strong traditions which have been formed through its long political experience and the more firmly established party system (in comparison with Argentina) will be great assets in the transition from the present "enlarged" participation, to the coming level of "total" participation. But, in any case, in all the five countries, with their rapid rate of urbanization and the even more rapid spread of communication, the incorporation of the still marginal groups is imminent. It will involve a great strain on the present institutions and, as the cases of Vargas and Peron show very clearly, they will not be immune from the possibility of "national-popular" solutions.

The role of the military in Latin America must be understood in this rather complex picture. If we conceive it as related both to the kind of political system and to its *degree* of stability, then we must expect everywhere in Latin America and at all levels of socio-economic and national development the possibility of some intromission of the military into civilian affairs. In fact, some degree of stability can be reached in most of the transition stages, even at the "backward" one of centralizing autocracy; and conversely instability may appear even at the most "advanced" level of "enlarged" democracy if its corresponding social and political requirements are not adequately satisfied.

Let us formulate now a typology of institutional civil-military relations and relate them to the different particular situations of the Latin American countries (3).

1. *The classical military garrison state.* This form develops typically in response to real or imagined external factors. No example of such Spartan organization is to be found in Latin America, where cases of truly serious and devastating wars of sufficient duration to work fundamental institutional change are extremely scarce. The major exception is the Paraguayan War of the last century, but social conditions in that country were insufficiently advanced to permit of the establishment of a truly centralized garrison state, despite the devastating nature of the armed conflict itself.

2. *The modern totalitarian garrison state.* This phenomenon is still, fortunately, an evil dream of imaginative writers, for no historical examples are to be found anywhere. The low state of the technological arts everywhere in Latin America makes this development at present impossible for these republics.

3. *The totalitarian politico-military relations.* This pattern of relationships inextricably intertwines political and military functions within a monolithic public organization, as in Nazi Germany. Once again the insufficiencies of Latin America's technological state have to date prevented the formation of modern, totalitarian states, although such a country as Argentina is beginning to approach at least the material ability to include such a solution within its array of social possibilities. The "national-popular" revolutions have not attained so far this politico-military structure and one reason may be the technical underdevelopment of their bureaucratic organization. On the other hand, the rapid extension of radio, television, and other media of mass communication heightens this possibility as the unilateral dependence on weapons alone for social control in extreme cases thus becomes less necessary.

4. *The military as institutionalized governors.* This kind of authoritarianism is very common in Latin America, and is a persistent form from the earliest days of independence to the present day. The existence of the armed forces as an organized and ostensibly efficacious group in administrative affairs has tempted to the simple transposition of personnel from military to governmen-

(3) For a narrower version of this typology and other suggested categorizations of Latin American politics, see K. H. Silvert, Political Change in Latin America, *in* Herbert Matthews, ed., *The United States and Latin America* (New York, The American Assembly, 1959). Also refer to the March 1961 issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, entitled *Latin America's Nationalist Revolutions*, for other pertinent and recent information.

tal functions and to subsequent rule as *de facto* and eventually *de jure* governors. Given the long-standing tradition of military privileges (from the colonial period) and military participation (from independence wars) in Latin America, such a pattern is likely to appear whenever the political instability reaches a point at which the social legitimacy of a regime or a government is no longer accepted by the major relevant groups within the society. Such a situation may happen, as we noted earlier, at every level of the transitional process. It is obvious why it would predominate during the early days of independence and the years of confusion and anarchy which followed the failure in establishing modern states in the liberated colonial territories. And it still predominates in the more retarded countries such as the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Haiti and Nicaragua, in all of which the structure of traditional society has changed very little. But it is small wonder that relatively more advanced countries such as Argentina from the early thirties and, in very recent years, Colombia and Venezuela have experienced the same phenomenon. Here the instability must be related, as we indicated before, to a different underlying situation. The crucial common ground of all these cases is an irreconcilable division among the various politically relevant groups, and the lack of shared norms regarding political activity. The military, clearly and loyally, has usually worked in conjunction with important civilian elements, serving as an arm for the maintenance of group interest. History belies the simplistic belief that such alliances have always been between the most conservative groups and the military. On many important occasions organized military might has been brought to bear to promote the interests of new industrial agglomerations against the pretensions of landed Conservatives and sometimes even the Church. During certain periods of Mexico's growth, for example, the military in combination with civilians contributed heavily to the social experimentation characterizing that country from 1917 until 1940 at least. This important category of events needs, thus, to be subdivided in accordance with the civilian allegiances and ideological orientations of the military, and the resultant effects on the total socio-economic and political structures.

5. *The military as trustee governors.* As naked military intervention becomes increasingly viewed as shameful, this phenomenon has increased in incidence. There are two notable recent cases, that of the Provisional Government of General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu in Argentina (1955-1958), and that of Admiral Wolfgang

Larrazabal in Venezuela (1958-1959). Both governments arose after the fall of dictators, both of whom had risen out of the ranks of the military and subsequently were deposed by the military in combination with civilian groups. Aramburu and Larrazabal committed themselves to "cushion" governments, *interregna* permitting the formation of parties, the holding of legal elections, and the installation of civilian authorities.

6. *The military as orienters of national policy.* This very subtle manifestation involves the exercise of power not on the immediately visible scene but rather in the fashion of a grey eminence. The military in this situation attempt to establish the broad policy limits within which civilian activity may express itself, the sanction for disobedience obviously being deposition of the legally constituted authorities. The significant Mexican developments mentioned above are, in all their real complexity, a combination of this category with the two immediately preceding. Whether or not the Mexican armed forces still effectively limit the freedom of the Mexican Government is a matter of some debate, especially given the strength of the single official party of Mexico and the very wide distribution of the civilian sectors supporting this party system and the incumbent governors (4). Perhaps the clearest, most evident case of tutelary military behavior can be seen now in Argentina, where the military overtly acts to contain the policies of the Government, openly threatens coups, publicly debates political policies, and on occasion even moves troops to back its demands on the civilian governors. Military budgets are holy, and officers of the armed forces in a limited retirement occupy many important administrative positions in the civil service.

7. *The military as pressure group with veto power.* This rather standard manifestation of military power in many developed countries is still little seen in Latin America, except possibly in the case of Chile. In this situation the military institution has the power to prevent antagonistic civilian action undertaken

(4) Oscar Lewis, in his "Mexico Since Cardenas", *in* Lyman Bryson, ed., *Social Change in Latin America Today* (New York, Harper, 1960), pp. 301-302, writes :

« A comparison of the allocations of federal funds to the various departments over the four presidential administrations from Cardenas to Ruiz Cortines reveals [...] some highly significant trends. Especially marked is the sharp decrease in the proportion of funds allocated to national defense, reflecting the demise of *caudillismo* as a serious factor in Mexican life. Adolfo Ruiz Cortines was the first president since the 1920's who did not depend heavily on either the national or a private army to maintain his control. »

Professor Lewis then points out that between 1935 and 1940 defense expenditures absorbed 17.3 percent of the national budget, dropping to 8.1 percent in the period 1953-1956.

against it, but cannot initiate independent action or policy in fields outside of its range of professional interest.

8. *The military as simple pressure group.* This stage, the last before the military fades away into complete subordination to the civil authorities, is probably the status of the armed forces of Uruguay alone among the Latin American republics. The very special circumstances of Uruguay's past offer some apparently reasonable explanations of this phenomenon. A buffer state lying between two relatively powerful neighbors, Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay has never been able realistically to dream of armed exploits. Further, the country is politically a city-state, a fact which has contributed to the early development of what can truly be called a "bourgeois" society (in the primitive sense of the term). Moreover, a high degree of political involvement of the citizenry has created areas of civil power not conducive to military adventures.

9. *The military as simple police force in complete subordination to the government.* Costa Rica prides itself on having this kind of civil-military pattern, and is even wont to deny the existence of an army altogether, stating that the civil force is in truth merely a police agency. If the situation is not really such a pure subordination of the armed forces to the civil authorities, still the case offers a reasonable approximation. Once more circumstances unique for Latin America have brought about this situation. Costa Rica was unattractive to early Spanish colonizers, for it had a small indigenous population and no readily available minerals. As a result the Costa Rican central valley was an area of slow and secondary settlement, peopled by persons who had to work the land themselves. This emergence of a landed peasantry permitted the development of a type of "bourgeoisie" (in the figurative sense of the word) which, as in the case of Uruguay, has had long experience in the organization and application of its power to the detriment of armed pretenders.

10. *The military as political arm of the state.* This pattern, obviously closely related to the idealized versions of the functions of the Red Army of the USSR and of the various "People's Armies" invariably tends to emerge from revolutionary situations of the left. The Arevalo-Arbenz Governments of Guatemala (1945-1954) and the present Governments of Cuba and Bolivia are the only three cases in Latin America of frankly leftist politics, albeit of different colors. In the Guatemalan case no serious attempts were made to turn the military into an active arm of the government; instead, especially during the interrupted term of Pres-

ident (and Lt. Col.) Jacovo Arbenz Guzman, the design was to keep the army small and the officer corps highly contented. According to available report, the Castro Government has broken the professional army by investing civilian militias with great power and by politicizing the officer corps of the regular forces. This procedure was also used in Bolivia with the establishment some eight years ago of an armed civilian militia whose primary function was to counterbalance the regular army.

Military intervention in civilian affairs, as is suggested by this typology, clearly does not occur either in an ideational vacuum or in the absence of a sometimes very wide range of interests and pressures. Military politics inevitably and invariably involve identification with wider social interests and ideologies. The patterning of these identifications depends in important measure on the social origins of the officer corps and the social mobility functions which the military institution may serve. Unfortunately there are almost no reliable data available on these questions. From subjective evaluations and informal observation, however, one may suspect a considerable variation in the social origins of officer groups from country to country, and a consequent variation in the political identification of the military. It is also entirely evident that there must be great variation in the opportunities for upward social mobility offered by differing armed forces. Wide differences in budgets and in the sizes of the military establishments must affect mobility, of course, as do generalized social attitudes concerning the prestige of the military (5).

A relatively safe generalization is that throughout Latin America

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(5) *The Statistical Abstract of Latin America 1960* (Center of Latin American Studies, University of California in Los Angeles), p. 32, offers some partial and tentative figures on the percentage of Latin American budgets devoted to defense expenditures. The data are incomplete for all countries.

Country	*Percentage of National Budget*	*Year*
Mexico	11,3	1958
Costa Rica	3,8	1958
El Salvador	10,2	1958
Guatemala	8,8	1958
Honduras	11,7	1957
Haïti	19,1	1957
Argentina	21,1	1958
Brazil	27,6	1958
Chile	21,9	1958
Colombia	5,7	1958
Ecuador	21,6	1957
Peru	23,2	1958
Venezuela	9,5	1959

These figures are admittedly tenuous, and probably err on the low side, of course.

the sons of middle class families are more attracted to the military than are the sons of the upper groups. The result often has been to split the ideological unity of the military, to create inter-service rivalries as well as intra-service discord. This growing fragmentation must be projected against the increasing complexity of Latin American society itself, affected as it is by economic development, changing world ideological currents, and rapidly growing industrial urbanization. Because nowhere in Latin America—even in famed Uruguay and Costa Rica—are the institutional patterns of secular and impersonal representative democracy fully established, many civilian groups are innately revolutionary in their attitudes and predisposed to the use of force as an inherent and thus desirable part of the social pattern. Both military schisms and military adventures are encouraged by the civilian groups soliciting armed aid for their political ambitions. Even though the following quotation concerns the Spain of the 1930's, it is valid for the Latin American arena as well :

> No doubt the generals in 1936 thought they were saving Spain [...] The State must be capable of embodying and responding to what Maura called the vital forces of the community. Otherwise, as he warned repeatedly, the army will claim to embody the national will in order to enforce changes which political institutions are impotent to encompass. Above all, no democrat, repeating the follies of the progressive and moderate minorities, can appeal to the sword rather than to conviction, however slow the educative process may be. Though the Republic of 1931 came in on a vote, many Republicans were willing to see it come in through the army. Repeating the tactics of Ruiz Zorrilla, they systematically undermined the loyalty of the army. Some saw the danger. 'I would prefer no Republic to a Republic conceived in the womb of the army.' Many did not. How could they complain when other forces tampered with the loyalty of the army in 1936 (6) ?

The military will be reduced to their barracks and their professional functions alone only when Latin American countries develop sufficiently complicated power structures and a society sufficiently flexible and integrated ; when social and geographical discontinuities have been greatly lessened and isolated or marginal masses incorporated into the national body ; when economic and social conflicts have found institutionalized expression within a common framework of shared norms.

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(6) A. R. M. Carr, "Spain", *in* Michael Howard, ed., *Soldiers and Governments : Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations* (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), pp. 145-146.

LUCIAN W. PYE

Armies in the Process of Political Modernization

ONLY a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing communist parties. It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation-building. Now that the military has become the key decision-making element in at least eight of the Afro-Asian countries, we are confronted with the awkward fact that there has been almost no scholarly research on the role of the military in the political development of the new states.

An underlying assumption behind much of Western political thought is that political institutions are above all else the products of the dynamic forces peculiar to a particular society and thus reflect the distinctive values and the styles of action common to that society. It is acknowledged, of course, that once institutions are established they tend to become dynamic and hence influence the values and the expectations of the population. There is thus an assumption of a circularity of relationships or a state of equilibrium. The fundamental view, however, is still that the dynamics of the system lie within the society as a whole and that it is the institutions which must be responsive. Governmental institutions can display initiative, but fundamental change originates within the society.

When we turn to the newly emergent countries this model no longer seems appropriate. For in these societies the historical pattern has been the introduction of institutions from outside, with a minimum concession to the values and behavior of the people. These fundamentally authoritative structures have thus tended to be shaped according to foreign standards. Rather than respond-

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ing to indigenous values they have often proved to be the dominant factor in stimulating further changes throughout the society.

These considerations suggest that it might be useful to organize our analysis of the political role of the army, first, with respect to the political implications of the army as a modern institution that has been somewhat artificially introduced into disorganized transitional societies : and second, with respect to the role that such an army can play in shaping attitudes toward modernity in other spheres of society. By such an approach we may hope to locate some of the critical factors for explaining why it is that the military has been a vigorous champion of progress and development in some countries and a retarding influence in others. We may also hope to gain a basis for judging the probable effectiveness of armies in promoting national development and eventually democratic practices.

1. *The Army as a Modern Organization.*

In large measure the story of the underdeveloped countries is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized for achieving new objectives. This is the problem of establishing organizations that, as rationalized structures, are capable of relating means to ends. The history of much of the Western impact on traditional societies fits comfortably within this theme, for the businessman, planter, and miner, the colonial administrator, the missionary, and the educator each in his own way strives to fit modern organizations into tradition-bound societies. Similarly, the story of the nationalists and of the other Westernized leaders can be treated on essentially identical terms, for they too try to change the habits of their people by creating modern organizations.

Needless to say, there are not many bright spots in this history, and it is open to question as to who has been the more tragically heroic or comically futile : the Westerners struggling to establish their organizations in traditional societies, or the nationalist politician and the indigenous administrator endeavoring to create a semblance of order out of chaos. On balance the attempts to establish military organizations seem to have been noticeably the most successful.

It would be wrong to underestimate the patient care that has gone into developing and training colonial armies, and in the newly independent countries the military have been treated relatively generously in the allocation of scarce resources. But in comparison to the efforts that have been expended in developing, say, civil administration and political parties, it still seems that modern armies are somewhat easier to create in transitional societies than most other forms of modern social structures. The significant fact for our consideration is that the armies created by colonial administration and by the newly emergent countries have been consistently among the most modernized institutions in their societies. Viewed historically, some of these armies have been distinguished : the Indian Army, the Malay Regiments, the Philippine Scouts, the Arab Legion, the Gurkha Regiments and the King's Own African Rifles, to mention only the more celebrated ones.

It would take us too far afield to explore the relative advantages military leaders have in seeking to establish armies in transitional societies. We need only note that there is a paradoxical relationship between ritualized and rationalized modes of behavior that may account for the ease with which people still close to a traditional order adapt themselves to military life. Viewed from one perspective, a military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the ideal type for an industrialized and secularized enterprise. Yet from another point of view, the great stress on professionalism and the extremely explicit standards for individual behavior make the military appear to be a more sacred than secular institution. If discipline is needed to minimize random and unpredictable behavior, it is also consonant with all the demands that custom and ritual make in the most tradition-bound organization.

For these reasons, and for others related to the hierarchic nature of the organization, the division between traditional and rationally oriented behavior is not very great within armies (1). Indeed, in any army there is always a struggle going on between tradition and reason. Historically, during periods of little change in the state of military technology the tendency has been for the non-rational characteristics to become dominant (2). Given this inherent conflict in any military organization the question arises as to why the forces of custom and ritual do not readily dominate the armies of the newly emergent countries, and so cause them to oppose the forces of change. In societies where traditional habits of mind are still strong one might expect the military to be strongly conservative. Such was largely the case in the West during the pre-industrial period. By contrast, in most of the newly emergent countries armies have tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to champion responsible change and national development.

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(1) It is significant that the most common weaknesses of civil bureaucracies in the new countries—like exaggerating the importance of procedure to the point of ritualizing the routine, and the lack of initiative and of pragmatic and experimental outlook—are not as serious drawbacks to smooth functioning of military establishments. On the contrary, the very qualities that have hobbled civil administration in these countries have given strength and rigidity to their military establishments.

(2) The classic discussion of the spirit of militarism as contrasted with the rational military mind is Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism : Romance and Realities of a Profession* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1937).

This state of affairs is largely explained by the extent to which the armies in these countries have been influenced by contemporary Western military technology. In particular nearly all of the new countries have taken the World War II type of army as their model (3). In so doing they have undertaken to create a form of organization that is typical of and peculiar to the most highly industrialized civilization yet known. Indeed, modern armies are essentially industrial-type entities. Thus the armies of the new countries are instinct with the spirit of rapid technological development.

The fact that these new armies in pre-industrial societies are modelled after industrial-based organizations has many implications for their political roles. One of their characteristics is particularly significant : the specialization that modern armies demand in skills and functions is only distantly related to the command of violence. There has generally been a tremendous increase in the number of officers assigned to staff functions as contrasted with line commands. As the armies have striven to approximate their ideal models they have had to establish all manner of specialized organizations and departments that require skills that are either in short supply or non-existent in their societies. The Burmese army, for example, in addition to its engineer and signal corps has special sections on chemical warfare, psychological warfare, and even a historical and archeological section. All the new armies have attempted to introduce specialized training schools and advanced techniques of personnel management and procurement. Consequently, numbers of the more intelligent and ambitious officers have had to be trained in industrial skills more advanced than those common to the civilian economy.

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(3) World War II was in itself a decisive event in the birth of many of these countries and, of course, the availability of large quantities of surplus equipment and arms made it realistic to aspire to a modernized army. American military aid has contributed to making the military the most modernized element not only in recipient countries, but also in neighboring countries which have felt the need to keep up with technological advances.

The high proportion of officers assigned to staff functions means that large numbers of officers are forced to look outside their society for their models. The fact that army leaders, particularly the younger and more ambitious, generally come from those trained in staff positions means that they are extremely sensitive to the needs of modernization and technological advancement. This kind of sensitivity bears little relationship to the command of physical violence and tests of human endurance—in short, to the martial spirit as we customarily think of it. In consequence the officers often find that they are spiritually in tune with the intellectuals and students, and those other elements in society most anxious to become a part of the modern world. They may have little in common with the vast majority of the men they must command. In this respect the gap between the officer class and the troops, once largely a matter of social and economic class (as it still is to some degree), has now been widened by differences in the degree of acculturation to modern life.

It should be noted that these revolutionary changes in military life have significantly influenced the status of the military profession in different societies and hence have had an interesting effect on relative national power. Cultures that looked down on the military at an earlier stage of technology now accord high prestige to the same profession as it has raised its technology. For example, when armies depended entirely on human energy and animal power the Chinese placed the soldier near the bottom of the social hierarchy; with present levels of advanced military technology the soldier is now near the top of the social scale in both communist and non-communist China. The change has been more in the nature of the military profession than in basic Chinese cultural values. Conversely, peoples once considered "martial" may now show little interest in, or aptitude for, the new kind of soldiering.

Above all else, however, the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies.

It might seem that those occupying positions in other modern-type organizations in underdeveloped societies would also feel much the same need for change. To whatever extent this may be so, three distinctive features of armies seem to make them somewhat more dynamic in demanding changes.

First of all, armies by nature are rival institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test of one against the other. All other organizations operate within the context of their own society; although their initial inspiration may have come from abroad, their primary focus is on internal developments. The civil bureaucracy, for example, can, and indeed has to, deal with its domestic problems with little regard for what other bureaucracies in other countries are doing. The soldier, however, is constantly called upon to look abroad and to compare his organization with foreign ones. He thus has a greater awareness of international standards and a greater sensitivity to weaknesses in his own society.

Second, armies for all their concern with rationality and becoming highly efficient machines are relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on a day-to-day basis. Armies are created for future contingencies, and in many underdeveloped countries these contingencies have never had to be faced. Even in countries where the army is forced to deal with internal security problems, such as Burma and Indonesia, the effects have been mainly to increase the resources available for building up the army according to the ideal model, with remarkably few concessions being made to practical needs. Other modernized organizations in underdeveloped societies have to cope with more immediate and day-to-day problems; hence they must constantly adjust themselves to local conditions. They cannot adhere as rigidly as armies can to their Western prototypes. Just as Western armies have often existed in a dream world of planning for types of wars that never occur, so armies of underdeveloped countries can devote themselves to becoming modernized and more "efficient" with little regard to immediate reality. Members of other modern-type organizations may desire to see social change in their society, but they are likely to be more conscious of the need to accommodate their ambitions to existing conditions.

Finally, armies always stand at some distance from their civilian societies and are even expected to have ways of their own, including attitudes and judgments, that are remote if not completely apart from those of civilian life. Thus again armies of the newly emergent countries can feel somewhat divorced from the realities of a transitional society and focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world. In consequence they are often unaware of the difficulties inherent in modernizing other segments of their society. Within their tradition all problems can be overcome if the right orders are given.

2. *Armies as Modernizing Agents.*

So much for the army as one of the more modernized of the authoritative agencies of government in transitional societies. When we consider it as a modernizing force for the whole of society, we move into a less clearly defined area where the number of relevant considerations becomes much greater and where we are likely to find greater differences from country to country. Indeed, we shall be able to deal only generally with the social and political aspects of military service and some of the more indirect influences of armies on civilian attitudes.

In all societies it is recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier. The underdeveloped society adds a new dimension : the good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to more Westernized ideas and practices. The very fact that the recruit must break his ties and associations with civilian life and adjust to the more impersonal world of the army tends to emphasize the fundamental nature of this process, which involves the movement out of the particularistic relationships of traditional life and into the more impersonal and universalistic relationships of an industrialized society.

Army training is thus consistent with the direction taken by the basic process of acculturation in traditional societies. Within the army, however, the rate of acculturation is greatly accelerated. This fact contributes to the tendency of army officers to underestimate the difficulties of changing the civilian society.

Probably the most significant feature of the acculturation process as it takes place under the auspices of the army is that it provides a relatively high degree of psychological security. The experience of breaking from the known and relatively sheltered world of tradition and moving into the more unknown modern world is generally an extremely traumatic one. In contrast to the villager who is caught up in the process of being urbanized, the young army recruit from the village has the more sheltered, the more gradual introduction into the modern world. It is hardly necessary to point out the disturbing fact that the urbanization process as it has taken place in most Asian, African, and Latin American societies has generally tended to produce a highly restless, insecure population. Those who have been forced off the land or attracted to the cities often find themselves in a psychologically threatening situation. These are the people who tend to turn to extremist politics and to look for some form of social and personal security in political movements that demand their total commitment. In contrast, those who are exposed to a more technologically advanced way of life in the army find that they must make major adjustments, but that these adjustments are all treated explicitly and openly. In the army one can see what is likely to happen in terms of one's training and one's future. This is not the case in the city.

It should also be noted that the acculturative process in the army often tends to be more thorough and of a broader scope than the urbanization process. In all the main Asian cities there are those who still follow many of the habits and practices of the village. They may live still within the orbit of their family and have only limited outside associations and contacts. These people have made some adjustment to the modern world, but they are likely to be faced with even more in the future, and thus they remain potential sources of political tension.

It should also be noted that the acculturative process in the army tends to be focused on acquiring technical skills that are of particular value for economic development. Just as the army represents an industrialized organization, so must those who have been trained within it learn skills and habits of mind which would be of value in other industrial organizations. In the West, armies have played a very important role in providing technical training and even direct services in the process of industrial development. The German army trained large numbers of non-commissioned officers who performed important functions as foremen in the German steel mills and in other industries. In the United States the Corps of Engineers, of course, played a central role in the whole development of the West; and after the Civil War army veterans provided considerable amounts of the skill and knowledge which, when combined with the influx of immigrants, provided a basis for much of our industrial development. In Latin America the Brazilian Army has played an important part in opening the interior, in promoting the natural sciences, and in protecting the Indian population. In Asia, too, we can see much the same story being enacted now. Before the war the compulsory training in the Japanese Army provided the whole society with increasing reservoirs of man power which contributed directly to the development of an industrial society. Army veterans in India have played an important role not only in lower-level industrial jobs, but also in managerial positions. In Malaya and the Philippines the army has been the main instrument for training people in operating and maintaining motor vehicles and other forms of machinery.

Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the army is that it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they are identified with a larger political self. They learn that they stand in some definite relationship to a national community. In this sense the army experience tends to be a politicizing experience. Even if recruits are not given explicit training in political matters, they are likely to learn that events in their society are determined by human decisions and not just by chance and fate. Within the army the peasant may come to realize that much in life can be changed and that commands and wishes have consequences. Thus even aside from any formal training in patriotism the recruit is likely to achieve some awareness of the political dimensions of his society. It is therefore not surprising that in many of the newly emergent countries veterans have had appreciable political influence even after only limited military experience.

Armies in the newly emergent countries can thus provide a sense of citizenship and an appreciation of political action. In some cases this can lead to a more responsible nationalism. Indeed, the recruit may be impressed with the fact that he must make sacrifices to achieve the goals of nationalism and that the process of nation-building involves more than just the shouting of slogans. At the same time there is always the potential danger that the armies will become the center of hyper-nationalistic movements, as in the case of pre-war Japan.

Because the army represents one of the most effective channels for upward social mobility, military-inspired nationalism often encompasses a host of personalized emotions and sentiments about civilian society. Invariably the men, and sometimes even the officers, come from extremely humble circumstances, and it is only within the army that they are first introduced to the possibility of systematically advancing themselves. In transitional societies, where people's station in life is still largely determined by birth, and by chance opportunities, powerful reactions usually follow from placing people in a position where they can recognize a definite and predictable relationship between effort and reward. The practice of giving advancement on merit can encourage people, first, to see the army as a just organization deserving of their loyalties, and then possibly, to demand that the same form of justice reign throughout their society.

Those who do move up to positions of greater respect and power through the army may often carry with them hostilities toward those with greater advantages and authority in civilian society. The tendency of the military to question whether the civilian elite achieved their station by merit adds another conflict to civil-military relations in most underdeveloped countries. More often than not the military show these feelings by seeking to make national loyalty and personal sacrifice the crucial test of national leadership.

The relationship between armies and civilian leaders varies, of course, according to the circumstances of historic development. Broadly speaking, however, it is helpful to distinguish three different general categories of such relationships.

There are first those patterns of development in which the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy. This situation is most likely to exist when the traditional political order, but not necessarily the traditional social order, has been violently disrupted and it becomes necessary to set up representative institutions before any of the other modern-type political organizations have been firmly established. The outstanding example of this pattern of development is modern China from the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the victory of the communists. Indeed, it is possible to think of this period as one dominated by a constant struggle to escape from the grim circumstances that obtained when only military organizations survived the fall of the traditional systems. Hence the military became the only effective political entity. Thereafter nothing could be done without them, and yet the military could do little without effective civilian institutions. Comparable situations seem to exist at present in some Middle Eastern countries where Western influence brought a commitment to republican institutions but left the army as the only effective modern political structure in the entire society.

A second category includes those countries where the military, while formally espousing the development of democracy, actually monopolizes the political arena and forces any emerging civilian elite to concentrate on economic and social activities. In many ways this arrangement is reminiscent of the Belgian variety of colonialism. At present, the most outstanding example of this form of rule is Thailand.

A third major category, which is probably the largest, consists of those countries in which the organization and structures essential to democratic government exist but have not been able to function effectively. The process of modernization has been retarded to such a point that the army, as the most modernized organization in the society, has assumed an administrative role and taken over control. In these cases there is a sense of failure in the country, and the military are viewed as possible saviors (4).

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(4) This study will be published in a forthcoming book entitled *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, edited by John J. Johnson.

RAYMOND ARON

La mitraillette, le char d'assaut et l'idée

L'INTÉRÊT que les sociologues prennent depuis quelques années aux problèmes de la guerre s'explique aisément si l'on regarde le monde. Ce qui devrait plutôt surprendre, c'est la relative indifférence que marquaient naguère la plupart des sociologues à ce phénomène à la fois social et asocial qui, à travers les millénaires de l'histoire humaine, a formé, détruit, façonné les sociétés.

Les faits qui sont à l'origine de ce regain d'intérêt me paraissent multiples, en apparence incohérents. Par leur diversité même, ils expliquent les directions, elles aussi divergentes, dans lesquelles s'est engagée la recherche.

I

Les grandes doctrines sociologiques, celles des fondateurs de la sociologie durant la première moitié du XIX^e siècle, incluaient toutes une interprétation de la guerre. Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx s'efforçaient de l'expliquer, de la mettre à sa place parmi les données majeures de l'ordre ou du devenir de l'humanité. Ils aboutissaient à des prévisions ou à des leçons — prévisions sur les chances de disparition de la guerre et leçons en ce qui concerne les conditions auxquelles elle disparaîtrait. La mise au point des armes de destruction massive a rendu quelque actualité à ces spéculations : ce sont les réalistes, non les utopistes, les savants plus que les moralistes qui posent la question de savoir si les guerres entre États armés de bombes thermo-nucléaires, donc la souveraineté des États, sont désormais compatibles avec la survie de l'humanité.

Simultanément, les historiens ou philosophes de l'histoire ne pouvaient pas ne pas être frappés par le contraste entre la perte

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des empires et la prospérité des métropoles. Le peuple anglais, en dépit de l'abaissement politique de la Grande-Bretagne, vit mieux qu'au temps de la splendeur impériale. La thèse soutenue par les libéraux au siècle dernier sur le coût économique des colonies recevait une confirmation spectaculaire. Du même coup, l'espoir était rendu aux sociologues pacifistes. En un siècle imprégné de marxisme, les sociologues passent aisément (trop aisément) de la proposition : « Guerres et domination sont de mauvaises affaires » à la proposition : « la société industrielle éliminera le fléau des guerres. »

Enfin, comme pour tourner en dérision les spéculations optimistes nourries par le fait thermo-nucléaire et la prospérité des métropoles décadentes, l'humanité d'aujourd'hui, des plaines du Laos jusqu'au faubourg de Berlin, semble vivre en une sorte de guerre permanente et diffuse. Le conflit entre les deux Grands ou les deux blocs est idéologique en même temps que diplomatique. Les querelles à l'intérieur des nations se rattachent aux rivalités sur la scène internationale. La distinction entre politique intérieure et politique étrangère s'efface. Peut-être, disent les pessimistes, la guerre thermo-nucléaire n'aura-t-elle pas lieu mais, en contrepartie, toute politique devient belliqueuse. A l'ombre de la menace thermo-nucléaire qui paralyse les grands États, la subversion se déploie.

A cette première série de phénomènes s'en ajoute une deuxième, qui touche aux relations de l'armée et du pouvoir civil. Trois phénomènes ont frappé les observateurs.

Le rôle joué par l'armée française depuis quelques années, le coup d'État finalement tenté par quatre généraux en retraite, ont démontré avec éclat — à supposer que la démonstration fût nécessaire — que, même en un pays où le pouvoir civil a maintenu sa suprématie à travers les changements de régime, les circonstances peuvent inciter le corps des officiers ou un fragment de ce corps à se mêler de politique, voire à tenter la prise du pouvoir.

Le cas français — vieille démocratie d'Europe occidentale — est contemporain de cas nombreux dans ce que l'on est convenu d'appeler le tiers monde. Régime neutre, dirigé par le chef de l'armée au Pakistan, régime révolutionnaire en Égypte, régime que l'on hésite encore à qualifier en Turquie, ces trois cas ont un trait commun : ils ne ressortissent ni à la démocratie occidentale ni au soviétisme. Ils ne méritent pas d'être appelés « intermédiaires », car ils ne sont pas à mi-distance entre la compétition constitutionnelle des partis et le monopole idéocratique du parti unique. En Turquie, l'armée est intervenue pour sauver l'héritage de la révolution moderniste de Kemal Ataturk, pour éliminer le despotisme d'un parti qui, à l'origine, avait été investi par le vote populaire mais qui avait progressivement vidé les institutions représentatives de leur substance et de leur signification. Au Pakistan, le régime militaire a succédé aussi à une démocratie pluraliste, arrivée à une phase extrême de corruption : il semble moins despotique qu'éducateur, il tente de créer les conditions dans lesquelles demain une démocratie authentique pourrait fonctionner. Le régime du colonel Nasser est moderniste, comme celui du maréchal Ayoub au Pakistan, comme celui du général Gursel en Turquie, mais, en plus, il se veut révolutionnaire (bien qu'il frappe impitoyablement les intellectuels, progressistes ou communistes).

Révolutionnaire, le régime du colonel Nasser s'affirme en route vers un but lointain, il se consacre à une tâche indéfinie, il veut bâtir un État, édifier une industrie, animer une nation. Les régimes non révolutionnaires du Pakistan ou de Turquie ne se donnent pas des objectifs aussi grandioses. Bien qu'ils soient également acquis à la cause, désormais universelle, du développement économique, ils sont soucieux de rétablir le règne de la loi, voire, le jour où les circonstances le permettront, les partis et le parlement.

Un troisième phénomène (peut-être faudrait-il dire un aspect du phénomène précédent) mérite d'être souligné : la tendance des partis et des régimes révolutionnaires à un style militaire d'action. Les armées de libération nationale, créées par les partis de l'indépendance, se soumettent inévitablement à une discipline qui doit être d'autant plus rigoureuse que soldats et officiers vivent dans la clandestinité ou le maquis. Mais les partis révolutionnaires eux-mêmes, suivant l'exemple donné par le parti de Lénine au début du siècle, n'hésitent pas à se comparer à une armée en campagne, à conférer au comité central ou à son bureau politique une autorité comparable à celle de l'état-major et à exiger du militant, une fois la décision prise au sommet, une conduite de soldat, même si la conduite est proprement politique (propagande, discours, etc.).

Des régimes, à beaucoup d'égards aussi différents que ceux d'Indonésie et de Cuba, présentent tous deux l'exemple d'une sorte d'osmose entre action révolutionnaire et action militaire — osmose qui se prolonge bien au-delà de la phase, nécessairement militaire, de la prise du pouvoir par la force. Le D^{r} Fidel Castro, fils de bourgeois moyens, ayant passé par l'université, demeure le

Commandante de « l'armée rebelle » tout en exerçant les fonctions de premier ministre. L'intellectuel révolutionnaire a pris le maquis, il a fini par conquérir l'État, il est devenu chef civil mais il garde la fierté de son rôle militaire et de son grade, il ne transmet à personne le commandement des forces armées, il donne des mitraillettes à 250 000 miliciens et il applique au développement économique et à la construction politique le vocabulaire des armées au combat. Qu'il s'agisse de réforme agraire, de sucreries ou de primeurs, les slogans sont animés d'un esprit martial : *venceremos, patria o muerte.* La menace américaine, il va sans dire, est pour une part cause, en tout cas justification de cette militarisation de la révolution. Mais la menace extérieure ne semble pas indispensable à la diffusion et à la permanence du style militaire : ce phénomène s'est reproduit trop souvent, en trop de pays différents, pour qu'il ne soit pas lié à des causes profondes, aux caractères mêmes de la tâche à accomplir et des partis qui en assument la responsabilité.

Les régimes militaires du tiers monde n'appartiennent pas à un camp plutôt qu'à un autre. Le régime du Pakistan est lié à l'Occident, celui de l'Indonésie se réclame du neutralisme positif comme celui de l'Égypte. Mais les armées du tiers monde n'appartiennent pas à un type unique. A une extrémité se situe l'armée du Pakistan qui demeure, en large mesure, une armée britannique, dont les chefs ont reçu formation technique et éducation morale en Grande-Bretagne. Une telle armée s'est chargée du pouvoir sinon malgré elle, au moins par nécessité, parce qu'une pseudo-démocratie pluraliste entraînait le pays vers le chaos. L'armée rebelle à Cuba et, à un moindre degré, l'armée indonésienne sont sorties de la révolution. Les officiers sont, en grand nombre, des intellectuels qui ont revêtu l'uniforme. L'armée du Pakistan est une survivance de la période impériale ou, si l'on préfère, une partie de l'héritage laissé par le colonialisme. L'armée cubaine ou indonésienne est, tout au contraire, l'œuvre de la révolution ou de la guerre de libération. L'armée égyptienne n'est ni du type pakistanais ni du type cubain ou indonésien. C'est une armée nationale qui peut invoquer un passé glorieux, antérieur à l'occupation britannique mais récent. Elle n'a pas eu à combattre pour vaincre la puissance impériale mais elle a connu, face à Israël, l'humiliation de la défaite. Les officiers qui chassèrent le roi, ses pachas et son pseudo-parlement ne sont ni de purs techniciens formés à Sandhurst ni des intellectuels sous l'uniforme. Ce sont des officiers issus des classes moyennes, qui ont reçu une formation professionnelle et qui ont des idées, qui sont révolutionnaires.

Comme on le voit, les deux phénomènes que j'ai mis en troisième position, à la fin de chacune des deux séries, se rejoignent et tendent à se confondre. Que l'on parle de « guerre subversive », du « style militaire des partis révolutionnaires », des « intellectuels sous l'uniforme » ou de la « propension révolutionnaire des armées dans les pays du tiers monde », on ne vise évidemment pas les mêmes faits ou les mêmes aspects de faits. Mais, à n'en pas douter, on désigne des faits contemporains les uns des autres, également caractéristiques du tiers monde. C'est dans le tiers monde que sévit la « guerre subversive », cependant que la menace thermo-nucléaire paralyse les grandes puissances et que les métropoles déchues cherchent refuge dans la prospérité et le bien-être. C'est dans le tiers monde que les intellectuels ont pris le maquis, que les officiers ont fait des révolutions, que toutes les armées sont modernistes et non réactionnaires, que langage politique et langage militaire se mêlent.

Du même coup, certaines oppositions, qui passaient pour inévitables en Europe occidentale, sont remises en question. Combien de fois, en France, n'a-t-on pas évoqué l'incompatibilité d'humeur entre le soldat et le professeur (ce dernier considéré comme symbole de l'intellectuel), l'un voué aux valeurs d'action et l'autre aux valeurs de réflexion, l'un se réalisant lui-même dans l'obéissance et par le sacrifice, l'autre dans le doute et par la critique, l'un de droite et l'autre de gauche, l'un répétant « travail, famille, patrie », l'autre « liberté, égalité, fraternité » ! Le dialogue du soldat et de l'intellectuel, sous la forme que nous lui avons caricaturalement donnée, est français et non universel. Il n'est même pas universellement français. Il n'est pas vrai que les officiers des armées européennes aient eu toujours, au long du XIXᵉ siècle, des idées conservatrices ou réactionnaires. Les officiers espagnols ont été, en grand nombre, libéraux, durant le siècle dernier. C'est après la guerre américaine et la perte des derniers lambeaux de l'empire que l'armée espagnole est devenue, définitivement, conservatrice d'elle-même et de ses privilèges, réactionnaire par égoïsme, par aveuglement, par mythologie compensatrice. De même, c'est dans le dernier tiers du XIXᵉ siècle, en fonction d'un certain recrutement, par réaction à l'avénement de la IIIᵉ République, que le corps français des officiers a combiné le loyalisme à l'État, la neutralité politique et la préférence pour les idées dites de droite. Si nous voulons comprendre comment se pose, à notre époque, à travers le monde, le problème général des armées et de la politique, la meilleure introduction sera de reprendre l'analyse du problème, tel qu'il s'est posé en Occident, en écartant les légendes et en surmontant les passions.

II

Prenons, pour point de départ, les relations entre pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire dans les circonstances où la coopération entre eux est à la fois le plus difficile et le plus indispensable : la guerre. La théorie est simple : le pouvoir civil est responsable de la *conduite de la guerre*, le pouvoir militaire responsable de la *conduite des opérations militaires*. Toute la question, en principe, est de savoir où se situe la ligne de partage entre la conduite de la guerre et la conduite des opérations. De 1914 à 1918, à l'intérieur de tous les pays belligérants, ministres et généraux furent en dialogue et souvent en conflit à la fois sur les mesures à prendre et sur le partage des responsabilités.

La compétence exclusive des généraux en fait d'opérations étant admise, une décision comme celle qu'inspira Winston Churchill, celle de tenter d'ouvrir les Dardanelles, ne pouvait être prise qu'après consultation et en accord avec les chefs militaires. Mais la décision d'une offensive française au Chemin des Dames ou d'une offensive anglaise dans les Flandres, directement inspirée par les chefs militaires, exigeait-elle l'accord des Cabinets? A quel moment les généraux avaient-ils le droit de reprocher aux hommes politiques de se mêler des affaires militaires dans lesquelles ceux-ci n'avaient pas de compétence? A quel moment les hommes politiques avaient-ils le droit de reprocher aux généraux de peser sur des décisions diplomatiques que ces derniers avaient à connaître mais non à discuter? La réponse à ces questions ne pouvait être ni générale ni indiscutable. Selon la personnalité des généraux et des ministres en présence, les uns ou les autres conduisaient la guerre. En Angleterre comme en France, généraux et amiraux ne mettaient pas en doute, sur le plan des principes, la suprématie du pouvoir civil, mais les généraux, précisément parce qu'ils n'envisageaient pas de résister à une décision explicite du Cabinet, ne dédaignaient pas d'agir sur la presse ou sur les parlementaires pour interdire au Cabinet les mesures qu'ils craignaient ou pour provoquer les mesures qu'ils souhaitaient. Lloyd George n'osa pas renvoyer Sir Douglas Haig comme il l'aurait voulu mais, craignant que le chef des armées ne déclenchât une nouvelle offensive, aussi coûteuse et vaine que les précédentes, il n'accorda pas tous les effectifs demandés par l'état-major.

Le cas anglais est simple et clair. Comme l'écrit M. Robert Blake, dans le livre *Soldiers and Governments* (1) :

> If the German break-through in March 1918 had succeeded, Lloyd George would have had to bear a terrible responsibility to posterity for deliberately keeping the British army short of men merely because he could not trust himself to overrule Haig if the latter pressed for another offensive in Flanders. It was very fortunate that this conflict between soldiers and civilians—or to use Sir Henry Wilson's language, "brass-hats" and "frocks"—was not exacerbated by any long tradition of civil-military mistrust. The ultimate supremacy of the civil power was never really in doubt—despite Lloyd George's suspicions. The struggle had no ideological background. *It was a straightforward dispute about the best way to win the war* [...] (2).

En 1940, la querelle entre Paul Reynaud et le général Weygand avait pour objet *la meilleure manière de liquider une guerre perdue*, mais la querelle avait un arrière-plan idéologique et elle était exacerbée par une longue tradition *française* de défiance entre parlementaires et officiers. Le problème théorique était aussi subtil que la décision à prendre tragique. Le choix de la capitulation militaire ou de l'armistice politique appartenait au Cabinet. Mais le général en chef tenait un des deux termes de l'alternative — la capitulation militaire — pour contraire à l'honneur de l'armée. Il refusait d'y consentir. Le président du Conseil avait le recours constitutionnel de remplacer le général Weygand par un autre général, partisan de *poursuivre* la guerre en Afrique (de même que Lloyd George aurait pu donner un successeur à Sir Douglas Haig). Mais, affaibli par les dissensions à l'intérieur du Cabinet, il n'osa ou il ne put renvoyer celui qui avait été le plus proche collaborateur du maréchal Foch, et c'est lui qui finalement s'inclina.

Il va de soi que le choc entre le général en chef et le président du Conseil ne fut qu'une des causes de l'armistice de 1940. Peut-être le pouvoir civil aurait-il, lui aussi, finalement préféré l'armistice entre gouvernements à la capitulation de l'armée française en métropole, même si le commandement militaire l'avait laissé libre de sa décision. Nous avons résumé le cas de juin 1940 pour illustrer une proposition générale : il est inévitablement des circonstances où conduite des opérations et conduite de la guerre deviennent indiscernables. La théorie occidentale pose que le pouvoir civil doit avoir le dernier mot : en pratique, les chefs militaires cherchent toujours à influencer le pouvoir civil et finissent quelquefois par le contraindre.

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(1) Sous la direction de Michael HOWARD (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 48.

(2) Souligné par moi dans le texte (R. A.).

Entre 1914 et 1918, du côté occidental, gouvernants et généraux furent le plus souvent d'accord sur l'objectif : abattre la volonté de résistance des empires centraux et dicter à ceux-ci une paix de victoire. Les généraux, en France et en Grande-Bretagne, craignirent maintes fois que les hommes politiques ne fussent prêts à conclure la paix avant d'avoir détruit la puissance militaire de l'ennemi. Mais, en fait, les gouvernants à l'ouest s'accordèrent avec les généraux sur l'objectif — la victoire absolue, c'est-à-dire la paix dictée à l'ennemi vaincu — non parce que seule une telle paix permettait d'atteindre les buts du camp allié mais parce que la victoire militaire semblait par elle-même un objectif et permettait de différer réflexion et décision sur les vrais buts, par essence politiques, de la guerre (3). Les querelles entre civils et militaires avaient surtout pour objet les moyens de remporter la victoire, les civils, sensibles aux effroyables pertes des armées alliées, furent conscients, plus et plus tôt que leurs conseillers militaires, de la folie des offensives sur le front ouest de 1915 à 1917.

Du côté allemand, la querelle entre le chancelier et le grand état-major avait une tout autre dimension parce qu'elle portait sur l'objectif même. La conduite de la guerre n'impliquait pas seulement des décisions difficiles sur la répartition des forces entre Est et Ouest mais aussi la détermination du but, victoire absolue ou paix négociée. En gros, les hommes politiques, conscients de la précarité des succès obtenus et des ressources immenses à la disposition du camp allié, penchaient vers une paix négociée cependant que le grand état-major (comme les généraux alliés) avait pour but une victoire absolue. Cependant, une telle opposition ne fut claire qu'à partir du moment où l'équipe Hindenburg-Ludendorff remplaça au commandement suprême le général E. von Falkenhayn. Ce dernier avait adopté une stratégie que Hans Delbrück appelait stratégie d'usure *(Ermattungsstrategie)*. Par l'offensive de Verdun, il espérait affaiblir l'armée française assez pour lui interdire des opérations importantes au cours de l'année 1916. Sûr de la solidité du front ouest, il comptait se retourner vers l'Est et y remporter sur la Russie de tels succès que les Alliés seraient contraints de conclure une paix négociée qui équivaudrait, pour l'Allemagne, à une paix de victoire (mais non de victoire absolue).

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(3) Cf. Bernard BRODIE, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, 1959), p. 63 : « Thus, after two years, during which he had presided over the liquidation of British lives at a greater rate than has ever occurred before or since in history, Sir Douglas Haig recommends *in victory* the imposition of exactly those terms which in September of 1916 he feared might become a basis for a negotiated peace [...] As is abundantly evident throughout, the question of *who* states the terms, and how, is to Haig much more important than the question of *what* the terms are [...]. »

C'est à partir de 1917 et de la chute de Bethmann-Hollweg que le grand état-major allemand, dirigé par l'équipe Hindenburg-Ludendorff, prit la responsabilité entière de la conduite de la guerre comme de la conduite des opérations. A la fin de 1917, en 1918, Ludendorff continuait d'exiger l'occupation permanente des côtes belges des Flandres. En d'autres termes, les généraux allemands, au nom de leur compétence et en vue d'assurer la sécurité définitive de la patrie, prétendaient dicter aux ministres non pas seulement le plan de guerre (offensive à l'Ouest au printemps de 1918) mais les termes de la paix future. Non seulement l'état-major administrait l'effort de guerre (en 1915, l'état-major et Joffre avaient aussi dominé le gouvernement) mais il s'immisçait dans la gestion de la diplomatie, il posait des conditions à l'acceptation éventuelle de la paix, il déclarait tel chancelier acceptable ou inacceptable à l'armée. Il ne franchit pas l'étape ultérieure qui aurait conduit au régime militaire, à savoir l'affirmation non pas qu'un gouvernement mais qu'un régime est acceptable ou inacceptable à l'armée. L'armée se tenait pour loyale à l'empereur, elle s'opposait aux parlementaires, incarnation du pouvoir civil, non à la dynastie ou au monarque.

Reprenons, en termes abstraits, les enseignements qui se dégagent des exemples précédents. En temps de paix, généraux et hommes politiques doivent collaborer au moins pour déterminer la fraction des ressources nationales consacrée à satisfaire les besoins de l'armée. En temps de guerre, ils doivent collaborer pour que les opérations soient orientées vers les buts politiques de la guerre. Cette collaboration comporte des tensions aussi bien en temps de paix que de guerre. En temps de paix, les chefs de l'armée sont normalement tentés de grossir le budget militaire et de réduire le contrôle que le pouvoir civil (dans l'Europe du XIX^{e} siècle, le parlement) est désireux d'exercer sur l'usage fait par les militaires des fonds qui leur sont alloués. En temps de guerre, de 1914 à 1918, le refus du contrôle civil prit la forme d'une revendication, par les chefs de l'armée, d'une responsabilité exclusive de la conduite des opérations. Le commandement est seul responsable parce qu'il est seul compétent, qu'il s'agisse de l'organisation des troupes ou de la tactique des combats. L'hostilité du quartier général de Joffre aux inspections parlementaires est bien connue (4). En Grande-Bretagne et en France, les conflits entre généraux et hommes politiques ne mirent pas en question la suprématie du pouvoir civil et les chefs militaires sauvegardèrent, en invoquant leur compétence, l'autonomie de l'ordre militaire. Dans le Reich wilhelmien où l'armée était liée par serment à son Souverain mais acceptait avec impatience la subordination aux parlementaires qu'elle méprisait et même aux ministres de l'Empereur, l'équipe Hindenburg-Ludendorff finit par exercer un droit de veto sur les buts de la guerre, le choix des ministres, la gestion des affaires.

Entre les deux guerres, la Reichswehr ne se soumit jamais pleinement au pouvoir civil, elle n'en toléra jamais le contrôle (5). Elle eut ses secrets diplomatiques (l'entente avec l'Union soviétique). Elle exerça, de temps à autre, un droit de veto sur le choix du chancelier. Elle ne fut mise au pas que par Hitler dont elle avait favorisé en fait, sinon en intention, l'accession au pouvoir.

Le processus par lequel généraux et amiraux au Japon établirent finalement une dictature militaire fut du même type. D'abord armée et marine firent légalement reconnaître, après la guerre contre la Chine de 1895, que les ministres de la guerre et de la marine seraient toujours choisis parmi des officiers d'active — ce qui donnait aux deux services la capacité effective de provoquer la chute de n'importe quel gouvernement en incitant des ministres militaires à démissionner. En 1913, il est vrai, la loi fut modifiée et les ministres purent être choisis parmi les officiers de réserve. La lutte entre pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire se prolongea durant les années 20. Elle fut tranchée, au début des années 30, par les coups d'État opérés par les associations d'officiers, officiers supérieurs groupés dans le *Toseiha*, officiers de grade moyen groupés dans le *Kodaha* (6). Mais la victoire des forces armées sur les partis et les hommes politiques fut accompagnée de dissensions telles, entre armée et marine, à l'intérieur de chacun des corps, que le régime militaire fut incohérent et maintes fois paralysé.

La crise actuelle des relations entre armée et pouvoir civil, en France, a pour origine directe le désaccord sur la conduite et

(4) Jere Clemens King, *Generals and Politicians* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951).

(5) John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (London, Macmillan, 1953). Traduit en français sous le titre *Le drame de l'armée allemande* (Paris, Gallimard, 1955).

(6) Cf. l'étude de F. C. Jones, in *Soldiers and Governments*, éd. par M. Howard.

les objectifs d'une guerre. En Indochine, l'armée obéit aux directives du pouvoir civil mais les généraux attribuèrent aux ministres, à leur indécision, à leur manque d'idées claires et de résolution, la défaite finale. En Algérie, l'armée découvrit l'unité nécessaire de la stratégie et de la politique sous la forme particulière de la résistance à la subversion. Elle ressentit avec amertume sa subordination au pouvoir civil lorsqu'elle redouta, au printemps de 1958, que les hommes politiques de la IV^e République ne consentissent à un « Dien-Bien-Phu diplomatique ». Le commandant en chef, le général Salan, durant la dernière crise ministérielle de la IV^e République, évoqua, dans sa lettre au président de la République, l'éventualité d'un refus par l'armée d'une « politique d'abandon », c'est-à-dire d'accommodement avec la rébellion. A partir de mai 1958, les gouvernants, sans reconnaître ouvertement à l'armée un droit de veto, tenaient compte des réactions possibles des « activistes » en cas de négociation avec les nationalistes algériens. En termes abstraits, on pourrait dire que le pouvoir se donnait pour but de guerre l'association entre une « Algérie algérienne » et la France alors que l'armée tenait l'intégration de l'Algérie à la France pour le seul but de guerre digne des sacrifices et compatible avec l'honneur de l'armée.

En avril 1961, quelques officiers généraux tentèrent un coup d'État, en vue d'instaurer, au moins en Algérie, un régime qui aurait mené la guerre d'Algérie selon les conceptions de l'armée. Logiquement, ils auraient dû vouloir donner à la France l'État capable de « vaincre ». La tentative échoua misérablement mais elle illustre la phase ultime de la politisation de l'armée. Le jour où celle-ci ne trouve plus de gouvernement qui se donne les objectifs qu'elle tient pour nécessaires, elle s'efforce de créer elle-même ce gouvernement. Ayant réclamé d'abord le droit de fixer les buts de guerre, elle finit par fixer l'idéal de la communauté. S'étant arrogé un droit de veto sur le choix des hommes et les décisions des gouvernants, elle finit par définir elle-même l'essence du patriotisme, l'essence de la nation japonaise, germanique, française, espagnole, et par déclarer traîtres à la cause sacrée ceux des Japonais, Allemands, Français ou Espagnols qui ne reconnaissent pas l'essence nationale dans la représentation qu'elle en donne.

C'est pour conquérir un empire ou élargir la zone de co-prospérité asiatique que les militaires japonais éliminèrent les parlementaires et les partis hostiles à l'aventure et que la Reichswehr, demeurée un corps dans l'État sous la République de Weimar, se soumit à l'ordre national-socialiste. C'est pour garder les derniers lambeaux de l'empire que l'armée française fut sur le point de franchir le Rubicon. C'est après avoir perdu les derniers lambeaux de l'empire que l'armée espagnole devint conservatrice d'un nombre d'officiers disproportionné au nombre de soldats et d'armes disponibles et, incapable de combattre au-dehors, s'instaura gardienne de l'essence de l'Espagne. Si le coup d'État d'avril 1961 avait réussi, les généraux français auraient eux-mêmes précipité la décadence qu'ils faisaient profession de combattre. Faute d'empire à défendre, l'armée française aurait soumis la métropole elle-même à la loi militaire.

III

L'idée d'une opposition entre les armées européennes, de recrutement aristocratique et d'opinions traditionalistes, et les armées non européennes, modernistes et parfois révolutionnaires, est devenue pour ainsi dire banale et classique. L'idée n'est pas radicalement fausse mais elle simplifie le problème et elle en interdit une vue synthétique.

Les conflits politiques du siècle dernier eurent pour enjeu la forme de l'État, selon l'expression employée en France, ou le principe de légitimité, comme disait G. Ferrero. Monarchie contre République, souverains contre parlementaires, naissance contre élection, tels étaient les adversaires visibles. La société moderne, telle qu'elle apparaissait dans les conflits du siècle dernier, se définissait par les institutions représentatives et non par l'industrie et le développement économique. Les officiers des armées européennes, s'ils avaient eu à se décider pour ou contre l'industrie ou le développement économique, auraient probablement eux aussi, au XIXe siècle, pris position pour cette sorte de modernité. Mais la modernité politique, incarnée par des parlements, des avocats, des discoureurs, suspects de préférer la loi au sabre, n'exerçait pas la même attraction sur les professionnels de l'action militaire.

En dépit de cette possible incompatibilité d'humeur entre soldats et orateurs, il s'en faut que les armées européennes aient été massivement hostiles aux idées libérales. Après le désastre d'Iéna, les plus intelligents des officiers prussiens, un Scharnhorst par exemple, recommandaient des réformes plus radicales encore que celles qu'accomplit Stein. En Espagne, certains coups d'État militaires se recommandaient d'idées libérales (Espartero, Narváez). En France, sous la Restauration, l'armée comptait des officiers bonapartistes et des officiers libéraux aussi bien que des officiers monarchistes. En Russie, les officiers, au moment de l'insurrection de 1825, se réclamaient eux aussi d'idées libérales.

Si, à la fin du siècle, les armées allemande, française, russe semblent toutes passées, en tant que corps constitués, au camp de la réaction, diverses causes semblent avoir joué. En Prusse (7), les descendants de l'aristocratie, par leur nombre et par les places qu'ils occupaient au sommet de la hiérarchie, exerçaient une influence décisive sur la manière de penser des officiers, sur l'attitude que ceux-ci adoptaient à l'égard de la société et de l'État. En France aussi, le recrutement dans la vieille aristocratie d'un nombre important d'officiers supérieurs contribuait à créer le climat moral à l'intérieur de l'armée (8).

La différenciation, caractéristique des sociétés modernes, s'est manifestée au siècle dernier par la séparation du pouvoir civil et du pouvoir militaire. Le pouvoir civil s'est exercé selon des procédures légales. Les parlements symbolisaient le pouvoir constitutionnel. Là où les armées se voulaient encore liées au souverain par un loyalisme d'essence féodale, elles tendaient à confondre la résistance au contrôle parlementaire des budgets militaires avec la défense de l'ancien régime. Le conflit entre parlement et armée avait pour enjeu le volume du budget et l'autonomie de l'ordre militaire, il était transfiguré par l'idéologie en rivalité historique entre l'héroïsme et l'argent, le sacrifice volontaire et le matérialisme sordide, les régimes dynastiques et les régimes représentatifs, entre les soldats et les avocats.

Cette tension entre pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire, partie intégrante du processus par lequel le gouvernement des sociétés européennes est devenu constitutionnel, a explosé en conflits ouverts en temps de guerre et même en temps de paix lorsqu'une armée a refusé la suprématie du pouvoir civil soit pour sauvegarder son budget et son autonomie, soit pour empêcher les gouvernants de mener une certaine politique. En 1917, le grand état-major allemand continuait à vouloir une paix dictée de victoire et non une paix négociée de compromis. En 1931, les officiers japonais regardèrent l'expansion en Mandchourie comme la solution des problèmes nationaux. En 1958, les officiers français, en majorité, n'acceptaient pas une négociation éventuelle entre le gouvernement et le F.L.N.

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(7) On trouvera des indications statistiques dans le livre de Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1938), pp. 65-66 et 199-201.

(8) Cf. R. Girardet, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine* (Paris, Plon, 1953). Il n'en allait pas de même en Espagne où l'armée était de recrutement bourgeois.

Une divergence entre pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire sur la conduite d'une guerre ne débouche pas nécessairement sur un conflit, mettant le régime en péril. Le général Mac Arthur fut relevé de son commandement : ni lui ni aucun autre général américain n'envisagea de refuser obéissance. Pour que la discussion sur les moyens ou même les buts de la guerre suscite une crise constitutionnelle, il faut que l'enjeu soit grave (paix de victoire ou paix de compromis), que les chefs de l'armée se sentent en accord avec la masse du peuple, qu'ils aient l'espoir d'être suivis par les soldats et soutenus par l'opinion. En 1917, Hindenburg et Ludendorff étaient populaires. En 1940, l'enjeu (armistice politique ou capitulation militaire) était tragique. En 1958, la IV^{e} République était méprisée et les officiers, en immense majorité, nourrissaient l'ambition passionnée d'une victoire et de l'Algérie française. En 1961, les officiers séditieux n'entraînèrent ni la majorité des officiers ni les soldats du contingent et moins encore les Français de la métropole.

Aucune des circonstances qui ont été, en Europe, à l'origine des tensions et des conflits entre pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire ne se retrouve dans les pays du tiers monde — ni la différence d'origine sociale et d'attitude humaine qui a séparé souvent officiers et parlementaires, ni la dissociation constitutionnelle entre gouvernement et état-major, ni la nécessaire et difficile coopération entre ceux qui conduisent la guerre et ceux qui conduisent les opérations, ni les desseins impériaux de l'Allemagne et du Japon, ni l'amère résignation à la perte de l'empire.

Désormais, c'est l'industrie qui symbolise la modernité : comment les officiers, à travers tout le tiers monde, ne seraient-ils pas modernistes, à la manière des polytechniciens de 1830 ou des officiers saint-simoniens sous la monarchie de Juillet? Issus de la Résistance, de la lutte pour la libération nationale, les hommes politiques ne sont pas des avocats méprisés par les soldats. Souvent ils ont été eux-mêmes chefs militaires et ils continuent parfois de porter l'uniforme. Le choc entre les bourgeois, entichés de légalité, et les officiers, encore acquis à la conception féodale de la discipline, ne peut pas se produire.

Il n'en résulte pas que les problèmes du rapport entre pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire ne se posent pas, à notre époque, dans le tiers monde. Ils se posent effectivement et même avec acuité.

Un premier problème est celui de l'intervention de l'armée quand aucun gouvernement ordonné, conforme à une légitimité politique, n'est plus possible. Tous les régimes de notre époque se réclament d'une « formule » démocratique (le mot formule étant pris dans le sens que lui donne Mosca). La « formule démocratique » comporte, à notre époque, deux traductions principales, le régime constitutionnel-pluraliste à partis multiples et le régime idéocratique de parti unique. Mais il arrive que la rivalité des partis dégénère en anarchie, manipulée par des ploutocrates sans qu'un parti unique soit prêt à imposer sa loi. Lorsque telle est la conjoncture, l'armée ne doit-elle pas fournir la légitimité de remplacement, le pouvoir neutre et fort qui maintiendra l'État en attendant le retour au règne de la loi? Tel est l'argument invoqué par les généraux au Pakistan, en Turquie, en Birmanie, au Soudan. Tel est l'argument qu'invoquaient discrètement les généraux français en mai 1958.

Quand l'argument est-il bien fondé? Quand n'est-il qu'une mauvaise justification aux ambitions politiques des chefs militaires? Quand, tout au contraire, l'armée impose-t-elle un répit nécessaire à la lutte des partis, une dictature temporaire à la romaine, entre l'anarchie pluraliste et la tyrannie totalitaire? Il n'est pas possible d'en décider dans l'abstrait. Seule l'étude empirique permettrait d'en décider. De la dictature neutre et temporaire, on passe aisément au régime militaire révolutionnaire, autrement dit du cas pakistanais au cas égyptien. Mais on ne passe pas au cas sud-américain. Depuis quelques années, les émeutes populaires (Corée), les révolutions ou coups d'État militaires (Turquie, Irak) se sont multipliés. En aucune région du monde, la pratique des *pronunciamientos* ne semble entrer dans les mœurs, devenir un mode, communément accepté, du changement de gouvernement et de régime.

Quelles ont été les conditions permanentes de la fréquence des coups d'État militaires, à la lumière de l'expérience du siècle dernier et de celui-ci? 1) Les coups d'État répétés ne doivent pas déboucher sur de véritables guerres civiles. Or, les coups d'État créent un risque de guerre civile d'autant plus faible que les masses participent moins à la politique. Cette condition n'a pas été réalisée en Espagne, aussi ce malheureux pays, au cours du XIX^e^ et du XX^e^ siècle, a-t-il été ruiné et saigné par les guerres civiles (guerre carliste, guerre de 1936). 2) Le cas de l'Espagne révèle peut-être une des autres conditions de la pratique des coups d'État militaires : l'absence d'une légitimité, authentiquement reconnue par les serviteurs de l'État et les citoyens. C'est la guerre carliste, le discrédit de la monarchie et des souverains qui, en Espagne, firent admettre par tous les partis, libéraux et conservateurs, les coups d'État comme une méthode normale de changer de gouvernement et de régime. En Amérique latine, pour des raisons multiples, aucune légitimité ne s'était enracinée : il n'y avait pas de légitimité traditionnelle puisque le pouvoir du passé était celui du roi ou du vice-roi d'Espagne contre lequel on s'était révolté ; quant à la légitimité « libérale » ou « démocratique », elle avait été proclamée au jour de la libération, par enthousiasme idéologique, mais le régime constitutionnel ne réussit pas à s'organiser à partir des idées venues d'Europe. L'échec des procédures et le manque d'adhésion réelle à la formule de légitimité se déterminèrent et s'aggravèrent réciproquement. 3) La relative tolérance de l'opinion à l'égard de l'action politique des officiers suppose aussi que les armées aient à peine une fonction nationale. Les conflits armés entre pays d'Amérique latine n'avaient guère plus de signification historique que les conflits entre partis ou factions de l'armée. L'armée française, à travers l'histoire turbulente de la France au XIX^e^ siècle, préserva jalousement son unité grâce à une sorte de neutralité parce qu'elle devait veiller aux frontières de la patrie ou aux marches de l'empire. 4) Les armées de coup d'État doivent être à la fois liées aux minorités privilégiées et sensibles aux idées qui agitent les classes dirigeantes et les partis d'opposition. Le recrutement social des officiers, dans les pays d'Amérique latine, variait de pays à pays, selon les moments, les armes, le grade. Mais il fallait que l'armée ne fût ni unanimement conservatrice ni sérieusement révolutionnaire, liée aux privilégiés mais aussi peuplée des représentants des demi-privilégiés pour qu'elle fût à la fois hostile à un bouleversement social et divisée sur la mesure exacte de conservation et de réformes.

Si sommaire que soit cette analyse, elle suffit à éclairer la différence radicale entre les armées de coup d'État, telles que furent au siècle dernier maintes armées d'Amérique latine, et les armées politisées dans le tiers monde du Proche-Orient et d'Asie au XX^e^ siècle. Que l'on songe au Pakistan, à l'Irak, à l'Indonésie ou à Cuba, les armées ne jouent pas à la politique ou au *pronunciamiento*. C'est pour surmonter le chaos des partis et des pseudo-élections que l'armée du Pakistan a pris le pouvoir. Certes, il est plus facile pour une armée d'entrer dans la politique que d'en sortir. Il se peut qu'une armée, qui a pris le pouvoir afin de rétablir par le sabre le règne de la loi, soit progressivement politisée et, du même coup, divisée, par l'exercice du pouvoir. Le premier coup d'État a été celui du chef de l'armée suivi par l'ensemble du corps d'officiers. Qu'en sera-t-il du prochain?

Bien que le danger existe, certaines circonstances rendent improbable une telle évolution. Idées et partis, des libéraux et des conservateurs, pouvaient se combattre et se réconcilier, se confondre ou se distinguer au siècle dernier : ils mettaient rarement en cause et en péril la fabrique même de la société, le droit de propriété, la puissance des propriétaires et des riches. Il n'en va plus de même aujourd'hui. L'ombre des régimes de type soviétique plane sur l'Asie comme sur l'Amérique latine. Les masses s'éveillent à la conscience et à la révolte. Le jeu des coups d'État est anachronique parce qu'il y a désormais de vrais révolutionnaires et que l'armée au pouvoir doit être, ou bien non partisane, ou bien rigoureusement autoritaire, ou bien dévouée à une tâche révolutionnaire, de toute façon sérieuse.

Au Proche-Orient, les officiers ont pris une part déterminante aux révolutions contre les régimes pro-occidentaux du roi Farouk ou de Noury Saïd. Ils continuent de tenir le premier rôle dans les régimes de neutralisme positif. Il serait imprudent de formuler une prévision dogmatique sur l'avenir du président Nasser ou du général Kassem. Mais un fait est certain : le renversement d'un de ces régimes par un coup militaire ne serait pas un épisode, plus ou moins sanglant, des querelles entre généraux, il serait un événement significatif, entraînant une participation des masses et une modification du rapport entre les forces des diverses factions (pro-communiste, pro-occidentale, neutre et neutraliste).

La question historique que nous posent les événements de ces dernières années concerne moins les intentions des généraux, au Pakistan, en Turquie ou en Irak, que les chances de régimes qui ne seraient pas du type soviétique. Dans quelle mesure, au bout de combien de temps l'armée parviendra-t-elle à créer les conditions dans lesquelles un pouvoir civil, plus ou moins démocratique, pourra fonctionner au Pakistan ou en Turquie? Un régime militaire, qui se veut révolutionnaire mais sans véritable parti unique, sans idéologie sociale, se maintiendra-t-il à la longue en Irak ou en Égypte? Ou, si l'on préfère, l'idéologie de modernisation, d'indépendance nationale suffira-t-elle, à la longue, pour remplir la fonction des idéologies dans les sociétés modernes : justifier du pouvoir, cimenter les masses, établir le circuit d'autorité et d'obéissance entre gouvernants et gouvernés?

Du même coup se dégagent clairement les données communes au problème armée-pouvoir civil en Europe occidentale au siècle dernier et dans le tiers monde en celui-ci. Les idées nouvelles, dans le premier cas, étaient politiques, elles comportaient la limitation constitutionnelle de l'autorité dynastique, l'élimination de la hiérarchie féodale ou aristocratique, la suprématie du pouvoir civil et l'avénement des hommes de loi ou de négoce aux dépens des nobles ou des hommes de guerre. Les idées nouvelles, en ce siècle et dans le tiers monde, sont celles de développement économique, d'industrialisation ; les survivants du passé qu'il faut éliminer sont les grands propriétaires ou les capitalistes étrangers.

Contre les hommes de loi ou de négoce, les officiers eurent tendance à constituer une caste fermée, à refuser l'intrusion des parlementaires ou des ministres civils au nom de leur exclusive compétence ou de l'autonomie de l'armée. Selon les pays et les circonstances, l'armée réussit plus ou moins à faire respecter son indépendance, elle accepta avec plus ou moins de résignation l'autorité du pouvoir civil. En Allemagne, en Espagne, elle joua un rôle néfaste, soit par volonté de victoire ou de revanche, soit par refus d'adaptation à la perte de l'empire. Au tiers monde, l'armée n'est pas hostile à l'avénement d'un pouvoir civil de style moderne. Mais l'échec de la démocratie pluraliste, dans certains cas, l'incite à créer un pouvoir de répit ou de substitution — répit aux luttes des partis, substitut à la légitimité démocratique, méprisée ou inopérante. La faiblesse de ces régimes est de ne pas opposer idée à idée, mais le fait de l'ordre et de l'autorité à des idéologies. L'antithèse « le sabre et la loi » est d'origine européenne et elle appartient au siècle dernier. L'antithèse d'aujourd'hui, à travers le monde, serait « la mitraillette et l'idée » et aussi « la mitraillette et le char d'assaut ». Deux sortes d'armées se combattent, celles qui utilisent les armes légères et individuelles, dans le maquis ou la clandestinité, et les armées régulières qui sont équipées avec les armes d'hier (canons, chars d'assaut). Parmi les armées régulières, certaines sont issues des combattants de la mitraillette : l'armée de Fidel Castro, devenue armée de l'État, continue de s'appeler « armée rebelle ». D'autres, au Pakistan ou en Turquie, sont, au contraire, des armées de formation apolitique. Elles n'ont pas à combattre des volontaires de la mitraillette, elles ne sont pas encore imprégnées d'une conception politique. Le dénouement du conflit, au siècle dernier, était le sabre au service de la loi. Le dénouement du conflit, au XX^e^ siècle, est que la mitraillette et les chars d'assaut soient dans le même camp et tous deux au service de l'État. Mais ce dénouement exige que l'État ait une idée ou donne aux masses le sentiment qu'il accomplit la fonction, primordiale, de développement économique et d'indépendance nationale.

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L'État détient le monopole de la violence légitime mais les armées sont au service de l'État pour combattre l'ennemi extérieur non pour imposer leur volonté propre à la nation. Cette formule classique, encore théoriquement valable, a été rarement appliquée et elle est d'application difficile : tantôt l'armée a des préférences idéologiques, tantôt l'État lui-même, disputé entre les partis, semble se dissoudre et l'armée se demande qui est l'État qu'elle a pour devoir de servir ; tantôt l'ennemi que l'armée a pour mission de combattre est lui-même idéologique, parti de libération nationale ou de révolution sociale, et l'armée se sent incapable de triompher d'un ennemi idéologique avec une force neutre.

Sur le plan mondial, l'ennemi de l'alliance atlantique est, lui aussi, idéologique. Les armées classiques de l'Occident se veulent encore neutres, non partisanes, aux ordres de l'État légal. Cette doctrine est compatible avec les faits aussi longtemps que l'ennemi idéologique n'est pas présent à l'intérieur des pays. Celui-ci, sous la forme du parti communiste, est présent en France et en Italie : aussi l'armée française, en fait, dans la conjoncture actuelle, est-elle de toute manière « politisée ». Elle doit adhérer aux idéologies des partis au pouvoir, rejeter les idéologies de l'opposition nonnationale.

En Union soviétique, l'obéissance au pouvoir civil entraîne automatiquement l'adhésion à la doctrine de l'État. Les commissaires politiques, qui avaient été nécessaires durant la guerre civile alors que l'armée rouge était contrainte d'utiliser des officiers d'ancien régime, ont été maintenus, plus de quarante ans après la révolution, comme pour symboliser la primauté jointe du parti et du marxisme. L'armée de l'Union soviétique demeure l'armée rouge. Les armées occidentales ont-elles une couleur? Ou la caractéristique de la société occidentale est-elle que ni l'État ni l'armée n'ait de couleur?

MICHAEL HOWARD

Civil-Military Relations in Europe and the United States: A Bibliographical Note

THE interest in civil-military relations which has arisen since the Second World War stems from a wide variety of national experiences; and these have moulded the subject in different ways in different countries.

In Britain and the United States, both un-military societies which have been forced twice within a single generation to transform themselves into nations in arms, the emphasis has been largely on administrative and political problems. How is an effective military machine to be created and controlled? How is its budget to be assessed and allocated? How is responsibility for its activities to be divided between professional commanders and the political leaders of the nation? Two valuable bibliographies produced in the United States during the past twenty-five years have been entirely utilitarian in object. *Civil-Military Relations: Bibliographical Notes of Administrative Problems of Civilian Mobilization*, edited by PENDLETON HERRING (Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1940) was simply a guide to the problems of American War Administration. Its successor, *Civil-Military Relations: an Annotated Bibliography 1940-52* (New York, 1954) was prepared by the Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research Council; and it was concerned, as Professor William T. Fox stated in his introduction, with works "casting light on procedures for making national policy, rather than [with] those on the substance of policy decisions". This search for an efficient mechanism to formulate and carry out national policy has characterized most American writings on civil-military relations since the Second World War, and only a few have dealt with the deeper problems which militarization may present to a liberal society. Those which have tackled this problem of the 'Garrison State' include HAROLD D. LASSWELL, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York, 1950); LOUIS SMITH, *American*

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 112-116.

Democracy and Military Power (Chicago, 1951) and ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, *The Civilian and the Military* (New York, 1956).

Otherwise American writers have tended to concentrate on the administrative problems with which they have been confronted since the war ended. For the experiences of the war itself one must refer to the appropriate volumes of the Official Histories, especially those devoted by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, to the work of the War Department. These cover not only the formulation of American grand strategy, but all questions of industrial and economic mobilization as well. Outstanding among the memoir material is ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, *The White House Papers of Harry Hopkins* (2 vols, 1956); HENRY L. STIMSON and MCGEORGE BUNDY, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (1949) and Fleet Admiral WILLIAM D. LEAHY, *I Was There* (New York, 1952). On subsequent developments there are two good general reviews: TIMOTHY W. STANLEY, *American Defence and National Security* (New York, 1956) and WALTER MILLIS and others, *Arms and the State* (New York, 1959). WALTER MILLIS' edition of *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1952) is indispensable; while useful, if acrimonious, contributions to a controversy best studied in periodical literature are JAMES M. GAVIN, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (1959) and MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1960). EDGAR S. FURNISS Jr, *American Military Policy* (New York, 1957) is a collection of documents which contains useful references to civil-military affairs. Finally, a group of thinkers in the United States has undertaken a number of valuable studies on the question of military education: the moulding of the minds of military leaders in order to produce the necessary combination of intelligence, technical expertise and moral leadership. The most complete of these studies is that of MORRIS JANOWITZ, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960), but two other works of major importance, dealing with the development of educational institutions and syllabuses, are JOHN W. MASLAND and LAURENCE RADWAY, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton, 1957), and GENE M. LYONS and JOHN W. MASLAND, *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C.* (Princeton, 1959).

In Great Britain the subject is older, less well documented, and the bias of existing studies is towards personalities rather than administrative problems. Exception must be made however for two general surveys of the fields: FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON'S magisterial *Defence by Committee: the British Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959* (1960) and the Lees-Knowles Lectures by JOHN EHRMAN, *Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940* (Cambridge, 1957). Such general works are unfortunately rare: the student is very largely dependent on the bibliographies and memoirs of the soldiers and statesmen concerned, and he would do well to begin with the *Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher* (4 vols, 1934-8), and SIR FREDERICK MAURICE, *Haldane* (2 vols, 1937-39). The memoir material on the First World War is too abundant and too well-known to need quoting here, but the publication of LORD HANKEY, *The Supreme Command 1914-1918* (2 vols, 1961) provides a new and excellent guide through the labyrinth of British policy during that period. There are very few works as yet on the inter-war period: LORD CHATFIELD, *The Navy and Defence* (2 vols 1942-47) and R. J. MINNEY, *The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha* (1960) are both of value, as is the first volume of SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL'S History of the Second World War, *The Gathering Storm* (1950): but for an authoritative study we must await the first volume of the 'Grand Strategy' series in the U.K. Official History of the Second World War, by N.H. Gibbs. For the war itself, the subsequent volumes in the 'Grand Strategy' series are authoritative guides on the formation of policy, and all biographical or autobiographical accounts—not excepting Sir Winston Churchill's—should be checked against them. The volumes in the Civil Series, edited by Sir Keith Hancock, deal with all questions of mobilization and economic control: the two master volumes are those of SIR KEITH HANCOCK and M. M. GOWING, *British War Economy* (1953) and M. M. POSTAN, *British War Production* (1952). As for the post-war period, there is virtually a blank. The White Papers on Central Organization for Defence of 1946 (Cmd 6923) and of 1958 (Cmd 476) should be consulted, and there is useful material both in the *Memoirs* of LORD MONTGOMERY (1958) and those of SIR JOHN SLESSOR, *The Central Blue* (1956). An attempt to compare developments in Britain and the United States since 1945 is made by the present writer in the *Political Science Quarterly* for March 1960.

For Continental countries the problem has been a different one. There the military has often constituted a distinct social and political element which has either dominated or sought to dominate the State: in order not only to dictate foreign policy but to control the speed of internal social change. General surveys of the European situation can be found in the two works of ALFRED

VAGTS, *A History of Militarism* (2nd ed. 1950) and *Defence and Diplomacy : the Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations* (New York, 1956) ; and in the second volume of GERHARD RITTER'S *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk : das Problem des 'Militarismus' in Deutschland* (2 vols appeared, Munich 1954, 1960). Professor Ritter's work, when completed, will be the major authority on the civil-military relations in Germany, but readers can with advantage use GORDON CRAIG, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1642-1945* (1955). E. OBERMANN, *Soldaten, Bürger, Militaristen* (Stuttgart, 1958) and R. HÖHN, *Sozialismus und Heer* (3 vols, Bad Homburg, 1959-60) also treat the German problem in a general fashion. On the Second Reich, the student will consult with profit R. STADELMANN, *Moltke und der Staat* (Krefeld, 1950) ; ERNST BETHCKE, *Politische Generale : Kreise und Krisen um Bismarck* (Berlin, 1930) ; and the memoirs of such figures as von Waldersee, von Einem, and the younger von Moltke. Memoir material is also embarassingly voluminous on the First World War, but the relations between the Government and the High Command are conveniently summarized in R. H. LUTZ, *The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918* (Hoover Library, 1934). Post-war developments were first dealt with by J. WHEELER-BENNETT, *The Nemesis of Power : The German Army in Politics 1918-45* (1953), but reference should also be made to HAROLD J. GORDON, *The Reichswehr and the German Republic* (Princeton, 1957) ; to the monograph by Dr G. A. CASPAR, *Die sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands und das deutsche Wehrproblem in den Jahren der Weimarer Republik* (Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Beiheft 11) ; to the collection of documents by O. E. SCHÜDDEKOPF, *Das Heer und die Republik* (Hannover, 1955) and to the biographies of General Groener and von Seeckt. With the advent of the Third Reich civil-military relations, though dramatic, ceased to have constitutional significance ; and the bibliography of military resistance or obedience to Hitler demands an article in itself.

On civil-military relations in France a number of general studies exist—foremost among them the brilliant essay by RAOUL GIRARDET, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine 1815-1939* (Paris, 1953). More detailed are J. MONTEILHET, *Les institutions militaires de la France, 1814-1932* (Paris, 1932) and RICHARD D. CHALLENER, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms 1866-1939* (New York, 1955). Some recent material can be found in RAOUL GIRARDET (ed.), *L'officier français 1945-1960*, Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (Paris, Armand Colin, 1961), and in a recent special issue of the *Revue française de sociologie* (II [1961], nº 2). GUY CHAPMAN makes some useful generalizations in his study of *The Dreyfus Case* (1955), while on the First World War JERE C. KING, *Generals and Politicians* (Berkeley, 1951) gives a clear analysis of the course of events, which can be amplified from the memoirs of the participants. On interwar developments the material is still thin. General WEYGAND, *Mémoires : Mirages et réalité* (Paris, 1957) and PAUL REYNAUD, *La France a sauvé l'Europe* (2 vols, Paris, 1947) contain useful material, but the student will also need to consult the nine volumes of the report of the Commission of the National Assembly of 1947, *Événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945*.

General studies embracing the above and other countries are MICHAEL HOWARD (ed.) *Soldiers and Governments* (1957) which also contains essays on Japan, Spain, and Latin America, and SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957). The latter is particularly recommended as an introduction to the entire subject.

NOTES CRITIQUES

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LA VERSION AMÉRICAINE DU MÉTIER DES ARMES

AVANT tout commentaire sur la force armée américaine *, sa nature sociale, sa place et son rôle dans le pays, deux remarques : 1) Les États-Unis, depuis leur naissance en tant que nation, n'ont jamais perdu une guerre. Constatation à tout prendre non absolument exceptionnelle (qu'on songe à la Grande-Bretagne, *mutatis mutandis*) si un second trait fondamental ne venait en accentuer la portée ; 2) En deux grandes occasions au moins, il a suffi aux États-Unis d'intervenir (peu importe le mécanisme) dans un conflit déjà engagé pour désigner *ipso facto* le vainqueur et du même coup « dire le droit ».

Pareil destin historique avait de quoi procurer de l'ivresse aux sphères distinctes et même antagonistes de la société américaine sans qu'il y eût de jaloux. C'est ainsi que les trois grandes Académies militaires ont pu justifier l'accent mis sur le « drill » militaire strict, sur la formation « technicien-ingénieur », dispensée de préférence à la formation « *whole man* », et « éduquer des générations d'officiers dans la certitude que le pays devait cette absence de défaite à la détermination de ses soldats professionnels, à leur aptitude à résoudre techniquement et scientifiquement tous les problèmes militaires », bref à l'excellence et à la parfaite adéquation de son armée de métier (p. 132). Tandis que d'un autre côté l'idéologie dominante dans la société civile des États-Unis pouvait avec quelque apparence de raison présenter au monde et à eux-mêmes leurs interventions, jamais tout à fait comme des « guerres », toujours un peu comme les actes exécutoires de sentences judiciaires transcendantes : le bras droit qui tient l'épée du Seigneur en son lit de justice. Grâces en soient rendues à l'isolement océanique, l'invulnérabilité stratégique qui en découlait, la surpuissance économique par rapport à tous les ennemis que les États-Unis eurent à combattre.

On trouve un reflet de cette idéologie en certains courants prédominants, après-guerre, dans la pensée sociologique américaine relative à l'étiologie des guerres. Notamment dans cet authentique dogme du

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* A propos de Morris JANOWITZ, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1960).

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 119-131.

social-scientist : la guerre naît « in the minds of men », qui puise sa force dans l'image préférée que nourrit de lui-même l'homme américain ; dogme bénéficiant en outre, à sa source, d'une complicité de l'histoire, en vertu de quoi les Américains s'autorisent à concevoir les guerres de leur propre passé avant tout sur le modèle de croisades de conviction, unanimes, spontanées, pour ainsi dire à base d'acclamation, de suffrage universel, par opposition aux guerres d'armées professionnelles de l'ancienne Europe (1).

Il ne faut jamais perdre de vue cette dualité (duplicité) d'interprétation lorsqu'on aborde le fameux antimilitarisme, de tradition dans la société américaine, et qui pourrait n'être en réalité qu'un a-militarisme : luxe suprême couronnant les bienfaits de la géographie, physique et politique.

Semblable attitude à l'égard de l'institution de l'armée permanente, qui à nous autres Européens paraît si remarquable, est ici de fondation et elle a des racines multiples qu'il est bon de rappeler. Au commencement, il y a la guerre d'Indépendance, sorte d'insurrection où l'ennemi est une armée royale, professionnelle, composée à 95 % de mercenaires. A partir de ce traumatisme natal de joyeux avénement, lié au souvenir des institutions militaires foncièrement aristocratiques du XVIII^e siècle, l'identification du militaire avec l'ennemi politique intérieur sera article de foi, tout au long du XIX^e siècle, pour chaque groupe libéral venant au pouvoir. La chose militaire sera tour à tour : 1) pour les démocrates jeffersoniens, l'alliée de la monarchie, une menace à la liberté ; 2) pour les jacksoniens, le fondement de l'aristocratie, une menace à la démocratie ; 3) pour le *business*, le vestige désuet d'un âge agrarien révolu, le refuge des parasites s'éliminant eux-mêmes de la féconde compétition laïque, une menace à la productivité ; 4) pour le travaillisme et le réformisme enfin, le mal absolu, par l'alliance sinistre du *business* et du militaire. Ajoutons quelques menues touches au tableau. Lors de la Guerre Civile, les brevetés de West-Point sont, dans l'écrasante majorité, à la tête des confédérés sudistes finalement vaincus. Tout au long du XIX^e siècle, ce sont des troupes régulières fédérales qui se trouvent chargées principalement de l'interminable et sanglante besogne, aboutissant à cette « solution définitive du problème indien », qu'aucun mémorial, aucun manuel scolaire américains ne juge digne d'ajouter aux quelque sept « guerres » habituellement homologuées. Wilson enfin minimisera le rôle de ses propres soldats de métier dans cette « guerre pour amateurs » et exaltera l'Amérique « champion du monde amateur » contre l'Allemagne « champion du monde pro » (2).

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(1) S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 143.

(2) S. P. Huntington, p. 153. Ajoutons que la persistance de ce trait de culture fondamental fera qu'en 1944 l'amalgame de la Wehrmacht militariste avec le régime nazi interdira d'exploiter efficacement l'opposition de la première au second ; erreur nullement partagée par les Russes, comme on sait.

Ainsi, tout au long de son histoire, le libéralisme américain aura confondu ennemi extérieur et ennemi intérieur sous les espèces du professionnalisme militaire. En d'autres termes, « les professionnels sont toujours de l'autre côté » (3). En fait les analyses sérieuses du XIX^e^ siècle américain témoignent que, hormis la liaison évidente avec le Sud, les militaires n'ont eu durablement partie liée avec aucun secteur déterminé de la société : isolement qui fit d'eux, précisément, l'adversaire idéal pour toute surenchère électorale.

En résumé : une société dont « environ 53 % de la population blanche étaient composés, en 1920, d'immigrés depuis 1790 et de leur descendance » (4) ; « société des classes moyennes par excellence » (5), où par conséquent règnent, comme pour servir d'archétype au reste du monde, les valeurs pacifistes de règlement négocié des antagonismes, d'individualisme rationaliste orienté vers la production et la consommation, valeurs qui ordonnent souverainement le bien et le mal, le comme-il-faut et l'indécent. Société de masses, jeune, brassée horizontalement et verticalement, libre de ses mouvements, alors que partout ailleurs se meurtrissent et s'ensanglantent, à intervalles réguliers, les nations durement corsetées dans leurs appareils étatiques. Société où l'antimilitarisme de fondation devient peu à peu a-militarisme agnostique, lequel fait bon ménage avec un orgueil impérieux, si peu consciemment « national », si peu exclusivement dépendant des symboles partout ailleurs déterminants — hommes, uniformes, carrés d'étoffe — qu'il est capable de contaminer rapidement l'immigrant et que chez ces derniers, le plus récemment débarqué est souvent aussi le plus susceptible d'étonner par sa surenchère.

Si donc, hormis le temps de guerre où tout est clarté, l'armée permanente pose sous tous les cieux un problème, on comprend qu'au sein de cette société où les critères les plus stricts de la rentabilité passent au crible toutes les activités professionnelles, toutes les entreprises, le problème engendre plus de contestations qu'ailleurs. Quelle entreprise est-ce là? Et sur quel étalon juger de son produit, dès lors que le besoin qu'il est censé satisfaire se trouve défini hors la sanction sacro-sainte d'un marché par un client unique, l'État-Nation, c'est-à-dire par personne, et ne comporte par conséquent aucun critère objectif?

Les résultats d'un Gallup national, en 1955, placent le prestige de l'officier non seulement au-dessous du médecin, du savant, du professeur de *college*, de l'ecclésiastique et de l'avocat, mais même du *public school teacher* (6) (sans parler de l'engagé dans le rang qui, lui, vient en seizième et pénultième position, après le mécano de garage, juste avant le chauffeur de poids lourds). Gageons que ceci est sans analogue dans le monde entier, à la même date.

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(3) HUNTINGTON, p. 154.

(4) H. PRATT FAIRCHILD, *in* DUBLIN, *Population Problems in the United States* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1926).

(5) Voir Merle CURTI, *Peace or War : The American Struggle, 1636-1936* (New York, 1936). A. A. EKIRCH, *The Civilian and the Military* (New York, Oxford U.P., 1956).

(6) Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., *Attitudes of Adult Civilian toward the Military Service as a Career* (Princeton, 1955).

Mais l'histoire, avec ses nécessités, montre le cas qu'elle fait de l'acquiescement du public. Un seul chiffre suffira : de 1900 à 1950, le corps des officiers du temps de paix se trouve multiplié par 27 (contre 9, entre les mêmes dates, pour le personnel au complet d'un grand service public, le State Department, pris comme terme de comparaison) (7). Paradoxe supplémentaire, cette armée, dont on nous dit que « généraux et amiraux, dans leur for intérieur, ressentent avec une sensibilité-à-vif son caractère anti-économique, du fait qu'elle n'a rien à vendre sur le marché » (p. 228), cette armée aspire à elle une part énorme, toujours croissante, du revenu national. Par le truchement des nouveaux combinés d'armements *(weapons systems)* qui n'existent que pour et par elle, cette armée est devenue pour l'industrie le formidable pôle, sinon de développement (dont le pays n'a pas besoin), du moins d'accélération, que l'on sait. De sorte qu'elle joue aujourd'hui le rôle de centre de redistribution d'une fraction croissante des valeurs et biens économiques et qu'une part grandissante de la population, dépendant d'elle, se trouve directement intéressée à sa politique.

Certes cet accroissement de l'appareil militaire en hommes (négligeons les choses pour l'instant) n'est pas une exclusivité américaine. Qu'on se remémore le chiffre stupéfiant avoué par Malinovski dans son discours du 15 janvier 1960 : 250 000 officiers et cadres de carrière promis au dégagement des cadres et à un reclassement civil problématique ou autoritaire, étalé sur dix-huit mois. Aussi bien Janowitz ne s'attarde-t-il sur le cas d'espèce américain que pour tenter d'éclairer les conséquences du vaste changement survenu depuis le tournant du siècle dans le recrutement et la structure du corps des officiers. Changement survenu précisément au sein de ce contexte social et idéologique typiquement américain qui méritait qu'on s'y attarde préjudiciellement.

Quels sont notamment, vu ce contexte, les changements intervenus dans la composition et la nature sociale de ce que Janowitz appelle « élite militaire », officiers supérieurs et généraux composant déjà ou susceptibles d'alimenter le « noyau de l'élite », et auxquels l'auteur réserve une bonne part de sa réflexion, dévoilant ainsi son souci prédominant : accroître la connaissance du rôle social et politique contemporain de ceux que C. W. Mills appelait (un peu emphatiquement) les « seigneurs de la guerre »? Ces derniers précisément, lorsqu'ils parviennent aux sommets d'où s'exerce leur influence réelle ou supposée, sont-ils encore d'une

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(7) De 1900 à 1910, 7 000 en moyenne ; de 1920 à 1940, 25 000 ; de 1948 à 1950, 188 000. Donc taux d'accroissement infiniment plus élevé que pour la population totale et que pour la plupart des professions (Janowitz, p. 54).

caste, ont-ils réellement partie liée avec tel ou tel segment de la société? Sont-ils plus « militaires » ou sont-ils devenus plus « civils » (8)?

Commençons par la troisième question. Elle nous renvoie à l'armée américaine en général, d'où émergent ces élites, et à quelques idées fondamentales déjà évoquées par Janowitz en 1953 et 1957 (9). Ces idées, dont certaines sont du domaine public, tournent, on le sait, autour d'une thèse centrale qui tient en trois mots : « civilisement [*civilianization*] du militaire », tempérée par l'antithèse (affectée d'un point d'interrogation) : « pérennité de l'esprit combattant? » C'est sur cette alternative que l'ouvrage s'ordonne en profondeur.

Comme s'il revenait sur son ancien point de vue, l'auteur cette fois-ci insiste sur l'erreur répandue consistant à voir de l'inédit absolu dans les principaux facteurs historiques de « civilisement » qui infléchiraient sans retour le nouveau cours, le nouvel esprit militaire. Certes, il y a la profonde transformation du contenu et des formes traditionnelles de l'autorité et du commandement, en vertu de quoi les liaisons horizontales tendent à primer les verticales, l'organisation et la coordination à supplanter la contrainte liée aux stratifications hiérarchisées, la persuasion à émousser la discipline tout comme dans l'entreprise industrielle. Certes, la piétaille, base traditionnelle de la « pyramide », fait place de plus en plus au « médium », soldat qualifié, sous-officier, officier subalterne, tout comme à l'usine ultra-moderne (structure « en diamant »). Certes, il y a la prééminence actuelle des tâches de gestion, la prime, chaque jour croissante, accordée aux qualifications : organisateur, expert en « communications », en « relations humaines » ou même « publiques »; il y a l'énorme extension des domaines logistique et surtout technologique, affaire d'ingénieurs, de laboratoires, d'organisation industrielle. Certes, les armes de destruction massive « socialisent » le danger au point d'égaliser le risque de guerre entre soldat et civil (10). Certes, aussi longtemps que l'armée fera largement fond sur du personnel volontaire à court-terme ou appelé, comme c'est le cas sous le règne actuel du service sélectif américain, ce *turnover* permanent de purs civils diluera puissamment formes autoritaires 'et traditionalisme militaires. Certes, enfin, au niveau global, la fonction « inhibition » de la violence, prenant le pas sur la traditionnelle fonction « activation », embarrasse le militaire consciencieux de problèmes diplomatiques, politiques, sociaux, économiques. Lesquels se compliquent, s'il vient à se mêler du stationnement de troupes en pays amis, de la conduite des alliances internationales, de l'exécution des programmes d'assistance militaire : tous domaines où, en temps de non-guerre, « col blanc et parole ailée font mieux qu'étoiles et que stick doré ».

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(8) Pour répondre à ces questions l'auteur a : 1° utilisé une abondante documentation historique, politique, littéraire (mémoires, discours, etc.) ; 2° étudié les antécédents sociaux, la biographie et la carrière de plus de 760 généraux et amiraux en activité dans les 4 années — du temps de paix — suivantes : 1910, 1920, 1935, 1950 ; 3° exploité une enquête par questionnaires *self-administered* ayant touché, en juillet 1954, un échantillon de près de 550 officiers d'état-major en service au Pentagone, l'enquête étant centrée sur l'éducation militaire, les opinions à l'égard des relations civils-militaires, etc. ; 4° dirigé personnellement en 1958 des interviews « intensives » auprès d'un échantillon de 113 colonels ou brigadiers en service dans les états-majors des trois armes ; ces officiers, réputés futurs membres probables, dans les dix années à venir, du « noyau de l'élite », fournirent d'amples données sur une série de sujets tels que : motivations du choix de la carrière, satisfaction ou insatisfaction professionnelle, missions, attitudes à l'égard de la discipline, problèmes de stratégie, etc. Un appendice méthodologique entre dans le détail des questionnaires et des échantillons.

(9) Morris JANOWITZ, *Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and the Political Power : A Theoretical Orientation and a Selected Hypothesis* (Institute of Public Administration, Univ. of Michigan, July 1953, 44 p., mimeogr.) ; Morris JANOWITZ, *Sociology and the Military Establishoment* (New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 1959), 112 p.

Qu'à cela ne tienne, dit Janowitz, aucun de ces traits n'est radicalement neuf et tous réunis ne sauraient sonner le glas de cet « esprit combattant », du caractère traditionnel du chef militaire, surtout aux bas échelons, qui pour l'essentiel serait « basé sur une impulsion [*motive*] psychologique qui pousse un homme à rechercher le succès au combat, en négligeant sa sécurité personnelle » (p. 32).

Loin d'être inédite, l'opposition est séculaire qui distingue deux types de missions, deux types de soldats : l'administrateur, plus proche du civil, et le « chef héroïque ». Socialisation du danger, égalisation du risque, similitude croissante des bureaucraties militaire et non-militaire? Tout cela n'empêchera pas de demeurer intacte, quoique mouvante, la distinction entre les exigences des « rôles » militaire et civil. Les formations conventionnelles prêtes-à-combattre en vue de la « guerre limitée », bien qu'entourées d'un immense appareil à dominante mécanisée, automatisée, et d'une fantastique complexité logistique, relèvent d'un type d'organisation et de fonctionnement à base de discipline, de hiérarchie strictes, dont la clé unique s'appelle « maximisation de l'esprit combattant, individuel ou d'équipe ». A quoi contribue leur ségrégation intentionnelle du reste de la vie militaire emportée par le grand courant de technologie. Le corps des *marines*, anomalie organisationnelle à l'issue de la guerre, n'a cessé depuis lors de gagner en légitimité et en importance. Les nombreuses unités aériennes et navales (de surface ou sous-marines), soit chargées en permanence de la surveillance à longue distance de l'adversaire, soit destinées aux *task forces*, les unités d'assaut aéroportées, complément des systèmes de fusées entièrement automatisées, tout cela requiert des formations militaires conventionnelles.

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(10) A mesure que se sont accrues les dimensions de la force armée américaine, le taux de mortalité en opérations n'a cessé de décroître, en dépit de la destructivité croissante de la guerre. De la guerre de Sécession à la Corée, le taux léthal (combats et maladies) est passé de 104,4 pour 1 000 hommes-années, à 5,5 (JANOWITZ, p. 37, citant un rapport gouvernemental).

Plus important : aucun stratège n'est assez fou pour attendre la « victoire » de l'éventuel échange initial des grands coups nucléaires. « Gagnera » celui qui, pour faire face à la « guerre des reins brisés », aura mis en place, en vue du chaos, les plus sûrs « noyaux de résistance », et disposera pour cela des meilleurs personnels militaires, préparés à combattre en *soldats*, c'est-à-dire en pleine soumission à l'autorité de guerre, quelles que soient leurs armes ou « leurs préférences personnelles » (p. 34).

Enfin, pas de mutation brusque non plus, pas de cause perfide d'anémie à redouter, pour l'esprit martial du militaire, dans ce déplacement de la visée fondamentale qui affecterait la préparation globale à la guerre et en vertu de quoi l'essentiel de cette préparation, si elle doit être heureuse, consiste à rendre impossible la guerre que l'on prépare, celle de l'alinéa précédent ; et non seulement celle-là, mais même, mais surtout les autres, celles qui la contiennent en puissance. Les principales forces armées du monde occidental de naguère, la Royal Navy par exemple, ne furent-elles pas longtemps les instruments de la politique d'équilibre des Puissances, qui consistait en dernier ressort, lorsqu'on savait l'appliquer, à préparer la guerre « si l'on voulait la paix », à montrer sa force « pour n'avoir pas à s'en servir »? Aujourd'hui comme alors, la menace n'a de chance d'être prise au sérieux que si elle s'incarne et se rend visible à qui de droit, dans un dispositif permanent, doué d'un haut degré d'esprit guerrier : contribution spécifique, et unique, des militaires.

Finalement, prenons acte que l'homme qui a pratiqué quelque 675 officiers supérieurs ou généraux du Pentagone, personnellement ou par questionnaire, croit pouvoir affirmer que ni le nombre ni l'influence rapidement croissants des « administratifs » au sein de l'armée américaine, n'autorisent à préjuger des perspectives politiques de ses chefs suprêmes. « L'esprit combattant impose toujours sa marque [...] même aux *managers* » (p. 36).

Cette armée est une caste, comme toutes les armées du monde (pour simplifier, limitons ici le monde à l'Europe occidentale) dont, plus tard venue, elle a revêtu les traits principaux, mais toujours un ton au-dessous. Retour des choses : l'Europe en s'américanisant voit certains traits (notamment certains déboires du recrutement des officiers) apparemment spécifiques de l'armée américaine, frapper sa chose militaire. Si toutefois on doit appeler américanisation les divers « miracles » économiques — allemand, italien, français — des trois lustres écoulés : la désaffection à l'égard des valeurs de « service public » au profit des valeurs de productivité, consommation, succès-dans-les-affaires, concomitants de ces fameuses hautes paies pratiquées dans les secteurs privés en pleine prospérité, et qui semblent devoir attirer sans peine non seulement la qualité, mais la quantité. Ce que traduisent un peu partout : 1° le relèvement continu du taux d'admission aux principaux concours, assurant le nombre au détriment du niveau ; 2° les chiffres de démissions parmi les officiers, jeunes ou non (11). Ainsi, aux États-Unis, le courant des démissions s'est accentué depuis 1951, au point qu'aujourd'hui un breveté d'académie sur 5, et même 4, quitte le service dans les cinq années consécutives à sa nomination (p. 15).

Plus significatif encore d'une convergence Amérique/Europe (tout au moins France) est la très nette augmentation depuis quinze ans, dans les rangs des nouvelles promotions, des fils de militaires. Le cas français est-il, lui aussi, justiciable de l'interprétation de la version américaine proposée par Janowitz? La part faite aux mécanismes institutionnels (12) favorisant délibérément l'endo-recrutement — trait d'ailleurs en lui-même assez remarquable — le phénomène est pour une grande part spontané et « inévitable dans une société où les valeurs commerciales l'emportent sur les valeurs de service public » (p. 100). Pourquoi? Parce que le soldat professionnel, qu'il ait choisi naguère son métier pour des motifs de « carrière » (sécurité d'emploi, retraite, etc.) ou de « mission », est soumis toute sa vie au « système d'endoctrinement » et que le service des Académies et Écoles supérieures, la routine du quotidien militaire, autant que la « constante préoccupation du combat », finissent par engendrer en lui un sentiment d'être à part. Que la société par ailleurs lui mesure son estime, et il réagira — classiquement — en « porteur de valeurs » dressé contre « l'envahissement du mercantilisme sordide ». Conséquence logique parmi d'autres, à la question : « Aimeriez-vous que votre fils... », les 113 officiers interviewés en 1958 répondent oui massivement, en dépit, ajoute Janowitz, des facteurs négatifs tels que « salaires médiocres, nomadisme, etc. » (13).

« Caste », « endo-recrutement », « porteurs de valeurs distinctes », en voilà assez, sous tous les cieux, pour évoquer les démons. Que sera-ce, là où le glaive terrifiant que l'on sait est également aux mains de ces porteurs-là, qui portent en outre sur leurs épaules le destin de l'Europe et le nôtre avec celui d'une moitié de l'humanité? Acceptons ce dernier fait comme un donné. Que la situation diplomatique d'où il est issu ait été ou non inventée par les États-Unis, n'en discutons pas. Sachons en plus sur leur armée, et si elle a, dans les grandes lignes, même visage que le pays.

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(11) Pour Saint-Cyr, le taux d'admission en 1958 a dépassé 50 %. Pour l'armée de terre française : 150 démissionnaires en 1953 ; 560 en 1959 (dont une centaine ne pouvaient prétendre à une retraite d'ancienneté) ; une étude, à paraître dans un prochain cahier de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, analyse en détail le recrutement actuel des officiers de terre. En Grande-Bretagne, « 60 % de tous les entrants à l'Académie Royale Militaire, qui réussissent aux examens et sont acceptés par le Regular Commissions Board, sont notés avant leur arrivée comme "à peine susceptible de faire un officier moyen", surtout pour manque de " motivation " et d'aptitude au commandement » (Janowitz, p. 122).

(12) Système du *presidential appointment* (i.e. fédéral) gagnant de plus en plus au détriment du *congressional appointment* (régional, local) ; facilités offertes aux fils de militaires aux concours des Académies, etc.

(13) A raison de : Navy, 76 % ; Air Force, 71 % ; Army, 68 %. 25 % des *West-Pointers*, classe 1960, sont fils d'officiers de carrière ; beaucoup plus à Annapolis, comme prévisible (Janowitz, p. 121).

Une remarque préalable : tous les traits ci-dessus (recrutement, exode, valeurs, etc.) et ceux qui suivent, ne prennent leur importance particulière, spécifique, qu'à l'occasion — et, pour certains, à contre-sens — d'un processus global qui tend normalement à en émousser le relief : la rapide expansion du militaire par rapport à l'entre-deux-guerres, et l'ouverture sociale du recrutement à la base qui l'accompagne. Chaque trait, dès lors, requiert d'être pondéré : telle accentuation apparente peut recéler une relative atténuation.

L'idée que le corps des officiers — et donc son noyau — doit refléter intellectuellement et moralement, par sa « représentativité » sociale accrue, le credo libéral de la nation, n'est qu'un aspect de la croyance générale à l'extraction modeste du dirigeant américain, garantie de son bon-vouloir à « rendre des comptes » *(accountability, shared power)*. En temps de guerre, l'Idée a été précieuse à l'administration : appelés et volontaires se sentaient commandés « par leur propre espèce » (p. 80), non par quelque couche particulière, aux traditions ou aspirations suspectes. Et lorsque les portes de la guerre sont fermées, l'Idée rassure : le corps des officiers, « cross-section of middle class America » (14), et son élite, « cross-section of the whole corps », ne cherchera pas à les rouvrir abusivement, même si la majorité de ses membres doit piétiner et se morfondre indéfiniment, à portée des promotions perdues, derrière les battants clos. Pas plus ne chercheront-ils à s'emparer du pouvoir, ni même à sortir de la neutralité politique.

Sans entrer dans le débat soulevé ici, enregistrons l'avertissement que le libéral Janowitz, invoquant — d'ailleurs sous certaines réserves — l'autorité doctrinale de Gaetano Mosca, croit devoir adresser une fois de plus à ses compatriotes (mais sur un ton, moins alarmé, semble-t-il en 1960 que dans le *working paper* de 1953, lequel se ressentait visiblement du débat passionné autour des chefs militaires, de la conduite de la guerre de Corée, et de l'effroi devant un problème inédit aux États-Unis. *L'élargissement à la base du recrutement social des « élites » militaires, dans une démocratie de type industriel moderne, n'entraîne nullement* ipso facto *une « démocratisation » correspondante de leurs vues et comportements politiques, ne s'accompagne pas nécessairement d'une propension accrue à rendre des comptes, à se soumettre au pouvoir civil.* Sans discuter de Mosca, il nous semble que le problème, tel que posé dans sa grande généralité théorique par Janowitz, manque de clarté. Quelle est la cause de cette turbulence accrue, de cette désaffection à l'égard de la démocratie politique, objet de la « profonde prophétie de Mosca, en particulier pour l'Europe » (p. 264)? Est-ce l'augmentation en chiffres absolus et relatifs, des officiers représentatifs des couches sociales inférieures? Est-ce au contraire l'*insuffisance* de cette augmentation, son retard relativement à d'autres secteurs (comparables) de la nation-État (en ce cas, un peu de démocratisation éloignerait..., beaucoup y ramènerait)? Est-ce simplement l'accroissement de l'organisme militaire tout entier, hommes, choses et biens? Et quelle part faire à la nouveauté radicale des situations historiques?

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(14) Huntington, p. 227.

Janowitz lui-même nous simplifie le débat, pour ce qui est des États-Unis du moins, lorsqu'il dissipe (en son chapitre V) certaines illusions au sujet de la « cross-sectionality ».

1) *Naissance.* Sur les 760 généraux et amiraux (1910-1950) examinés, 2 % étaient nés à l'étranger ; en 1959 et 1960, 1 % des cadets de West-Point sont *foreign-born* contre 6,7 % de la population blanche totale. Vif contraste avec les *top businessmen* et les politiques : pour les premiers, Lloyd Warner trouve 5 % de *foreign* en 1952.

2) *Origine rurale.* Environ 70 % de l'élite militaire contemporaine, contre 26 % du *top business*, sont d'origine « rurale » (et petites villes, en dessous de 2 500 habitants).

3) Plus important, *le Sud.* En 1950 « le Sud est sur-représenté dans les forces américaines à raison d'un tiers en sus par rapport à sa population blanche ». En tout, 30 % de « sudistes » parmi l'élite militaire, contre 16 % chez les *businessmen.* Pour l'armée de terre surtout (à elle seule sur-représentée à raison de deux fois sa part), et la flotte, beaucoup plus que pour l'aviation, l' « affiliation sudiste (lieu de naissance, éducation première, secondaire, alliance, parentage, etc.) est éclatante ». Il est vrai que pour la même armée de terre, l'année 1910 indiquait 90 % de « sudistes ».

4) *Classe sociale.* En général « l'élargissement de la base sociale a surtout introduit des éléments de la *lower middle class* : familles de " cols-blancs ", commerçants, représentants, fonctionnaires, plus une teinture [*sic*] de classe ouvrière ». Dans l'élite de l'armée de terre, où en 1910-20 ces professions étaient totalement absentes, elles représentent en 1950 16 %, et dans l'aviation 21 %. Fils de travailleurs *(workers)* parmi les rangs supérieurs de 1950 : 5 % (avec une proportion supérieure pour l'aviation, comme prévisible) contre 15 % chez les *top businessmen.* Fils de « cols-blancs » : 11 %, contre 19 % chez les *businessmen.* Reste enfin : 75 % *(soixante-quinze)* pour les fils de la *upper*, de la *upper middle class* et partiellement de la *lower middle*, à raison de : 10 % pour les fils de « fermiers » (contre 8 % parmi les *businessmen*), 44 % pour les fils de *professional* et *managerial* (contre 29 %), 30 % pour les fils d'hommes d'affaires (contre 26 %). La plus forte proportion est donc représentée par les fils de juristes, médecins, fonctionnaires, officiers, enseignants, ecclésiastiques et hommes d'affaires. Parmi les Cadets de 1960 — généraux de l'avenir — la proportion des fils d'hommes d'affaires décroît sans cesse, surtout des *top businessmen*, fait qu'il faut se garder d'interpréter hâtivement, par exemple contre les thèses dites

« de C. W. Mills », en raison de sa lecture difficile. Enfin, comme déjà indiqué, la proportion des fils d'officiers augmente sans cesse : 7 % en 1910, 23 % en 1935, 25 % parmi les seuls Cadets de West-Point en 1960 (or on comptait moins de 20 % de fils de médecins parmi les étudiants en médecine de 1957).

5) *Affiliation religieuse* enfin. Elle indique une très forte sur-représentation protestante : 88 % des généraux et amiraux de 1950, contre 12 % catholiques. Or, à la même date, les « romains » représentent 20 à 22 % de la population blanche totale. Il est vrai qu'à West-Point (1959, 60, 61) leur proportion ne cesse d'augmenter.

En résumé, conclut Janowitz, en dépit d'un élargissement ininterrompu vers le bas (15), loin d'offrir un substrat social « représentatif », les militaires américains ont de nombreux traits en commun avec l'élite des affaires et de la politique : recrutement fortement sur-représenté en natifs d'ancienne ou très ancienne implantation (souche anglo-saxonne) et en couches sociales supérieures (non les grandes familles d'affaires mais plutôt « ... the prosperous, the professional, the upper middle class »).

Rendre compte, c'est choisir. A la réflexion, nous ne pensons pas nous être trop longtemps attardé aux chapitres sur les origines sociales, puisque précisément un des points d'interrogation de ce livre — qui en est riche — consiste à mettre en doute l'importance primordiale des origines.

Être du corps traditionnel des administrateurs de la violence nationale (et quelle violence) ne se compare à rien d'autre, et comporte *per se* des valeurs, une logique, grosses de surprises, capables d'ignorer ou d'inverser le signe de bien des facteurs. Les hasards du tempérament, du type d'intelligence, des rencontres, des promotions, des événements politiques ou historiques, de la vie privée, peuvent tout autant que les filiations décider des affiliations à tel ou tel « clan », telle ou telle écurie ou doctrine : « Asia-first » ou « Europe-first » ; représailles massives ou éventails de forces équilibrées ; stratégie périphérique avec alliances planétairement dispersées, ou au contraire resserrée, isolationniste ; « *Rolling-back* » ou « *Containment* » ; d'une façon générale, « absolutistes » ou « pragmatistes », etc.

Là comme partout ailleurs, on trouve cependant des « clés » de croyances, d'opinions, d'attitudes, de conduites, des *Gestalten*. Ce qui aboutit parfois à des inconséquences. Ainsi le fonds essentiel de conservatisme, véhiculé par la profession, qui veut qu'en matière de doctrine économique l'on soit expressément pour le *statu quo*, la libre entreprise, la non-intervention de l'État, veut aussi que l'on incline vers les stratégies dures, les programmes de surarmement les plus coûteux, donc les plafonds budgétaires volatilisés, et finalement un super-interventionnisme étatique. Certains ne s'en tirent pas (16).

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(15) Il faudrait insister à ce propos sur le cas de l'Air Force, qui par ailleurs connaît de nos jours le taux d'exode précoce le plus élevé des trois armes, ce qui s'explique aisément par le degré plus fort de « transférabilité » au secteur civil des qualifications acquises.

Autre cas d' « incompatibilité » (sur un tout autre plan) et qui donne lieu à l'une de ces analyses fines dont le livre regorge. « Porteur de valeurs », « être-à-part », voilà qui fait mauvais ménage avec l'idée de « représentativité » que le militaire, comme les autres élites, a fini par incorporer dans l'image qu'il se fait de lui-même. Non sans malaise. On lui avait appris à accepter le postulat culturel et politique qui veut que les hommes soient plus semblables que différents. Il partage en tant qu'Américain la méfiance instinctive à l'égard des chefs mandatés par eux-mêmes (anathème !), et d'ailleurs il préfère en général se présenter à autrui comme un homme de la moyenne, partie *aliquot* du vaste courant de la société contemporaine. Simultanément, il se veut mainteneur de grandes traditions, incarnation de vertus supérieures, modèle d'« idéalisme » au sein d'une société « matérialiste » qui n'en a cure. Crainte d'être à la longue par trop sensible à la prime partout accordée au technicien, au spécialiste, au professionnel, il forcera sur le sens du sacrifice, sur sa vocation, se prévaudra finalement, et secrètement, du coefficient « mortel » dont celle-ci est affectée pour revendiquer en priorité, par devant le Créateur, un droit ultime sur les destinées de la Nation.

> Seul le chef militaire [...] à qui incombe par destination la décision de retirer éventuellement le bien le plus précieux — la vie — à son compagnon d'armes, est capable, avec assez de compréhension mais avec une détermination inébranlable, de trancher en matière de politique de sécurité, dont dépend l'existence de la patrie. Le plus grand capitaine d'industrie ne sera jamais qu'un pâle novice pour cette plongée aux tréfonds de l'âme *(questionnaire)*.

Mais seul un général américain était capable, lors de l'évacuation de l'Autriche, de *fondre en larmes* sous les flashes : « J'espère que l'on gardera ici le souvenir de nos actions humaines plutôt que de nos actes officiels » (*Life*, 31-10-1955). En d'autres termes, dit Janowitz, le général Arnold rappelait aux Autrichiens [...] que les généraux américains sont aussi des êtres humains.

D'analyse fine en analyse fine (17), ce livre aboutit à un portrait du militaire dans la société américaine, dont on ne saurait rendre toutes les nuances. A l'usage d'un lecteur européen moyennement averti, c'est peut-être à C. W. Mills qu'on l'opposerait le plus utilement (18), suivant d'ailleurs en cela Janowitz lui-même. Peut-être, incidemment, reprocherons-nous à ce dernier d'en avoir trop vite fini avec Mills, et de le disputer sur des points somme toute secondaires. Ne reprend-il pas largement à son compte (p. 251) certains griefs de Mills, après avoir récusé ce dernier (pp. 4, 73 et 74)? D'ailleurs n'a-t-on pas, ici et là, un peu rapidement brocardé (19) l'accusateur public des « seigneurs de la guerre », oubliant que si Mills, comme on le lui a reproché, ne souffle mot de l'affaire Mac Arthur — exemplaire en effet — c'est qu'il en avait moins aux *warmongers* (il n'est point si sot) qu'aux « seigneurs du $ des armements »? Or, n'est-ce pas l'administration républicaine elle-même, par la voix de son président, qui en 1959 dénonçait pathétiquement les lobbyistes munitionnaires et leurs acolytes du Pentagone (20)?

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(16) Cf. notamment G. M. Lyons, Exigences militaires et budgets militaires aux U.S.A., *Rev. fr. de. sociol.*, II (1961), pp. 66-74.

(17) Absence de tradition féodale. Effets de la « professionnalisation » croissante, tendant à l'érosion des appartenances de classe. Importance des carrières « non-conformistes ». Changement des archétypes du Chef, vers le modèle « technologiste héroïque » (amiral Rickover), etc..

(18) C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), ch. VIII, IX, et XII : "The Warlords", "The Military Ascendancy".

Ces réserves faites, prenons acte ici que, de toutes les démocraties occidentales, l'américaine est sans doute la seule de nos jours où il se trouve un auteur « de gauche » (qu'il nous pardonne) pour conclure à la nécessité de s'acheminer au plus vite vers une armée de métier *stricto sensu*, réputée ici seulement non-porteuse des périls que l'on sait. Mais cette armée de métier, cette « maréchaussée » (21) n'est pas conçue, à l'instar des théoriciens européens, comme la meilleure *force* armée possible, créée pour conduire une guerre jusqu'à la victoire totale. Janowitz nous présente sa conclusion comme la conséquence des nouvelles missions assignées à l'armée américaine : « Se tenir en permanence prête à agir, *se donner pour règle le recours minimal à la force*, rechercher l'établissement de relations internationales viables plutôt que la victoire » (p. 418, souligné par nous).

Notre conclusion rejoindra nos remarques initiales et les justifiera peut-être d'avoir été si longues. Autour du berceau, beaucoup de chances se trouvaient réunies (dont celle de la géographie). Elles devaient faire des États-Unis les favoris de l'histoire dans la première moitié du XX^e^ siècle. Ce bonheur a nourri là-bas les frères ennemis — armée et anti-armée — suffisamment pour qu'ils prospèrent l'un et l'autre sans avoir eu, à ce jour, à en venir aux mains et même en s'ignorant réciproquement. Mais la bonne fée Géographie a perdu sa baguette. En vue du classement général définitif des démocraties (catégorie des relations armée-nation) il se pourrait que le siècle bouclé en 1965 (capitulation de Lee : 9 avril 1865) n'ait été pour les États-Unis qu'une mesure pour rien : l'épreuve de fond n'a pas commencé, en ce qui les concerne.

CONSTANTIN ŒCONOMO

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(19) Voir entre autres, Jean-Claude CASANOVA, in *Critique*, XV (1959), 264-276.

(20) *New York Times*, 5 juin 1959.

(21) Part VIII, Epilogue : "Toward the Constabulary Concept" (Comment traduire? le français n'offre qu'un mot, là où l'anglais permet le *distinguo*).

MASS SUFFRAGE, SECRET VOTING AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

THESE notes are concerned with a series of problems in cross-national studies of citizen participation in political decision-making.

The discussion focuses on contrasts among three channels of citizen influence on decisions for the territorial collectivity :

— the *traditional* channel, characterized by the recourse to kinship ties and local *notables;*

— the *electoral* channel, characterized by the recourse to formal rights of participation and standardized rules of representation ;

— the *organizational* channel, characterized by the recourse to collective action through functional associations organized across a variety of localities within the national or federal territory.

I. *The unit citizen and the formalization of participant acts.*

In the terminology suggested by David Easton, individual political acts constitute *inputs* into the process of decision-making for the territorial community (1). Individual acts of disobedience or resistance, spontaneous demonstrations, public articulations of opinion, mass media campaigns, demands, appeals and threats from organized movements and interest groups, offers and counteroffers in bargains between corporate units, reactions and suggestions flowing back from administrative agencies : these are so many examples of inputs to be taken into account in any analysis of the processes of decision-making in the nation-state. How do the electoral inputs fit into this broader framework of articulations of demands and aggregations of pressure (2)? This is the problem I hope to throw light on in these notes. It is a problem of central importance in the integration of approaches to the study of political processes : important in the analysis of the functional unity of systems, and important in the study of the motivations and manifestations of individual participation in the affairs of the community and the nation.

This problem has a crucial *historical* dimension. The processes of centralization and democratization during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century brought about a more and more marked con-

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(1) D. EASTON, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, *World Politics*, IX (1957), pp. 383-400.

(2) The concepts of "interest articulation" and "interest aggregation" are discussed in detail by Gabriel Almond, *in* G. ALMOND and J. S. COLEMAN, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 33-45.

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 132-152.

trast between the electoral and the other channels of participation in decision-making : the seemingly irresistible trend toward the formal standardization of procedures and enforcement practices gradually set the electoral mode of aggregation distinctly apart from other modes, both from the traditional influences of locally dominant families and from the emerging influences of functionally differentiated national organizations.

In full-fledged political democracies, electoral acts of participation will differ from other acts on three crucial counts :

first *the universality of access*—all accountable adults without severe criminal records are given the vote, however peripheral their concern for politics and public affairs, however dependent and subordinate their roles in their community or their organizations ;

secondly *the equality of influence*—each vote cast counts as one anonymous unit of influence and is completely divorced from the person and the roles of the participating citizen ;

and thirdly *the privacy and the "irresponsibility" of the participant act*—the vote is given the status of a "privileged communication" to the territorial authorities, there is no feedback to the citizen's other roles in his community and it is consequently up to each voter to decide whether or not to reveal his act and take responsibility for it in his day-to-day environment.

The history of the movement toward formal democracy in the West could appropriately be written as an analysis of the sequences of decisions that led to the adoption and enforcement of these three institutional solutions to the problem of the legitimacy of representation. What was central in this development was the growing acceptance of the concept of the *unit citizen* of the nation-state acting in abstraction from his particular roles in the organizational and institutional structure of society. It is tempting to see the development of these channels for mass participation in politics as one element in the complex series of processes that led to the growth and integration of territorially defined nation-states. The extension of political citizenship rights to all accountable adults and the equalization of all votes within a standardized system of electoral decision-making was one of several important facets of an overall process of *political mobilization* within the national territory : a process bringing about a steady increase in the proportion of the territorial population standing in direct, unmediated communication with the central authorities (3). It is not difficult to trace this process in the history of the consolidation and integration of the nation-states of the West in the nineteenth century and there are important parallels in the current developments in the new states in Africa and Asia (4). Essentially what we find is a process of institutional innovation leading to the imposition of formally equal obligations and the granting of formally equal rights to all accountable adults independently of differences in their established influence through roles in the kinship system, the local community or other corporate bodies. Direct taxation, military conscription and compulsory education would be major examples of formally universalized obligations to the nation-state, while equality before the courts, social security provisions and universal suffrage would be the principal examples of national citizen rights (5). We rarely find any straight progression toward the universalization of all these obligations and all these rights : what we find is a series of temporary compromises in a complex bargaining process between major power groups in each polity.

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(3) For an attempt to develop this concept in detail, see Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, Wiley, 1953), pp. 100-101. For a fascinating analysis of the role of the *mass media* in such processes of political mobilization, see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1958).

What needs to be emphasized in this context is that this process of nation-building brought with it almost as a matter of necessity the enfranchisement of vast masses of politically inarticulate citizens and at the same time make it formally possible for them to cut off traditional allegiances to the local communities and their hierarchies of influence. Edmund Burke was probably the first to see the growth of formal equality in this perspective : he denounced the French revolution for instituting an abstract equality of citizenship in order to insure greater centralization under the national government. Alexis de Tocqueville went further in this analysis of the parallel movements toward national integration and universal suffrage. He saw in the growth of *démocratie* a part-process in the total mobilization of all adult subjects into direct, unmediated relationship to the nation-state : *démocratie* implied more than an extension of political citizenship rights to the bourgeoisie and the lower classes, it stood for a trend toward the disintegration of all intermediate authorities between the government and the mass of legally equal citizens. In fact for Tocqueville the levelling of all differences in legal and political status among the subjects of the régime was at the heart of the overall trend toward a centralization of territorial authority in the nation-state : the demands of the subjects for greater equality strengthened the claims of the centralized state and the central powerholders reinforced these same demands in order to undercut all interference from intermediary powers, whether feudal, local or associational. Tocqueville prophesied that this dialectical process would be accelerated through the growth of manufacturing industries and the decline of local power based on agriculture : industrialization would not only bring with it changes in the social structure and intensify the demands for equality of status, it would also create conflicts that would increase the need for regulation of local affairs by the central government.

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(4) The term "political mobilization" is discussed by D. A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East* (Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1956), pp. 16-18. Comparative studies of the impact of mass suffrage in underdeveloped countries are essential for an understanding of factors making for integration or dissensus, cf. W. J. M. Mackenzie and K. Robinson, eds., *Five Elections in Africa* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960) ; T. E. Smith, *Elections in Developing Countries* (London, Macmillan, 1960). A fascinating account of the effects of the introduction of a system of mass elections in a traditional, highly stratified society is Jacques Maquet and Marcel d'Hertefelt's *Élections en société féodale : une étude sur l'introduction du vote populaire au Ruanda-Urundi* (Bruxelles, Académie royale des sciences coloniales, 1959).

(5) The most remarkable single-nation study of such processes of change is T. H. Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1950).

How did these projections into the future fit the actual facts of the political developments in the Western nation-states during the hundred years that followed? Tocqueville proved remarkably prophetic at one level : at the level of the development of *formal* political institutions and regulations. The continued growth of the manufacturing industries *did* bring about increased centralization of the national decision-making systems and *did* lead to the equalization of citizenship rights and obligations : by the end of World War I practically all nations of the West had introduced universal manhood suffrage and a majority of them also extended these rights to women. What Tocqueville was less ready to see was that *this development toward formal equalization could proceed* pari passu *with the steady growth of a pluralist network of associations and corporate bodies* : the systems of "one citizen, one vote" decision-making were gradually balanced off, so to speak, against systems of bargaining, consultation and representation among growing numbers of interest organizations, voluntary associations and public bodies. Tocqueville saw this coming in his description of the political and civil associations in the United States but somehow these insights did little to change his central vision of the growth of mass democracy. He did not see that the institutionalization of formal equality would not only allow, but sometimes even encourage the persistence of traditional loyalties to local notables and trusted spokesmen in guilds and associations and, what was to become even more important, set the stage for the growth of new organizations.

2. *Three central problems for comparative research on citizen participation.*

Gabriel Almond has argued persuasively for the development of "dualistic models" in the comparison of political systems at different stages of growth : a system may be "modern", "universalistic" and "achievement-oriented" at one level and in one of its channels of decision-making, and still remain "traditional", "particularistic" and "ascriptive" at other levels and in other channels of decision-making (6). National political systems are "multistructural" : the growing complexity of the economy may bring about a variety of differentiated rational-legal systems of decision-making, but the traditional local structures will invariably persist in one form or another and decisively affect the actual functioning of the new institutions.

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(6) ALMOND, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-25.

Almond urges the importance of this perspective in functional comparisons of total systems : the perspective is of equal importance in the study of the structural contexts of individual participation in decision-making. Almond's primary example highlights the contrast between the opportunities for formal participation opened up by the extension of the suffrage and the persistence of earlier structures of dependence on local spokesmen : the contrast between the assumptions of equality, anonymity and individual choice underlying the institutions of mass democracy and the discovery in *The People's Choice* and a long series of other empirical studies of the importance of face-to-face communication with opinion leaders in the immediate environments of the enfranchised citizen.

Students of political behaviour have again and again been struck by this contrast between the "one citizen, one vote" provisions of political democracy and the persistent inequalities in the actual processes of decision-making. Study after study has underscored the contrast between the high proportions of voters and the very low proportions of politically concerned and alert citizens within the mass electorate :

— on the one hand a large majority of *"only-voters"*, of citizens who turn up at their polling stations but show very little articulate concern about the issues of politics, only rudimentary knowledge of the alternatives and no willingness to take an active part in the conflict between the parties;

— on the other hand a small minority of *active participants* in the political system, of articulate and informed citizens motivated to act and to take a stand.

These inequalities have persisted in all mass democracies : they invariably became even more marked with the extension of the suffrage to women. The improvement of educational standards, the spread of the mass media of communication, the organizational work of the mass parties may have helped to raise the "political literacy" levels in most systems, but the basic inequalities in participation have remained. The persistence of these inequalities raises a series of questions about the *implications of the introduction of universal suffrage* for the functioning of modern political systems. So far, such questions of functional relationships have mainly been raised in discussions of evidence from single-countries (7). To gain a *comparative perspective* on such

(7) See particularly B. Berelson, Democratic Theory and Public Opinion, *Publ. Op. Quart.*, XVI (1952), pp. 313-330; B. Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 314-317; R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, *Marginal Seat, 1955* (London, Hansard Society, 1958), ch. XIII; R. E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Free Press, 1959), pp. 340-348; A. Campbell *et. al.*, *The American Voter* (New York, Wiley, 1960), ch. XX.

consequences we shall clearly have to do much more to collate data from countries differing in their characteristic sequences of developments towards full-fledged democracy and differing in the political alignments of the masses of citizens enfranchised through these developments :

— we need *historical* comparisons of the processes of decision-making which led to the expansion of the electorate and the standardization of registration and voting procedures ;

— we need *statistical* comparisons of trends in the political reactions of the masses of lower class citizens and of women after their entry into the electorate ;

— and we need *institutional and structural* comparisons of the different ways in which the pressures of the mass electorate, the parties and the elective bodies are dovetailed into a broader system of decision-making among interest organizations and private and public corporate units.

These are the three sets of problems I consider crucial in any systematic study of the structural contexts of political participation :

— first, the series of decisions which *set the formal conditions* for the political mobilization of the masses of inarticulate subjects within each territory ;

— secondly, the actual *rates of mobilization* to political activity and the conditions making for higher or lower rates ;

— thirdly, the conditions for given types of *tie-ins between party-political activities and participation in other policy-influencing groups, collectivities and organizations.*

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the current status of research on each of these problems : I shall limit myself to a few suggestions of promising lines of analysis.

3. *The institutional settings and the structural restraints.*

Discussing the progress of democracy in the U.S., Alexis de Tocqueville pointed to an "invariable rule in the history of society" : once the first step had been taken to reduce the qualifications for the vote it would be impossible to halt the movement at any point short of universal suffrage (8). It is extraordinary to see how Tocqueville's projections turned out to fit the actual developments toward full-fledged formal democracy in nation-state after nation-state : the decisions to extend the vote were not uniformly a response to pressures from below, they were as often the results of contests for influence at the top and of deliberate moves to broaden the bases for an integrated national power structure. The French Revolution had sown its plebiscitarian seeds and the success of Napoleon III had a distinct impact on political minds in Western Europe (9). By a much-debated historical coincidence, the two great Conservative leaders Disraeli and Bismarck proceeded in 1867 within months of each other to extend the suffrage further than their Liberal antagonists had wanted (10). In both cases these "leaps in the dark" were motivated by a profound belief that the entry of the working classes into the electorate would strengthen the unity and stability of the nation-state. Disraeli expressed great faith in the working class and saw a major source of strength for the Conservative party in these new entrants into the electorate. In the words of a *Times* obituary 16 years later, Disreali discerned the Conservative working man "*in the inarticulate mass of the English populace*" just as "the sculptor perceived the angel in a block of marble" (11). Bismarck also saw a major ally against the Liberals in the working class and was clearly very much influenced in his decision by his secret conversations with Ferdinand Lassalle: the Junker and the Socialist found a common ground in their belief in the integrating and centralizing impact of the introduction of universal manhood suffrage (12). The motive for extending the suffrage to the workers was patently not to create a channel for the articulation of the interests of the economically dependent strata: the objective was to strengthen the policies of centralization by enlisting the support of the least articulate classes in German society. Bismarck even toyed with the possibility of introducing a system for ensuring numerical support through the tacit acquiescence of the inarticulate masses: the votes of those who did not turn out were to be counted in favour of the governmental candidates (13). Lassalle developed the idea, he called it his *Zauberrezepte* (14), of ensuring results in the same direction by a system of *obligatory voting*. This idea was not taken up in the debate over the constitution of the North German Federation, but was later to become a standard strategy in efforts to ensure an equilibrium of power in mass suffrage systems (15).

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(8) *De la démocratie en Amérique* (Paris, Gosselin, 1835), vol. I, chap. IV.

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(9) Cf. particularly H. Gollwitzer, Der Cäsarismus Napoleons III im Widerhall der öffentlichen Meinung Deutschlands, *Hist. Zs.*, CLXXIII (1952), pp. 23-76. For a detailed account of the electoral manipulations of the "masses" under the Second Empire, see Theodore Zeldin, *The Political System of Napoleon III* (London, Macmillan, 1958).

(10) For the developments leading to the Second Reform Act, see particularly Ch. Seymour, *Electoral Reform in England and Wales* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916); for the decision of the North German Federation, see H. Oncken, *Historisch-politische Aufsätze u. Reden* (München, Oldenbourg, 1914), vol. II, pp. 157-192. W. Gagel, *Die Wahlrechtsfrage in der Geschichte der deutschen liberalen Parteien* (Düsseldorf, Droste, 1959).

(11) *The Times*, 18 April 1883, quoted in R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, Macmillan, 1955), p. 147. The most recent discussion of the Conservative belief in the principle of "one man, one vote, one value" is in Sir Ivor Jennings, *Party Politics, I: Appeal to the People* (Cambridge, The University Press, 1960), pp. 18-28.

(12) E. R. Augst, *Bismarcks Stellung zum parlamentarischen Wahlrecht*, (Diss. Leipzig, 1916). G. Mayer, *Bismarck u. Lassalle* (Berlin, Dietz, 1929).

(13) Mayer, *op. cit.*, p. 36; E. Eyck, *Bismarck*, (Erlenbach-Zürich, Rentsch, 1945) vol. I, p. 601.

(14) Letter to Bismarck, 13 Jan. 1864; Mayer, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

At the heart of the bitter debates over the extension of the suffrage were conflicting expectations concerning the repercussions of the entry of the "politically illiterate" into the electoral arena : conflicting views of the *allegiances and probable reactions* of these masses once enfranchised, and conflicting evaluations of the possibilities of *controlling and channelling* the new forces. Liberals tended to express fear of an irresponsible and disruptive radicalization of politics. Conservative and Christian party leaders were more likely to see in the enfranchisement of the lower classes and of all women a major strategic move in the stabilization of the national system against the attacks from the Socialist Left. An extraordinary variety of institutional compromises were tried out in response to these conflicting pressures. The history of these innovations is not of merely antiquarian interest : these developments set the stage for the organization of mass politics in each country and the particular solutions reached at each stage helped to determine the conditions for the integration of the lower classes into the national community.

In a systematic comparison of the sequences of decisions that led to the introduction of full-fledged formal democracy a great number of *dimensions of institutional change* would have to be considered. For the present purposes a simplified schematic chart has been prepared (fig. 1) to set in relief some of the salient differences between Western European countries in the developments that led to the enfranchisement of the politically least articulate strata of each population (16). This chart takes into account only three dimensions of variation : the steps in the *extension of the suffrage*, the decisions on the *weighting of the votes*, and the steps toward the *privatization of electoral preferences*.

A comparison of these sequences of decisions reveals some marked contrasts : not just in the number of years and the number of steps it took to reach universal suffrage but even more in the decisions taken at the point of the entry into politics of the hitherto unrecognized strata of the population.

It would be difficult to devise an electoral measure more calculated to alienate the lower classes from the national political system than the one promulgated in Prussia in 1849 : all adult men were given the vote but the workers and the lower middle class were given only a token chance to influence the elections because of the three-class division of the electorate (17). What is even more remarkable about the Prussian case is that it was possible to maintain for more than two generations a system of universal manhood suffrage with *oral voting at public sessions*. Of other countries only Denmark kept up provisions for public voting for any length of time after the introduction of near-universal manhood suffrage. In France the provisions for secrecy were largely nominal far into the era of the Third Republic : mayors and other officials had little difficulty in controlling the votes of the less articulate (18). In most other countries of Western Europe provisions for the secrecy of the vote either preceded or were developed *pari passu* with the extension of the suffrage to the lower classes.

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(15) For a general review of these developments, see Georg MEYER, *Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht* (Berlin, Haering, 1901), pp. 653-660, and K. BRAUNIAS, *Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht* (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1932), vol. II, pp. 35-45. On the Belgian law of 1893, see particularly J. BARTHÉLÉMY, *L'organisation du suffrage et l'expérience belge* (Paris, Giard, 1912), chap. VI.

(16) Secondary sources : Ch. SEYMOUR and D. P. FRARY, *How the World Votes* (Springfield, Mass., Nichols, 1918), vol. I-II. BRAUNIAS, *op. cit.*, vol. I.

The extraordinary contrast between the electoral systems of Prussia and the Reich from 1870 to 1918 has given rise to a great deal of discussion among historians and political theorists : in Prussia a system of extremely unequal, open and indirect elections, in the Reich a system of equal, secret and direct voting, but for a Diet without decisive influence in the affairs of the nation. There is a wealth of evidence to show that this constellation of institutions was highly dysfunctional : the extension of the suffrage appeared to encourage the participation of the lower classes but the contrast between the two systems of elections made for widespread resentment and helped to isolate the workers in permanent opposition to the régime.

Ernst Fraenkel has recently suggested that the introduction of *secret voting* in the Reich contributed decisively to the isolation of the urban working class in *eine soziale Ghettopartei* (19) : what he has in mind is that the deep resentments caused by the Prussian system of unequal and open voting could find secret and safe expression in votes for the Reichstag without any pressure on the ordinary voter to articulate his feelings openly in his community. In the deeply divided German society, the introduction of secret voting in fact tended to keep the newly enfranchised citizens in isolation outside the national political system and clearly did not contribute to the integration of the polity.

Interestingly enough, the evidence for the developments in other countries, particularly in Britain, suggests the opposite. The Ballot Act was passed five years after the decisive extension of the suffrage in 1867 and coincided with the great efforts of the Conservative party to organize clubs of workingmen for political action. The Ballot Act reduced drastically the opportunities for local influence on the

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(17) For the background of the regulations of 30 May, 1849, see most recently H. BOBERACH, *Wahlrechtsfragen im Vormärz* (Düsseldorf, Droste, 1959).

(18) For a collection of electoral *curiosa* indicating the low level of standardization, see A. PILENCO, *Les mœurs du suffrage universel en France* (Paris, Revue Mondiale, 1930).

(19) « Parlament und öffentliche Meinung », in *Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie. Festgabe für H. Herzfeld* (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1958), p. 178.



FIG. I

COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF SUFFRAGE EXTENSIONS: SOME CONTRASTS IN WESTERN EUROPE worker vote through bribery and chicanery but at the same time made it possible for the "deferent working man" to vote with his superiors without making this an issue in his day-to-day life with his fellow workers. The decisive difference between the developments in Britain and in Germany after the extension of the suffrage in 1867 was no doubt due to the action of the parties : in Britain both the Conservatives and the Liberals developed mass organizations aimed at the new entrants into the electorate; in Germany the parties on the right remained *Honoratiorenparteien* and left it to the Social Democrats to develop a network of political, social and cultural organizations for the workers which kept them clearly apart from the rest of the body politic. The introduction of secret voting in both countries accentuated these differences in development.

This contrast raises a series of intriguing questions about the functions for political systems of the introduction of institutions for the safeguarding of the *privacy* of the voting act. It is remarkable how little attention has been given in the literature to the effects of these profound changes in electoral procedures (20). What can be said at this stage will of necessity be based on speculation and only scattered and unsystematic evidence.

Tocqueville would clearly have seen in the provisions for secrecy a further extension of the tendency for the centralizing nation state to enter into direct communication with each individual subject and to undermine all intermediary powers : the essential effect of the secrecy institution is to accentuate the equality of each voter by isolating him from the hierarchical influences in the local community. Through the secrecy provisions the power of the local aristocracy, the notables and the clergy is further reduced and, to follow the Tocqueville model, the tendencies toward centralization correspondingly strengthened.

In sociological terms we might say that in the situation of secret voting the individual adult is cut off from all his roles in the subordinate systems of the household, the neighbourhood, the work organization, the church and the civil association and set to act exclusively in the abstract role of a citizen of the over-all political system : there will be no feedback from what he does in this anonymous role to what he does in the other roles and therefore no need for him to take responsibility for the act of voting in his everyday interaction in his regular environment.

The obvious manifest reasons for introducing the secrecy provisions were the numerous public scandals over attempts at intimidation and bribery.

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(20) The formal history of the Anglo-Saxon systems is well covered in J. H. Wigmore, *The Australian Ballot System* (Boston, Boston Book Co, 1889); E. D. Evans, *A History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1917). On other systems, see Meyer, *Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht, op. cit.*, pp. 528-565, and Braunias, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 168-174.

The primary motive for the introduction of the ballot system was to make it possible to escape sanctions from superiors : this was the essence of the Chartists' early demands and has always been a basic concern of working class movements.

What has been less emphasized in histories of electoral institutions is that the provisions for secrecy could cut the voter off from his *peers* as well as his *superiors*. It is often overlooked that there are two distinct elements in the secrecy provisions : the first is to make it *possible* for the voter to keep his decision private and avoid sanctions from those he *does not* want to know ; the second is to make it *impossible* for the voter to prove how he voted to those he *does* want to know. The very rigorous rules set up in country after country for the invalidation of all irregularly marked ballots were directed to this second point : they were devised to ensure that the citizen could no longer treat his vote as a commodity for sale. He might well be bribed but the price per vote would clearly decrease as soon as it proved impossible to check whether it was actually delivered (21). The salient point here is that by ensuring the complete anonymity of the ballots it became possible not only to reduce bribery of the economically dependent by their superiors but also to reduce the pressures towards conformity and solidarity within the working class.

The secrecy provisions clearly constituted an important mechanism of escape for the politically inarticulate entrants to the electorate. The actual political effects of this privatization of the vote varied enormously, however, with the organizational environments of these citizens (22). In Germany, the Social Democratic party was able, at least in the major cities, to create a highly homogeneous working class environment through the development of a wide variety of secondary organizations : it became what Sigmund Neumann has called *eine integrale Partei*, a party that could claim the allegiance of its voters in all their social roles and therefore isolated them from disturbing cross-pressures. In this case, the introduction of secret voting for the Reichstag contributed further to the isolation of this subsystem since it reduced to a minimum the need for community interaction about political differences. In Britain the mass-directed efforts of the Conservative and the Liberal parties subjected the new entrants into the electorate to conflicting pressures : in this situation the institution of secrecy became an important device for the stabilization of the system since it allowed legitimate withdrawal from open political strife, not just by abstaining from the vote, but also by keeping preferences private and without consequence in everyday life. With increasing social mobility and the cross-cutting influences brought about by expanding associations in the community and the nation, more and more workers must have come under conflicting political pressures and must have felt the need for such provisions for the privatization of the act of voting.

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(21) See SEYMOUR, *op. cit.*, pp. 434-435, and for details on the effect on the "vote market", H. J. HANHAM, *Elections and Party Management : Politics in the Time of Disraeli and Gladstone* (London, Longmans, 1959), chap. XIII.

(22) This, of course, is the theme of OSTROGORSKI's volumes. For a detailed account of developments in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, see HANHAM, *op. cit.*

What is crucial here is that this need for privatization tends to be much more marked among the politically inarticulate than among those who for one reason or another have become motivated to concern themselves with public issues. Under regulations for secret voting there is an important *asymmetry* in the system-voter relationship : the "system" is pledged to the safeguarding of the secrecy of the vote but the voter is under no legal obligations to keep his preferences private, however little he can do to provide direct proof of his actual behaviour at the poll. The institution of secret voting in this way places every citizen before another set of alternative decisions : should he keep his vote completely to himself as is his right, or should he make his preference known to others within his primary groups only, within the organizations and associations he is part of, or to the general public?

This in fact brings about a *stratification* of the electorate on a "privacy-publicity" dimension : from those who never reveal their vote to anyone to those who publicly take their stand on the alternatives set and openly proclaim how they will vote or have voted. The *active* and the *militant* in the political parties clearly cannot make much use of the secrecy provisions : they may be important for them in the choice of particular *candidates* but it is part of their community role to commit themselves publicly between the major alternatives.

4. *Statistics on the political mobilization of the inarticulate strata.*

The effects of the secrecy provisions on the behaviour of the masses of workers and later of women enfranchised through the final universalization of the suffrage have never been systematically studied. The marked contrasts in the turnout proportions between parallel elections in Prussia and in the Reich have frequently been documented, but no detailed ecological comparisons of results in open and results in secret elections have, as far as I have been able to ascertain, ever been attempted. Erik Hogh has under way a fascinating analysis of the electoral registers for a sample of Danish constituencies from the period of open elections : here it will be of the greatest interest to analyze the extent of participation and the political preferences of the various categories of manual workers.

Comparative research on the processes of *entry into politics* is indeed still in its infancy. Tingsten was probably the first to give serious attention to the study of the electoral records for the last to be enfranchised, the workers and the women (23). His actual analyses, however, did not go beyond the *first step* in this process : the *use of the vote.* Statistics on the turnout of the latest entrants into the electorate were available for some countries : statistics on their *further advances* into the political arena have generally proved much more difficult to assemble and, what is crucial here, much more difficult to break down by categories of the electorate.

Maurice Duverger assembled an important body of comparative information on *party memberships* and established trends in the member-voter ratios for mass parties in Western Europe (24) : these, however, were all derived from aggregate figures for entire parties, without any breakdowns by the occupation or the sex of the member. Historical statistics on the recruitment of party members from the ranks of the latest entrants into the electorate may still be assembled for the better-documented parties but the data are often fragmentary and hard to evaluate. The outlook for historical comparisons is markedly better for the *ultimate steps* in participation in each system : for competitive participation in *candidacies* and for actual participation in decision-making in formally established *elective offices.* For such studies there will generally prove to be an abundance of documentary materials available for coding and counting, but so far hardly anything has been done in any country to assemble such statistics for the *lower rungs* of political systems : there is a growing body of literature on the recruitment of participants in *central, national* decision-making (25), but to reach fuller understanding of the "entry-into-politics" process we shall clearly have to collect data on candidates and officers in samples of *local administrative* districts.

Data on the socio-economic backgrounds of party members, candidates and elected officials can to a large extent be assembled from regularly maintained "bookkeeping" records. Sources of this kind will only rarely, however, offer detailed data for analyses of the *paths of recruitment* and the *over-all patterns of participation in community life, in policy-influencing organizations and in the flow of public and private communication* about the polity and its affairs. To ensure a basis for such analyses we will normally have to proceed to *direct data gathering*, either through local inquiries and the use of informants, or through personal interviews. Two distinct strategies of data gathering have been developed in such studies : the one starts out from rosters of *organizationally visible participants* (e. g., party members (26), party officials (27), candidates, elected officials), the other is to select *cross-sectional samples from the electorate-at-large* and to rely on breakdowns by levels of activity within the samples. Each procedure has its drawbacks as well as its advantages : the ideal solution is a design that combines the two (28). Studies focussing exclusively on the visible participants will only allow very few comparisons with the rest of the electorate. Cross-sectional studies will allow a wide range of direct comparisons but will in most cases have to be prohibitively large to permit analyses of upper-echelon participants (29). The basic difficulty, however, lies in the *time* dimension : in most Western countries it took years after the final extension of the suffrage before adequate survey data started to get accumulated. Any time series that can be established for the recruitment of active participants among the lower strata and among women will be very short indeed. Something can be done through breakdowns by age within the samples, even more through the systematic use of recall questions about the activity levels in the family of origin and through analyses of social and political mobility, but serious gaps in our knowledge of the time sequences in the "entry-into-politics" processes will remain whatever we do in this direction.

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(23) Tingsten's work on the behaviour of recently enfranchised groups needs to be completed and systematized on a variety of points. Quite particularly, it would be of great theoretical interest to undertake comparative analyses of the rate of "politicization" in the peripheral areas of each nation-state, the remote, less "modernized" areas of the national territory. This is a central concern in our current studies of electoral participation in Norway, to be reported on in S. ROKKAN and H. VALEN *et al.*, *Valg i Norge*, now in preparation. We find clear evidence that women are least prone to vote in the less accessible, least politicized areas along the coast. It is of interest to note that similar differences in the rates for women appeared in German statistics just after the introduction of female suffrage, cf. Gabriele BREMME, *Die politische Rolle der Frau in Deutschland* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Rupert, 1956), p. 45, but have tended to *disappear in post-war elections.* This has been interpreted in terms of a process of "mobilization" by Erwin Faul, *in* E. FAUL, ed., *Wahlen und Wähler in Westdeutschland* (Villingen, Ring-Verlag, 1960), pp. 156-163.

(24) *Political Parties* (London, Methuen, 1954), ch. II.

(25) Cf. H. D. LASSWELL *et al.*, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952) ; D. MARVICK, ed., *Political Decision-Makers : Recruitment and Performance* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1961). Our Norwegian programme of research on parties, elections and political behaviour includes a study of the recruitment of candidates for the *Storting :* this gives particular emphasis to the analysis of the *local* contexts of recruitment.

However limited the possibilities of historical comparisons, cross-national analyses of survey data are clearly essential in any attempt to reach some understanding of the implications of mass suffrage for the functioning of Western-type political systems. Comparisons of the extent and scope of participation within the lower socio-economic strata can help us to gain insight into the functional importance of the right to the vote: What does the suffrage mean for citizens in these strata? Is voting a peripheral activity of little consequence or does it fit in with a wider range of participant activities in the community, in associations, in politics? Sample surveys can give us data on these wider contexts of participation and comparisons of such data across communities and across national systems can give us clues to an understanding of the importance of the structural settings and the alternatives in the system for the recruitment of active participants from the lower strata within each society.

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(26) Examples : O. Rantala's work on the membership of the Conservative party in Finland, *Konservatiivinen puolueyhteisö* [The Conservative party community]. (Helsinki, Tammi, 1956), Renate Mayntz's study of the CDU members in a district of Berlin, *Parteiengruppen in der Grossadtt* (Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959).

(27) Example : H. Valen and D. Katz, An electoral contest in a Norwegian province, *in* M. Janowitz, ed., *Community Power Systems* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1961), pp. 207-236.

(28) Attempts in this direction : D. Katz and S. J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Activity upon the Electorate", *Publ. Op. Quart.*, XXV (1961), 1-27 ; also Valen and Katz, *op. cit.*

(29) This, of course, will vary with the administrative structure and the population density of the country : figures for Finland and Norway indicate that up to 2 % of any nationwide sample will be candidates for offices elections, see the article on "Finland" and "Norway and the United States of America", *in* S. Rokkan, ed., Citizen participation in political life, *Int. Soc. Sci. J.*, XII (1960), particularly pp. 31-32 and 81-84.

Our recent attempt at comparing data on participation from two systems differing as much from each other as Norway and the United States (30) points to a possible line of research in this direction. Our principal concern here was with the extent of political participation within the lower strata of the two electorates : the workers as contrasted with the salaried employees, the professional people and the businessmen, the primary-educated as contrasted with the secondary-educated and the college-educated. We found for both countries the usual differences in turnout between the strata and we found consistent differences in the same direction for the extent of *attention to the mass media* during the campaign : here we simply dealt with replications of "micro-micro" breakdowns. What changed the character of the analysis was the finding that there were no such uniform differences between the strata for *organizational activity in politics :* using a simple index of participation based on party membership, attendance at meetings and electoral work, we found *no consistent differences between strata in the Norwegian sample but a marked and consistent one in the U.S.* We interpreted this to reflect the contrast between the two regimes in the *alternatives set for the citizens*, both as voters and as potential recruits to party activity : in the one case a markedly class-distinct, "status-polarized" party system, in the other much less correspondence between the lines of socio-economic cleavage and the lines of political conflict (31). To explore this further we proceeded to a "third-order" "macro-micro-micro" comparison. We rank-ordered the parties in the two systems according to the proportions of manual workers among their voters and we found that the class character of the parties made a decisive difference in the recruitment of active participants in political work. In the Norwegian Labour party we found manual workers more likely to be active than middle class voters. In the more heterogeneous Democratic party in the U.S. we found a tendency in the opposite direction : the level of participation was slightly lower for workers than for middle class voters. The most marked status differentials in participation were found within the parties with the lowest proportions of working class voters : the opposition parties in Norway and the Republican parties in the U.S. This, of course, cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence : the differences were found within *nation-wide* cross-sections and will need to be tested by *categories of communities*. However, the findings do suggest important hypotheses for continued comparative research : they accentuate the importance of assembling data on the character of the *political choices confronting the worker*, on the opportunities open to him for *experience and training in organizational skills*, and on the *channels of recruitment* from class-distinct associations such as unions to membership and activity in political parties.

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(30) S. Rokkan and A. Campbell, Norway and the United States of America, *in* S. Rokkan, ed., *op. cit.*

(31) For a general discussion of concepts of "status-polarization", see Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, ch. xiii.

Perhaps the most important set of factors to be taken into account in any comparative study of participation bear on the *organizational bases* for the recruitment of active supporters in party-political work: How open, direct, stable are the channels of recruitment from the given economic, cultural or religious organization to the given party? What are the alternative "policy pay-offs" of other affiliations, other modes of influence, for the given organization? What are the alternative prospects of achievement and advancement for the active participants in the given organization?

Questions along these lines may be raised for any association or organization and for any party. They are of particular importance in comparative studies of the socio-economic bases for party conflict. In pushing further our tentative comparisons between Norway and the United States, these are exactly the questions we shall want to explore in detail : the character of the tie-ins between the different labour unions and the parties, the distinctiveness of the union votes, the extent of recruitment from union activity to political activity, the relationships between union activity and participation in other organizations and associations in the community and the nation.

5. *Party-political activity, community influence and organizational power.*

With these questions we are already at the heart of another important area for comparative research : the study of factors making for differences between systems and changes within systems in the importance of party politics and elections in the overall process of decision-making for the territorial population.

In an attempt to clarify issues in the current debate over method and theory in the study of community power structures, Peter Rossi recently suggested a typology and a set of hypotheses of general importance in comparative research on participation (32).

Rossi's basic concern is with community conditions making for *separation between the political elite and the economic elite:* in terms of our discussion the focus of his analysis is on conditions for the development of two distinct channels of decision-making, one based on mass suffrage and party organization, the other based on professional status, managerial position and the control of wealth.

Rossi specifies three sets of conditions for the development of such separate channels.

First the *size* of the community : this determines the extent to which local government offices will be full-time roles segregated from any other roles of the incumbents;

secondly, the *strength of partisan traditions in local government:* the stability and competitive character of the local party system;

and thirdly, the extent of "*political crystallization*" (33) : the extent to which the social structure of the community is reflected in the divisions of the electorate at the polls.

Rossi sees a "natural strain" in community life toward overlap and congruence between economic and political dominance. This is the normal situation in small communities in the United States, whether run by the Democrats in the South or the Republicans in the North. There is a tendency in the same direction in larger communities with strong traditions of *non-partisan*, "*managerial*" government: such traditions generally tend to strengthen the position of the local economic elite and prevents the growth of "countervailing powers" deriving their strength from the mass suffrage.

A marked separation between political and economic elites will generally be found in Northern cities governed by Democratic politicians deriving their power from socio-economically and ethnically distinctive electorates. In such communities the level of status polarization will regularly be found to be as high as in countries with clearly class-divided party systems throughout their territory (34). If we compared just these U.S. cities with cities in a country with a major Labour party such as Norway we should *not* find differences of the magnitude we reported for nation-wide samples. It is important to note that in the United States a high level of status polarization in the division of local votes does not appear to increase appreciably the recruitment of *working*

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(32) P. H. Rossi, Power and Community Structure, *Midwest. N. J. Pol. Sci.*, IV (1960), pp. 390-401.

(33) This is the term introduced by G. E. Lenski, *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, XIX (1954), pp. 405-413; in this context it is synonymous with the term "status polarization" used elsewhere in this paper.

(34) Correlations by precinct between economic/ethnic indices and the Democratic vote have been found to be very high in such cities : see Rossi and Cutright, The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting, in M. Janowitz, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 81-116.

class citizens to public positions Comparative evidence from communities differing in the level of status polarization should not be very difficult to assemble, but the scattered local studies at hand are not always easy to compare for rates of recruitment. Reviewing such evidence as is at hand, Rossi finds that the cleavage between the political and the occupational elites will largely tend to be a cleavage *within* the world of business and the professions : the leaders in the "public" sectors of such communities are most likely to be recruited from the ranks of small businessmen and lawyers at the hearts of extensive networks of local face-to-face acquaintanceships while the leaders in the "private", economic and professional sectors are more likely to derive their power from positions in large-scale territory-wide organizations cutting across a variety of localities.

Here we touch on an important theme in the analysis of the implications of mass suffrage for the functioning of pluralist political systems : what changes will occur in the over-all processes of decision-making with the mobilization of the less articulate electorates for political action and with the consequent growth of independent centers of electoral power?

Rossi hypothesizes that the three basic strategies used by economic elites in countering the effects of the growth of electoral power will be these :

1) the promotion of non-partisan electoral systems and of technically neutral administrative agencies;

2) the intensified proliferation of privately controlled community institutions and voluntary civic associations serving as instruments of influence and pressure in conflicts over local policies;

and 3) the development of state-wide or nation-wide interest organizations to influence policies beyond the control of the local political elite.

Hypotheses of this kind may be tested either *diachronically* or *synchronically*. Several attempts have been made to establish *trends toward a withdrawal of the economic elites from local politics* in the U.S. over the last decades (35), but the factors accounting for such trends are complex : they certainly cannot be attributed solely to the growth of independent electoral power centers. *Synchronic* comparisons of the extent of private policy-influencing activity through community institutions and voluntary associations have, to my knowledge, never been attempted in the United States : Rossi's hypothesis is that such activities would be more extensive the more marked the separation of the economic from the political elite in the community. The basic task here would be to find some meaningful measure of the "importance" of the private institutions and the voluntary associations in each community: mere statistics on size of memberships and the economic roles of the active participants would not be likely to take us very far in this direction.

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(35) R. O. Schulze, The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure, *Am. Sociol. Rev.*, XXIII (1958), pp. 3-9; also : "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City", *in* M. Janowitz, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 19-80.

Whatever the technical difficulties of testing the hypotheses suggested by Rossi, the underlying reasoning about the processes of decision-making in mass-suffrage systems will clearly prove important in future attempts at cross-national comparisons.

The most straightforward of the tasks to be taken up in comparative research on these wider contexts of participation is the collation of national statistics on the recruitment of *members and officers* in different categories of *voluntary associations.* Studies of the linkage between association membership and political activity have been undertaken in several countries over the last years (36) and evidence on the character of such linkages can now be assembled for a wide range of structurally different systems. The studies so far undertaken have focused on social activities in the community and in wider organization as sets of *conditioning variables* in explaining levels of political partisanship and participation : the simplest way of establishing the linkages has been by direct counts of the total number of non-political membership and offices held by each respondent and by analyses of the correlations with indices of political activity. In moving toward comparative analyses of channels of influence on community policy-making it will clearly be essential to go beyond such crude correlations : voluntary associations and private organizations will have to be differentiated not only according to their substantive goals and their membership criteria (37), but also in terms of the socio-economic background and political partisanship of their clientele and their leaders and, what is of particular importance here, in terms of *the "pay-off" probabilities of action through parties vs. action directly on policy makers and administrative agencies.* Detailed studies along these lines would require the co-ordination of institutional analyses with surveys of samples of community leaders as well as of the rank-and-file electorate. Attempts in this direction have been made in some countries but research in this area is still at a very early stage of development.

Comparative research along these lines may help us to gain further insight into the implications of the processes of political change in systems undergoing economic growth. With the early phases of industrialization went a variety of tendencies towards greater integration of the national decision-making machinery and a widening of the representative bases of each regime. The introduction of mass suffrage made it possible to mobilize the lower strata of economically dependent citizens into distinctive political parties and set the stage for the development of new channels of influence on the processes of decision at local and national levels. At the same time, and partly in reaction to these developments, most systems of the West witnessed an extraordinary growth in the scope and activity of voluntary associations and interest organizations. With the continued growth and diversification of each national economy, these networks of organizations have tended to cut across the earlier party-political divisions and create cross-pressures making for a lowering of the polarization in the system (38). If Rossi is right in his conjectures we are faced here with an intriguing process of historical dialectics : the extension of the suffrage increased the chances for a status polarization of national politics, but this very polarization brought about a proliferation of sectional and functional organizations which in turn tended to soften the overall strains in the system and reduce the level of polarization (39). What we tend to find is a cumulation of forces making for a narrowing of the alternatives for national politics, a fragmentation of the networks of policy-influencing organizations, and a consequent decline in the importance of the decisions of the electorate-at-large. This may tend to lower the level of general political participation and to alienate from politics sizable sections of the once enfranchised citizenry, leaving the basic decisions to a bargaining process between interest organizations, parties and agencies and departments of the national bureaucracy. We see tendencies in these directions in many countries of the West : the developments toward *Entideologisierung* and "all-party governments" are cases in point (40). We know far too little about the dynamics of these developments and we need to do much more to facilitate co-operation and co-ordination of studies of these problems in different countries. *

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(36) For the U. S., see the secondary analyses of N.O.R.C. data by C. R. WRIGHT and H. H. HYMAN, Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults, *Am. Sociol. Rev.*, XXIII (1958), pp. 284-294. For Finland : Erik ALLARDT *et al.*, On the Cumulative Nature of Leisure-Time Activities, *Acta sociologica*, III (1958), pp. 165-172. For Germany : E. REIGZROTZSKI, *Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1956). For Norway : S. ROKKAN, Electoral Activity, Party Membership and Organizational Influence, *Acta sociologica*, IV (1959), pp. 25-37. For Sweden : H. ZETTERBERG, Voluntary Associations and Organized Power, *Industria International* (in press).

(37) Cf. A. M. ROSE, *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1954), ch. III.

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* This note represents a revision of two sections of a longer paper for the IPSA Round Table Conference at Ann Arbor, Mich., in September, 1960. This longer paper, entitled "The Comparative Study of Political Participation", will be printed in 1962 in A. Ranney, ed., *Recent Developments in the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press).

(38) This point of view has been developed in further detail for Sweden by H. Zetterberg, *op. cit.*

(39) N. W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory*, Ph. D. diss. Yale 1960, ch. vii, has suggested such a cyclical pattern for developments in U.S. cities since the peak inflows of ethnically distinct lower class citizens.

(40) Cf. especially Otto Kirchheimer, The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes, *Soc. Res.*, XXIV (1957), pp. 127-156 ; also Alex Vulpius, *Die Allparteienregierung* (Frankfurt a/M, Metzner, 1957).

ÜBER EINIGE PROBLEME DER SOZIOLOGISCHEN THEORIE DER REVOLUTION

I

KURIOSERWEISE scheint es heute nötig, den Nachweis zu führen, daß die Theorie der Revolution ein wichtiges Desiderat jeder engagierten Soziologie sein muß : so weit haben wir uns von den Erfahrungsgrundlagen und Denkansätzen der Anfänge der Soziologie entfernt. Für Comte, Tocqueville, Marx und viele Geringere war die Theorie der Revolution ein Kernstück der Soziologie überhaupt ; sie standen in der Spannung zwischen der Bewältigung der Revolution des 18. und der Vorhersage derer des 20. Jahrhunderts. Liest man dagegen die Vorträge und Diskussionen des 3. Deutschen Soziologentages aus dem Jahre 1922 zum Thema »Das Wesen der Revolution« (27)*, dann könnte man geneigt sein, aus der sie beherrschenden Atmosphäre der Unwirklichkeit und Gleichgültigkeit zu schließen, das Problem der Revolution habe nunmehr alle Aktualität verloren. Die Diskussionen des 13. Deutschen Soziologentages 34 Jahre später (»Tradition und Revolution«) bestätigen diesen Eindruck aufs Neue (28), und auch international sieht es nicht so aus, als sei das Problem der Revolution besonders brennend. Auf dem Dritten Weltkrongreß für Soziologie — mit dem Generalthema »Sozialer Wandel« — war von Revolution nicht die Rede (24) ; während des Vierten Weltkongresses 1959 fand zwar eine Diskussion zu diesem Thema statt, doch gehörte sie nicht zum offiziellen Kongreßprogramm (25). Doch — muß man es sagen? — kommt dem Problem der Revolution aus mindestens zwei Gründen auch heute erhebliche Bedeutung zu : Einmal ist, allem Anschein nach und entgegen dem Selbstverständnis westlicher Gesellschaften, unser eigenes Jahrhundert eine Zeit großer Sozialrevolutionen in allen Teilen der Welt. Es vergeht kaum ein Jahr, in dem wir nicht von radikalen und raschen Wandlungen in irgendeinem Lande hören. Wissenschaftler, Politiker und öffentliche Meinung stehen diesen Entwicklungen dabei mit verschiedenen Graden von Hilflosigkeit gegenüber. Von metaphysischen Hinweisen auf die unaufhaltsamen »winds of change« bis zum naiven Glauben an den Verschwörungscharakter (und daher die Reversibilität) der Revolutionen findet sich jede Spielart des Irrtums. Nur an einer historisch einigermaßen bewährten, soziologisch durchdachten Theorie fehlt es leider. Von solchen unmittelbaren Erfahrungsbezügen abgesehen, schiene eine Theorie der Revolution in hervorragendem Maße geeignet, den weißen Fleck »sozialer Wandel« auf der

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* Zahlenangaben in Klammern verweisen auf die Literaturhinweise am Schluß dieses Aufsatzes.

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Landkarte soziologischer Erkenntnis mit bestimmten Aussagen auszufüllen und damit endlich über die bloß programmatische Diskussion hinauszukommen.

An Hand einiger Veröffentlichungen zur Theorie der Revolution soll im folgenden der Versuch unternommen werden, das Problem ein wenig zu gliedern, die Ansatzpunkte weiterer Überlegungen anzudeuten und offene Fragen zu formulieren.

Dabei ist das Interesse an der »Theorie« der Revolution streng zu nehmen. Es gibt, grob gesprochen, zwei Arten der Beschäftigung mit Revolutionen (wie mit allen historischen Phänomenen) : die eine ist deskriptiv, individualisierend, konkret, die andere analytisch, generalisierend, abstrakt. Man könnte geneigt sein, diese beiden Ansätze einfach »historisch« und »soziologisch« zu nennen, doch geht die einfache Gleichung nicht auf : Trotzki geht in seiner *Geschichte der Russischen Revolution* sowohl deskriptiv als auch analytisch vor ; die letzte große verallgemeinernde Studie der Revolution stammt von einem Historiker, Crane Brinton ; die politische Philosophie der Revolution à la Hannah Arendt, Brinkmann oder Sartre ist als solche weder Historie noch Soziologie und gehört doch eindeutig zur Sache. Wie stets läßt sich also auch hier die Welt glücklicherweise nicht in die Kästchen der Universitätsdisziplinen packen ; wir müssen uns an sinnvolleren Wegweisern orientieren. Ein solcher Wegweiser ist nun der Begriff der Theorie : Es geht mir hier nur um Versuche der allgemeinen Erklärung des Phänomens Revolution bzw. auch (in zweiter Linie) der empirisch verallgemeinernden Darstellung dieses Phänomens, nicht aber um die Beschreibung bestimmter einzelner Revolutionen. Wer sich von diesem Interesse leiten lässt, wird bald feststellen, daß es nur wenig Literatur gibt, die unter ähnlicher Absicht steht. An Material, d.h. an historischen Darstellungen bestimmter Revolutionen besteht kein Mangel ; der Versuch aber, eine allgemeine Theorie der Revolution zu entwickeln, ist bisher überhaupt nur von Marx in aller Breite und Strenge unternommen worden.

II

Die Inflation des Wortes »Revolution« in der wissenschaftlichen und der alltäglichen Umgangssprache ist heute weit fortgeschritten. In der Soziologie kennen wir die Revolutionen der Manager (Burnham), der Angestellten (Croner), die zweite und dritte industrielle Revolution ; im Sprachgebrauch der Presse gibt es Revolutionen der Mode und des Automobilbaus, des naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens und der Krebsforschung, des Tourismus und des Wohnstils usw. usw... Geht man diesem Sprachgebrauch nach, so stellt sich bald heraus, daß das Wort »Revolution« dahin tendiert, mit dem »Wandel« bedeutungsgleich zu werden. Darin liegt eine Bedeutungsverschiebung, deren ideologiekritische Erklärung vermutlich aufschlußreiche Resultate erbrächte. Hier ist jedoch vor allem festzuhalten, daß ein so verwässerter Revolutionsbegriff den Gegenstand der soziologischen Theorie der Revolution nicht hinreichend zu bezeichnen vermag. Eine gewisse begriffliche Klärung ist Vorbedingung der Theorie der Revolution, zumal auch im informierten Sprachgebrauch mehrere Bedeutungsnuancen durcheinandergehen.

Zu einer befriedigenden Abgrenzung des Gegenstandes einer Theorie der Revolution bieten sich zwei Wege an; man sollte vielleicht beide beschreiten und eine Entscheidung erst später suchen. Der erste dieser Wege besteht in einer Aufzählung der fraglichen Phänomene, also etwa darin, den Anwendungsbereich der Theorie durch die Französische, die Russische und die Ungarische Revolution zu »definieren«. Solche Aufzählungen haben den Vorteil äußerster Bestimmtheit und den Nachteil konkreter Begrenztheit. Theoretisch sind sie insofern misslich, als sie es stets gestatten, der Theorie jene Phänomene zu entziehen, an denen sie scheitern könnte.

Daher ist neben der Aufzählung durchaus auch an Definitionen im klassischen Sinne zu denken. Sieht man die Literatur durch, so scheinen alle Autoren in der Bestimmung des *genus* einig: Revolutionen sind eine Form des sozialen Wandels. Im Hinblick auf die *differentia specifica* finden wir jedoch häufig zwei nicht durchweg vereinbare Bestimmungen, die hier an je zwei Beispielen demonstriert werden sollen:

a) L. von Wiese (27, S. 13): »Ich definiere die Revolution im Staatsleben als eine plötzlich und in schnellem Zeitmaß vor sich gehende Machtverschiebung.«

C. Brinton (5, S. 4): »Our focus is on drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of the running of a territorial political entity for another group. There is one further implication: the revolutionary substitution of one group for another, if not made by actual violent uprising, is made by *coup d'état*, Putsch, or some other kind of skulduggery.«

b) Th. Geiger (10, S. 511 f.): »Revolution im allgemeinsten Sinn bedeutet jede grundlegende Umgestaltung eines bestehenden Zustandes [...] Es gehört nicht zu ihrem Wesen, daß sie plötzlich und uno actu, nicht daß sie gewaltsam und jäh erfolge.«

L. Gottschalk (11, S. 4): »A revolution is a popular movement whereby a significant change in the structure of a nation or a society is effected [...] Palace *coups* that have no popular backing and mere riots or rebellions that produce no significant change are not revolutions.«

Diese Definitionen unterscheiden sich in mehrfacher Hinsicht voneinander. Augenfällig ist vor allem der Unterschied in den Angaben des Substrats von Revolutionen: »Machtverschiebungen im Staatsleben«, »substitution of groups in charge«, »jede grundlegende Umgestaltung«, »change in the structure of a nation or a society«. Immerhin ließe sich hier zwischen den zitierten (und wohl auch den meisten nichtzitierten) Autoren dahingehend Einigkeit konstruieren, daß für sie Revolutionen zumindest auch einen Wechsel in den politischen Führungsgruppen herbeiführen. Nicht versöhnen läßt sich jedoch ein anderer Unterschied. In den beiden ersten Definitionen wird vor allem die Zeitdimension des Wandels (»plötzlich«, »in schnellem Zeitmaß«, »sudden«), daneben dann auch die Gewaltsamkeit des Prozesses hervorgehoben. Eine andere Dimension dagegen, die in den letzteren beiden Definitionen im Vordergrund steht, wird hier nicht betont bzw. sogar (von Brinton im zweiten zitierten Satz) beiseitegeschoben, das ist die Dimension dessen, was Gottschalk »significant change« und Geiger »grundlegende Umgestaltung« nennt, also der Bedeutung des Wandels. Orientiert man sich am Wortlaut der Definitionen, dann wäre der Übergang von der Vierten zur Fünften Französischen Republik für Geiger und Gottschalk keine Revolution, für Brinton dagegen möglicherweise doch eine solche; dagegen könnte Brinton die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung 1933 im Gegensatz zu Geiger und Gottschalk nicht als Revolution anerkennen. Geigers Definition ist sogar so weit, daß auch die »industrielle Revolution« durch sie noch gedeckt wird.

Die Beispiele belegen die Bedeutung der Fragestellung : Ist das Tempo oder die Bedeutung von Wandlungen ausschlaggebend für das Phänomen der Revolution? Da die Frage terminologisch ist, läßt sie sich mit prinzipieller Willkür beantworten; doch gilt es zu bedenken, daß die Theorie umso schärfer werden kann, je präziser und begrenzter ihr Gegenstand bestimmt wird. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt würde ich meinen, daß man von einer möglichst engen Definition der Revolution ausgehen sollte. Ich würde Revolutionen als politische und soziale Wandlungen definieren, die unter Anwendung von Gewalt extrem rasch verlaufen und äußerst tiefgehende Wirkungen zeitigen. So verstanden, ist die industrielle »Revolution« sicher keine Revolution, wird aber auch die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, die Gründung der Fünften Republik und die südamerikanische oder südostasiatische Palast »Revolution« ausgeschlossen.

III

Allgemeinste Frage der soziologischen Theorie der Revolution ist also : Unter welchen Bedingungen treten jene extrem rapiden und radikalen Wandlungen ein, die wir Revolutionen nennen? Dies ist die Frage nach den Ursachen der Revolution — so ärgerlich eine solche Formulierung zumal dem an Dilthey gebildeten Historiker klingen mag. Man muß dem Chicagoer Historiker L. Gottschalk dankbar sein, daß er nicht zögerte, einen Aufsatz »Causes of Revolution« zu überschreiben und das Problem direkt anzugehen.

Die kohärenteste Theorie der Revolution ist bis heute die von Marx. Mit ihrer doppelten Figur der Dialektik von Produktivkräften und Produktionsverhältnissen sowie des Klassenkampfes ordnet sie den Revolutionen die Schlüsselpositionen des Geschichtsprozesses zu. Jede Epoche drängt zu ihrer eigenen Aufhebung, weil ihre immanenten Klassengegensätze sich ständig verschärfen; diese wiederum nehmen immer heftigeren Charakter an, weil sie Ausdruck der zunehmenden Unvereinbarkeit der (als dynamisch gedachten) wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten einer Epoche und ihrer (als statisch vorgestellten) sozialen Struktur sind. Motor des Wandels allgemein, damit auch Ursache der Revolution, sind also die ständig wachsenden »Produktivkräfte«, insofern diese alle institutionellen Formen sprengen. Über die Breite des Marxschen Begriffes der Produktivkräfte ist viel gestritten worden; sicher gehören dazu die technischen Voraussetzungen der Produktion, wahrscheinlich auch ihre wirtschaftlichen, möglicherweise sogar die arbeitsorganisatorischen Bedingungen. Die Revolution tritt jeweils dann ein, wenn der Widerspruch zwischen wirtschaftlicher Potenz und sozialer Struktur »unerträglich«, der Klassenkampf zum »Kampf Mann gegen Mann« geworden ist; im besonderen Fall der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft kann die äußerste Not des Proletariats als Index dieser Situation gelten.

Die Marxsche Theorie ist ohne Zweifel von außerordentlicher Erklärungskraft. Sie ist zwar dogmatischer, aber doch auch komplexer als Ogburns heute zum soziologischen Gemeinplatz gewordene vulgärmarxistische Auffassung vom technischen Fortschritt als Hauptstrang des Wandels, dem alle anderen Elemente sozialer Strukturen sich nur in mehr oder minder großem Abstand »anpassen«. In paradoxem Verhältnis zu den Vermutungen von Marx paßt seine Theorie vor allem auf Gesellschaften, die ihre industrielle und ihre »französische« Revolution in einem Zug vollziehen: also auf Russland 1917, auf China seit den 40er, Indien seit den 50er, Cuba und andere Länder seit den 60er Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts. Aber sie paßt hier sozusagen zufällig, d.h. auf Grund einer keineswegs in allen Revolutionen auftretenden Kombination von Faktoren. Schon die Französische, aber auch die Ungarische Revolution kann die Marxsche Theorie nicht mehr erklären. Hier wirkt sich — neben anderem, wie der Epochenkonzeption, der falschen Annahme der Statik sozialer Strukturen und des revolutionären Charakters allen Wandels — vor allem der monokausale Charakter der Marxschen Theorie schädlich aus. Man wird Gottschalk zustimmen müssen: »All but the simplest forms of historical causal relationships show multiple causes, since single causes usually are insufficient to account for complex results« (11, S.1.).

Allerdings muß es zweifelhaft scheinen, ob eine bloße Aufzählung heterogener Faktoren bereits eine Theorie zu begründen vermag. Die beiden neueren Autoren, die auf diesem Wege die Ursachen der Revolution zu fixieren versucht haben, Brinton und Gottschalk, sind jedenfalls nicht zu ganz überzeugenden Ergebnissen gekommen. Ihre Ursachenkataloge sehen so aus :

Gottschalk :
1) »Demand for change«, beruhend auf
   - *a*) »provocation«, z.B. wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen,
   - *b*) »solidified public opinion«;
2) »hopefulness«, beruhend auf
   - *a*) »program of reform«,
   - *b*) »leadership«;
3) »weakness of the conservative forces.«

Brinton :
1) »Societies [...] on the upgrade economically«,
2) »very bitter class antagonisms«,
3) »desertion of the intellectuals«,
4) »governmental machinery [...] inefficient«,
5) »ruling class [...] politically inept«.

Diesen Listen ließe sich mancher Faktor aus Analysen anderer Autoren hinzufügen, ohne daß dadurch ihr logischer Status verändert oder ihr sachlicher Wert erhöht werden würde. Kataloge dieser Art geben vielfältige wertvolle Hinweise für eine Theorie der Revolution, zumal man ihren Faktoren die Konkretheit historischer Erfahrungen sehr viel deutlicher anmerkt als dies bei soziologischen Theorien der Fall zu sein pflegt. Aber solche Listen sind doch nur ein erster Schritt. Sie müssen (erstens) unter dem Gesichtspunkt systematischer Fragestellungen reorganisiert und (zweitens) an Hand historischer Belege daraufhin geprüft werden, ob man mit weniger Faktoren auskommen kann bzw. zu einer bündigen Erklärung weitere braucht. Wenigstens zur ersten dieser Aufgaben kann hier ein Ansatz versucht werden.

Sieht man sich die Kataloge von Gottschalk und Brinton an, so fällt auf, daß die Faktoren sich auf Prozesse beziehen, die in sehr unterschiedlicher Nähe zum Ereignis der Revolution selbst stehen. So werden etwa die bitteren Klassengegensätze auch dann schon deutlich sein, wenn die Regierungsmaschinerie noch funktioniert (Brinton); die Provokation durch die wirtschaftliche Lage geht der Formulierung eines Reformprogramms voraus (Gottschalk). Die Unterscheidung zwischen langfristig und kurzfristig wirksamen Faktoren legt eine Aufgliederung der Frage nach den Ursachen der Revolution in zwei Teilprobleme nahe : in die Frage nach den Bedingungen, unter denen eine *revolutionäre Situation* in einer Gesellschaft zustandekommt (langfristig wirksame Faktoren) und die daran anschließende Frage nach den *auslösenden Bedingungen* der Revolution (kurzfristig wirksame Faktoren).

Die revolutionäre Situation ist die Strukturlage, aus der der revolutionäre Prozeß herauswächst. Sie läßt sich möglicherweise durch besonders bittere Klassengegensätze, rechtliche Hemmungen wirtschaftlicher Möglichkeiten, gegensätzliche Ideologien und ähnliche Einzelfaktoren kennzeichnen. Vielleicht ließen sich auch noch allgemeinere Merkmale von revolutionären Situationen finden, die dann ihrerseits weitere Kausalfragen herausfordern. Unter Voraussetzung der Permanenz und Ubiquität des sozialen Wandels könnte man beispielsweise revolutionäre Situationen als solche der Erstarrung des Wandels beschreiben, um dann zu fragen : Unter welchen Bedingungen wird der ständige Prozeß des Wandels verlangsamt oder gar arretiert? Wo liegen die Reibungshemmnisse des historischen Prozesses? Welche spezifischen Ursachen vermögen Tempo und Tiefgang sozialer Wandlungen zu beeinflussen?

Hinter solchen Fragen steht das verbreitete Bild der Revolution als Explosion des Dampfkessels, der lange nach außen hin ruhig erscheint, bis er schließlich dem immer wachsenden inneren Druck nachgibt. Wenn man die Analogie nicht zu weit treibt, scheint mir diese Metapher aufschlußreicher als die des Fiebers, die Brinton heranzieht. Doch ist in jedem Fall zu betonen, daß Revolutionen keine Naturvorgänge sind. Auch wenn eine Gesellschaft sich kaum noch wandelt, wenn also der innere Druck zum Zweck der Aufstauung historischer Veränderungen außerordentlich stark geworden ist, tritt die revolutionäre Explosion noch nicht notwendig ein. Es gibt Gesellschaften die sich längere Zeit im Zustand der revolutionären Situation halten, ohne daß die Revolution selbst zum Ausdruck kommt. Hier sind zusätzlich gewisse auslösende Bedingungen nötig, die man möglicherweise mit dem Begriffspaar »Hoffnung« und »Schwäche« glücklich bezeichnen kann : der parallele Prozeß des Zweifels der Herrschenden an ihrem Recht und des Gefühls der revolutionären Gruppen, sie hätten Aussicht auf Erfolg, löst die Revolution selbst aus. Hier wäre die Frage also : Unter welchen Bedingungen stellt sich das Gefühl der Schwäche bzw. der Hoffnung ein? Das Vorhandensein eines Reformprogramm und einer Führungsgruppe bei den Revolutionären (Gottschalk), der Abfall der Intellektuellen und das Nichtfunktionieren der Regierungsmaschinerie vom Standpunkt der Herrschenden (Brinton) sowie das berühmte leichte Nachlassen des Druckes, das jeder Revolution voranzugehen scheint, sind hier gewiß wichtige Faktoren.

Kehren wir nach dieser Aufgliederung der Fragestellung zu den Listen von Brinton und Gottschalk zurück, so fällt auf, daß beide sich insbesondere mit den auslösenden Bedingungen der Revolution, also den kurzfristig wirksamen Faktoren beschäftigen. In der Tat bietet die vorhandene, meist historische Literatur eine Fülle von Anregungen zur Ermittlung dieser Faktoren. Dagegen liegt die Erforschung der Strukturelemente der revolutionären Situation vergleichsweise sehr im argen. Diese voranzutreiben, ist die trockenere, soziologischere, aber wohl auch wichtigere Aufgabe der Theorie der Revolution : Die Ermittlung der Sozialstruktur der revolutionären Situation ist das Kernstück der Theorie der Revolution ; sie bedeutet zugleich einen Beitrag zur Erforschung der Faktoren, die eine allgemeine Theorie des sozialen Wandels konstituieren.

IV

Brintons Buch trägt völlig zu Recht den Titel *Anatomy of Revolution.* Tatsächlich geht es Brinton nicht so sehr um die Erforschung der Ursachen der Revolution als um die ihrer »Anatomie«, d.h. der Struktur des revolutionären Prozesses selbst. Was geschieht, wenn die Revolution einmal begonnen hat? Welche Stadien durchläuft die Revolution. Wohin führt sie? Zweifellos sind auch dies Fragen einer Soziologie der Revolution ; doch sind sie sachlich und vor allem methodologisch von denen der Ursachen scharf zu trennen.

Die soziologische Theorie der Revolution hat die Erklärung des Eintretens extrem rapider und radikaler Wandlungen zur Aufgabe. Es handelt sich hier um eine theoretische Aufgabe in vergleichsweise strengem Sinn, denn es soll ein Problem durch allgemeine Aussagen so erklärt werden, daß (idealiter) Prognosen möglich werden, deren Erfolg über die Richtigkeit der Theorie verbindlich entscheidet. Die Anatomie der Revolution ist demgegenüber ein eher deskriptives Unterfangen. Hier wird dargestellt, wie ein Prozeß abläuft, nicht erklärt, warum er so abläuft. Es wäre wohl auch eine (erklärende) Theorie des Ablaufes von Revolutionen denkbar, doch scheint diese auf starke technische Schwierigkeiten zu stoßen. Daher tritt an die Stelle der Theorie vorerst die empirische Verallgemeinerung, d.h. die allgemeine Beschreibung unter Verzicht auf die Angabe von Ursachen.

Zur Beschreibung des Ablaufs von Revolutionen erbringt jede historische Studie einer bestimmten Revolution neues Material. Es kann nicht ausbleiben, daß das vielfältige und farbige Material zu jeder einzelnen Revolution die unvermeidlich eher trockene verallgemeinernde Aussage einschränkt. In diesem Sinne ist vielfach an Brintons Versuch der Verallgemeinerung Kritik geübt worden. Ich würde demgegenüber meinen, daß Brintons Ansatz und Resultate durch solche Kritik im Kern nicht getroffen werden. Einerseits enthalten empirische Verallgemeinerungen keinen Anspruch auf absolute Geltung ; andererseits bewährt sich Brintons Beschreibung der Stufen revolutionärer Entwicklung auch in den jüngsten Beispielen immer wieder in erstaunlicher Weise : Nach den ersten, meist sehr raschen und gewaltlosen Schritten setzt eine Periode trügerischer Ruhe unter der Herrschaft der Gemäßigten ein ; in dieser Periode bahnt sich jedoch die eigentliche Revolution erst an, denn es gelingt den Gemäßigten nicht, effektiv zu regieren ; eine Gruppe von Extremisten bahnt sich den Weg zur Macht und errichtet ein Regime des Terrors, mit dem die Revolution in ihre gewaltsame Periode eintritt ; schließlich setzt ein Thermidor dem rapiden Wandel und der unkontrollierten Gewaltsamkeit ein Ende, und mit dem Aufstieg der Cromwells, Napoleons, Stalins schließt der Prozeß der Revolution ab.

Wir können nie genug von historischen Wirklichkeiten wissen; daher ist eine weitere Verfeinerung der Anatomie der Revolution durchaus zu wünschen. Doch liegt die vordringliche Aufgabe der Forschung heute nicht in diesem Bereich vergleichender Deskription, sondern in der allgemeinen Theorie der Revolution selbst.

V

Wie so vielen anderen Theorien der Soziologie wird man auch der der Revolution, wenn sie über die angedeuteten Fragenkomplexe nicht hinausgeht, nachsagen, sie verfehle das eigentlich Bewegende ihrer Phänomene. Hier wie auch sonst besteht dieser Vorwurf zumindest teilweise zu Recht. Die Soziologie hat ja eine möglicherweise fatale Neigung dazu, »reinlich, aber ärmlich« zu werden. Allerdings finden sich in der Literatur zur Theorie der Revolution bislang mehr Belege für die farbige, konkrete und wertende Erörterung des Problems als für seine theoretisch strenge Behandlung. Vor allem die philosophische — hier geschichtsphilosophische, dort philosophisch-anthropologische — Fragestellung des »Geistes der Revolution« (Was ist der Sinn, die Bedeutung, der geistige Gehalt der Revolution?) zieht sich durch alle Behandlungen des Problems.

Diese metasoziologische Diskussion beginnt mit der Stellungnahme. Der bei Comte formulierte, in Tocqueville und Marx lebendig gewordene Gegensatz zwischen einer revolutionsfeindlichen (»Ordnung«) und einer revolutionsfreundlichen Haltung (»Fortschritt«) findet sich auch in der neuesten Diskussion noch wieder. So analysiert C. Brinkmann nicht nur, sondern beklagt auch jene »Paradoxie im Recht der Revolution«, nach der das Recht von heute zum Unrecht von morgen und das Unrecht von heute zum Recht von morgen werden kann. Für Brinkmann sind die Diskontinuität, die Unverläßlichkeit, die Aufhebung des Rechtes durch die Macht sämtlich Hinweise auf die zerstörerische Kraft der Revolution. Sartre dagegen knüpft an genau dieselben Beobachtungen an, wenn er Revolutionen gewissermaßen als existenzielle Entscheidungssituationen ganzer Gesellschaften interpretiert. Das Besondere und Gute der Revolution liegt für Sartre eben darin, daß in ihr alle Verläßlichkeit, alle Routine, alles äußerlich Institutionelle aufgehoben wird und damit das Existenzielle hervortritt.

Dies ist nicht der Ort, um die soziologische Naivität beider Werthaltungen zu erörtern. Es liegt jedenfalls nahe, solche Haltungen vorwiegend als Material zur Analyse des Geistes von Revolutionen (und nicht als diese Analyse selbst) zu nehmen. Schon Landauer versuchte (15), Revolutionen aus der Dialektik von — wie er es nannte — »Topie« und »Utopie« zu verstehen. Sicher scheint, daß die Utopie, das Millennium, der Messianismus eine besondere Rolle in revolutionären Bewegungen spielen. Soziologische Naivität ist selbst ein Merkmal revolutionärer Bewegungen und Ideologien. Insofern sagen uns die Studien von Cohn (8), Hobsbawm (13) und Talmon (23) sowie etwa auch die Arbeiten von Mühlmann über Chiliasmus, Nativismus und Nationalismus in afrikanischen Gesellschaften (18) mehr über den subjektiven Sinn von Revolutionen als alle emphatischen Stellungnahmen für die eine oder andere Seite. Der geistesgechichtliche Zusammenhang von Revolution und Heilserwartung darf dann vielleicht als Hinweis auf den anthropologischen Sinn der Revolution verstanden werden : als stets vergeblicher Griff über die Gesetze der historischen Existenz des Menschen hinaus.

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(11) L. Gottschalk, Causes of Revolution, *American Journal of Sociology*, L (1944), 1-8.

(12) K. Griewank, *Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff — Entstehung und Entwicklung* (Weimar, 1955).

(13) E. J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels* (Chicago, 1955).

(14) R. Hunter, *Revolution—Why, How, When?* (New York/London, 1940).

(15) G. Landauer, *Die Revolution* (Frankfurt, 1907).

(16) E. Lederer, *Einige Gedanken zur Soziologie der Revolution* (Leipzig, 1918).

(17) A. Meusel, « Revolution and Counter-Revolution », *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1934).

(18) W. Mühlmann, « Chiliasmus, Nativismus, Nationalismus », *Verhandlungen des 14. Deutschen Soziologentages* (Stuttgart, 1959). Vgl. auch das demnächst erscheinende Buch des Verfassers zum gleichen Thema.

(19) E. Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Europäischen Revolutionen*^{2} (Stuttgart/Köln, 1951).

(20) J.-P. Sartre, « Matérialisme et Révolution », *Situations* III (Paris, 1954).

(21) Th. Schieder, « Das Problem der Revolution im 19. Jahrhundert », *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1958).

(22) P. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia, 1925).

(23) J.-L. Talmon, *Political Messianism* (London, 1960).

(24) *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology* (« Problems of Social Change in the 20th Century », 8 Bde., London, 1960).

(25) *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology* (London, 1959).

(26) L. Trotzki, *Geschichte der Russischen Revolution* (Berlin, 1931).

(27) *Verhandlungen der Dritten Deutschen Soziologentages* (« Das Wesen der Revolution », Tübingen, 1923). Darin u.a. : L.v. Wiese, « Die Problematik einer Soziologie der Revolution », L. M. Hartmann, « Zur Soziologie der Revolution ».

(28) *Verhandlungen des 13. Deutschen Soziologentages* (Köln und Opladen, 1957). Darin u.a. : R. Nürnberger, « Revolution und Tradition. Paris-Moskau-Peking ». S. Landshut, « Tradition und Revolution ».

(29) A. Vierkandt, « Zur Theorie der Revolution », *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, XLVI (Berlin, 1922).

ON INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

SOCIAL responsibility has been the subject of considerable thought and research. Down through the ages, philosophers and theologians have had much to say about what makes some men concerned about their fellows and willing to devote time and energy for benefit of society; more recently some social scientists have contributed studies of social participation, moral integration, and altruism. Some have seen the advantages of studying a specific society other than their own, in which the trait studied assumes significantly different forms. More specifically, sociologists from countries like the United Kingdom or the United States, where social responsibility is moderately developed, study countries like France or Italy, which are said to manifest little social responsibility (or much "individualism" as it is called locally). The difficulty with this procedure is that *any* difference between the two countries can be interpreted as *the* cause.

Explanations of the lack of social responsibility among the Latin peoples, based either on casual observation or on more careful study, have included poverty, traditional conservatism, traditional fatalism, low educational level, exploitation by the upper classes, distrust of the government. A recent study by Edward C. Banfield *, of a village in Southern Italy, rejects these and comes up with the hypothesis of "amoral familism"—that is, a popular belief that questions of right and wrong apply only to the family, and that outgroups look out for themselves. Personal experience suggests that this explanation is also inadequate, as many Italians, including villagers, are generous, hospitable, and willing to go out of their way to help a stranger. Furthermore, loyalty to families is found not only in countries like Italy which are low in social responsibility, but also in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and perhaps the Scandinavian countries, where social responsibility is also high. Apparently one of Banfield's difficulties is that he comes from the United States where the culture does not call for high loyalty to family. What seems to be different about the Italians—where they contrast with the British, the Swiss, the Scandinavians, and the Americans—is that they have few *organizations* for helping others, except those set up by the government. That is, Italians help on a personal basis, but do not seem to think of organizing to carry out social responsibilities. There is a general paucity of voluntary associations, and the "individualismo" of the Italians can be explained in terms

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* *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, the Free Press, and the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, 1958).

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 163-169.

of factors that have inhibited the rise of voluntary associations.

How can the researcher choose among the various explanations offered by scholars of Italian culture as to that country's "individualism", or for that matter any cultural trait deemed significant enough for study? The answer we propose is through *strategic comparative research.* Not only must countries (or societies) be selected for study which are high or low on the characteristic being studied, but they must also be as similar as possible in other cultural characteristics and in history, so as to rule out divergence of many other possible sorts as part of the explanation. Each country (or society) must be examined for those factors in its history and social organization which might possibly contribute to the cultural characteristic being analyzed; then when other countries are studied these same factors can be tested for their relevance in explaining the presence or absence of the characteristic. The search for causal factors should be directed to basic structures which can influence other characteristics of the society, and for which there might be significant variations in content among the societies being studied. The research on Italy reported in this note illustrates a second step in carrying out a long-range program of strategic comparative research to explain individualism, social responsibility, or the development of the institution of voluntary associations.

In a previous study of "Voluntary Associations in France" (1) it was pointed out how the legal tradition of France had severely restricted the development of voluntary associations, especially of the "social influence" type, and that this seems to have resulted from two political influences: 1) the conservative fear of the revolutionary potentiality of free associations and 2) the liberal antipathy to the accumulation of property by religious associations and to the restraint of trade by business monopolies or workers' unions. There were other historical forces, of course, contributing to the weak tradition of private associations, such as the practical monopoly over private charity by the Catholic Church, but the restrictive legal tradition seemed most influential. This legal tradition has not developed in Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, or the United States, among others: while all of these countries have gone through periods of governmental restraint of economic associations, particularly of trade unions, their legal tradition has been to ignore other voluntary associations or to encourage them. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, states the right of citizens peaceably to assemble, and the Supreme Court has interpreted that to mean the right to form associations.

Italy has had a legal tradition much like France's; the statutory law and the penal code reflect a governmental fear of, and anxiety toward, private associations. While the modern history of Italy has been very different from that of France, both countries trace their law to the Justinian Code, as modernized under Napoleon. The spirit of this legal tradition is that every human action should be regulated under law, leaving no sphere of the "purely private" except where stated in law, and leaving no problems to be decided "arbitrarily" by judges under common law. Under this tradition, private associations must, of course, be regulated, although not necessarily in a restrictive manner. To the tradition, Napoleon added specific restrictions against voluntary associations, partly following the Revolution's Le Chapelier law against economic associations and partly expressing his own conservative fear that private associations for any purpose might become revolutionary. Italy has not had as strong a liberal tradition as France had, and whatever anti-clerical tendency it had has been almost submerged. But, in addition to the conservative fear of revolution, Italy has had special reasons to be concerned about private associations—sometimes they were organized for criminal purposes and, in recent years, Italy has had special problems with Fascist and Communist subversion. So Italy's laws regarding associations express the suspicion that these were organized for revolutionary, subversive, or criminal purposes. Special penalties are provided for leaders and members of revolutionary, subversive and criminal associations, beyond those provided in law for revolutionary, subversive, or criminal activity on the part of "individuals".

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(1) Arnold M. Rose, *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1954), ch. IV.

Let us examine more closely the law governing association in Italy (2). Every association must register with the "governing authority" (i.e., the *prefetto*, or local representative of the central government) its constitution and by-laws, which must specify the name, purpose, source of funds, seat, rules for administration and admission, names of officers, as well as obligations of the members toward the association and vice versa. The registration is not automatic; the governing authority has the right to approve the purpose and structure of the associations to make sure they are neither criminal nor against the state in any way. Registration gives the association the status of a "juridical person"—which limits the personal responsibility of the officers in conducting the affairs of the association. Regardless of the purpose and structure of the association, no donation or bequest may be accepted without the approval of the governing authority. The law specifies that all the members of the association must be invited to at least one annual meeting to approve the financial accounts, and that ten per cent (or more) of the members may convoke a general meeting at any time. The deliberations of the first general meeting are valid only when half of the membership is present, and then the majority rules; for the second general meeting and after, any number of members may be present for the deliberations to be valid. During the vote on the financial statement, the officers may not vote. If the constitution is to be modified or the association to be disbanded, three-fourths of the members must be present (and decisions are as usual by majority vote). Changes in the constitution or of officers or of seat must be reported to the governing authority. Members can be suspended only for serious reasons (*gravi motivi*), and with exclusion the member loses all rights to the funds of the association. Associations are disbanded when their stated purposes have been achieved or when they lack members; the demise of an association is declared by the governing authority. Activities outside the purpose of the association are prohibited, and when undertaken are at the personal risk and responsibility of the officers. When an association ceases to exist, and creditors have been paid off, the remaining funds can be spent only in accord with the constitution; in case this is not specified, the governing authority gives the funds to other "juridical persons" which have analogous purposes. Officers or liquidators of an association who fail to register all the required information with the governing authority are subject to a fine of from 800 to 40, 000 lire (approximately $1.28 to $ 64).

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(2) The facts of this paragraph are taken from the *Codice Penale* and the *Codice di Procedura Civile*, as reported in *I quattro codici* by Professors L. FRANCHI and V. FEROCI (Milano, Editore Ulrico Hoepli, 1956).

It is not likely that all of these regulations are followed in practice and it would seem that the details *cannot* all be followed in practice, but their very existence gives a significant restraining power to the police, if they wish to exercise it, and a significant disrupting power to a dissident faction that wishes to make trouble for the association by reporting picayunish violations of the law to the police. The police and often the judges support the political party in power and especially if a leader of the dissident faction is of the same political party, he can get the police and the judge to enforce the rules, or punish their infraction, and hence disrupt the association when the elected leaders of the association belong to a different political party. These possibilities for control and disruption help to permit national politics to enter into the activities of any association. I have personally seen this happen in an association organized for scientific purposes. The power of the police and the courts is not only exerted through the possibility of enforcing the numerous regulations, but also through a catch-all clause (article 23 of the *Codice Penale*) which states that activities "contrary to public order or to proper morality [*buon costume*] may be suspended by the governing authority".

The ostensible purpose of all these possibilities for state control, in addition to expressing the legal tradition in which all activities must be specified in law, is to restrain associations for criminal purposes and associations "against the personality of the State". While these are not the typical associations we are concerned with, it might be valuable for an understanding of private associations in Italy to consider just how these are defined and dealt with under law (3). The following provisions of law come into operation when three or more persons associate themselves for criminal purposes. The penalties are more serious for promoters, leaders, and members of such associations than if they committed their illegal activities alone, because, according to Antolisei, associated activity creates alarm in the population independently of the crimes committed. For these special penalties to come into operation, it is not necessary that the prohibited acts actually be performed but simply that three or more persons come together to accomplish them or threaten to accomplish them. The penalties are increased when 1) the associates are armed and roam about the countryside and public highways creating public alarm, and when 2) the number of associates is ten or more. For promoters, organizers, and leaders of such associations, the penalty is 3 to 7 years in prison, and for ordinary members 1 to 5 years in prison (this is, of course, independent of the penalty for any specific crimes committed). There are also penal sanctions for those who give shelter or food to members of such associations.

Subversive associations are defined in Article 270 of the penal code :

> Whoever [...] constitutes, organizes, or directs associations for the purpose of establishing by violent means the dictatorship of one social class over another, or of violently suppressing one social class, or of violently subverting the constituted economic or social order, is to be punished with imprisonment of 5 to 12 years.

An ordinary member of such an association is punishable with imprisonment of 1 to 3 years. Article 271 sets penalties for "anti-national associations" :

> Whoever [...] constitutes, organizes, or directs associations which propagandize in favor of an activity directed to destroy or defame national loyalty [*il sentimento nazionale*] is punishable with imprisonment from 1 to 3 years. Those who are only ordinary members of such associations are punishable with imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years.

The mere fact of forming such associations, whether action is engaged in or not, merits these penalties. There is a special penalty (articles 273-4) for constituting an association having an international character without permission of the governing authority : the penalty is 40,000 to 160,000 lire fine ($ 64 to $ 256) or imprisonment up to 6 months, for the leaders, and a fine of from 8,000 to 80,000 lire ($ 12.80 to $ 128) for ordinary members. If a false declaration is made in registering an international association, or section of an international association, the penalty is from 1 to 5 years imprisonment, and a fine of not less than 80,000 lire ($ 128).

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(3) Our main sources here are Francesco ANTOLISEI, *Manuale di diritto penale* (Milano, Giuffre, 1954), pp. 573-578 ; and Professors FRANCHI and FEROCI, *op. cit.*, I. *Codice Penale*, pp. 62-68, and *passim*.

What is of interest to us in the above summaries of certain articles in the penal code is not that the Italian government penalizes subversive, criminal, or revolutionary *activity*, or activity even potentially subversive, criminal or revolutionary ; all governments do that. What is of interest to the student of social structure is that there are special penalties for forming *associations* to engage in these prohibited activities, and that the Italian code suspects associations of having subversive, criminal, or revolutionary purposes and hence gives the police special regulatory power over associations which they do not have over private individuals. We cannot claim from these facts that the law is the sole, or even the major, cause inhibiting the development of private associations of all kinds (which seem to have developed in certain other modern democratic countries with a different legal tradition), but certainly it can be said that this legislation does not encourage the development of associations or make it easy for them to organize and operate.

There is no systematic evidence available on the number of associations in Italy or their membership, but it is a widespread opinion among both Italian and foreign observers that the voluntary association is not a highly developed institution in Italy. Partial evidence is available, however, from an interview study I directed in two lower-income communities of Rome in February and March, 1957. A representative sample of adults in these two communities were asked, among other matters, about whether they were members of a political party, of a trade union, or of a club or other voluntary association. Ten per cent claimed to be members of a political party, 16 per cent said they were members of a trade union, and only 15 per cent said they were members of a club or some other association. When asked about the purpose of the associations of which they were members, 7 per cent indicated that they belonged to a sport or other recreational association, 6 per cent to a religious association, 1 per cent to a political association (presumably, other than a political party), and less than 1 per cent each to an educational association, to an association for the public welfare, to a nonpolitical association to improve the community, and to a veterans' organization. None belonged to a cooperative. The median number of hours per month spent in the activities of the associations, on the part of those who were members, was 7.5. Less than 1 per cent of the total population, or 5.7 per cent of those who said they were members of some association, stated that they held office in the association. While these figures definitely cannot be generalized to all of Italy, they are indicative of the relatively low participation in voluntary associations. It is known from studies in the United States and Great Britain that urban people have higher participation in voluntary associations than do rural people, and that upper income people have higher participation than do lower income people. In so far as these relationships hold true for Italy, and in so far as these communities are typical of lower-income, urban communities in Italy—two matters about which nothing is known—the above figures could be said to be not too far from the Italian average.

One could state that the Italians tend to be a sociable and gregarious people. Still, it is also widely accepted that they are "individualistic", like the French. This "individualism" has diverse forms and many roots, which are not the same in France and in Italy. Much of Italy had been under foreign rule for hundreds of years before achieving its independence and unification in 1859, and there is a history of individual and group opposition to the government and its entities. Other traditions arising out of the particular history of Italy could no doubt be found to help explain the tradition of "individualism". But among these would certainly be counted the legal tradition of suspicion toward, and control of, voluntary associations. When people are forcibly prevented from co-operating, they necessarily become "individualistic".

This brief report, when examined in the light of the more comprehensive study I made in France, will be seen as a second step in a program of strategic comparative research to explain the cultural characteristics called individualism or social responsibility. The next steps would be to study a nation in the European culture area with high social responsibility or to carry the causal analysis into a country outside the European cultural area. As the stages of this research are carried out, not only is more concrete causal knowledge accumulated on the specific social characteristic being studied, but there is some additional illumination of the cultures of the societies being chosen for study. These societies are seen not only in terms of their own unique national history but also in terms of a broader cultural history and of the operation of social structural forces. The advantages of strategic comparative research suggest a plea for more research of this type, a plea which has its own sociological history at least as far back as Max Weber's studies in religious forms and the spirit of activism-quietism in a society or Durkheim's studies on forms of social solidarity and the extent of suicide in a society. Such strategic comparative research is the only sound method for explaining whole cultural characteristics scientifically.

ARNOLD ROSE

FUNCTIONALISM AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

FUNCTIONALISM in American sociology has been accused by a number of critics of having a conformist cast. * Tumin's criticism of Davis-Moore, to take one example, showed how the theoretical framework of a functionalist analysis of stratification is such that it postulates the necessity of inequality in general in a way which forces it to defend at the same time the necessity of the specific, given inequalities which are to be found in the society being observed. The whole structure of the analysis in so far as it appeals to given inequalities to illustrate its theory, thus collapses the distinction between transitory social justifications of a given distribution of values and the bases of permanent categories of inequality. This approach does this because it by-passes that kind of criticism of the status quo which is the lever of social change ; and where it recognizes its social and political weight at all, there seems to be no way of dealing sociologically with it except by calling it "dysfunctional for the system". But to call any change or demand for change in a system "dysfunctional" is to look at the system from the point of view of those who profit from the system. This cannot help but color one's observations no matter how neutral one may think he is about the system in question. For example, from this point of view one would be compelled to call honest criticism of a given state of affairs, courageously uttered in the face of great opposition, "deviant behavior". But does not this formulation miss the point of what honest criticism is all about?

Now at the outset it is important to emphasize that this kind of conformism is not derivative from an "ideological commitment". One is tempted, of course, to ascribe some weight to the influence of the affluent society as, at least, a vague support for this point of view. It certainly was not the sociology of the Depression. But what makes this position intellectually interesting and intellectually so troublesome to disentangle is the degree to which its conformism is really the willy-nilly outcome of certain theoretical premises. As one may suspect,

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* Ralf DAHRENDORF, Out of Utopia, *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1958), 115-127 ; Clifford GEERTZ, Ritual and Social Change, *American Anthropologist*, LIX (1957), 32-54 ; Wayne HIELD, The Study of Change in Social Science, *British Journal of Sociology*, V (1954), 1-10 ; Melvin M. TUMIN, Some Principles of Stratification : A Critical Analysis, [*American Sociological Review*, XVIII (1953), 387-394. Two representative examples of functionalist theory which provide the background for the present analysis are Kingsley DAVIS and Wilbert MOORE, Some Principles of Stratification, *American Sociological Review*, X (1945), 242-247 ; Robert MERTON, Manifest and Latent Functions, in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, the Free Press, 1949), 21-82.

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 170-179.

the heart of the matter would lie in the specific understanding which this position has of its central concept, "function".

Functionalism, by its own account, is realistic and, hence, non-teleological. This means that in order realistically to describe what an institution is doing, one must look not at purposes but at results. The former may be purely legalistic criteria which are not an accurate guide to what is actually happening in the society. Function is thus redefined not as end but in terms of consequences for individuals or groups of individuals.

This alone, however, does not constitute any major change in orientation. This is so because the function of an institution, conceived of as its purpose, and consequence for the individual, far from being radically disjoined, are complementary. If the function of a hospital is to administer to the sick, and it is performing its function, then consequences for the individual will be present as a matter of course. The function of an institution, as its end or social purpose, thus specifies itself in terms of certain consequences for individuals. There is nothing mystical or even vague about function in this teleological sense.

The real change in orientation comes about when functionalism, seeking, curiously, to correct the narrowness of legalistic criteria, drops altogether as an element in analysis not only the legal but also those trans-legal thoughts and opinions about the purposes of institutions which supply the indispensable standards for seeing what the results in fact are. From this point of view anything that an institution systematically does for individuals is part of its function or functions. I think it is of some importance to note, however, that this point of view certainly preserves a teleology but one which is radically individualized. The analytical horizon, instead of being the point of view of the whole, now becomes congruent with the horizon of the private individual seeking or gaining unintentionally his own private advantage. From this point of view, however, it is very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to see the structure of the whole, i.e., the political community, upon which the individual's private ends depend and which establishes in an overall way the hierarchy of ends. The theoretical problem which arises, now, is that from the standpoint of the beneficiary who finds a profitable use in an institution for his own private ends there are an enormous if not infinite number of such uses, a range which is as great as the range of human ingenuity and idiosyncrasy itself. A really thorough description thus can only culminate in a bewildering if not chaotic array of such uses or advantages which can only be described laterally, i.e., as if they were of equal status or respectability in that society. But they are not. Where there are conflicts of interest, this differential respectability can have a bearing upon which interest will prevail. Is it the "function" of a college to provide customers for the neighboring shopkeepers? There could in principle be a conflict of interests about, let us say, admissions policy between the shopkeepers and the college. Now could the former publicly make demands for an increase in enrollment on the grounds that the provision of customers is one of the college's "latent functions", i.e., that the college exists for their interests? Why not?

Here I suggest that what functionalism with its private perspective lost sight of is the following sociologically crucial fact : although an institution does many things for a multiplicity of groups and individuals, only some of the things are publicly defensible as the things which it ought to do. These are its publicly defensible functions, the very possession of which makes an institution respectable in that society. It is these functions which supply the focal point from which people in that society will look at everything the institution does. It is in terms of these, in the first place, that a boundary or definition is placed around the institution ; for it is on the basis of these publicly defensible functions that people will see and say that an institution either is or is not doing something which is its proper business rather than that of another institution. When people say, for example, that a school is no longer a school but a social club, they are saying not only that these institutions have different functions but, obversely, that these functions define the institution. As such they are voicing an opinion which has these theoretical implications. These publicly defensible functions, furthermore, are in that society the focal point for perceiving the hierarchy of functions within that institution and the direction of the flow of activities, i.e., what is for what. This hierarchy, derived from or pointing towards some understanding of a public function, thus supplies the criteria for seeing which activities are central, which are subordinate, and which are altogether neutral with regard to the functions of that institution. Thus, to dwell for a moment on the painfully obvious ; since both hospitals and schools in cold and wet climates have to be in buildings, which in turn require some kind of custodial service, one sees that this service is irrelevant to the definition of the function of either.

All in all, then, we may say that it is with reference to this public function that one can distinguish and precisely describe the variety of things an institution does. This would range from the public function itself, to those quasi-public functions which are thrust upon it, which shades over in turn to systematic private benefits which are not publicly defensible but are also not vulnerable to attack, to systematic private benefits which can become vulnerable to attack, finally to the infinitude of accidental private benefits which are of no interest at all to anyone except the person who gets them. With the conception of a defensible public function, furthermore, one would be able to describe the situation of an institution which lacks one and is, hence, not respectable in that society, such as a black market, but which at the same time performs certain services which have a claim to public defensibility, which everyone knows about, and, hence, insure it against attack from all but extremists. Also of interest here is the problem of secrecy and the mode of defense. There are certain kinds of moderately unrespectable activities and institutions which are regarded as desirable or even politically necessary but which can be defended as such only privately, not publicly by an official speaking *ex cathedra*. This means that they can be tolerated, and even in some cases quite openly, so long as a public official is not forced officially to acknowledge their existence. It is in the light of such considerations that officials themselves attempt to keep cases "off the record", i.e., to keep things from getting to a point where they have no choice but to acknowledge their existence and to proceed accordingly. Where a government itself engages in politically necessary but unrespectable activities, such as espionage, it can simply disavow any responsibility for these activities should the spies be caught in the country being spied on. Here, as recent events have shown, it is not so much the commission of the acts, which all governments know about because they do them themselves, as it is the public avowal and defense of the acts, which compels the spied-on government to react with public indignation. The latter carries an implication of a *right* to the exercise of such activities, which the mere (and unacknowledged) commission of the activities does not possess. Further distinctions of this kind need not be developed further here.

Now what makes the function of an institution publicly defensible is that a case can be made out, in the given circumstances and in the given range of opinion, that this function serves a social need. This is what distinguishes a public function from a purely private interest. To go further one may say that in order for an institution to be respectable or publicly defensible, a case has to be made that its function serves the needs of society as a whole. This is demanded by the fact that it is the nature of every society to understand itself as a moral phenomenon. One thinks first of all of what the status would be of proposals which were advanced in the public arena with the justification, "I want this because I want this". The very adherents of a leader who dared to speak publicly in this way would not trust him. In addition, every political issue brings into existence not only a set of extremes but also a middle group of greater or lesser size and strength, whose interests are not precisely those of either extreme. The necessity for getting the support of this middle group, which is the normal requirement for a society not divided into factions that are on the verge of civil war, makes it necessary to advance programs which transcend the special and narrowly defined interests of either extreme. Finally, looking at the whole from the point of view of the middle, we note that even the extremes, if they are not simply to become conspiratorial rumps, have to feel that certain of their legitimate interests, i.e., those which they can respectably advance in the public arena, are not simply being ignored. Political proposals, then, in so far as they are political and not simply manifestations of private, illicit power as in the case of an armed gunman holding up a victim, must culminate in a claim that they are serving the needs or the good of the whole.

It is in the nature of the case, however, that what is in the needs of society or what is socially necessary is not something that is politically unambiguous like the needs of the organism and which can, so to speak, be dictated to a society out of a treatise. These needs are, rather, things that are intrinsically subject to social and political dispute. This is so because their determination raises the question of justice, and this is a permanent question of social life. Thus in contrast to the world of human affairs, the heart does not have to plead to be allowed to perform its function, does not have to make a case that it is more important to health and life than other "dispensable" organs, does not have to defend itself by political *action* in the literal meaning of this term. The mechanisms of "defense" are such only metaphorically. The heart is in short not a political agent and as such makes no political claims. All this is the obverse of the fact that the organs of the body are not ranged in political parties or interest groups with conflicting standards of health. They do their work, without raising the question of relative rights, or the organism as a whole perishes; and if it does they don't even care.

In virtue of such considerations one can see that every attempt to pattern a sociological or political theory on a physiological analogy can lead at best only to a political metaphor or a political myth. One thinks of the familiar organic analogies of the Middle Ages in which the parts of society were likened to the parts of the body, each functioning in its place to contribute to the well-being of the whole, and which is necessarily deranged when parts try to usurp the functions which belong to other parts. When the political intention behind such myths disappears, and all that is left is the physiological analogy as a kind of explanatory model of how societies in fact work, the analysis can terminate only in serious confusion. For granted that physiological systems and politico-social systems are both "systems", it may still be the case that the *difference* between these two types of system is not only more important and theoretically more instructive than any analogized similarity but in addition is obscured by the analogy. This difference, to repeat, is that the manner of integration of a society, i.e., its political order, is itself intrinsically subject to political dispute (1). It is this fact which renders the physiological analogy not only superfluous but misleading. Thus on the physiological analogy, one can say that societies have to do certain things to survive. But is not survival in human affairs always a question of survival on certain terms? Have not societies chosen to commit collective suicide rather than surrender? Societies are not integrated like bodies or hydraulic systems with interconnected tubes in which each part has a determined place in the whole. Human societies, on the contrary, are composed of political parts or interests which compete about their rank in the whole and, hence, about the structure of the whole. Even when the preservation of the whole itself is at stake, different parts can have different views of whether survival is worth it, and the voice of the preponderant part can be powerful enough to impel a whole society to total self-destruction (2).

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(1) For a fuller discussion of this than I give here, see my paper, Social Stratification and the Political Order, *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1959), 571-578.

On a lower level of generality one could say, following again the physiological analogy, that all societies require government to maintain law and order just as all bodies require a central nervous system. But there is no such thing as "government" in the abstract. Every government necessarily takes shape in being a government of a certain kind, which is defined and distinguished from other kinds of government by the kind of ruling class and the kind of people who hold power and prestige—democracy, aristocracy, rule by country gentlemen, rabbis, philosopher-kings, etc. Since every kind of government will have to maintain law and order anyway or collapse in chaos, it can only be the things which differentiate governments which are the object of political choice. These differentiae are precisely the things that people care most about because of their comprehensive effect on the life of the society as a whole. Thus, granted that there must be government, one still cannot help caring about the *kind* of men and the *kind* of class interest which will run it. For what is at stake is not merely the way in which the law will be administered. Inseparable from this is the question of those moral, political, cultural, aesthetic standards which are elevated to public respect in the very elevation of a specific type of ruling class to power. As such, there is nothing less at stake than the way of life of that society. Now when government, or to be more precise the political order, is seen in the fullness of its political and cultural dimensions, there proves to be—on this level—no universal necessity either across or within societies. This is precluded by the very notion of choice. Different groups and classes have different opinions of what the needs of society are and what kind of government will best serve these needs. These groups have variable chances for getting power. This alone is a necessary cause of the variety among political orders (3).

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(2) "Some were for accepting the proposals, as offering the only chance of preservation. But the priests took a different view of the matter. They knew that the ruin of their own order must follow the triumph of Christianity [...] The eloquence of the priests, artfully touching the various wrongs of his people, roused the hot blood of Guatemozin [...] 'Let no man, henceforth, who values his life, talk of surrender. We can at least die like warriors'." William H. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (New York, the Modern Library), p. 589. See also the dialogue at Melos in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

(3) The only respect in which it makes sense to speak of government in the abstract, as a politically meaningful entity, is noticeable in such expressions as "any government would be better than none". As a meaningful political opinion, however,

Now in virtue of the ambiguity and, hence, disagreement which will exist in the society about its overall needs, there will be ambiguity and disagreement about the purposes or functions of institutions which look towards these needs as their public justification. Function, of course, must be understood here, and in the light of the previous argument, not in a formal legal or bureaucratic sense but with regard to the content, nature, or quality of the activities which the institution performs about which dispute can arise. Looking at these matters in a dynamic perspective, at a moment when change is visibly imminent or actually taking place, we see a vocal competition among different groups trying to make a case before a public tribunal that their point of view best serves the needs of society. Which point of view will win out depends upon the interplay of circumstance, interest, and opinion—the latter as a base for appealing to certain principles about the rightness of the policy being advanced. Proposals in behalf of a universal right to a higher education would obviously not have the same weight in an aristocracy as in a democracy, appealing as such proposals do to premises about the equality of men that are the ultimate principles of the political order as a whole.

Looking at the matter statically, one can say that every institution which makes a claim to public respectability is a *settlement.* This, of course, is true of the political order as a whole which is *the* model for all subsidiary institutions. A certain view of what the public function of the institution is and corresponding interests become elevated to pre-eminence. Alternative views and corresponding interests become subordinated in prestige and influence. The former are vocal, authoritative, respectable. The latter are more or less mute, unlistened to, voices in the wind. One cannot, however, look at this distribution of power, prestige, and influence too statically, as if it were some kind of geological "cross-section". For the opposition, with a different view of the functions of the institutions is, though more or less mute, present, waiting for a chance to become vocal. Its existence and its potentiality for becoming vocal means that the dominant view is in principle potentially always before a public tribunal. The degree to which this can be actualized depends on the strength which the opposition has to force it into an explicit public defense of its position. Thus before the analyst decides that the point of view of the party presently in power is *the* function of the institution, he has to weigh the strength of the opposition. If it has been as reduced to political insignificance

this can only be the demand of people in a state of complete lawlessness and disorder. But the only kind of government which can arise under these circumstances is some form of dictatorship, be it the more benign form of Wyatt Earp or the more permanent dictatorships of all times. Mere government, in the apparently abstract, not only is the product of an extreme situation but necessarily takes shape in a specific political order.

as the monarchist or pro-slavery point of view in the United States has been, it can, of course, be ignored. Such a point of view has no chance of becoming respectable in any rational, practical calculation. But such an extreme is an example of an opinion which is not merely mute but extinct. Far short of this extreme there is opposition which can become vocal and pre-eminent. For the analyst to decide that the point of view of the dominant party of the moment is *the* function or that the conferring of private benefits upon private interest groups is *the* function is to abstract from the fact that other groups in the society do not think that this is *the* function. The analyst in other words abstracts from the fact that the determination of the function (and the parallel phenomenon of functional necessity) is a social decision. An analyst who completely ignores the weight of opposition opinion in deciding that something is the function or is functionally necessary thus puts himself in a position where the opposition can legitimately ask by what right he claims to speak for the whole. More than this he may be describing something as the function but which is on the verge of political repudiation and collapse. This point of view necessarily culminates in an absolutization of the status quo, no matter how strong or weak.

This leads to our final remarks. How does an opposition, heretofore subordinate, become vocal, pre-eminent, authoritative? In formal respects, which are all that we limit ourselves to in this preliminary analysis, it does this when it is able to *discredit* the party in power. The opposition gains credit when it can make a successful case that the party in power is incompetent to serve the common good. To the extent that the settlement which established the dominance of the party in power was a really stable one, the opposition is dependent upon a massive change of circumstances which so impinges upon public opinion that it can make a rhetorical use of these facts in making its case as to what these new facts and, hence, new needs actually are. In doing so, however, the opposition is also appealing to certain opinions and principles which co-exist in the society with those of the dominant party which are now used to advance its claims in the light of the new facts. When capital had been massively discredited by the depression, the New Deal was able to advance a program of social welfare that appealed to principles that co-existed in an ambiguous way with those of laissez-faire. As one looks at the educational controversy now going on in the United States, we see that the party in power has been to some degree discredited by Russian technological achievements. Pointing to these the opposition not only adduces these facts but, as a basis for change, appeals to certain standards of excellence which co-exist ambiguously with the principle of equality. If this diffuseness of principle did not exist, there could be no peaceful change, i.e., change based on consent, of any political magnitude, especially since the various principles, when radicalized and thus pressed to their theoretically consistent extremes, can be seen to be in conflict and in tension with each other. Moderate proposals, however, must as much as possible seek to blur this tension, and make their case in a way that gains the greatest amount of agreement and alienates or antagonizes as few people as possible.

As stated above, every institution gets to be supported by private interests. These supply powerful motives for sustaining the institution in the direction it has been going. Now with regard to the problem of institutional (and political) change, it suffices to note here that so long as opinion is such that an effective case cannot be publicly made that an institution is not performing its function, it is very difficult to attack it merely by showing that private interests are being served. One can accuse the party in power of being "empire builders", "vested interests", of "feathering their own nests", of "monopolizing all the rewards". All this may be true, at least in some measure. But so long as a public case cannot be made that their policy is wrong, such an attack will only have the status of "sour grapes". So long, in short, as they can publicly defend their policy, they can silence such criticism ; their adequate defense of their position implicitly transforms such criticism into resentment based not on right but envy. They re-emerge not as vested interests but as the most qualified and, hence, entitled to maintain authority. It is for such reasons that an attack on power-holders, on the mere grounds that they hold power, is worse than useless since its defeat, as is true of any defeat, will set back the disinterested cause at the basis of the attack. Only when their policy has begun to lose credit, i.e., only when the facts of their incompetence impinge upon opinion in a politically demonstrable manner, can one make a publicly defensible attack that they are holding onto power at any cost. No matter how far statesmanship or public-spirited criticism is in advance of opinion, the party in power must have begun to discredit itself by the facts. The statesman calls attention to these facts, explains their significance and can with skill and with luck decisively precipitate a change in opinion. In a complex society, detailed and careful investigation by a "fact-finding commission" may be necessary in order to establish the facts. The impartiality or impeccability of the investigation lends authority to the claims which the facts support (4). The use of such commissions, however, should not cause one to lose sight of the generalization that the clarification of the facts of the situation is a permanent task and exercise of the practical judgment of the statesman. And he knows that in order for these facts to carry political weight, circumstances must be such that the facts are recognizable, intelligible, meaningful. They must seem to be able to "speak for themselves". Only then will criticism be free of the stigma of resentment, of "criticizing for the sake of criticizing", i.e., of public irresponsibility. Only then will the truth acquire the respectability of legitimate criticism. Only then will the charge "stick" (5).

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(4) The implication of this is that most political controversies are not about values but facts.

HOWARD BROTZ

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(5) An attack upon interest *qua* interest, in other words, is the political equivalent of the genetic fallacy.

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HEINRICH POPITZ

Soziale Normen

DIE Normgebundenheit des sozialen Verhaltens ist eine einfache, ja triviale Alltagserfahrung : wir geraten ständig an Kreuzungen, die mit grünen und roten Signalen versehen sind, — in soziale Situationen, die offenbar bereits von anderen entdeckt, fixiert, vorgeformt sind. Es steht uns nicht frei, diese Vorgeformtheit, diese Besetzung von Situationen mit positiv und negativ bewerteten Alternativlösungen ohne weiteres zu ignorieren. Wenn wir uns um die grünen und roten Lichter nicht scheren, wird unser Verhalten dennoch *von anderen als eine Antwort* auf diese Signale interpretiert, — auch wenn es gar nicht in unserer Absicht lag, uns eine Frage stellen zu lassen. So können wir in einer ersten Annäherung sagen : die Normgebundenheit sozialen Verhaltens bedeutet, daß soziale Situationen mit bestimmten Alternativen belastet sind, die auf irgendwelchen Verabredungen zu beruhen scheinen ; Verabredungen, von denen man nicht recht weiß, wer sie eigentlich getroffen hat ; Verabredungen, die wir nicht aus der Welt schaffen, wenn wir sie von Fall zu Fall nicht akzeptieren. Sie sind irgendwie so auf Dauerhaftigkeit angelegt, daß sie vom Einzelnen nicht beliebig außer Kraft gesetzt werden können.

Dieses eigenartige Phänomen ist das Thema der folgenden Überlegungen. Ich möchte Ihnen einiges vom Ansatz des soziologischen Denkens und von den Grundbegriffen der soziologischen Forschung zu zeigen versuchen, indem ich nach Kennzeichen der sozialen Normgebundenheit frage, die in allen uns bekannten Kulturen aufweisbar sind und daher die Analyse der verschiedensten sozialen Ordnungen zu leiten vermögen *.

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* Ich lege hiermit meine Antrittsvorlesung an der Universität Basel, gehalten am 15. November 1960, in unveränderter Form vor. Sie setzt, dem Anlaß entsprechend, keine soziologischen Vorkenntnisse voraus. Mein Ziel war es, wie im Text formuliert, »unter dem Vielen, was uns im sozialen Leben selbstverständlich erscheint, einige derjenigen Selbstverständlichkeiten darzustellen, die es wirklich sind«. Die hinzugefügten Anmerkungen geben einige weiterführende Hinweise.

Archiv. europ. sociol., II (1961), 185-198.

⁂

Daß Menschen ihr Verhalten sozial binden, sozial *verbindlich* machen, ist eine höchst merkwürdige Leistung. Wie bringen wir diese Leistung eigentlich zustande?

Eine erste Antwort führt uns nicht sehr weit, ist aber Voraussetzung jeder weiteren sinnvollen Eingrenzung der Fragestellung. Wir müssen uns darauf besinnen, daß die Art und Weise der Gestaltung, der Formung des sozialen Lebens dem Menschen ebenso wenig vorgegeben ist wie die Art und Weise der Naturgestaltung. Vergesellschaftung ist stets ein Artificium.

Selbstverständlich sind viele soziale Verhaltensgebote und Verbote eng mit *biologischen Bedingtheiten* verknüpft, wie dem Unterschied der Geschlechter, Geburt, Kindheit, Altern und Tod. Aber der Kulturvergleich zeigt uns, daß auch diese biologischen Bedingtheiten in den einzelnen Kulturen völlig verschiedenartig sozial überformt werden. So werden z.B. in jeder Kultur in einigen typischen, häufig wiederkehrenden Situationen verschiedenartige Verhaltensgebote an Männer und an Frauen gestellt. Der Unterschied der Geschlechter kommt also auch in der Formulierung von Sozialnormen irgendwie zum Ausdruck. Vergleicht man jedoch die etwa den Frauen zugeschriebenen Sozialnormen in den uns bekannten Kulturen miteinander, so erweist es sich als äußerst schwierig, universal gültige Gemeinsamkeiten, »wesenseigene« Verhaltenskonstanten zu finden. Der biologische Unterschied der Geschlechter ist im Hinblick auf das jeweils gebotene Verhalten offensichtlich nicht mehr als ein Startpunkt, ein Ansatzpunkt, von dem aus sich in jeder Kultur eine besondere Reihe von »Wesensunterschieden« entwickelt. Jede dieser kulturspezifischen Varianten erscheint uns, von außen her gesehen, als mehr oder minder willkürlich — oder besser : als künstlich.

Ebenso zeigt das Verhältnis zu Geburt, Altern und Tod eine nahezu uferlose Variabilität. In den Haltungen zu so vitalen Problemen wie Selbstmord, Krieg, dem Verhältnis zu Verstorbenen läßt sich — soweit ich sehe — kein allgemein-menschlicher Fundus finden, der in allen Kulturen in sozial gebotenen Verhaltensweisen zum Ausdruck käme. Der Verkehr mit den Verstorbenen kann für die gesamte soziale Ordnung konstitutiv sein ; an den Tod können sich Verpflichtungen knüpfen, die das ganze Leben formen — wir können ihn aber auch sozial zu ignorieren versuchen.

Eine universal gültige Norm scheint am ehesten das Inzest-

Tabu zu sein. Aber auch das Inzest-Tabu ist nicht nur *übertretbar* (sonst wäre es ein Naturgesetz, keine Norm), sondern auch als normative Verhaltensforderung *suspendierbar* (1).

Statt vieler weiterer Beispiele sei daran erinnert, wie alt und ehrwürdig die Einsicht in die Relativität der sozialen Verhaltensgebote ist. Herodot erzählt folgende Anekdote : »Darius berief während seiner Herrschaft die anwesenden Hellenen zu sich und stellte an sie die Frage : um welchen Preis sie ihre gestorbenen Väter würden aufessen wollen. Sie erklärten, um keinen Preis täten sie dies. Darauf berief Darius die Inder, welche Kalatier genannt werden und ihre Eltern verzehren (der sog. Endokannibalismus), und fragte sie in Gegenwart der Hellenen, welche durch einen Dolmetscher alles, was gesprochen wurde, vernahmen : um welchen Preis sie es wohl über sich bringen würden, ihre gestorbenen Väter (nach hellenischer Sitte) im Feuer zu verbrennen. Da schrien sie laut auf und baten ihn, doch nicht mit solchen Dingen zu kommen.« Herodot schließt mit der Bemerkung : »So ist es nun einmal Sitte, und Pindar scheint mir recht zu haben, wenn er in einem seiner Gedichte behauptet : die Sitte sei König über alles« (2).

Warum eine bestimmte Verhaltensnorm in einer bestimmten Kultur unter bestimmten Bedingungen »nun einmal Sitte« ist — das ist natürlich Gegenstand soziologischer Erklärungsversuche aller Art. Hier aber ist zunächst festzuhalten, daß die Frage nach den Kennzeichen der normativen Gebundenheit sozialen Handelns nicht befriedigend zu beantworten ist, indem man nach sozialen Normen sucht, die in ihrer *inhaltlichen Bestimmtheit* universal gültig sind.

Wir können diese Kulturbedingtheit und »Relativität« sozialer Normen von zwei verschiedenen Seiten her umschreiben als *soziale Plastizität* des Menschen — seine Formbarkeit, seine Reagibilität auf die verschiedensten Ordnungs-Entwürfe — und als *soziale Produktivität* : die Gestaltungskraft und Phantasie, mit der Menschen die Ordnungen ihres sozialen Lebens entwerfen, biologische Gegebenheiten interpretieren, Bedingungen umformen und sich selbst in ihrem Verhalten stilisieren. Beide Phänomene fordern sich wechselseitig heraus. Die Frage, die die soziale Plastizität stellt, ist zwingend — ein Zwang zur *Gestaltung*. Und die Antwort, die gegeben werden muß, ist produktiv nicht nur im Sinne der Wahl innerhalb eines Spielraums von Möglichkeiten, sondern vor allem als Entscheidung, durch die der Mensch sich selbst festlegt und formt, sich sozial selbst definiert. Dieses Sich-Selbst-Feststellen des Menschen beruht stets auf einer *normativen* Entscheidung : es bleibt also stets imperativ, eine Forderung — man könnte auch sagen : eine Hoffnung.

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(1) Zur Frage der Universalität des Inzest-Tabus vgl. George Peter Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York, 1949), S. 284 ff. Murdock gelangt zu einigen bemerkenswert klaren und eindeutigen Verallgemeinerungen, die aber auf einem begrenzten Material beruhen. Gegenbeispiele gegen die Thesen Murdocks finden sich z.B. bei Richard Thurnwald, *Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen*, Bd. II (Berlin und Leipzig, 1932), S. 162 f.

(2) Herodot, III, 38, zitiert in der Übersetzung von J. Chr. F. Bähr (Berlin o.J.) Herodot mißversteht offensichtlich den Sinn des nomos-Begriffs bei Pindar. — Zum sog. Endokannibalismus vgl. Herodot, I, 216 und III, 99.

Hier aber bietet sich nun ein Ansatzpunkt, der zwar als eine nicht weiter diskutable Selbstverständlichkeit erscheinen mag, von dem sich aber einige universal gültige Merkmale der sozialen Normgebundenheit ableiten lassen. Es handelt sich um eine Bedingung, die jenseits aller kulturspezifischen Variationen in der »Tatsache Gesellschaft« selbst beschlossen liegt : das Sich-Selbst-Feststellen des Menschen als soziales Wesen, von dem wir sprachen, ist dem Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip unterworfen — also ein *Sich-gegenseitig-Feststellen.*

Soziale Normen begrenzen offenbar die Willkür in der Beziehung von Menschen zueinander. Sie bewirken, daß Menschen sich mit einiger Sicherheit und Dauerhaftigkeit aufeinander einstellen können. Diese Einstellung aufeinander wäre aber nicht möglich, ohne daß wir das Handeln der jeweils Anderen in oft wiederkehrenden, typischen Situationen voraussehen, also mit Regelmäßigkeiten rechnen können (3). Die Wirksamkeit der Normgebundenheit sozialen Handelns wäre damit umschrieben als eine Art »Konstruktion« regelmäßiger und wechselseitig voraussehbarer Handlungsabläufe. Es ist nun diese wechselseitige Voraussehbarkeit, diese Einstellung aufeinander, oder einfach : diese Gegenseitigkeit, die bestimmten »Konstruktionsprinzipien« unterliegt und die uns daher einige Teilantworten auf die Frage erlaubt, von der wir ausgingen : die Frage, wie es Menschen eigentlich machen, ihr soziales Verhalten normativ zu binden.

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(3) Die Bedeutung der Voraussehbarkeit sozialen Handelns betont insbes. Theodor Geiger, Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts, in *Acta Jutlandica* XIX, 2 (Aarhus und Kopenhagen, 1947), S. 14 f, 57 f.

⁂

Ich möchte — um der Übersichtlichkeit willen — fünf solcher Teilantworten unterscheiden.

Erstens. — »Dieses Tier darf niemand jagen« — »In dieser Situation darfst Du Deines Nachbarn Behausung betreten, in jener nicht« — »Ein Kind muß abends frühzeitig zu Bett gehen« : Das sind formulierte Normen verschiedener Art. Gemeinsam ist ihnen, daß sie Handlungen und Situationen *typisieren.* Für das Kind, das abends ins Bett soll, ist die Situation heute ganz anders als gestern oder vorgestern. Für die Eltern ist sie anders als für das Kind ; für den Beobachter anders als für die Beteiligten. Die Markierung bestimmter Handlungen als »verbindlich« setzt jedoch voraus, daß wir Kriterien gefunden haben, die subjektiv *verschiedenartige* Handlungen und Situationen *gleich oder zumindest vergleichbar* machen. Diese Kriterien stellen eine Auswahl bestimmter Handlungs- und Situations-Merkmale dar, die von jeder Generation neu erlernt werden muß. Das Kunststück der Erziehung besteht ja nicht zuletzt darin, einen bestimmten Bestand von typisierten Situationen gegen die Fülle der subjektiv-individuellen Situationserlebnisse des Kindes zur Geltung zu bringen.

Es sei also hier zunächst festgehalten, daß *jede* normative Interpretation von Handlungen und Situationen die soziale Relevanz der individuellen Erlebnissphäre begrenzt. (*Jede* normative Interpretation : also nicht nur die an Rechtssatzungen orientierte.) Stets schaffen Normen eine artifizielle Kommunikationsebene zwischen Menschen, auf der nicht alles »gilt«, was wir erleben, fühlen, wahrzunehmen glauben (4). Keine psychologische oder phänomenologische oder soziologische Schuldtheorie kann die Möglichkeit, ja Wahrscheinlichkeit subjektiver Ungerechtigkeiten aus der Welt schaffen, die mit dieser Grundbedingung aller sozialen Normsetzung gegeben ist : Soziale Normen können nicht gelten, ohne daß allgemein verbindliche Typisierungen von Handlungen und Situationen als geltend anerkannt und durchgesetzt werden — und zwar, wie wir sehen werden, Typisierungen besonderer Art.

(4) Die Gleichheit bezw. Vergleichbarkeit von sozialen Situationen ist also nicht, wie gelegentlich unterstellt wird, eine methodische Fiktion des Soziologen, der soziale Ordnungen interpretiert ; sondern eine Abstraktionsleistung, die stets vollzogen werden muß, wo Menschen ihr Handeln in verbindlicher Form voraussehbar machen. Soziale Ordnungen beruhen auf Abstraktionsleistungen dieser Art.

Zweitens. — Der Satz : »Dieses Tier darf *niemand* jagen« ist eine formulierte Norm, die sich offenbar an *alle* Mitglieder eines bestimmten Universums geordneter Beziehungen wendet. Der Satz »Ein Kind muß abends frühzeitig zu Bett gehen« bezieht sich ausdrücklich auf einige Mitglieder, die Kinder. Andere Normen sind speziell an die »Väter«, »Mütter«, »Medizinmänner«, »Werkmeister« adressiert. Soziale Normen schließen also nicht nur Typisierungen von Situationen und Handlungen, sondern auch von Personen ein. Sie wenden sich an einen bestimmten Menschen, *insofern* er Vater, Medizinmann oder Staatsbürger ist. Und zwar erstrecken sich diese Typisierungen nicht nur auf die jeweils Handelnden, sondern auch auf diejenigen, die mit einer bestimmten Handlung »gemeint«, von ihr betroffen werden. Welche Verhaltenserwartungen an ein Kind gestellt werden, hängt auch wesentlich davon ab, ob sich seine Handlung auf die Eltern oder die Spielkameraden oder die Lehrer bezieht.

All das erscheint uns selbstverständlich. Es ist auch selbstverständlich, wenn man als gegeben voraussetzt, daß soziale Gruppen nicht ein Wirrwarr uniformer Teilchen, sondern ein in sich differenziertes Gefüge von Rechten und Pflichten darstellen. Was wir festhalten wollen, ist lediglich eine Bedingung dieser Möglichkeit : soziale Normen können eine *Differenzierung verschiedener Personenkategorien* mitsetzen — verschiedener »sozialer Rollen«, wie wir seit Ralph Linton sagen (5). Diese Differenzierung ist nicht beliebig, sofern sie zu einem geordneten Zusammenleben führen soll. Vielmehr müssen sich die einzelnen sozialen Rollen wechselseitig implizieren : Der Familienvater hat bestimmte Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen, die z.B. speziell auf Kinder bezogen sind und erwartet seinerseits wieder eine entsprechende Antwort des Kindes in der Erfüllung von Verhaltensgeboten. Ferner müssen die einzelnen Verpflichtungen *eines* Menschen aufeinander abgestimmt, also z.B. die Verpflichtungen des Vaters und Ehemanns (wenigstens im Prinzip) miteinander vereinbar sein. Und schließlich müssen sich die speziellen Sozialnormen so ergänzen, daß sich ein lebensfähiges Ganzes, ein »arbeitsfähiges« Gefüge verschiedenartiger Leistungen ergibt. Aus dieser wechselseitigen Implikation, dem Aufeinander-Abgestelltsein und dem Sich-Ergänzen spezieller Verhaltensgebote, entstehen die Normstrukturen verschiedener sozialer Einheiten :

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(5) R. LINTON, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936). Neue Gesichtspunkte entwickelt : Ralf DAHRENDORF, *Homo Sociologicus, Ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle* (Köln und Opladen, 1959) Dort auch weitere Literatur.

etwa einer Schulklasse im Unterschied zu einem Verein, eines Industriebetriebes im Unterschied zur Familie, der patriarchalischen Großfamilie im Unterschied zur modernen städtischen Kleinfamilie.

Wir haben heute die wohl höchste Rationalisierung solcher Verteilung und Zusammensetzung von Verhaltensgeboten in der modernen Bürokratie erreicht — wenigstens ihrem Anspruch, ihrem »Entwurf« nach (6). Auch die besonders ausgefeilte bürokratische Systematik von Kompetenzen beruht aber auf Prinzipien, die wir in ihrem Grundriß überall dort nachweisen können, wo Menschen ihr Zusammenleben zu ordnen versuchen. Stets finden wir eine Art »Arbeitsteilung« von Verhaltensgeboten und Verboten, die sich als jeweils besonderes Gefüge sozialer Rollen beschreiben läßt.

Drittens. — Wir sprachen von Normstrukturen — einem Gefüge aufeinander bezogener sozialer Rollen — die soziale Einheiten (Gruppen, Kollektive) kennzeichnen. Aus der alltäglichen Erfahrung ist uns geläufig, daß der Einzelne mehreren sozialen Einheiten zugehört, Träger mehrerer sozialer Rollen ist (7). Diese Vielfalt der Zugehörigkeiten wird oft sogar als ein spezifisch modernes Phänomen gedeutet : als Konsequenz des modernen Pluralismus, der Aufspaltung von Privatheit und Öffentlichkeit, des »Institutionenzerfalls« oder anderer Heimsuchungen, die der Zeitkritiker gerne für sich und seine Zeitgenossen in Anspruch nimmt. Es handelt sich aber keineswegs um ein spezifisch modernes Phänomen. Wir können vielmehr die empirisch überprüfbare These wagen : Jeder Mensch — mit Ausnahme des sehr kleinen Kindes, das noch völlig in der Familie aufgeht und natürlich mit Ausnahme von Eremitentum u.dergl. — *jeder Mensch in allen Kulturen, die wir*

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(6) Vgl. hierzu Robert K. MERTON, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, in *Social Theory and Social Structure*² (Glencoe, 1957) und Theodore M. NEWCOMB, *Sozialpsychologie* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1959), S. 211 f.

(7) Leider hat sich eine einheitliche Terminologie und Klassifikation sozialer Gebilde noch nicht durchgesetzt. Ich gebrauche hier »soziale Einheit« (social unit) als Oberbegriff für soziale Gruppen und Kollektive. — Dabei möchte ich auf das in der Regel angeführte Begriffsmerkmal des »Wir-Bewußtseins«, »Solidaritäts-Empfindens« oder dergl. verzichten. Es genügt m.E., soziale Einheiten als Gefüge aufeinander bezogener sozialer Rollen zu kennzeichnen. Hiermit ist das Verbindende — die Unterscheidung von »innen« und »außen« — bereits zureichend formuliert. Und zwar nicht nur auf Grund der *Bezogenheit* der sozialen Rollen aufeinander. Vielmehr steckt in jeder sozialen Rolle bereits eine *»Zugehörigkeitshypothese«*, die »Mitglieder« im Unterschied zu »Nichtmitgliedern« verbindet und die erst die Formulierung partikularer Rechte und Pflichten legitimiert. (Die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Staatsverband, die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Kernfamilie ist in der Formulierung der sozialen Rolle »Staatsbürger«, »Familienvater« mitgesetzt.)

kennen, ist Mitglied mehrerer sozialer Einheiten. Selbst in australischen Hordenkulturen, in denen sich die lokale Einheit mit der Großfamilie deckt, werden zumindest noch Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen realisiert, die sich auf andere lokale Einheiten ausdehnen. Wir finden also auch hier — im Extremfall — *wenigstens* zwei soziale Einheiten, denen der Einzelne verpflichtet ist — selbst wenn man die Kernfamilie nicht als gesonderte Funktionseinheit betrachtet.

Das geläufige Bild, das dem Einzelnen »die Gesellschaft« gegenüberstellt, ist also irreführend. Der Einzelne ist stets — wenn wir diesen Ausdruck einmal gebrauchen wollen — Mitglied *mehrerer* Gesellschaften. Überall, wo Menschen Ordnungen des Zusammenlebens entwerfen, ergibt sich eine Vielheit sich übergreifender und überschneidender sozialer Einheiten — ein immer wiederkehrendes Formprinzip der Vergesellschaftung. Die Frage, warum dies eigentlich so ist, scheint mir bisher noch nicht befriedigend beantwortet, ja vielleicht noch nicht einmal zureichend eindeutig formuliert worden zu sein.

Ich muß mich darauf beschränken, auf *eine* Konsequenz aufmerksam zu machen. Die Vielheit sich überschneidender und übergreifender Verpflichtungen bedeutet, daß die *Möglichkeit eines Normenkonfliktes* prinzipiell in der *Struktur sozialer Ordnungen* angelegt ist. Es bedarf durchaus nicht unbedingt einer »Wertkrise«, um für den Einzelnen oder für Gruppen Situationen entstehen zu lassen, die von verschiedenen Zugehörigkeitserwartungen verschieden interpretiert werden. Eine latente Interessenkonkurrenz sozialer Einheiten finden wir in allen Kulturen — auch in jenen, die wir für besonders homogen zu halten pflegen.

Vielleicht besteht aber ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem Grade der Unhomogenität der verschiedenen sozialen Verpflichtungen und dem Grade, in dem sich der Einzelne überhaupt als individuelle Existenz bewußt wird. Vielleicht muß die latente Konkurrenz und Konfliktmöglichkeit der sich im Einzelnen überschneidenden Normstrukturen manifest werden, bevor wir die sozialen Bindungen als eine Dimension des menschlichen Lebens reflektieren können und die Distanz der spezifisch individuellen Reflektion auf uns selbst gewinnen. Das hieße, daß eine mittelbare Beziehung besteht zwischen dem Bewußtwerden der Individualität und jenem Formprinzip der Vergesellschaftung, das wir als prinzipielle Vielheit sozialer Einheiten beschrieben haben.

Viertens. — Wir haben bisher davon gesprochen, daß soziale Normen Handlungen und Situationen typisieren; daß Normstrukturen entstehen, welche die Mitglieder einer sozialen Einheit durch ein bestimmtes Beziehungsnetz (von Rechten und Pflichten) miteinander verbinden; daß der Einzelne als Mitglied mehrerer sozialer Einheiten stets Schnittpunkt mehrerer Normstrukturen ist. Es bleibt nun zu fragen, woran man denn eigentlich die »Existenz« von Normen erkennt. Wenn der Begriff der sozialen Normen im Rahmen der Soziologie Bedeutung haben soll, müssen sich empirische Anhaltspunkte für die *Geltung* von Normen finden lassen. Ich habe diese Frage bisher zurückgestellt, weil sie uns zu einem weiteren, vierten Phänomen führt, das nach dem bisher Gesagten besser verständlich zu machen ist.

Die Geltung von Normen kann offenbar nicht einfach mit erwarteten Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten aller Art gleichgesetzt werden. Es gibt viele erwartete Regelmäßigkeiten — z.B. den Brauch, zu bestimmter Zeit zu Mittag zu essen — die keineswegs den Charakter der Verbindlichkeit haben. Man kann es ohne weiteres auch anders machen. Von der Geltung einer Norm wollen wir erst dann sprechen, wenn ein Abweichen von solchen erwarteten Regelmäßigkeiten *Sanktionen* gegen den Abweicher auslöst, etwa demonstrative Mißbilligung, Repressalien, Diskriminierung, Strafen. In diesen Fällen *folgen* also auf die abweichende Handlung eines Einzelnen oder Mehrerer *weitere Handlungen* anderer Menschen, die auf jene Abweichung in bestimmter Weise Bezug haben.

Die Grenze zwischen einem Brauch und einer sozialen Norm — einer (verbindlichen) Sitte etwa — läßt sich allerdings nur dann eindeutig ziehen, wenn Präzedenzfälle vorliegen. Nicht nur für den Soziologen, sondern auch für den Handelnden selbst, insbesondere für den Fremden, kann es durchaus in der Schwebe bleiben, ob ein allgemein übliches Verhalten als verbindlich betrachtet wird oder nicht: jedenfalls solange, bis eine Abweichung stattfindet und die Reaktion beobachtet werden kann.

Wer aber sind die »Anderen«, denen wir eben unterstellt haben, daß sie Sanktionen vollziehen? Können wir einfach sagen: diejenigen, die von einer abweichenden Handlung unmittelbar betroffen werden, denen sie schadet, Nachteile bringt? Das wäre vergleichsweise eindeutig, aber allzu vereinfachend. Denn dann müßten wir *jeden* Akt privater Vergeltung als Vollzug einer Sanktion gegen einen Normbrecher interpretieren. Wer Normbrecher ist, entschiede immer gerade derjenige, der aus irgendeinem Grunde auf Vergeltung sinnt.

Wir kommen also nicht aus ohne den berühmten Dritten. Nennen wir ihn, Theodor Geiger folgend, die »Gruppenöffentlichkeit« (8). Solange der durch ein abweichendes Verhalten Geschädigte *auf sich allein angewiesen* ist, bleibt seine Reaktion ebenso Privatsache wie das abweichende Verhalten selbst. Erst die Unterstützung durch die anderen, die Gruppenöffentlichkeit, verleiht ihr den Charakter einer Sanktion. Die ersten Spuren einer solchen Unterstützung zeigen sich, wenn die Gruppenöffentlichkeit das abweichende Verhalten *demonstrativ mißbilligt*, dem Betroffenen dagegen einen Vergeltungsakt zubilligt, der vom üblichen Verhalten abweicht, d.h. sich nur als Reaktion auf ein angetanes Unrecht rechtfertigt. Das ethnographische Material, aber auch die alltägliche Beobachtung zeigen uns nun zahlreiche Übergänge von der demonstrativen Mißbilligung bis zur handgreiflichen *Beteiligung* der Gruppenöffentlichkeit an der Sanktion (etwa in Form des sozialen Boykotts) und von hier aus wieder bis zur vollständigen Übernahme des Sanktionen-Vollzuges durch die Gruppenöffentlichkeit. Der letztere Fall setzt allerdings in der Regel bereits die Existenz bestimmter Autoritäten voraus, die die Gruppenöffentlichkeit repräsentieren (des »Anführers« in Spielgruppen, des Familienvaters, bestimmter Vorgesetzter, der »opinion leaders« usw.). Von Rechtsnormen sprechen wir, wenn sich solche Autoritäten zu einer Zentralinstanz ausbilden, die eine angebbare Reihe von sozialen Normen kraft *alleiniger* Sanktionsgewalt schützen.

Es soll uns hier aber nicht auf die Abgrenzung dieses Sonderfalles sozialer Normen, der Rechtsnormen, ankommen. (Man kann den »Schwellenwert« terminologisch natürlich früher oder später ansetzen.) Wichtig ist in unserem Zusammenhang die Einsicht, daß es auch ohne bzw. jenseits der Rechtsnormen eine *empirisch aufweisbare* soziale Normgebundenheit gibt.

Welches Verhalten normativen Charakter hat, wird nicht unbedingt durch verbale Verständigung entschieden; dementsprechend sind soziale Normen auch nicht durch Meinungsbefragungen zu ermitteln. Die soziologischen Kriterien liegen allein in den Handlungen der Beteiligten. Ob erwartete Regelmäßigkeiten des sozialen Verhaltens normativ interpretiert werden, läßt sich nur an der Reaktion der jeweils »Anderen«, der Gruppenöffentlichkeit und eventuell ihrer Autoritäten und Instanzen ablesen (9). Entscheidend ist, ob bestimmte Verhaltensweisen gegen offenkundige Abweichungen geschützt werden — und zwar *nicht nur durch diejenigen, die eventuell unmittelbar Schaden erleiden.* Entsprechend ist der *Grad der Geltung* sozialer Normen auch nicht allein von ihrer Befolgung abhängig, sondern (ebenso) auch vom Grad der Bereitschaft, die entsprechenden Schutzfunktionen zu vollziehen; von der Bereitschaft, den Anspruch auf dauerhafte Verbindlichkeit gegen den Normbruch durchzusetzen. Die Normgebundenheit verwirklicht sich also nicht nur in einem Handeln, das zum Ausdruck bringt : »Dies galt und gilt heute«, sondern auch in einer Reaktion, die besagt : »Dies soll in Zukunft wieder gelten«.

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(8) Theodor GEIGER, *op. cit.* S. 33.

(9) Die Analysen der Reaktionen auf Normbrüche (und auch im weiteren Sinne: der Präventive gegen Normbrüche) gruppieren sich um das Stichwort »soziale Kontrolle«. Einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Theorie der sozialen Kontrolle gibt George Caspar HOMANS, *The Human Group*

Alles, was wir bisher über normatives Verhalten und Normstrukturen gesagt haben, muß also gleichsam in einer *Verdoppelung* gesehen werden. Jeder sozialen Verpflichtung eines Menschen entsprechen Schutzfunktionen anderer. Auch diese Schutzfunktionen sind an die Differenzierung sozialer Rollen und an bestimmte Zugehörigkeitserwartungen geknüpft. Durch die Art, in der wir sie ausüben, in der wir Sanktionen vollziehen, wirken wir ebenso an der Aufrechterhaltung von Normstrukturen mit wie an ihrer Veränderung.

Warum auch an der Veränderung? Wir haben bisher lediglich festgestellt, daß sich die Herausbildung sozialer Normen am Vollzug von Sanktionen erkennen läßt : ein eingespieltes, als üblich erwartetes Verhalten wird als verbindlich geforderte Norm erkennbar, sobald eine Abweichung Sanktionen hervorruft. Ein entsprechender Vorgang läßt sich nun auch beobachten, wenn eine normative Forderung abklingt, ein bestimmtes Verhalten den Charakter der Verbindlichkeit verliert : Abweichungen werden — zunächst zögernd — hingenommen, lösen immer seltener Sanktionen aus, bis sie nach einem Übergangsstadium der Unsicherheit schließlich freigegeben werden. (Anschauliche Beispiele für diesen Prozeß der »Freigabe« ehemals normativ gebundener Verhaltensformen bieten die sog. Emanzipationsbewegungen, wie die Emanzipation der Frauen, bestimmter Sozialschichten, Volksgruppen und Völker.)

Schwankungen des Sanktionen-Vollzuges können uns also als Seismograph dienen, an dem sich Veränderungen der Normstrukturen ablesen lassen. Aber damit erschöpft sich nicht die Bedeu-

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(New York, 1950). Dt. : *Theorie der sozialen Gruppe* (Köln und Opladen, 1960). (»Die spezifischen Kontrollen, das heißt die zwischen Nichtbefolgung einer Norm durch einen Menschen und den verschiedenen Folgen jener Nichtbefolgung bestehenden Beziehungen, sind nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die alten, diesmal differential betrachteten Beziehungen der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit.« S. 283).

tung dieses Phänomens. Der Sanktionen-Vollzug zeigt nicht nur Veränderungen an, er ist selbst der labilste, störungsempfindlichste Teil des normativen Handlungssystems. Und zwar vor allem deshalb, weil er in der Regel zwar selbst eine normative Verpflichtung, aber eine normative Verpflichtung geringeren Grades ist. Der primäre Rechtsbruch wird im allgemeinen schärfer verurteilt als die Verletzung der entsprechenden Anzeigepflicht, das unmoralische Verhalten schärfer als der Mangel an Entrüstung. Auch dieses Nicht-Reagieren *kann* natürlich wieder Gegenstand von Sanktionen werden. Man wird aber — etwas schematisch vereinfachend — sagen können, daß der Verbindlichkeitsgrad solcher sekundären oder tertiären Reaktionen sukzessive abnimmt. Der Verzicht auf Sanktionen trägt zwar ebenso zur Veränderung von Normstrukturen bei wie der primäre Normbruch. Aber er ist gewöhnlich ungefährlicher, bequemer, oft auch weniger sichtbar. Daher pflegt bei der Mehrheit der Beteiligten das Abklingen der Geltung einer Norm darin zum Ausdruck zu kommen, daß sie auf Übertretungen nicht mehr reagieren, also handeln, indem sie gar nichts tun. Hier setzt z.B. die (bewußte oder unbewußte) Taktik an, mit der sich Gewaltherrschaften etablieren. Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung wird zunächst nicht zum Bruch primärer Normen verleitet, sondern demoralisiert, indem man sie am Vollzug von Sanktionen gegen den Normbruch zu hindern versucht, — ihr also das Reagieren überhaupt abgewöhnt. Der Prozeß der Demoralisierung greift zunächst die Bereitschaft an, die dauerhafte Verbindlichkeit einer Norm gegen den Normbruch zur Geltung zu bringen. Die Bereitschaft zur *Aktion* wird vorbereitet durch den Verzicht auf die *Reaktion.* Das ist gemeint, wenn wir den Sanktionenvollzug als den labilsten, störungsempfindlichsten Teil des normativen Handlungsysstems bezeichnen.

Fünftens. — Soziale Normen sind tradierbar. Jede Erziehung hat das Ziel, bestimmte Normeninhalte von einer Generation auf die andere weiterzugeben. Das gelingt oft höchst mangelhaft. *Daß* es aber gelingen *kann* und wohl nie *vollkommen* mißlingt, ist eine Bedingung der Möglichkeit jeder Kontinuität sozialer Lebensformen und Verhaltensmaßstäbe.

Stellen wir wiederum die Frage : *warum* kann das gelingen? Auch diesmal läuft die Antwort auf eine Binsenwahrheit hinaus. Aber darum geht es ja hier gerade : unter dem Vielen, was uns im sozialen Leben selbstverständlich erscheint, einige derjenigen Selbstverständlichkeiten zu finden, die es wirklich sind. Wie also kann Erziehung das Ziel erreichen, soziale Normen zu tradieren?

Die Vererbung löst dieses Problem nicht. Eine »Übernahme« bestimmter Normen kann offenbar nur dann erfolgen, wenn das Kind die Verhaltenserwartungen, die an es gestellt werden, nicht nur befolgt, sondern eben : *über-nimmt*, d.h. die Ansprüche, die von außen an es herantreten, zu Ansprüchen an sich selbst macht. Das setzt keineswegs eine reflektierte Morallehre voraus. Das »Sollen« kann durchaus an bestimmte Handlungen und bestimmte Situationen gebunden bleiben. Wir unterstellen auch nicht, daß die Befolgung sozialer Verpflichtungen sich stets auf moralische Motive zurückführen ließe. Persönliche Interessen, Furcht vor Sanktionen und ähnliches werden häufig mitspielen, oft sogar ausschlaggebend sein. Darüber hinaus aber kann eben die Vorstellung, daß ein bestimmtes Tun oder Lassen »an sich« verbindlich sei, Handlungsmotiv des Menschen werden. Und diese Vorstellung des an sich Verbindlichen ist lehrbar und lernbar. Nur daher hat es Sinn zu sagen, daß der Mensch das Wesen ist, das *sollen kann*.

Das allgemeinste und gleichzeitig wohl wichtigste Kennzeichen dieser Lernbarkeit von Sollansprüchen scheint mir nun darin zu liegen, daß wir Verpflichtungen *habitualisieren* können. Oder, um es bildhafter auszudrücken : Sollansprüche können aus einer Zumutung von außen zu einer »Selbstverständlichkeit von innen« werden. Eben diese Umsetzung ermöglicht, daß wir Sollansprüche befolgen, ohne sie zu reflektieren, — was jede Alltagserfahrung bestätigt. Es wäre daher falsch gefragt, wenn wir jedes Phänomen der Normgebundenheit *entweder* auf Eigeninteressen *oder* auf bewußte Norm-Orientiertheit — oder auf eine Mischung von beidem zurückzuführen versuchten. Und es ist ebenso irreführend, Gewohnheiten und Normgebundenheit alternativ gegenüberzustellen. Gewohnheit ist häufig »gelerntes Sollen«. Und umgekehrt : daß Sollansprüche lernbar und insbesondere habitualisierbar sind, drückt sich eben darin aus, daß sie den Charakter des »Ohnehin«, des Unproblematischen, des Sich-von-selbst-Anbietenden erhalten können. Sie können zu einer Antwort werden, der keine Frage mehr vorauszugehen braucht.

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Ich möchte hier abbrechen und mit einer allgemeinen Überlegung über die Art der Fragestellung schließen, die ich ein stückweit verfolgt habe. Um weiterzugehen, wären vor allem analoge Untersuchungen der Über- und Unterordnungsphänomene des menschlichen Zusammenlebens notwendig, des Einflusses, der Macht, der Herrschaft und schließlich : der Gewalt, — jenes schwer ergründbaren Phänomens, in dem sich im Extremfall der höchste Grad von Realität im vital-physischen Sinne mit dem höchsten Grad an Abstraktheit im sozialen Sinne verbinden kann.

Die Fragestellung, um die es hier geht, ist diejenige nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit menschlichen Zusammenlebens. Wie ist, um die Wendung Durkheims zu gebrauchen, die »Tatsache Gesellschaft« möglich? Wie ist es möglich, daß Menschen sich mit einiger Sicherheit und Dauerhaftigkeit aufeinander einstellen können?

Ich halte diese Frage für beantwortbar. Und zwar deshalb, weil Menschen nicht *zueinander* kommen können, ohne einen *Prozeß der Formung dieses »Zueinander«* auszulösen (10). Der Gestaltungsprozeß der Formung des Zueinander aber geht ein oder besser : geht durch Verfestigungen, Gehäuse, Kristallisationen, Institutionalisierungen hindurch. Es gibt *Bedingungen* dieser Formung des Zueinander, Konstruktionsprinzipien der »Gehäuse« des menschlichen Zusammenlebens, die wir mitsetzen und mitsetzen müssen, wenn wir dem Chaos des Beziehungslosen ein Stück Land abgewinnen. Diese Bedingungen lassen sich finden — und zwar hinter den Geläufigkeiten und Trivialitäten des Alltags, die uns den Blick auf das Unabdingbare im sozialen Leben eher zu verstellen als zu schärfen pflegen.

Gewiß kann man menschliches Zusammenleben ebenso als unvollständige »Integration« wie als unvollständige »Desintegration« beschreiben. Unsere Fragestellung unterstellt keineswegs die Existenz einer »absoluten Ordnung«, die ebenso eine Fiktion ist wie die alte Formel des Krieges aller gegen alle. Sie bezieht sich, um dies noch einmal zu verdeutlichen, auf jene Leistungen der sozialen Produktivität des Menschen, die unser Zusammenleben um einen Teilstrich über das Willkürliche, Zufällige, Unvorhersehbare erheben. Wir können nicht wissen, wo die Grenzen der Fähigkeit des Menschen liegen, sich selbst sozial zu definieren. Aber wir können, glaube ich, wissen, welche Bedingungen aller Erfahrung nach mitgesetzt werden müssen, wenn Menschen sich »sozial feststellen«.

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(10) Dies ist bekanntlich der Grundgedanke der Soziologie Georg SIMMELS, dem ich mich hier auch in der Formulierung anschließe; vgl. *Soziologie*^{4} (Berlin, 1958), S. 5. Über die Mißverständnisse, die mit der Abstempelung der Leistungen Simmels als spezifisch »formaler« Soziologie verbunden sind : Friedrich H. TENBRUCK, Georg Simmel, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, X (1958), 587-614.

RAYMOND ARON

La définition libérale de la liberté

I

A propos du livre de F. A. Hayek *The Constitution of Liberty*

Le livre de F. A. Hayek a été ignoré ou presque en France et beaucoup de ceux, en Grande-Bretagne et aux États-Unis, qui auraient dû le lire, l'ont négligé, hostiles d'avance aux thèses de l'auteur du *Road to Serfdom.* Personnellement, j'approuve sans réserves la formule du professeur J. W. N. Watkins :

> In any circumstances *The Constitution of Liberty* would have been an important book. Given the condition of political philosophy in the English-speaking world to-day, it is outstandingly important. In recent years contributions to political philosophy have consisted almost exclusively either of historical work, often of a high scholarly excellence but hardly attempting to bring the ideas discussed to bear on modern issues, or of occasional *ballons d'essai* which have not risen very high despite the absence of mooring-lines (1).

Que l'on suive ou non Hayek, qu'on le suive un bout de chemin ou jusqu'au bout, c'est une joie pour l'esprit de lire un livre systématique dans lequel un esprit vigoureux a tenté de dérouler selon une logique rigoureuse une chaîne de raisons, de préciser, à partir de quelques définitions, ce que devrait être une société libre, c'est-à-dire une bonne société.

Les critiques que j'aurai à formuler ne devraient pas induire en erreur : elles ne m'empêchent pas de souscrire au jugement que je viens de rapporter et d'admirer l'ampleur de la construction.

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(1) J. W. N. Watkins, "Philosophy", in *Agenda for a Free Society*, Essays on Hayek's *Constitution of Liberty*, publié par Arthur Seldon (London, Hutchinson, 1961).

Archiv. europ. sociol., II (1961), 199-218.

I

Traduisons littéralement le titre du livre : *La constitution de la liberté.* Le terme de « constitution » a manifestement une compréhension plus riche que dans son emploi strictement juridique. La constitution est entendue ici comme étant par rapport à la société ce qu'est la constitution, au sens étroit du terme, par rapport au système politique. Elle détermine les lois selon lesquelles est organisée la vie en commun. A quelles conditions cette organisation sociale mérite-t-elle d'être dite libérale, c'est-à-dire respecte-t-elle *la* liberté des individus?

La recherche a pour point de départ et pour fondement une définition de *la liberté.* La liberté est définie d'abord négativement par l'absence de coercition ou de contrainte *(coercion).* Mais la contrainte n'est pas une notion beaucoup plus claire que la liberté, elle appelle à son tour une définition (que le lecteur trouve au début de la deuxième partie). La définition initiale — la liberté (en anglais *freedom* et *liberty* indifféremment) n'est rien d'autre que l'absence de contrainte — n'en a pas moins pour conséquence d'écarter trois autres idées qui sont, à notre époque, fréquemment liées au concept de liberté : la participation à l'ordre politique ou, plus précisément, le choix des gouvernants par la procédure électorale, l'indépendance d'une population qui rejette des maîtres étrangers et qui est gouvernée par des hommes de sa propre race ou nationalité, la puissance *(power)* de l'individu ou de la collectivité, capable de satisfaire ses désirs ou d'atteindre ses fins propres. Pas davantage la « liberté intérieure », la capacité de choisir intelligemment ou raisonnablement, ne doit être assimilée à la liberté que Hayek veut préserver ou promouvoir.

Ainsi définie, la liberté est une réalité négative mais indivisible. A la différence des contre-révolutionnaires ou conservateurs qui parlent plus volontiers *des libertés* que de *la liberté,* Hayek s'en tient au singulier. Les hommes sont plus ou moins libres, c'est-à-dire que la contrainte à laquelle ils sont soumis est plus ou moins grande, mais leur liberté ne se décompose pas en droits divers ou en puissances séparables. S'ils échappent à la contrainte, ils sont libres ou mieux la mesure de leur liberté est celle de la réduction de la contrainte.

Cette argumentation suppose évidemment que cette dernière, à son tour, soit, elle aussi, une réalité indivisible bien que susceptible de plus ou de moins. Ce résultat est obtenu par la définition suivante : " Coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve another man's will, not for his own but for the other's purpose" (2). Et, un peu plus loin : "Coercion implies both the threat of inflicting harm and the intention thereby to bring about certain conduct" (3). L'essence de la contrainte est donc la menace d'infliger à un autre, s'il ne se soumet pas à notre volonté, une sanction, le plus souvent mais non toujours par l'emploi de la force. Celui qui est contraint perd la capacité d'user de son intelligence pour choisir ses moyens et ses fins. Il devient l'instrument de celui dont il subit la volonté.

> Since coercion is the control of the essential data of an individual's action by another, it can be prevented only by enabling the individual to secure for himself some private sphere where he is protected against such interference (4).

La définition de la contrainte confirme la conception négative de la liberté. Celle-ci consiste essentiellement dans la sphère de décision et d'action réservée à chacun. Est libre celui qui n'est pas esclave. Est libre celui qui a le statut légal d'un membre protégé de la communauté, celui qui ne court pas le risque d'une arrestation arbitraire, celui qui a le droit de choisir son travail et de circuler selon son bon plaisir (5). Hayek n'évoque pas quatre « libertés » mais quatre droits, ceux-ci n'étant qu'une énumération (non exhaustive ni finale) de ce qui est normalement contenu dans la sphère privée, réservée à chacun.

A partir de ces définitions initiales, il est facile de poser les questions fondamentales que soulève cette philosophie de la liberté : 1) Est-il possible de circonscrire de l'extérieur le domaine de la contrainte, de faire la discrimination des influences contraignantes et non contraignantes qu'exercent les hommes les uns sur les autres? 2) Dans cette tâche de discrimination, est-il possible de s'en tenir à la séparation radicale entre la liberté — sphère de décision privée — et les autres sens de la liberté? 3) Est-il légitime de déterminer la bonne société ou la société libre par référence au critère unique de la liberté non contrainte? C'est à ces trois interrogations que nous tâcherons de donner réponse dans les pages suivantes.

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(2) *Constitution*, p. 133.
(3) *Ibid.* p. 134.
(4) *Ibid.* p. 139.
(5) *Ibid.* p. 20

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Il est bien clair que la vie en société implique la coordination des activités individuelles. Cette coordination, à son tour, exige des règles, c'est-à-dire la distinction de ce qui est autorisé et interdit. Elle exige aussi une hiérarchie d'autorité dans n'importe quelle entreprise collective, qu'elle soit économique ou militaire. Que l'objectif soit de tuer du gibier, de prendre d'assaut une redoute ennemie ou de construire un pont, les actes de chacun — chasseur, soldat ou travailleur — sont et doivent être parties d'un ensemble qui n'existe, entier, que dans l'esprit d'un ou de quelques chefs. Chasseurs, soldats et travailleurs sont inévitablement les *instruments* de leurs chefs, par suite contraints — à moins que l'on n'utilise une autre définition de la contrainte.

Probablement Hayek admettrait-il qu'un soldat n'est pas libre. Mais cette proposition qui, en un sens, est incontestable, n'en est pas moins gênante car le citoyen qui accepte, par son vote, le service militaire obligatoire, souscrit pour ainsi dire à l'aliénation temporaire de sa liberté. Contraint dans l'action quotidienne, il consent moralement à cette contrainte par sa décision de citoyen. A définir exclusivement la liberté par la « sphère de décision individuelle », on perd la possibilité de discriminer entre la situation de l'individu enrôlé de force dans une armée conquérante et celle du citoyen qui accomplit les obligations militaires dont il a été, par son vote, un législateur. Ou, du moins, la discrimination, selon les concepts de Hayek, n'aurait rien à voir avec la liberté.

A cette objection, Hayek répond presque directement :

> It would be difficult to maintain that a man who voluntarily but irrevocably has sold his services for a long period of years to a military organization such as the Foreign Legion remained free thereafter in our sense ; or that a Jesuit who lives up to the ideals of the founder of his order and regards himself "as a corpse which has neither intelligence nor will" could be so described (6).

Incontestablement, le légionnaire ou le jésuite acceptent d'obéir à la volonté directe et spécifique d'un autre. Mais la non-liberté, ainsi définie par Hayek, est un concept peu utilisable ou, tout au moins, trop vague. Supposons un légionnaire qui aime le métier militaire, qui croit aux causes pour lesquelles il sera amené à combattre et qui ait confiance dans ses officiers : il n'éprouvera aucun sentiment d'oppression (7). De même, le jésuite aliène effectivement sa liberté en ce sens qu'il renonce à tout ou partie de sa sphère privée de décision. Il n'est pas libre au sens de Hayek, il est contraint et contraint en permanence. En ce sens, il est opprimé puisque (8) "oppression which is perhaps as much a true opposite of liberty as coercion, should refer only to a state of continuous acts of coercion".

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(6) *Ibid.* p. 14.

La difficulté, me semble-t-il, tient à une définition trop large de la contrainte, visible d'ailleurs dans le texte lui-même. En effet, ou bien il y a contrainte dès lors qu'il y a aliénation du droit de décision et d'action personnelle, et, en ce cas, toutes les entreprises du type militaire comportent la contrainte ; ou bien la contrainte ne commence qu'à partir du moment où l'individu devient *contre son gré* l'instrument d'un autre et cède à ce dernier par crainte de la sanction et, en ce cas, il convient d'introduire entre la liberté-activité personnelle et la contrainte opérée par la menace un domaine d'activité *neutre* en tant que telle. L'individu ne saurait être dit libre puisqu'il ne choisit pas son objet, son projet ou même ses moyens, mais il ne saurait davantage être dit contraint ou opprimé puisqu'il reconnaît la nécessité ou (et) la légitimité des commandements auxquels il se soumet.

Si, dans le cas du légionnaire ou du jésuite, Hayek peut à la rigueur plaider que l'un et l'autre choisissent la servitude, il ne saurait avancer le même argument à propos de l'ouvrier. Or celui-ci, en obéissant aux ordres du contremaître, de l'ingénieur ou du directeur, sert manifestement les objectifs d'un autre, il ne choisit ni ses buts ni ses méthodes et il est menacé de sanctions en cas de refus d'obéissance. Hayek est probablement conscient de l'objection possible puisqu'il utilise l'opposition, à ses yeux décisive, entre *loi générale* et *commandement spécifique* pour réintroduire dans l'entreprise ou le foyer domestique une sphère de liberté individuelle :

> The manner in which the aims and the knowledge that guide a particular action are distributed between the authority and the performer is thus the most important

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(7) Page 143, faisant allusion au service militaire, Hayek écrit :

> Though compulsory military service, while it lasts, undoubtedly involves severe coercion, and though a lifelong conscript could not be said ever to be free, a predictable limited period of military service certainly restricts the possibility of shaping one's own life less than would, for instance, a constant threat of arrest, resorted to by an arbitrary power to ensure what it regards as good behavior.

Ce texte est intéressant parce qu'il n'envisage pas la limitation de la contrainte à l'intérieur du service militaire. Il implique donc que le soldat en tant que tel subisse une sévère contrainte. Hayek n'en tire pas la conclusion que certaines activités humaines et sociales ne comportent pas la liberté au sens où il a défini ce concept.

(8) *Ibid.* p. 135.

> distinction between general laws and specific command [...] Such general instructions will already constitute rules of a kind, and the action under them will be guided by that of the acting persons. It will be the chief who decides what results are to be achieved, at what time, by whom, and perhaps by which means ; but the particular manner in which they are brought about will be decided by the individuals responsible. The servants of a big household or the employers of a plant will thus be mostly occupied with the routine of carrying out standing orders, adopting them all the time to particular circumstances and only occasionally receiving specific commands (9).

La citation précédente appelle deux remarques : est-il vrai que le travail, dans le foyer ou l'entreprise, consiste essentiellement à exécuter des consignes permanentes? Est-il vrai que la liberté de l'ouvrier soit mesurée par le rapport entre consignes permanentes et commandements précis? La liberté augmente-t-elle avec l'accroissement du pourcentage de celles-là et la diminution du pourcentage de ceux-ci? J'ai des doutes sur ces deux propositions. La première me paraît vraie pour des entreprises d'un certain type, mais non pas pour toutes. Quant à la deuxième, elle ne peut être posée qu'à titre de décision de langage : par définition, la liberté du travailleur dans l'entreprise sera mesurée par la part d'initiative dont il jouira dans la mise à exécution des consignes permanentes. Mais, visiblement, le sentiment de liberté et d'oppression du travailleur dans l'entreprise dépend de multiples facteurs, l'extension des consignes permanentes et l'initiative dans l'exécution n'étant qu'un de ces facteurs.

Concluons ces premières analyses : Hayek a voulu définir la liberté par l'absence de contrainte et la contrainte par une situation objectivement identifiable. Comme est contraint tout individu qui apparaît instrument au service d'un autre, tout projet, conçu par un seul homme et exécuté par beaucoup, entraînera la contrainte de ceux qui ne sont pas les chefs. A moins que l'on fasse intervenir la notion de « menace » de la part du chef et de refus ou résistance de la part des exécutants. Mais, en cette hypothèse, l'accent se déplace : l'essentiel n'est plus que l'individu ne choisisse pas ses buts ou ses moyens, l'essentiel est que l'individu obéisse à une discipline qu'il n'approuve pas, qu'il juge contraire à ses droits ou à l'équité. Mais si l'on introduit cet élément subjectif dans la définition de la contrainte, on devra l'introduire aussi dans la définition de la liberté. *Pas plus que l'obéissance à des commandements spécifiques n'entraîne contrainte, la soumission à des consignes permanentes ou à des lois générales ne garantit* la *liberté.*

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(9) *Ibid.* pp. 150-51.

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Hayek, en effet, et cela va de soi, ne nie pas que la vie en société exige un certain volume de contrainte. Il ne nie pas que, dans la vie privée ou les relations inter-individuelles, chacun de nous ne soit exposé au risque d'être contraint par ses proches, ses amis, les personnes de rencontre. Il ne nie pas davantage qu'en dehors des lois ou des pouvoirs publics, les coutumes, les préjugés collectifs ne puissent contraindre l'individu. Mais il considère ces risques de contrainte pour faibles comparés à ceux que crée le refoulement progressif du *règne de la loi (rule of law)* par le gouvernement des hommes *(government or domination of men)*. Il n'est pas vrai, dit-il, que, dans une société libre, les hommes règnent sur les hommes : ce sont les lois qui règnent également sur les gouvernants et les gouvernés.

> The conception of freedom under the law that is the chief concern of this book rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free (10).

Et, un peu plus loin :

> The fact is that, if "to rule" means to make men obey another's will, government has no such power to rule in a free society (11).

Hayek se rattache à une longue et glorieuse tradition, celle qui confond la liberté avec l'obéissance aux lois et s'efforce de réduire le plus possible l'emprise que certains hommes exercent sur d'autres.

Une première difficulté que Hayek note lui-même est qu'une loi abstraite, générale, également applicable à tous peut néanmoins restreindre la liberté. Il admet que la religion a souvent fourni le prétexte pour l'établissement de règles qui ont été ressenties comme extrêmement oppressives et il ajoute même que les croyances religieuses ont été la raison unique pour laquelle "general rules seriously restrictive of liberty have ever been universally enforced" (12).

Le problème, en vérité, est double : l'obéissance à des lois générales est-elle en tant que telle liberté, selon la définition donnée à ce mot? Ou la généralité de la loi crée-t-elle une probabilité que les lois ne soient pas oppressives? A dire vrai, la pensée de Hayek, sur ce point, est flottante. Il dit que les lois peuvent restreindre la liberté, il ne dit pas qu'elles peuvent être « contraignantes » (soumettre quelqu'un à la volonté d'un autre homme). Il dit que des lois générales *peuvent être ressenties* comme « oppressives », il ne dit pas qu'*elles le sont.* Elles ne pourraient être oppressives au sens propre que dans le cas où ces lois générales apparaîtraient comme l'expression de la volonté d'une personne ou d'un groupe d'hommes. Mais si Hayek admettait que la loi générale exprime en la camouflant une volonté humaine, l'opposition sur laquelle se fonde la doctrine perdrait de sa rigidité.

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(10) *Ibid.* p. 153. (11) *Ibid.* p. 156. (12) *Ibid.* p. 155.

Rien n'est plus facile que d'imaginer des lois conformes à l'essence de la légalité et qui pourtant peuvent être ressenties comme « oppressives ». Si une loi interdit à tous les citoyens de voyager au-dehors, elle n'est pas discriminatoire sans être pour autant libérale. Une loi, discriminatoire en fait, peut être formulée en termes tels qu'elle présente toutes les caractéristiques de généralité et d'abstraction : par exemple, si nul désormais n'a le droit de posséder plus du tiers du capital d'une publication quotidienne, seul un petit nombre de personnes seront atteintes, mais la forme ne permet pas de discerner s'il s'agit d'un « commandement » ou d'une « loi ».

La généralité de la loi ne permet donc pas d'affirmer que l'interdiction édictée par celle-ci n'est pas considérée comme oppressive par ceux qui y sont soumis. Elle ne suffit pas non plus à garantir l'élimination de l'élément de « commandement personnel » que Hayek considère comme l'essence de la contrainte. Prenons le cas des lois somptuaires ; celles-ci peuvent être formulées en règles générales : nul n'aura le droit de posséder plus de tant d'hectares... nul n'aura le droit de dépenser plus de tant de millions... nul n'aura le droit de fabriquer tels ou tels bijoux... Elles ne visent personne en particulier mais elles visent tous ceux qui peuvent tomber sous ces interdits. Or les lois, si générales soient-elles, bien qu'elles visent toutes les personnes, ne concernent *effectivement* que celles qui sont en situation de faire ce qui est interdit. Où se situe la séparation entre les lois discriminatoires et les autres?

Hayek suggère deux réponses : une loi n'est pas discriminatoire si elle s'applique également aux gouvernants et aux gouvernés. Une loi doit être acceptable à ceux qu'elle frappe comme à ceux qu'elle n'intéresse pas. La première réponse a une certaine valeur *pragmatique.* On est tenté d'admettre, en première instance, que, si les gouvernants sont soumis aux mêmes lois que les gouvernés "little that anybody may reasonably wish to do is likely to be prohibited" (13). Mais une première exception, reconnue par Hayek, est celle des « vrais croyants », quelle que soit leur religion, qui n'hésitent pas à imposer aux autres ce qu'eux-mêmes jugent conforme à leur foi. Que cette foi soit économique, qu'elle proclame, à la manière de Proudhon, l'équivalence du commerce et du vol, et l'interdiction de la propriété privée des instruments de production deviendra loi. Cette loi présentera toutes les caractéristiques formelles de la loi. Si Hayek, dans son système, peut la condamner, c'est que la suppression de la propriété privée entraîne la réduction ou l'élimination de la sphère individuelle, l'élargissement du domaine des commandements personnels. Il est plus facile de condamner certaines lois en se référant à l'idéal de la sphère d'action personnelle que de présenter la généralité de la loi comme preuve que celle-ci n'est pas oppressive.

Quant au deuxième critère — les lois qui ne s'appliquent qu'à une catégorie de personnes doivent être acceptables aux membres de cette catégorie comme au reste de la collectivité, — il aboutirait à donner à n'importe quel groupe minoritaire un droit moral de veto sur la législation. Bien que l'idée ne soit pas formulée de manière catégorique, elle surgit, sous une forme atténuée, à diverses reprises. Quand il est question des services sociaux que l'État doit financer en usant de contrainte, Hayek écrit :

> It is not to be expected that there will ever be complete unanimity on the desirability of the extent of such services, and it is at last not obvious that coercing people to contribute to the achievement of ends in which they are not interested can be morally justified (14).

A propos de l'impôt progressif, le même argument est repris :

> What is required here is a rule which, while still leaving open the possibility of a majority's taxing itself to assist a minority, does not sanction a majority's imposing upon a minority whatever burden it regards as right (15).

La loi fiscale qui prévoit la progressivité de l'impôt sur le revenu est *formellement* une loi, elle est abstraite et générale, elle ne vise pas des personnes en particulier. Elle n'en est pas moins une forme de contrainte puisqu'elle fait servir les revenus des personnes aux fins posées par l'État, c'est-à-dire d'autres personnes. Mais, étant admis qu'une certaine contrainte de l'État est inévitable, la question se pose de savoir dans quelles limites la contrainte étatique est légitime. Le caractère non discriminatoire de cette contrainte ou, au cas de discrimination, l'acceptation de celle-ci par la minorité comme par la majorité serait le signe extérieur en même temps que la confirmation de l'équité de la discrimination :

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(13) *Ibid.* p. 155.

(14) *Ibid.* p. 144.

(15) *Ibid.* p. 314.

> If the classifications of persons which the law must employ are to result neither in privilege nor in discrimination, they must rest on distinctions which those inside the group singled out, as well as those outside it, will recognize as relevant (16).

Quoi que l'on pense de l'impôt progressif, il serait excessif d'espérer que la minorité riche l'accepte d'aussi bon cœur que la majorité pauvre. Ou bien celle-là se plaindra de *discrimination*, ou bien celle-ci s'en prendra à des *privilèges*. Ce n'est pas la minorité ou la majorité qui trouveront la solution, de nature à éviter discrimination et privilèges, mais les hommes de raison en l'une et l'autre. Ce qui revient à dire qu'il n'y a pas de critère *objectif* de la non-discrimination et du non-privilège (pas plus qu'il n'y a de définition objective et extérieure de la contrainte).

A partir de là, je serais enclin à récuser une comparaison qui tient une place de premier ordre dans la philosophie de Hayek : les lois générales, édictées par l'État, seraient comparables aux lois naturelles, elles déterminent les conditions auxquelles chacun de nous doit s'adapter ou qu'il doit maîtriser afin d'agir, elles laissent intactes notre sphère personnelle, notre liberté d'action. En revanche, les commandements, qu'ils viennent d'autres personnes ou de l'État, impliqueraient contrainte.

Est-il vrai que les règles générales puissent être considérées comme l'équivalent des lois naturelles? Je ne le pense pas. D'abord, à notre époque, les hommes en jugent autrement. Ils savent que les lois, si générales soient-elles, sont l'œuvre des hommes ; le fait que la loi prévoyant deux ans et demi de service militaire ne comporte pas d'exemption, ne la rend pas, *aux yeux des intéressés*, assimilable aux lois naturelles. En d'autres termes, la comparaison est en tout cas fausse, par rapport aux sentiments des hommes. Comment pourrait-il en être autrement? Les lois peuvent être tournées, l'individu ingénieux peut les violer sans encourir de sanctions, l'individu honnête peut s'efforcer d'en obtenir la modification. De toute manière, la généralité d'une interdiction ou d'une autorisation légale n'a pas le même sens que l'impossibilité ou la possibilité physique. Comme aurait dit Durkheim, le lien entre la violation de la loi et la sanction est synthétique, entre l'acte et ses conséquences analytique. Chacun de nous refusera, et à juste titre, l'assimilation de la loi sociale à la loi naturelle chaque fois que la loi nous paraîtra injuste ou absurde.

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(16) *Ibid.* p. 314.

Hayek, très justement, se refuse à circonscrire la sphère d'autonomie personnelle, en dehors des circonstances de temps et de lieu. Il était légitime pour l'État, écrit-il, d'imposer un conformisme religieux aussi longtemps que les hommes croyaient à la responsabilité collective à l'égard de quelque divinité. Pour tracer les frontières de la zone protégée, la question importante est de savoir "whether the actions of other people that we wish to see prevented would actually interfere with the reasonable expectations of the protected person" (17). Autrement dit, l'État est en droit d'interdire ce que l'individu, à chaque époque, considère raisonnablement comme n'appartenant pas à sa sphère individuelle. La sphère individuelle est plus ou moins large selon les sociétés, le contenu des libertés individuelles est historiquement variable. Mais, s'il en est ainsi, comment se combine la définition éternelle de la non-contrainte grâce à la généralité de la loi avec l'historicité de la délimitation de la sphère personnelle? A mon sens, la conciliation exige que l'accent soit mis moins sur le caractère non contraignant d'une loi générale que sur le caractère concret des interdictions édictées par les lois. Ou encore, il n'est pas impossible d'imposer, à coups de lois générales, des interdictions qui seront oppressives parce qu'elles rendront illégal l'exercice de la décision personnelle en des domaines où les gouvernés s'attendent à en jouir.

Une fois posé le caractère historique, variable, des limites de la sphère personnelle, les autres critères, non-discrimination, généralité de la règle, réduction du domaine des commandements spécifiques, gardent une signification. Aucun, à lui seul, n'est décisif mais tous ensemble suggèrent un idéal : celui d'une société où l'État laisserait aux initiatives individuelles une marge de manœuvre aussi large que possible, où les gouvernants seraient soumis aux mêmes obligations, aux mêmes interdits et aux mêmes autorisations que les simples citoyens, où privilèges et discriminations seraient réduits au minimum. Mais il n'y a pas plus de définition objective, éternellement valable, de ce que l'on appellera « discrimination » qu'il n'y a une telle définition de la contrainte et, par suite, de la liberté.

La pensée de Hayek est parfaitement claire au niveau où elle se situe d'ordinaire, c'est-à-dire en tant que doctrine de ce que la société moderne devrait être. En revanche, les fondements philosophiques qu'il a voulu donner à cet idéal social me paraissent fragiles. Il a voulu définir la liberté par l'absence de contrainte et la contrainte par une situation objectivement reconnaissable. Mais il a méconnu le fait que toutes les entreprises collectives font de certains individus les instruments de leurs chefs sans que pour autant soldats ou travailleurs se jugent « opprimés ». Il a posé une différence radicale entre l'obéissance à des personnes et la soumission à des règles et il a ignoré ou négligé le fait que des règles générales pouvaient être, elles aussi, oppressives et qu'en dernière analyse c'est le rapport entre le contenu des interdits et des obligations d'une part, les attentes légitimes des individus de l'autre qui détermine la mesure effective de la liberté dans une société donnée. Il nous faut maintenant savoir si et dans quelle mesure la critique des fondements philosophiques entraîne des conséquences en ce qui concerne la doctrine économico-sociale elle-même.

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(17) *Ibid.* p. 145.

II

Le but d'une société libre doit être de limiter le plus possible le gouvernement des hommes par les hommes et d'accroître le gouvernement des hommes par les lois. Tel est, à n'en pas douter, l'impératif premier du libéralisme tel que le conçoit F. A. Hayek. Il se trouve que, personnellement, je partage cet idéal. Les réserves que je formulerai n'auront donc pas pour origine une hiérarchie différente de valeurs mais la considération de quelques faits.

Il n'a jamais existé et il n'existe pas de « collectivité humaine ». Il y a des « collectivités humaines ». Chacune d'entre elles se trouve en relations tour à tour amicales et hostiles, pacifiques et belliqueuses avec quelques autres. La gestion des relations extérieures appartient et ne peut pas ne pas appartenir à un ou quelques hommes. La désignation de cet homme ou de ces hommes s'opère autrement selon les siècles et les régimes. Mais la direction de la politique extérieure est l'œuvre des hommes et non des lois. Locke, dans le deuxième traité, distingue explicitement deux aspects ou deux modalités du pouvoir exécutif : celui-ci a, d'une part, la fonction d'assurer l'exécution des lois, d'autre part la fonction des traités, de la paix et de la guerre. Hayek, comme la plupart des libéraux, ne traite pas de la politique étrangère. Il se borne, en passant, à indiquer que, provisoirement, l'État mondial lui paraît dangereux pour la liberté individuelle et que mieux vaut, dans ces conditions, s'accommoder de la pluralité des États et des guerres éventuelles (18).

Mais le pouvoir fédératif, pour reprendre le terme de Locke, n'en demeure pas moins le gouvernement des hommes par les hommes et non par des lois. En matière de traités, de paix et de guerre, écrit Locke, il n'y a guère de lois ou de règles. Les États, dans leurs relations mutuelles, sont soumis aux obligations du droit naturel, mais comme il n'y a ni tribunal ni police, ils sont bien obligés de se faire justice eux-mêmes. Et ce sont des hommes, non des lois, qui décident de ce qu'exige cette « justice ». Selon les définitions de Hayek, je crains que toute action diplomatique, en tout cas toute action conduisant à la guerre ne doive être considérée comme « contrainte » des gouvernants sur les gouvernés, la collectivité tout entière étant l'instrument de projets conçus par les seuls gouvernants. Dira-t-on que tel n'est pas le cas si le peuple est en accord intime avec les décisions prises par ses chefs? L'objection, dans le cadre de la pensée de Hayek, ne serait pas valable puisque la contrainte a été définie par l'absence de choix personnel, par la manipulation des données ou par la menace en cas de non obéissance. Toutes ces caractéristiques sont présentes chaque fois que l'action diplomatique oblige les citoyens à honorer les engagements pris par ceux qui les gouvernent.

Mais s'il en est ainsi, si paix et guerre résultent de l'action des hommes au pouvoir, il n'est plus possible de prétendre que le règne des lois ne laisse pas de place à la domination des hommes par les hommes. Du même coup on comprend, sans même sortir du système intellectuel de Hayek, pourquoi il est impossible de s'en tenir à la seule définition de la liberté par l'absence de contrainte, absence elle-même garantie par la généralité des lois. Puisqu'il n'y a pas de collectivité sans politique étrangère, sans pouvoir fédératif, puisque celui-ci est toujours exercé par des personnes, les citoyens ne peuvent pas ne pas obéir à des commandements spécifiques et ils sont légitimement soucieux de savoir à quels individus et dans quelles conditions ils obéiront.

Du même coup, deux des sens du concept de liberté — sens que Hayek a indiqués et qu'il a non rejetés mais subordonnés à la notion fondamentale de *non-contrainte* — réapparaissent inévitablement. S'il ne manque pas d'hommes qui, entre la liberté individuelle et la liberté de leur nation, n'hésitent pas, en cas de choix nécessaire, à sacrifier celle-là à celle-ci, nous aurions tort de méconnaître les motifs intelligibles, sinon rationnels, de cette préférence. Tant qu'il y aura des guerres, l'appartenance à une unité politique équivaudra à la discrimination des amis et des ennemis. Si je dois payer la liberté dont je jouis en temps de paix par l'obligation de combattre contre mes frères de race ou de langue ou de nationalité en cas de guerre, je puis, en toute lucidité, me résigner à la perte de ma liberté pacifique pour me retrouver parmi mes frères au jour où chacun affronte la mort.

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(18) *Ibid.* p. 263 :
I wish to add here my opinion that, until the protection of individual freedom is much more firmly secured that it is now, the creation of a world state probably would be a greater danger to the future of civilization that even war.

Je ne veux évidemment pas suggérer que telle soit l'origine de la passion nationale, manifestée par tous les peuples depuis un siècle, et de la relative indifférence à la liberté individuelle, dont témoignent tant de millions d'hommes. Il est loisible de plaider que le nationalisme demeure le plus souvent une forme, à peine civilisée, de la conscience tribale alors qu'au contraire le souci de la liberté individuelle marquerait une étape ultérieure de la prise de conscience politique. Ces remarques ne visent même pas à esquisser une interprétation sociologique des deux sortes de liberté (liberté individuelle et liberté nationale). Elles tendent simplement à établir la proposition suivante : puisqu'en fait de paix et de guerre, les hommes sont toujours gouvernés par d'autres hommes, il est normal et raisonnable que les gouvernés n'aient pas le sentiment d'être libres, même si, en temps de paix, les lois leur laissent une sphère de décision personnelle, dès lors qu'ils n'appartiennent pas à l'unité politique de leur choix, de leur race ou de leur langue.

Le même argument vaut pour la liberté définie comme la participation aux procédures par lesquelles sont choisis les gouvernants. Si ceux-ci, par le pouvoir fédératif, disposent sur nous du droit de vie et de mort, n'est-il pas intelligible que nous considérions comme essentielle la participation, si indirecte fût-elle, à leur désignation? Qu'il s'agisse de lois ou de commandements spécifiques, le sentiment d'obéir à soi-même dépend de la relation qui existe entre le citoyen et le législateur, entre le chef et le soldat. Hayek pourrait rejeter cet argument s'il avait découvert une définition objective de la contrainte, définition qui ne tiendrait pas compte de ce qui se passe dans la conscience des individus en relations. Mais, puisque Hayek lui-même introduit la notion de menace — la contrainte se confond avec la menace de sanctions, — l'état de conscience de celui qui commande et de celui qui obéit fait partie de la notion même de liberté (qui n'est rien que négation de la contrainte).

La menace est nécessaire quand le citoyen n'obéit pas spontanément ou ne reconnaît pas la légitimité du pouvoir, ou la rationalité de l'ordre donné. L'individu aura le sentiment d'être opprimé, il sera effectivement opprimé (soumis à des menaces constantes) dans la mesure où il ne reconnaîtra pas l'État, ou le régime, ou les gouvernants pour légitimes.

Hayek avait pour but de fonder philosophiquement une théorie de la liberté, qui justifiât la réduction au minimum de l'intervention étatique dans la sphère privée, l'élargissement au maximum de cette sphère elle-même. Pour atteindre ce but, il a cherché une définition objective de la contrainte (devenir l'instrument d'un autre) et décrété qu'il existait une opposition radicale entre la loi générale (comparable à une loi de la nature) et le commandement spécifique. Mais cette définition strictement objective est impossible, du fait même qu'il évoque la menace. Or, à partir du moment où les états de conscience doivent être pris en considération, la liberté ne dépend pas seulement de la non-ingérence d'autres hommes dans la sphère privée. D'autre part, si la loi, toute générale qu'elle est, n'en exprime pas moins les volontés de certains hommes, si les gouvernants, responsables du pouvoir fédératif, imposent aux citoyens les conséquences de leurs décisions, alors le règne de la loi demeure peut-être un idéal à certains égards, mais il ne peut pas être intégralement réalisé. Tout pouvoir comportant une part de gouvernement des hommes, la liberté n'est pas définie adéquatement par la seule référence au règne de la loi : la manière dont sont choisis les détenteurs de ce pouvoir et dont est exercé celui-ci est ressentie, à notre époque, comme partie intégrante de la liberté. A tort ou à raison, les hommes se jugent libres ou non libres, selon la nationalité de ceux qui rédigent les lois et non pas seulement selon la part respective des lois et des commandements dans la gestion de la société.

Peut-être la raison dernière de ce que je tiens pour l'insuffisance de la philosophie élaborée par Hayek afin de fonder son libéralisme tient-elle à son refus de prendre en considération le problème de la liberté intérieure. Hayek qui, sur tant de points, s'oppose aux tendances positivistes, qui reproche à Kelsen d'accorder la dignité de loi à n'importe quel système de normes étatiques, s'est laissé impressionner par une école actuelle de philosophie au point de croire que les controverses dites métaphysiques sur la liberté de la volonté sont dénuées de sens (19). Sans entrer dans

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(19) Il me paraît aventureux d'admettre que les plus grands esprits ont discuté passionnément et durant tant de siècles de questions sans portée et même sans signification. Je crois donc erronée l'affirmation :

> It appears that the assertion that the will is free has as little meaning as its denial and the whole

cette controverse métaphysique, bornons-nous à constater que Hayek lie justement liberté à responsabilité. Seul peut prétendre à la liberté celui qui peut être tenu pour responsable de ses actions, donc qui est capable d'agir rationnellement :

> The assigning of responsibility thus presupposes the capacity on men's part for rational action, and it aims at making them act more rationally than they would otherwise. It presupposes a certain minimum capacity in them for learning and fore sight, for being guided by a knowledge of the consequences of their actions (20).

Il me paraît moins facile que ne semble le croire Hayek de déterminer quels êtres humains, en fait, répondent à ces exigences. A quel âge les enfants cessent-ils d'être « irresponsables »? A partir de quel niveau d'éducation une population vivant sous un régime tribal peut-elle prétendre à n'être plus traitée comme irresponsable? En d'autres termes, à l'intérieur d'une société, la discrimination des « responsables » et des « irresponsables » ne va pas de soi. De même, une société dite civilisée est-elle autorisée à ne pas reconnaître aux membres d'une société dite archaïque les droits de la liberté? La théorie de Hayek se donne, par hypothèse, des hommes ayant recu l'éducation qui les rendra dignes de la liberté. Mais la politique concrète, à chaque époque, comporte une composante d'éducation : appellera-t-on contrainte l'éducation? A quel moment l'éducation nécessaire à la rationalité devient-elle une manière de refuser à des hommes le droit à leurs propres erreurs? A l'intérieur des collectivités comme entre les tribus ou les peuples, les hommes n'ont cessé de s'imposer les uns aux autres, par la force, la menace ou le prestige, des systèmes de valeurs ou d'idées. Hayek écrit justement, quelque part, que "a free society will function successfully only if the individuals are in some measure guided by common values" (21). Il y voit l'explication du fait que les philosophes ont parfois défini la liberté comme « l'action conforme aux lois morales ». Hayek se trompe, me semble-t-il, en expliquant ainsi l'équivalence, établie par maints philosophes, entre moralité (ou rationalité, ou universalité) et liberté. Il suffit d'opposer passions et réflexions, ou animalité et conscience pour que la liberté (intérieure) apparaisse comme le terme de l'effort par lequel l'animal humain accède à l'humanité.

Il est vrai que définir la liberté par la moralité de la conduite

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ssue is a phantom problem, a dispute about words in which the contestants have not made clear what an affirmative or a negative answer would imply.

Le débat sur le caractère significatif ou non significatif du débat traditionnel sur la liberté de la volonté a remplacé ce dernier débat. Je n'y vois pas un progrès.

(20) *Ibid.* p. 76.

(21) *Ibid.* p. 80.

est dangereux : au nom des exigences de l'éducation, celui qui se prétend investi d'une mission cherchera à contraindre ceux qui pensent autrement que lui. Mais le danger existe aussi de l'autre côté. Nulle collectivité n'a pu accéder à l'existence et à la conscience, c'est-à-dire au respect de valeurs communes, sans une éducation qui fut souvent une mise au pas. L'idéal d'une société dans laquelle chacun choisirait ses dieux ou ses valeurs ne peut se répandre avant que les individus ne soient éduqués à la vie collective. La philosophie de Hayek suppose acquis, par définition, les résultats que les philosophes du passé considéraient comme les objets primaires de l'action politique. Pour laisser à chacun une sphère privée de décision et de choix, encore faut-il que tous ou la plupart veuillent vivre ensemble et reconnaissent un même système d'idées pour vrai, une même formule de légitimité pour valable. Avant que la société puisse être libre, il faut qu'elle soit.

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Hayek, on le sait, est de formation un économiste. La distinction de la liberté et de la coercition, qui sert de fondement à sa philosophie, a pour origine une réflexion sur la conduite économique. Le sujet économique, laissé à lui-même, utilise librement, c'est-à-dire en choisissant ses buts et ses moyens, les ressources dont il dispose. En revanche, soumis à un plan, les individus ne sont plus que les rouages d'un mécanisme, les instruments des « planificateurs ». Parti d'une analyse analogue, M. Jacques Rueff avait établi, lui, une distinction entre deux modes d'action de l'État (22). La contrainte, disait-il, consiste toujours à modifier la désirabilité ou indésirabilité d'un acte en en modifiant les conséquences :

> L'intervention d'une autorité contraignante, en modifiant, par voie de désirabilité ou d'indésirabilité additionnelles, les conséquences effectives des actes susceptibles d'être accomplis, amène la personne contrainte à vouloir librement les actes que l'autorité contraignante choisit pour elle (23).

Donc, écrit M. Rueff, « l'homme gouverné est toujours aux mains de son propre conseil, il reste un homme libre ». Et, de même, "Though the coercee still chooses, the alternatives are determined for him by the coercer so that he will choose what the coercer wants" (24).

La contrainte, c'est-à-dire la modification par des sanctions (punitions et récompenses) des préférences individuelles, est donc inséparable du gouvernement dans les sociétés policées, mais cette contrainte, par rapport aux droits que possèdent les individus propriétaires, peut être exercée de deux manières :

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(22) Jacques Rueff, *L'ordre social* (Paris, 1945), 2 vol.

(23) *Op. cit.* t. II, p. 568.

(24) *Constitution*, p 134.

> Ou bien le gouvernement n'affecte en rien la maîtrise des titulaires de droits sur le domaine qui ne leur est pas retiré. Leur champ de souveraineté est réduit du contenu des droits transférés au gouvernement, mais tel qu'il subsiste après prélèvement de l'impôt, il reste soumis à la seule volonté du propriétaire. Celui-ci demeure donc entièrement libre à l'intérieur du domaine possédé. C'est pour cette raison que le régime de gouvernement correspondant est qualifié de libéral. La deuxième méthode ne modifie pas la délimitation des champs de souveraineté individuels, mais elle impose au titulaire des droits de propriété de vouloir, pour certains de ses droits, le contenu et l'usage nécessaire à l'accomplissement de la mission gouvernementale (25).

Ainsi procède le gouvernement qui interdit au propriétaire d'un champ d'y semer tel produit dont la récolte est excédentaire.

Hayek et Rueff se donnent tous deux les individus agissant tels que les conçoit la science économique. Chacun choisit et demeure, en toutes circonstances, aux mains de son propre conseil. Mais, restant au niveau de la théorie sociologique, M. Rueff distingue d'abord deux méthodes de gouvernement, libérale et autoritaire, ensuite deux types idéaux de société, individualiste et communiste, selon que la puissance gouvernementale respecte intégralement les droits des propriétaires ou, au contraire, leur refuse aucun droit d'appropriation. Préférant la méthode libérale et la société individualiste, M. Rueff admet la nécessité de certains recours à la méthode autoritaire et se résigne à l'élargissement des fonctions de l'État pourvu que l'inflation ne multiplie pas les faux droits et ne sème pas le désordre. En d'autres termes, il tire de son analyse un acte d'accusation contre l'inflation plus encore que contre la méthode autoritaire.

Hayek a voulu passer de la coercition — modification de la désirabilité des actes par des sanctions — à une philosophie de la liberté par l'intermédiaire de la généralité des lois. Celles-ci interdisent, sous peine de châtiments, telles ou telles conduites, mais elles laissent une marge de choix. Elles constituent l'équivalent de lois naturelles auxquelles les hommes doivent s'adapter, mais elles n'empiètent pas sur la sphère de décision individuelle. Cette argumentation est vulnérable à deux objections : il n'y a pas de délimitation universellement valable de la sphère privée. Hayek reconnaît justement, contre J. S. Mill, qu'il n'y a pas d'acte individuel qui ne soit susceptible d'affecter les autres. D'autre part, les individus peuvent avoir le sentiment d'être opprimés et l'être en effet, selon la définition de Hayek, par des lois générales.

Sur le plan d'une théorie de la bonne société, Hayek n'a pas tort d'insister sur deux idées, à mes yeux comme aux siens fondamentales : la liberté est d'abord *négative*, non-contrainte, préservation d'une sphère privée ; plus les ordres du pouvoir s'expriment en règles dépersonnalisées, plus la liberté a chance d'être préservée. Mais ces deux idées ne suffisent ni à constituer une philosophie de la liberté ni même, en notre temps, à préciser les critères d'une société libre.

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(25) Rueff, *op. cit.* t. II, p. 607.

Hayek insiste, au point de départ, sur la nécessité d'une discrimination rigoureuse entre la liberté (non-coercition) et d'autres notions comme autogouvernement, démocratie, puissance, statut. Il est bon, en effet, de ne pas confondre les concepts : la participation au procès politique, ou autogouvernement, bien qu'elle soit considérée souvent comme un élément de la liberté, doit en être séparée. De même, la démocratie, qu'on la définisse à la manière de Hayek par le gouvernement de la majorité ou par l'organisation d'une rivalité pacifique pour l'exercice du pouvoir, est peut-être favorable à la liberté (elle lui est, *en général*, favorable), elle ne se confond pas avec elle. Qu'un ouvrier non qualifié, qui n'a rien d'autre à vendre que sa force de travail, n'ait pas de puissance, autrement dit qu'il ne puisse satisfaire ses désirs, est incontestable, il n'est pas pour autant un instrument des autres : le clochard peut jouir de la liberté. Enfin, si les membres d'une minorité revendiquent l'égalité contre une majorité qui les traite en inférieurs — soit l'égalité individuelle dans le cadre de la communauté existante, comme les nègres des États-Unis, soit l'égalité collective par la constitution d'une communauté indépendante, — cette revendication est, à coup sûr, légitime mais elle n'est pas revendication de liberté (26).

Mais, si l'on a été jusqu'au bout de cette réduction, on sera mal venu ensuite de s'étonner que cette sorte de liberté ait été rare à travers l'histoire et qu'aujourd'hui encore la plupart des hommes ne lui subordonnent pas toutes leurs aspirations et ne la tiennent pas pour un critère unique ou suprême de l'ordre social.

Il est clair, en effet, que le sentiment de liberté ne sera pas proportionnel à la liberté effective, mesurée en fonction de la définition adoptée. Les prolétaires observés par Marx, quelle que fût la législation, ne pouvaient éprouver aucun sentiment de liberté parce qu'ils étaient privés du minimum de pouvoir faute duquel le droit de choisir fins et moyens est purement illusoire. Pour la masse des musulmans d'Algérie, la liberté que leur assurait la loi française pesait moins lourd que l'humiliation provoquée par la discrimination. A chaque époque, en chaque société, le *sentiment de la liberté* dépend, en priorité, d'*une* circonstance. Peut-être même dépend-il de l'élimination d'une certaine forme d'oppression, éprouvée comme intolérable. L'exigence d'une sphère privée peut constituer le contenu essentiel de la revendication de liberté. Mais ce cas a été rare dans l'histoire : les hommes ont protesté contre la violence faite à leurs croyances ou à leurs mœurs par les vainqueurs, contre la violence faite à leur foi par les inquisiteurs, contre la violence faite à leur dignité par des maîtres qui les traitent en esclaves ou en sous-hommes, contre la misère à eux infligée par des hommes ou la fortune.

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(26) On se rapportera aussi à l'essai de Sir Isaiah Berlin, *Two concepts of liberty* (Oxford, 1958).

Aujourd'hui encore, autant il est légitime de considérer le respect et l'élargissement de cette sphère pour un des buts, éventuellement pour le but primordial de l'ordre social, autant il est inacceptable de se référer à ce critère unique pour juger de toutes les sociétés actuelles. Peut-être a-t-on tort d'employer le même mot pour exprimer la libération par rapport à la police et la libération par rapport à la faim. Mais on n'a pas tort de maintenir que, ni en théorie ni en pratique, il n'est bon de tout rapporter à un objectif unique. Les hommes sacrifient une partie de leur sphère privée pour être gouvernés par des frères de race, de langue ou de religion, pour être traités en égaux, pour se donner une patrie, voire dans l'espoir de sortir de la misère.

A ce point, il est vrai, Hayek objecterait qu'il n'a pas justifié la liberté en tant que telle, comme une valeur dernière, qu'il l'a, au contraire, justifiée pragmatiquement, par ses fruits. La primauté de la liberté telle que la conçoivent les libéraux, primauté que nous n'avons pas acceptée sans réserves sur le plan philosophique, faut-il donc l'accepter sur le plan économico-social? La société conforme à l'idéal des libéraux serait-elle non pas seulement la meilleure moralement mais la plus efficace?

J'ai toujours peine, personnellement, à croire que les choses soient ainsi faites que moralité et utilité coïncident pleinement. Je me méfie des ruses de la raison comme de la virtuosité des économistes. Je ne refuserai pas mon admiration à la démonstration de Hayek, mais je réserverai ma foi. Les libéraux ont parfois tendance, comme les marxistes, à croire que l'ordre du monde pourrait réconcilier nos aspirations avec la réalité. Cette confiance ne manque pas de grandeur. « Souffrez que je l'admire et ne l'imite point » *.

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* Je continuerai, dans un prochain numéro, l'examen de la théorie libérale de la liberté.

ON THE WELFARE STATE

ASA BRIGGS

The Welfare State in Historical Perspective

I

THE phrase "welfare state" is of recent origin. It was first used to describe Labour Britain after 1945. From Britain the phrase made its way round the world. It was freely employed, usually but not exclusively by politicians and journalists, in relation to diverse societies at diverse stages of development. Historians also took over the phrase. Attempts were made to re-write nineteenth and twentieth century history, particularly British history, in terms of the "origins" and "development" of a "welfare state".

Much of the political talk and the international journalism was loose and diffuse. The phrase "welfare state" was seldom defined. It was used to cover both social and economic changes. Among the social changes the demand for more comprehensive social security—"freedom from want"—was linked, often with little thought, with the demand for greater "equality of opportunity" through educational reform. The differences between the two goals, differences which had been noted by earlier writers, were not usually stressed. It was only in the aftermath of change that the social implications of "meritocracy" were disentangled from the social implications of other aspects of legislation. There was confusion also on critical issues concerning social change and economic power. The most important economic changes which found a place in British "definitions" of the "welfare state" were those which seemed to entail direct and immediate social consequences—the "abolition of poverty" and the "conquest of unemployment".

The historical writing dwelt primarily on the contrast between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The "night-watchman state", condemned by Lassalle, had become as obsolescent, it was argued, as *laissez faire* itself. Emphasis on "political rights" had given way naturally, as the nineteenth century went by, to the

Archiv. europ. sociol., II (1961), 221-258.

demand for "social rights". The year 1848 was a landmark on the continent : Chartism was a landmark movement in Britain. Democracy had become completely meaningful only as it had taken the form of "social democracy". "Welfare states" were fruits of "social democracy". One strain in this historiography was a modern counterpart of the "Whig" historiography of nineteenth-century Britain with the concept of "welfare" substituted for the concept of representative government. The past was seen as leading inevitably and inexorably along a broad highway with the "welfare state" as its destination.

Already the early journalism appears dated and the history looks slanted. Increasing emphasis has recently been placed in Britain, the home of the phrase, on the contemporary social influence not of legislation but of an affluent market economy. Both critics and admirers of the welfare state have been driven to concern themselves with "affluence". There has been talk of "myths" of the "welfare state", including a "myth of the welfare state for the working classes" which has persuaded (against much factual evidence) both politicians and voters that most, if not all, contemporary social problems have been solved since 1945. The inhibiting effects of the "myth" have received as much attention from critics as the liberating effects of the legislation. At the same time recent writings from all sides make it abundantly clear that the ideals which inspired the achievement of a "welfare state" are now no longer universally shared. Comprehensive notions of a "welfare state" based on complete "equality of citizenship" no longer receive universal assent (or lip service). Against a background of recurring fiscal crises, "paying for services" has replaced "fair shares for all" as a current political slogan. The switch may only be temporary and it has already met with resistance, but it is a sign that what only recently seemed to be fixed is far from fixed, that the post-1945 "welfare state" was not in itself a final destination. "Beyond the welfare state" has become a slogan for socialists. On the other side a number of writers, some of them influential, have reverted to older and more limited ideas of a "social service state" where limited services are provided for a limited section of the population. That section is the least well-off section of the community. The state services liquidate themselves, it is claimed, as more and more people rise above the level of a minimum standard of living to reach "freedom" to buy for themselves the services (health, education, etc.) which they want.

While political attitudes have been changing not only in Britain but even more markedly in other parts of the world, a small number of British historians and sociologists have begun to make a more searching examination of the "background" and "benefits" of the "welfare state". As a result of their continuing labours, the significance of each of the great "turning points" of British "welfare state" history is already being re-assessed. The stark contrast between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been qualified. Landmark legislation such as the National Health Insurance Act of 1911, which hitherto had been treated generally or symbolically, has been re-interpreted in the light of newly discovered or hitherto neglected evidence. The pressures have been more carefully scrutinized, and the setbacks have been examined as well as the successes. Many of the "reforms" were designed as remedies for specific problems : they were certainly not thought of as contributions to a "trend" or a "movement". The sources of inspiration were multiple—socialism was only one of several strands—and this very multiplicity added to later complications and confusions. The old poor law, from which social services emerged both directly and by reaction, was not so much broken up, as its critics had wished, as eroded away by depression, war, unemployment and the introduction piecemeal of remedial legislation. The social welfare legislation of the Labour government of 1945-50, the climax of fifty years of social and political history, has itself begun to be viewed historically. The pre-suppositions which underlay it can now be seen to have been the products of a particular set of circumstances, circumstances which have already changed. Among those circumstances the experience of war seems to have been as relevant as the appeal of socialism in determining the practicability and the popularity of introducing comprehensive welfare proposals.

So far, however, the re-interpretation and the rewriting have largely been insular. Relatively little attention has been paid, in consequence, to the comparative history of welfare legislation. Specialists in social administration have collected comparative data, but they have naturally enough used them more frequently for practical than for historical purposes. The "uniqueness" of Britain has been emphasized to the neglect of the study of trends and tendencies in other countries.

In certain respects British experience has been unique, as foreign writers as different as Halévy and Schumpeter, have recognized. The uniqueness can only be appreciated, however, when the experience of several countries is taken into account.

The trends and tendencies which led journalists, politicians and historians to apply the label "welfare state" to Britain may be noted in all modern industrialised communities. They have influenced non-industrialised communities also. The "causes" of the "welfare state", as of nineteenth-century *Sozialpolitik*, are to be found, therefore, in far more general phenomena than the programmes of the British Labour party or the persistent prodding of the British "liberal conscience".

It was the International Labour Office, a mine of invaluable factual information and a source of inspiration in international social service development, which noted in 1950 at a time when the term "welfare state" was being generally applied to Britain, that a "new conception" was transforming the pre-war systems of social insurance in many countries. "There is a movement everywhere", one of its reports stated, "towards including additional classes of the population, covering a wider range of contingencies, providing benefits more nearly adequate to needs and removing anomalies among them, loosening the tie between benefit right and contribution payment, and, in general, unifying the finance and administration of branches hitherto separate" (1). In other words, a "quest for universality" was transforming the pre-war "social service state" into some kind of "welfare state".

The "new conception" reflected changing attitudes towards citizenship as well as changing views about the proper role of the state. Some of these attitudes and views had taken shape during the Second World War when talk of "four freedoms" was thought to have universal application, and the International Labour Conference at Philadelphia in 1944 dwelt on "the deep desire of men to free themselves from the fear of want". "The meaning which can be given to 'international society', it was argued, will be judged in terms of human benefit and welfare" (2). The I.L.O. report of 1950 went on to state that "the transformation of social insurance is accompanied by the absorption or coordination of social assistance, and there begins to emerge a new organization for social security, which we can describe only as a public service for the citizenry at large. This new organization now concerns society as a whole, though it is primarily directed to the welfare of the workers and their families. It tends, therefore, to become a part of national government, and social security policy accordingly becomes coordinated closely with national policy for raising the standard of welfare and, in particular, for promoting the vitality of the population".

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(1) I.L.O., International Labour Conference, 34th Session, *Objectives and Minimum Standards of Social Security* (1950), pp. 3-4. See also "Survey of Post-War Trends in Social Security" in *International Labour Review*, June, July, August, September, 1949.

(2) I.L.O., *Approaches to Social Security* (1942), p. i.; *Objectives and Advanced Standards of Social Security* (1952); D. Thomson, A. Briggs, E. Meyer, *Patterns of Peacemaking* (1945), p. 340, ch. vii, appendix ii.

This international report touches on matters which had already been discussed at length in British contexts. During the Second World War, the historian of British social policy writes, "it was increasingly regarded as a proper function or even obligation of government to ward off distress and strain not only among the poor but among all classes of society. And because the area of responsibility had so perceptibly widened, it was no longer thought sufficient to provide through various branches of social assistance a standard of service hitherto considered appropriate for those in receipt of poor assistance" (3). The disassociation of "welfare" from poor law stigmas inevitably meant a raising of standards. Concern for the "citizenry at large" meant taking account of democratic demands not simply seeking to satisfy assessed needs.

There were many instances in Britain of changing notions of what was "appropriate". One of the most striking was a revolution in school meals policy. School meals had developed during the nineteenth century as a charitable service for "necessitous children" (private charity outside the scope of the poor law). The private charities providing them were at pains to make sure that they were not catering for the children of "undeserving and worthless parents" (4). The Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906, which brought the state directly into this area of social welfare policy, was a highly controversial measure. It drove A. V. Dicey, the noted British lawyer and writer, to complain that it was altogether wrong that fathers of children fed by the state should retain the right of voting for members of parliament. "Why a man who first neglects his duty as a father and then defrauds the state should retain his full political rights", he went on tendentiously, "is a question easier to ask than to answer" (5). Dicey, like a number of his conservative contemporaries, was concerned that social service legislation would follow a "slippery slope" in which each generation would fall more sharply than its prede-

(3) R. M. Titmuss, *Problems of Social Policy* (1950), p. 506.

(4) C. L. Mowat, *The Charity Organization Society*, 1869-1913 (1961), p. 75.

(5) A. V. Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (1914 edn.), p. 1.

cessor. The statesmen who had passed the Education Act of 1870, creating the first public-provided schools, would probably have been quite unwilling to have passed the 1891 Act relieving parents of the necessity for paying for any part of their children's elementary education. The people who passed the 1891 Act would in their turn have baulked at the School Meals Act of 1906. Dicey was right in implying that the men of 1906 would certainly have stopped far short of the "school meals revolution" of the Second World War. A Board of Education circular of 1941 completely abandoned old precepts that cheap school meals should be provided only to children who were both "necessitous" and "undernourished". Already during the previous year the number of school meals provided had doubled. By 1945 1,650,000 dinners were taken on every school day in England and Wales, about fourteen per cent being free and the rest costing the parents a nominal sum. This figure compared with 130,000 in 1940 and 143,000 in the depressed conditions of the mid-1930s. In round figures one child in three was fed at school in 1945 in place of one child in thirty in 1940.

The distribution of milk, fruit juice and "welfare foods" was regulated on social grounds throughout the Second World War. The same principles were carried from nutritional policy to social security policy. "In a matter so fundamental", a government White Paper of 1944 stated, "it is right for all citizens to stand in together, without exclusion based on differences of status, function or wealth" (7). The argument was not simply that administrative problems would be simplified if structures were "comprehensive" or "universal" but that through "universal schemes" "concrete expression" would be given to the "solidarity and unity of the nation, which in war has been its bulwark against aggression and in peace will be its guarantee of success in the fight against individual want and mischance".

This White Paper, like the equally significant White Paper of 1944 (Cd. 6527) accepting the need for social action to prevent unemployment, was the product of a coalition government, pledged to national unity. The strains and stresses of total war forced politicians to consider the "community" as a whole : the hopes of "re-construction" (the term was used with particular fervour

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(6) Titmuss, *op. cit.* pp. 509-10.

(7) Cd. 6550 (1944) § 8, § 33. See also Cd. 6404 (1942) and A. Briggs, "The Social Services" in *The British Economy*, 1945-50, (ed. G.D.N. Worswick and P. Ady, 1952), pp. 365-80.

during the First World War) were held out to inspire the public in years of trial. There was thus a close association between warfare and welfare. Moreover, the knowledge that large sums of money, raised through taxation at a level without precedent, were being used to wage war led without difficulty to the conclusion that smaller sums of money could produce a "welfare state" in times of peace. All parties were interested in this line of argument. The Conservative partner in the war-time coalition, the predominant political partner, published as late as 1949 a pamphlet, *The Right Road for Britain*, which stated unequivocally that "the social services are no longer even in theory a form of poor relief. They are a cooperative system of mutual aid and self-help provided by the whole nation and designed to give to all the basic minimum of security, of housing, of opportunity, of employment and of living standards below which our duty to one another forbids us to permit any one to fall".

By 1949, when this pamphlet was published, the legislation introduced by the Labour government of 1945 to 1950, particularly the health service legislation, was freely talked of as "welfare state" legislation. Much of it went beyond the ideas of "comprenhensiveness" or "cooperation" as such and reflected socialist philosophies of "equality". Attempts had been made to raise the standards of service to meet the claims of "equal citizenship". "Homes, health, education and social security, these are your birthright", exclaimed Aneurin Bevan. Sociologists as well as socialists explained the new policies in terms of the fabric of citizenship. Hitherto, they suggested, social service policy had been thought of as a remedial policy to deal with the basement of society, not with its upper floors. Now the purpose was extended. "It has begun to re-model the whole building," T. H. Marshall wrote in 1949, "and it might even end by converting a skyscraper into a bungalow" or at least into a " bungalow surmounted by an architecturally insignificant turret" (8).

The changes in mood since 1949 have already been noted : they can be explained in narrowly fiscal or broadly socio-political terms and they constitute the background of current controversies. The object of this paper is to go back beyond the current controversies, beyond the relatively recent experience of total war, to the historical matrix within which the idea of a "welfare state" has taken form. Before going back in time, however, it is necessary to attempt a more precise definition of the term "welfare state" than has been common in recent discussions. And the definition itself will suggest certain interesting and relevant lines of historical enquiry.

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(8) T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (1949), pp. 47 and 48.

II

A "welfare state" is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions—first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain "social contingencies" (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.

The first and second of these objects may be accomplished, in part at least, by what used to be called a "social service state", a state in which communal resources are employed to abate poverty and to assist those in distress. The third objective, however, goes beyond the aims of a "social service state". It brings in the idea of the "optimum" rather than the older idea of the "minimum". It is concerned not merely with abatement of class differences or the needs of scheduled groups but with equality of treatment and the aspirations of citizens as voters with equal shares of electoral power.

Merely to define the phrase "welfare state" in this way points to a number of historical considerations, which are the theme of this article. First, the conception of "market forces" sets the problems of the "welfare state" (and of "welfare") within the context of the age of modern political economy. In societies without market economies, the problem of "welfare" raises quite different issues. Within the context of the age of modern political economy an attempt has been made, and is still being made, to create and maintain a self-regulating system of markets, including markets in the fictitious commodities, land, money and labour. The multiple motives lying behind the attempt to control these markets require careful and penetrating analysis.

Second, the conception of "social contingencies" is strongly influenced by the experience of industrialism. Sickness, old age and death entail hardships in any kind of society. Ancient systems of law and morality include precepts designed to diminish these hardships, precepts based, for example, on the obligations of sons to support their parents or on the claims of charity, *obsequium religionis*. Unemployment, however, at least in the form in which it is thought of as a social contingency, is a product of industrial societies, and it is unemployment more than any other social contingency which has determined the shape and timing of modern "welfare" legislation. Before the advent of mass unemployment, "unemployability", the inability of individuals to secure their livelihood by work, was a key subject in the protracted debates on poor law policy. The existence of "chronic unemployment", structural or cyclical, has been a powerful spur from the nineteenth century onwards leading organized labour groups to pass from concentration on sectional interests to the consideration of "social rights" of workers as a class; to philanthropic businessmen wishing to improve the "efficiency" and strengthen the "social justice" of the business system; and to politicians and governments anxious to avoid what seemed to be dangerous political consequences of unemployment. The memories of chronic unemployment in the inter-war years and the discovery of what it was believed were new techniques of controlling it reinforced "welfare state" policies in many countries after the Second World War.

Third, the idea of using organized power (through politics and administration) to determine the pattern of welfare services requires careful historical dating. Why not rely for "welfare" on the family, the church, "charity", "self help", "mutual aid" (gild, trade union, friendly society) or "fringe benefits" (business itself)? Whole philosophies of "welfare" have been founded on each of these ideas or institutions : often the philosophies and the interests sustaining them have been inimical to the suggestion that the state itself should intervene. The possibility of using governmental power has been related in each country to the balance of economic and social forces; estimates of the proper functions and, true or false, of the available resources of the state; effective techniques of influence and control, resting on knowledge (including expert knowledge); and, not least, the prevalence (or absence) of the conviction that societies can be shaped by conscious policies designed to eliminate "abuses" which in earlier generations had been accepted as "inevitable" features of the human condition.

Not only does the weighting of each of these factors vary from period to period, but it also varies from place to place. It was Bentham, scarcely distinguished for his historical sense, who in distinguishing between *agenda* (tasks of government) and *sponte acta* (unplanned decisions of individuals) wrote that "in England abundance of useful things are done by individuals which in other countries are done either by government or not at all... [while] in Russia, under Peter the Great, the list of *sponte acta* being a blank, that of *agenda* was proportionately abundant" (9). This contrast was noted by many other writers later in the nineteenth century, just as an opposite contrast between Britain and the United States was often noted after 1945.

If the question of what constitutes "welfare" involves detailed examination of the nature and approach to "social contingencies", the question of why the state rather than some other agency becomes the main instrument of "welfare" involves very detailed examination of a whole range of historical circumstances. The answer to the question is complicated, moreover, by differences of attitude in different countries, to the idea of "the state" itself. Given these differences, a translation of basic terms into different languages raises difficulties which politicians and journalists may well have obscured. For example, is the term *Wohlfahrtsstaat* the right translation of "welfare state"? British and German approaches to "the state" have been so different that they have absorbed the intellectual energy of generations of political scientists. In the nineteenth century there were somewhat similar difficulties (although on a smaller scale) surrounding the translation of the British term "self help". A French translator of Samuel Smiles's book of that title (1859) said that the term "self help" was "à peu près intraduisible".

Fourth, the "range of agreed social services" set out in the provisional definition of "welfare state" is a shifting range. Policies, despite the finalism of much of the post-1945 criticism, are never fixed for all time. What at various times was considered to be a proper range shifts, as Dicey showed, and consequently must be examined historically. So too must changing areas of agreement and conflict. Public health was once a highly controversial issue in European societies : it still is in some other societies. The "sanitary idea" was rightly regarded by the pioneers of public health as an idea which had large and far-reaching chains of consequences. It marked an assault on "fate" which would be bound to lead to other assaults. Public health, in the administrative sphere of drains, sewers and basic "environmental" services, has been taken outside the politics of conflict in Britain and other places, but personal health services remain controversial. There is controversy, very bitter indeed in the United States, not only about the range of services and who shall enjoy them but about the means of providing them. The choice of means influences all "welfare state" history. "Welfare states" can and do employ a remarkable variety of instruments, such as social insurance, direct provision in cash or in kind, subsidy, partnership with other agencies, including private business agencies, and action through local authorities. In health policy alone, although medical knowledge is the same in all countries of the West and the same illnesses are likely to be treated in much the same kind of way, there is a remarkable diversity of procedures and institutions even in countries which make extensive public provision for personal health services.

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(9) J. Bentham, *Works* (ed. J. Bowring, 1843), vol. III, p. 35. Cf. J. M. Keynes's view of the "agenda" of the state in *The End of Laissez Faire* (1926).

Fifth, there are important historical considerations to take into 5
account in tracing the relationship between the three different directions of public intervention in the free (or partially free) market. The demand for "minimum standards" can be related to a particular set of cumulative pressures. Long before the Webbs urged the need in 1909 for government action to secure "an enforced minimum of civilised life", the case for particular minima had been powerfully advocated. Yet the idea of basing social policy as a whole on a public commitment to "minimum" standards did not become practical politics in Britain until the so-called "Beveridge revolution" of the Second World War. The third direction of "welfare" policy, and the distinctive direction of the "welfare state", can be understood only in terms of older logic and more recent history. The idea of separating "welfare" policy from "subsistence" standards (the old minima, however measured) and relating it to "acceptable" standards ("usual work income") provides an indication of the extent to which "primary poverty" has been reduced in "affluent societies". It may be related, however, to older ideas of equality, some of which would lead direct not to state intervention in the market but to the elimination of the market altogether, at least as a force influencing human

relationships. A consideration of the contemporary debate is more rewarding if it is grounded in history.

III

Each of these five historical considerations deserves fuller treatment. The texture is often complex. There have been markedly different chronologies of development and different answers have been given in different countries to the same set of leading questions.

By the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century there had been a general reaction against attempts to maintain self-regulating systems of markets. This reaction has been variously described as "the decline of liberalism", "the advent of collectivism" and "the rise of socialism". Fabian writers, who are particularly illuminating on these themes, used all three labels, and after painting a grim picture of a period of capitalist anarchy in the early nineteenth century went on to show how

> in the teeth of the current Political Economy, and in spite of all the efforts of the millowning Liberals, England was compelled to put forth her hand to succour and protect her weaker members [...] Slice after slice has gradually been cut from the profits of capital, and thereby from its selling value, by strictly beneficial restrictions on the user's liberty to do what he likes with it [...] On every side he is being registered, inspected, controlled, and eventually superseded by the community [...] All this has been done by "practical men", ignorant, that is to say, of any scientific sociology, believing Socialism to be the most foolish of dreams [...] Such is the irresistible sweep of social tendencies, that in their every act they worked to bring about the very Socialism they despised (10).

In outlining this development of "our unconscious Socialism" Sidney Webb directed attention to the efforts both of "individuals" and of "municipalities" before he turned explicitly to the state. The "masses" were kept in the background, vague and undifferentiated. So too were the trade unions, the importance of which he discovered only a few years later. The main emphasis was placed on the power of the ballot box as it was by revisionists on the continent. It might have been foreseen, Webb remarked, (and it had indeed been foreseen by men like Bagehot) that "individualism could not survive their (the working classes) advent to political power". "Unconscious" or later "conscious" socialism was the necessary corollary of political democracy. The result would necessarily be the emergence of a more active state.

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(10) S. Webb, in *Fabian Essays* ([1889] 1948 edn.), p. 43, p. 46.

The analysis was historically significant but limited in depth. Another of the Fabian essayists, Hubert Bland, pointed out by implication three of Webb's superficialities. First, state control did not imply socialism, conscious or unconscious. "It is not so much to the thing the State does as to the end for which it does it that we must look before we decide whether it is a Socialist State or not". Sixpenny telegrams organised by a state-run Post Office had nothing to do with socialism or "welfare" in the "welfare state" sense. Second, and in writing in this way Bland was exceptionally percipient about the shape of the future, "it is quite certain that the social programme of our party will become a great fact long before the purely political proposals of the Liberals have received the royal assent". Third, and here Bland was a better historian than Webb, there had been a far less sharp break than Webb had suggested between the "period of anarchy" of the early nineteenth century and "the present". There was certainly no one single landmark, like Mill's *Political Economy* (1848), which provided a frontier post between an age of individualism on one side and an age of socialism on the other. "There never has been as long as society lasts", Bland went so far as to argue, "and never can be a *parti sérieux* of logical *laissez faire*. Even in the thick of the industrial revolution the difference between the two great parties was mainly one of tendency—of attitude of mind" (11). The simplicities of market political economy could never be consistently applied in practical politics. The attempt to plan *laissez faire* was doomed from the start. If you had to refer to an economist, you would have to fall back upon Adam Smith, a pragmatist, rather than upon more systematic classical theoreticians. When the classical theoreticians were drawn into active politics, their theories immediately became hedged round by an intricate tangle of qualifications.

Bland was more subtle in his approach than Webb (and incidentally more direct in his demand for a new and "definitely Socialist party"). It is clear from more recent academic writings first that there never was a completely "negative state" even in early nineteenth-century Britain, and second that even classical theoreticians were by no means unanimous about the merits of complete *laissez faire*. "The principle of *laissez faire* may be safely trusted to in some things", wrote J. R. McCulloch (1789-1864), but in many more it is wholly inapplicable; and to appeal to it on all occasions savours more of the policy of a parrot than that of a statesman or philosopher" (12). Nassau Senior (1790-1864), the architect of the new poor law of 1834, a substitute for a social policy, yet an innovation from which many new social policies in health and education derived, maintained that

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(11) H. Bland, *ibid.* p. 198.

> it is the duty of a government to do whatever is conducive to the welfare of the governed. The only limit to this duty is power [...] it appears to me that the most fatal of errors would be the general admission of the proposition that a government has no right to interfere for any purpose except for that of affording protection, for such an admission would be preventing our profiting from experience, and even from acquiring it (13).

Senior stressed, of course, that the power limit to the duty of the state was set not only by the coercive power of the law but by the effective power of the "laws of political economy". A knowledge of the laws of political economy was necessary to legislators, and the new poor law of 1834 with its abandonment of outdoor relief to the poor and its stress on making conditions for indoor relief in workhouses "less eligible" than the worst employment outside was an attempt to rule the poor by the laws of political economy. Later critical writers were to dismiss these economic laws as "gigantic stuffed policemen" (14), and even at the time there were passionate enemies of "political economy" who went far towards envisaging a "welfare state" where politics would have primacy over economics.

In early industrial Britain one of the most influential of the group of anti-political economists was Richard Oastler (1789-1861), a religious man of Tory convictions and a violent critic of the poor law of 1834, who led a working-class agitation during the 1830's for legal limitation of the hours of work of women and children in textile factories. He was known in consequence as "the Factory King". To him "political economy" was "at total variance with every precept of our Holy Religion, every principle of our Constitution, and every security to Rank and Prosperity". The ideal state was what he called the "social state". This state would seek "to secure the prosperity and happiness of every class of society" but it would be particularly concerned with "the protection of the poor and needy, because they require the shelter of the constitution and the laws more than other classes". The "social state" was the true state of history : it was the political economists who were the revolutionaries. Because, however, the actual state in the early nineteenth century was deviating further and further from the ideal (and historic) state, the defence of social rights would have to take the form, if need be, of rebellion.

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(12) J. R. McCulloch, *Treatise on the Succession to Property vacant by Death* (1848), p. 156.

(13) The passage comes from his Oxford lectures of 1847-8. It is quoted in L. Robbins, *The Theory of Economic Policy* (1953), p. 45. See also for a modern comment on the history of the term *laissez faire*, D. H. McGregor, *Economic Thought and Policy* (1949), ch. III.

(14) G. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* ([1908] 1929 edn.), p. 13. There is a fascinating, if controversial, account of poor law and market in K. Polanyi, *Origins of Our Time* (1946).

> If governments are established in this land for the sole purpose of hoarding up large masses of gold and stamping down individual wretchedness, if *that* is the sole interest and sole object of our government, I declare myself a traitor to it, if I die tomorrow for using the word (15).

Oastler's movement, grounded in toryism, thus merged into Chartism. The idea of the "historic rights of the poor", threatened by 1834, provided a link between "traditionalism" and modern working-class politics. Chartism was a movement with several distinct sources of inspiration : it nevertheless asserted clearly and unequivocally the case for the extension of the suffrage to the working classes in the name not only of political but of social rights.

What Marx called "feudal socialism" was one source, therefore, of the revolt against the market economy, "the laws of political economy" and "the night-watchman state". Indeed the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, called Oastler a "democratic Tory", a title adopted by his most recent biographer (16). It is easy to see how close certain aspects of his thought were to that of John Ruskin (1819-1900), a social prophet of great influence, who went on (with Marx himself) to shape the thought of William Morris (1834-1896) and later of J. A. Hobson. Ruskin criticised orthodox political economy at greater length than Oastler while seeking to evolve a system of political economy of his own with his own definitions of "wealth", "illth" and "value" and with a practical concern for the provision of a "living wage". "The first duty of the state", he urged, "is to see that every child born therein shall be well housed, clothed, fed and educated until it attains years of discretion". He added the rider that to do this

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(15) *The Fleet Papers* (1842), p. 58; (1841), p. 39; *Leeds Intelligencer*, 10 August 1833.

(16) *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 July 1843; C. DRIVER, *Tory Radical* (1946).

"the government must have an authority over the people of which we now do not so much as dream" (17).

Through Ruskin and others, Oastler points forwards as well as backwards. His immediate support, however, came from working men, organised in factory committees (he has his place, therefore, in the history of working-class organisation as well as of social thought) and from a motley group of clergymen, philanthropists, small squires and Tory members of parliament. Leading the latter for many years was Lord Ashley, later the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, the main parliamentary spokesman for legislative interference with the working hours of women and children. It was Ashley's efforts which led to the passing of a number of factory acts, notably the Ten Hours Act of 1847, which marked a definite breach with *laissez faire*. He was also associated with reforms in mining, housing and health. Like Oastler, Ashley would have argued that the breach with *laissez faire* was less significant than the "capitalist" breach with the past. The "welfare state" was the true historic state. The Fabians took up this point also. *Laissez faire* was an aberration, "an acute outbreak of individualism, unchecked by the old restraints" (18). There had not only been a medieval order—unlike Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris, they did not dwell on this—but a "mercantilist" order, buttressed by custom and law. It had disappeared under the weight of the pressure for profit during the industrial revolution. According to the Fabians, it was the task of socialists to create a new order appropriate to democracy. The increasing state intervention during the previous forty years seemed to point (although as Bland showed, not always indubitably) towards this destination.

Bland was right to imply that there were intricacies and complications. Ashley, for example, can only be properly understood if his work is related to that of Senior as well as of Oastler. The extension of the powers of the state had a Benthamite as well as a philanthropic or tory inspiration. One of Senior's colleagues in the drafting of the new poor law of 1834 was Edwin Chadwick, Bentham's disciple and "attached friend". Chadwick went on to concern himself with public health and was the author of the important official publication, *The Sanitary Condition of the Labour-*

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(17) The phrase is taken from his *Stones of Venice* (1851). (*Works*, ed. Cook and Wedderburn, vol. XI, p. 263). The term "living wage" was first used by the English Cooperator, Lloyd James, in the *Beehive*, July 1874. The term "fair day's wages for a fair day's work" was older.

(18) H. S. Foxwell, *The Claims of Labour* (1886), p. 249.

ing Classes (1842), which had a profound effect on the evolution of British social legislation. When at last in 1848 a General Board of Health was founded under the first national public health act (there had previously been a certain amount of local initiative and legislation), both Chadwick and Ashley were made members. Behind Ashley was the old dream of a traditional "social state", grounded in "responsibility" and strengthened by "charity" : Chadwick, selecting from a number of possible Benthamite philosophies that which laid greatest emphasis on the active intervention of the state to suppress "sinister interests" in the name of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number", was a believer in a renovated "administrative state". Such a state would rest on uniformity of procedures and the kind of "centralisation" which Oastler abhorred. "I care more for the good of the service", Chadwick once said in a revealing phrase, "than for putting it in what is called Harmony with the House of Commons" (19).

Ashley and Chadwick worked together closely before, to their mutual regret, the General Board of Health was destroyed by a coalition of enemies in 1854. Yet their sources of inspiration remained quite different. Ashley, tory though he was, looked to the people : he liked crowds. Chadwick looked to the expert. There were, of course, far fewer acknowledged "experts" in the late 1840's and 1850's than there were a hundred years later when the twentieth-century "welfare state" was being fashioned. It is interesting to note also that Chadwick, like Senior, feared the extension of the suffrage to the working classes. Senior had warned against the advocacy of "the political economy of the poor", their belief in the power of human institutions to subvert "the laws of political economy" in the name of "social rights" and "equality" (20) : Chadwick feared something worse, that the "quest for popularity" would lead rich men to subvert the poor at election times by offering lavish promises (21).

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(19) Quoted in S. E. Finer, *The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick* (1952), p. 477.

(20) N. Senior, *Journals Kept in France and Italy* (1843), pp. 150-2. In this journal Senior compared England with Switzerland. The "pure democracies" of small Swiss cantons, he claimed, resisted the spell of "the political economy of the poor" because all their adult males "venerated their clergy, their men of birth and of wealth and their institutions". He did not see that "deference" was as much a feature of nineteenth-century England. Estimates of the likely effect of the extension of suffrage on popular demands for a new political economy were influenced by estimates of the power of "deference". See W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (1872 edn.) ; A. Briggs, *The Age of Improvement* (1959), ch. x.

(21) "Much of that tact which dreads the ballot is a dread of the loss of aristocratical influence which prevails by gold,

These fears, shared by many people of property, were as important, and in some ways more incisive, than other men's hopes in determining the tempo and the pattern of state intervention during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century. For Chadwick and the practical Benthamites, however, the fears were not completely inhibiting. They were constructive men who evolved useful new administrative devices, notably the device of inspection, without which social legislation would have been administratively ineffective. Although the coercive powers of factory, mining and school inspectors were severely limited and most of the early inspectors came from the upper middle classes, the inspectors exerted considerable influence, through their presence as well as through their reports, not only on the way in which existing legislation was administered but on the preparation of new legislative initiatives (22). In the long run, moreover, Benthamitism itself could be given a democratic tinge. As Professor McGregor has written, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is an invitation to a continuous review of economic policy; and the greatest number is always the working classes" (23).

The complex detail of nineteenth-century British approaches to state action makes all attempts to divide the century neatly and tidily into "phases" or "epochs" seem grossly over-simplified. The most ambitious of such attempts was A. V. Dicey's large and stimulating *Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century* (1905). Originally a collection of lectures delivered in Harvard in 1898, Dicey's book had polemical as well as historical significance, particularly when it was re-issued in 1914 with a new preface attacking "the trend towards collectivism" which had been especially pronounced since the return of the Liberals to power before the general election of 1906. Dicey placed at 1865 or "roundabouts" the beginning of "collectivism", which he defined as "faith in the benefit to be derived by the mass of the people from the action or intervention of the State". Thereby he ignored the interventionist element in Benthamism, formalized statements both about philanthropy and *laissez faire*, and confused his own hostility towards "collectivism" with an objective investigation of facts and policies. A recent critic of his work has replaced his tidy

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and of the gain of the influence which prevails by popularity" (Letter of 14 October 1852, quoted in Finer, *op. cit.* p. 478).

(22) For details, see D. Roberts, *Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State* (1960), esp. pp. 152-244.

(23) McGregor, *op. cit.* p. 54.

phases with a more complex picture of pressures and counter-pressures.

> Looking back across the nineteenth century in Great Britain, it is possible to tabulate the parallel developments of *laissez faire* and state intervention almost year by year. What must be kept in mind in spite of our tendency to polarize opposites is that both were exercises of political power, that is, instrumentalities of several kinds of interest. These interests strove to be the state, to use the state for economic and social ends (24).

Against this background, the extension of the suffrage, which to Webb was decisive, was relevant primarily in that it provided the working classes with an instrument whereby they too *might* attempt to control the state. What Senior, Chadwick (and Bagehot) most feared, Webb, Bland and the Fabians most hoped. Bland noted "the sort of unconscious or semi-conscious recognition of the fact that the word 'state' has taken to itself new and diverse connotations—that the state idea has changed its content". He argued that working people had themselves changed from fearing it as an enemy to regarding it as a "potential saviour" (25). This comment was exaggerated, as we shall see, as a statement of fact but it was a pointer to the politics of the future. In Britain, as in many continental countries, independent labour parties emerged in the late nineteenth century and put forward demands for "the socialisation of politics". The demands included many of the measures which subsequently have been regarded as central to the "welfare state". Just as eighteenth-century civil rights (freedom of meeting, for example, or of the press) were employed to ensure political rights (the right to vote and its corollaries), so political rights were to be employed to secure social rights. Bevan's claim after 1945—"Homes, health, education, and social security; these are your birthright"—would have seemed neither strange nor extravagant to the socialists of 1895. The long intervening period was a period of intermittently intense struggle to secure objects which had already been defined before the beginning of the twentieth century.

Reliance on the state (rather than on trade-union or other kinds of voluntary action) to secure these objects was for a time controversial, as we shall see, yet, as the Fabians pointed out

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(24) J. B. Brebner, "*Laissez faire* and State Intervention in Nineteenth-century Britain" in *Tasks of Economic History*, Supplement VIII (1948) to the *Journal of Economic History*. For the dangers of explaining in terms of Dicey's "abstractions", see also MacDonagh, "The Nineteenth-century Revolution in Government : a Re-appraisal" in the *Historical Journal* (1958).

(25) Bland, *loc. cit.* p. 195, p. 200.

(the Marxists with their concern for the forms of economic power did not agree), the state against whose interference "the popular party" waged "such bitter war" in the first decades of the nineteenth century [...] was "an altogether different thing" from the state whose assistance "the new democracy" was continually invoking and whose power it was bent on increasing. Bland recognized also that if labour parties put forward "welfare" objectives in their electoral programmes, other parties working within a democracy would be forced themselves to put forward policies which would attempt to meet some at least of the labour demands. Tories had advanced social policies earlier in the nineteenth century in the name of "traditionalism" or sometimes of "paternalism" : Liberals, some of whom were developing a positive theory of "welfare" of their own, would similarly be forced to advance "welfare" policies, if only in the name of political realism.

> "The Liberals" he held (and he had a clear anti-Liberal bias) were "traditionally squeezable folk" and "like all absorbent bodies" they would be "forced to make concessions and to offer compromises [...] Such concessions and compromises will grow in number and importance with each successive appeal to the electorate, until at last the game is won" (26).

This characteristically Fabian conclusion, which attached strategic significance to the working of the parliamentary system, was not shared by those socialists on the continent and in Britain who were sceptical about parliament and drew a sharp distinction between "palliatives" and "fundamental economic and social transformations". Four years before Bland wrote his essay, Joseph Lane in *The Commonweal* put the alternative point of view when he warned his socialist readers that although it was possible that "the governing classes" might offer a "normal working day of eight hours", free meals for children and cumulative taxation on large incomes, "their doing so would certainly put off the revolution which we aim at" (27). The argument has been echoed ever since. In practice, however, non-Fabian socialists, like H. M. Hyndman, who believed not that the "game would be won" but that there would be a "final clash", were prepared to advocate "palliatives", including, for example, free meals for children. Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation refused to take up an "impossibilist" position and instead talked of "palliatives" as "stepping stones" leading in the right direction (28). The international socialist controversy on this subject, which reached its climax when two rival conferences were held in Paris in 1889, was never completely settled, but the "palliatives" generally agreed upon at the "possibilist" conference, the larger of the two, were all of a kind later to be associated with the "welfare state".

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(26) *Ibid.* p. 200.

(27) Quoted by D. Thompson in "A Note on the Welfare State" in the *New Reasoner*, No. 4, 1948.

(28) See C. Tsuzuki, *H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism* (1961), p. 56, p. 148.

It was argued, and has often been argued since, that the successful achievement of a programme based on individual "palliatives" would represent a victory for "working-class values" within a capitalist, market society. Marx himself had claimed that the passing of the Ten Hours Act of 1847 was the first great occasion on which "in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class" has "succumbed to the political economy of the working class". Certainly the ten hours agitation, led by Oastler and supported by Ashley, marked a genuine stage in a process of conversion of values.

The "social service state" of the twentieth century, "palliative" state or not, in so far as it was a product of working-class efforts and aspirations, was a different phenomenon from the "social state" of Oastler. Like the mercantilists, Oastler founded his theory of the state on a theory of society divided into "proper stations and ranks". "God has appointed the proper stations and ranks for each. He has exhibited Himself in His Word and His Works as the God of Order, and has thus left man without excuse if he should be in want and destitution." In this sense Oastler's was a stationary view of pre-market society. It did not assume a future increase in national income and it looked back to "ancient corporations and gilds" as proper instruments of welfare.

> There were periods in the past when "the labourer's wages were protected by statute, and the common foods of the working people [...] were prohibited from being made articles of speculation. Care was then taken that the labourer's hope of reward should not be cut off by the inordinate desire for gain in the capitalists" (29).

When Oastler attacked "acquisitive society", he was speaking the same language which had been taken for granted as a basis of social morality until the long erosion of values described by Max Weber and R. H. Tawney in their studies of puritan religion gave way to fundamental shifts in outlook, organization and not least in real wealth which we associate with the industrial revolution.

The ten hours movement and the later movements for nine-hour and eight hour days increasingly became movements within the expanding (but fluctuating) industrial market, with *class* bargaining power being used. The late nineteenth-century British and continental labour groups were reacting against the individualism of orthodox "political economy" and capitalist economic organisation not by falling back on ideas of "rank" and "order" but by developing ideas of "class" and "movement". The systems of regulation which they were anxious to establish were not copies of medieval or mercantilist models (although for a time these were familiar and some of them came into later prominence with gild socialism) (30) but new models appropriate to the new "social nexus" of industrialism. Written into them was the ideal not only of "fairness", a link between old and new, but of "equality". The old system, both Fabians and trade unionists saw, was riddled with what Webb called "status and permanent social inequalities". The attack on status, which had been prosecuted by middle-class radicals and Benthamite theorists, was now pursued by working-class socialists and Fabian theorists. There was a real link between Mill and the Fabians. Of course, the attack was local rather than general, intermittent rather than continuous if only because of economic fluctuations, and subject to all kind of manœuvres and diversions.

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(29) *The Fleet Papers* (1842), p. 190.

Once arguments for social reform had shifted from talk of "rank" and "order", it was easier for a section of non-socialist radical opinion to support them. The so-called "new Liberals" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries argued the case for "welfare" from a democratic standpoint within the new market economy. They could condemn certain of the conditions of the market without condemning "capitalism" as a whole, and they could criticize, from a very different standpoint from that of Oastler, the theory of poverty which lay behind the poor law of 1834. They could thus reach substantial, though limited agreement, with trade unionists and socialists about particular social service measures, as was shown during the period of Liberal government from 1906 to 1914.

It is necessary to draw distinctions between the early and the late nineteenth century not only to arrive at historical truth but to dispose of current descriptions of "welfare state" policy in terms of "neo-mercantilism". The "enlargement of welfare" is not adequately so described. "There are elements in it which were not present in mercantilist phases of the history of civilisation [...] It issues from a new phase in man's history" (29).

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(30) Yet Beatrice Webb herself said of her poor law scheme in 1907 : "The whole theory of the mutual obligation between the individual and the State [...] is taken straight out of the nobler aspect of the medieval manor" ; *Our Partnership* (1948), p. 385.

The point is perhaps most clearly demonstrated from the history not of Britain itself but of British settlements in the Antipodes, where there were striking examples before the end of the nineteenth century of what a French observer called "socialism without doctrines" (30). The early granting of universal suffrage in Australia and New Zealand was followed by the demand for social measures which would guarantee "fairness". Both Australians and New Zealanders had long boasted that they had no poor law—by that they meant that the conditions giving rise to a poor law and to "workhouses" were absent. In fact, however, they had by no means eliminated poverty, and in the last decade of the nineteenth century legislative measures were introduced which went further in certain respects than British legislation. There had been considerable dependence upon the state from the earliest period of colonization (the older British middle-class fear of the state as an "establishment" was missing) and there was little serious challenge to the view that the state machinery was freely available to those groups able to secure possession of it. "The more the state does for the citizen", Pember Reeves, the first New Zealand minister of labour, remarked in 1895, "the more it fulfils its purpose [...] The functions of the state should be extended as much as possible [...] True democracy consists in the extension of state activity". It was Pember Reeves who coined the phrase "colonial governmentalism" (31).

There was nothing paternalistic, however, about this willingness to delegate powers to the state. The emphasis, though at times it may have been somewhat misplaced, was always egalitarian. There was talk along practical, if extended Benthamite lines, of "the right to work, the right to fair and reasonable conditions of living and the right to be happy" (32). The collective power

(29) H. L. BEALES, "The Making of Social Policy", (*L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture* (1946), p. 5. The mercantilist parallel usually refers not only to welfare policy but to population policy (which, through such devices as family allowances, has "welfare" implications) and to protection (which also has "labour" implications).

(30) A. MÉTIN, *Le socialisme sans doctrines* (1901). See also A. SIEGFRIED, *Democracy in New Zealand* (1906).

(31) MÉTIN, *op. cit.* p. 229; J. B. CONDLIFFE, *New Zealand in the Making* (1930), pp. 164-5.

(32) W. K. HANCOCK, *Australia* (1930), p. 61. For general reflections on the role of the state in Australia, see S. ENCEL, "The Concept of the State in Australian Politics" in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, May 1960.

of the state (not a remote, impersonal state but a close-at-hand, essentially personally manipulated piece of machinery) was to be used to support social rights. These attitudes were reflected in the social service legislation of the Ballance-Seddon-Reeves ministry in New Zealand from 1891 onwards and in the legislation of the Turner government in Victoria from 1895.

Much of this legislation was concerned with the creation of effective departments of labour and the control of sweated industries paying low wages to their workers. In both Australia and New Zealand, however, pensions legislation was either introduced or just round the corner by the end of the nineteenth century. The New Zealand Old Age Pensions Act of 1898 was the first in a British dominion. It provided at state expense pensions to people of good character but with little or no means above the age of sixty-five. New South Wales and Victoria followed the example of New Zealand in 1901, and the new federal constitution of Australia stated in the same year that the Commonwealth might legislate for old age and invalid pensions. A federal act of 1908 extended the old age pension system to all Australian states and included also pensions for the blind and for permanently disabled persons. In the same year Britain passed its first non-contributory old age pensions act after decades of pressure from philanthropists, societies and even politicians. It was an act hedged round with moral qualifications (35), but it nonetheless marked, as did dominions legislation, an attempt to get away from the harshness of an all-embracing poor law. "The state was making new provision for welfare, in piecemeal fashion, outside of and parallel to the poor law." This, it has been argued, was "the real beginning of the welfare state in its modern form" (36).

Pember Reeves, who came to England from New Zealand, was a member of the Fabian Society. He divided old age pensions into three classes. "First comes the socialists' ideal", he said, "of a universal and comfortable provision which shall supersede the necessity for petty thrift; next come the various schemes, more or less orthodox in principle, but complicated and burdensome in their nature, for the reward and encouragement of thrift and self-denial; in the third class may be placed the humanitarian proposals, the humble yet not ungenerous aim of which is to soften the bitterness of poverty to those aged who, while unfortunate, are not wholly undeserving." The antipodean legislation, he believed, fell into the third class : "it was designed to offer help to those who need it most" (37). Its inspiration was neither a set of doctrines nor a cluster of ideas : it was a bundle of feelings about how people were treated. In Britain itself Hobson was to argue that the strongest solvent of the Poor Law of 1834 was "a movement along the lines of the strongest human feelings" (38).

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(35) See A. Wilson and G. S. Mackay, *Old Age Pensions, An Historical and Critical Study* (1941), ch. II, III, IV. See also R. M. Titmuss, *Essays on "The Welfare State"* (1958), pp. 18-19.

(36) C. L. Mowat, "The Approach to the Welfare State in Great Britain" in the *American Historical Review*, October 1952. It has also been called "an extended form of outdoor relief". See B. Abel-Smith, "Social Security" in Ginsberg (ed.), *Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century* (1959), pp. 352 ff.

It was liberal rather than socialist governments who moved along the lines described above, abandoning in the process many of the ideas which had dominated liberal thought earlier in the century, however much they had been qualified, as we have seen, on particular occasions or by particular writers.

> "When I went up to Oxford", wrote Lord Milner of the early 1870's, "the *laissez faire* theory still held the field. All the recognised authorities were "orthodox" economists of the old school. But within ten years the few men who still held the old doctrines in their extreme rigidity had come to be regarded as curiosities" (39).

One of the liveliest transforming influences was T. H. Green, who argued forcefully that the state ought to remove all obstacles to the development of "social capacity", such as those arising from lack of education, poor health and bad housing (40).

Hobson himself—and later L. T. Hobhouse—were sensitive students of the changes and initiators of new views. The issues with which late Victorian and Edwardian liberal intellectuals were having to concern themselves were social issues, and the practical politics, as Bland had prophesied, was increasingly pivoting on social politics. "It is not about details that the people care or are stirred", wrote R. B. Haldane, "what they seem to desire is that they should have something approaching to equality of chance of life with those among whom they live" (41). Even old conservative principles of property were reinterpreted in radical terms and in Hobhouse's arguments were converted into instruments of social justice (42). Individualism itself was increasingly associated with the freeing of the powers of "under-privileged" individuals. In 1909 Hobson commented that "the whole conception of the state disclosed by the new issues, as an instrument for the active adaptation of the economic and moral environment to the new needs of individual and social life, by securing full opportunities of self-development and social service for all citizens, was foreign to the Liberalism of the last generation" (43).

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(37) W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand* (1902), vol. II, p. 244. For more recent appraisals, see W. B. Sutch, *The Quest for Security in New Zealand* (1942); R. Mendelsohn, *Social Security in the British Commonwealth* (1954).

(38) J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (1902), p. 321.

(39) A. Milner, Introduction to A. Toynbee, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution* (1923 edn.), p. xxv. Toynbee anticipated the Fabians in these lectures, delivered to working-men in the early 1880s, by contrasting the age of capitalist anarchy with the age of regulation which had preceded it. For movements in liberal political economy at this time, see T. W. Hutchison, *A Review of Economic Doctrines*, 1870-1929 (1953), ch. 1.

(40) T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (1895 edn.) pp. 206-209.

The "welfare measures of the Liberal governments of 1905-14, culminating in the bitterly controversial "budget against poverty" of 1909 and Lloyd George's national insurance schemes against ill health and unemployment in 1911, were in sharp contrast to the Gladstonian liberalism of only thirty years before. "They are so far removed from the old Liberal individualism", one Liberal historian has written recently, "that they may be called social democracy rather than pure liberalism" (44).

IV

That was the British story, more complex than it is usually told and revealing a multiplicity of motives and inspirations.

German experience in the nineteenth century was in certain important respects different from that of Britain. If before 1900 factory legislation was more advanced in Britain than in any other European country, Germany had established a "lead" in social security legislation which the British liberal governments of 1906 to 1914 tried to wipe out. Bismarck's reforms of the 1880s—laws of 1882, 1884 and 1889 introducing compulsory insurance against sickness, accidents, old age and invalidity—attracted immense interest in other European countries. Just as British factory legislation was copied overseas, so German social insurance stimulated foreign imitation. Denmark, for instance, copied all three German pensions schemes between 1891 and 1898, and Belgium between 1894 and 1903. Switzerland by a constitutional amendment in 1890 empowered the federal government to organise a system of national insurance. In Britain itself a friendly observer noted in 1890 that Bismarck had "discovered where the roots of social evil lie. He has declared in words that burn that it is the duty of the state to give heed, above all, to the welfare of its weaker members" (45).

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(41) R. B. HALDANE, *Autobiography* (1929), pp. 212-214.

(42) See, in particular, L. T. HOBHOUSE, *Elements of Social Justice* (1922); *The Labour Movement* (1893); *Democracy and Reaction* (1904); *Liberalism* (1911); "The Philosophical Theory of Property", in *Property, its Duties and Rights* (ed. C. GORE, 1915). For the significance of his work, see J. A. HOBSON and M. GINSBERG, *The Life and Work of L. T. Hobhouse* (1931).

(43) J. A. HOBSON, *The Crisis of Liberalism* (1909), p. 3. For Hobson, see H. N. BRAILSFORD, "The Life and Work of J. A. Hobson" (*L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture*, 1948).

(44) R. B. MCCALLUM, "The Liberal Outlook", in M. GINSBERG (ed.), *Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century*, p. 75.

More recently Bismarck's social policy has been described by more than one writer as the creation of a "welfare state" (46). The term is very misleading. Bismarck's legislation rested on a basic conservatism which Oastler himself would have appreciated (47) and was sustained by a bureaucracy which had no counterpart in Britain except perhaps in Chadwick's imagination. The Prussian idea and history of the state and the British idea and history of the state diverged long before the 1880s, and it is not fanciful to attribute some of the divergences to the presence or absence a century before of "cameralism", the idea of the systematic application to government of administrative routines.

Equally important, the history of political economy in the two countries diverged just as markedly. The development of a school of historical economics provided a powerful academic re-inforcement in Germany for *Sozialpolitik*. The refusal of historical economists to "isolate" economic phenomena, including "economic man", their distrust of "laws of political economy" covering all ages and all societies, their *critique* of the motives and institutions of contemporary capitalism and their underlying belief in a "social order" distinguished them sharply from classical political economists in Britain. Their influence was considerable enough for Schmoller (1838-1917), the most important figure in the history of the school, to argue forcefully that no Smithian was fit to occupy an academic chair in Germany (48).

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(45) W. H. Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism* (1890), p. ix.

(46) S. B. Fay, "Bismarck's Welfare State" in *Current History*, vol. XVIII (1950).

(47) " A British Bismarck", Professor Driver has written, "would have commanded all his uncritical devotion, but Wellington was no Bismarck" (Driver, *op. cit.* p. 189).

(48) J. A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (1954), p. 765.

Even among the "precursors" of the historical school and among economists who stayed aloof from Schmoller and his circle, there was a powerful tradition linking social reform with conservative views of society (49). J. K. Rodbertus (1805-75) was a conservative monarchist who combined dislike of the "class struggle" and belief in state socialism. Adolf Wagner (1835-1917) who stayed aloof from Schmoller and admired Ricardo as the outstanding economic "theorist", acknowledged his debt to Rodbertus when he gave a warm welcome to Bismarck's legislation.

According to Wagner Germany had entered a "new social period", characterised by new economic ideas, new political views and new social programmes. National economy (*Volkswirtschaft*) had to be converted into State economy (*Staatswirtschaft*) : the foundation of the new economy would have to be "welfare". The idea of regarding "labour power" as a commodity and wages as its price was "inhuman" as well as "un-Christian". Wagner proposed a number of practical measures, some of which went further than those introduced by Bismarck. Schmoller, too, advocated policies aiming at "the re-establishment of a friendly relation between social classes, the removal or modification of injustice, a nearer approach to the principles of distributive justice, with the introduction of a social legislation which promotes progress and guarantees the moral and material elevation of the lower and middle classes" (50).

Bismarck, for whom the idea of insurance had a particular fascination both in his domestic and foreign policies, did not envisage a social policy which would go anywhere near as far as some of the "socialists of the chair" would have wished. He objected, for example, to the limitation by law of the hours of women and children in factories and he was at least as stubborn as any mill owner of the Manchester School when "theorists" talked of state officials interfering with private concerns in agriculture or industry. He also disliked extensions of direct taxation. He wanted the state, however, to be actively involved in the financing and administering of the insurance schemes which he proposed and he defended the introduction of these schemes—against both right-wing and left-wing opposition—in terms of "the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes". "The state", it was laid down in the preamble to the first and unsuccessful bill of 1881, "is not merely a necessary but a beneficent institution". Bismarck disagreed with Theodor Lohmann, who drafted his first social insurance legislation, about whether the state should contribute directly to the costs of insurance. Bismarck got his way that it should, but the political parties objected and his first attempts at legislation foundered. It was a measure of his recognition of political realities that the idea of state contributions was dropped in 1884 when his accident insurance bill was introduced. The law of 1889, providing for disability and old age pensions, did entail a flat rate contribution from the imperial treasury of fifty marks for each person receiving a pension, but this was a small element in the total cost and fell far short of the amount Bismarck had originally envisaged.

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(49) The pre-history of this approach leads back to Sismondi who has important links with Mill and the English utilitarians. He is a seminal figure in the critique of industrialism and the demand for welfare legislation.

(50) A. Wagner, *Rede über die soziale Frage* (1872), pp. 8-9. G. von Schmoller, *Über einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirtschaft* (1875), p. 92.

Many of Bismarck's critics accused him, not without justification, of seeking through his legislation to make German workers "depend" upon the state. The same charges have been made against the initiators of all "welfare" (and earlier, of poor law) policy often without justification, yet it was Bismarck himself who drew a revealing distinction between the degrees of obedience (or subservience) of private servants and servants at court. The latter would "put up with much more" than the former because they had pensions to look forward to. "Welfare" soothed the spirit, or perhaps tamed it. Bismarck's deliberate invocation of "subservience" is at the opposite end of the scale from the socialist invocation of "equality" as the goal of the "welfare state". It is brutally simple, too, when compared with sophisticated liberal attempts to define the conditions in which liberty and equality may be made to complement each other (51). The invocation was, of course, bound up with conscious political calculation. Bismarck was anxious to make German social democracy less attractive to working-men. He feared "class war" and wanted to postpone it as long as possible. His talks with Lassalle in 1863 had ranged over questions of this kind (52), and in 1884 he argued explicitly that if the state would only "show a little more Christian solicitude for the working-man", then the social democrats would "sound their siren song in vain". "The thronging to them will cease as soon as working-men see that the government and legislative bodies are earnestly concerned for their welfare" (53). It has been suggested that Bismarck was influenced by Napoleon III's successful handling of social policy as an instrument of politics. He certainly spent time seeking an "alternative to socialism" and it was this aspect of his policy which gave what he did contemporary controversial significance throughout Europe.

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(51) For the background of these attempts, see M. Ginsberg, "The Growth of Social Responsibility" in *Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 3-26.

(52) See G. Mayer, *Bismarck und Lassalle* (1927).

His policy also provided a definite alternative to liberalism. During the last years of his life when he was prepared to contemplate insurance against unemployment and when he talked of the "right to work" as enthusiastically as any Chartist, he was reflecting that sharp reaction against economic liberalism which could be discerned, in different forms, in almost every country in Europe. Disraeli's social policy in his ministry of 1874-1880 had somewhat similar features. It also had the added interest of appearing to realize hopes first formulated by Disraeli in the age of Oastler and the Chartists. In 1874 also a royalist and clerical majority in the French National Assembly carried a factory act, limiting hours of work of children below the age of twelve, which went further than a law of 1848 on the same subject. A later and more comprehensive act of 1892 was the work of Conservative Republicans. The nineteenth century closed with a British Money-lenders Act which, Professor Clapham has argued, in effect revived the medieval law of usury, the last remnants of which had been swept away, it was thought for ever, in 1854 (54).

Medieval attitudes to "welfare" were echoed most strongly in Christian apologetics. Papal encyclicals, notably *Rerum Novarum* (1891), were not only manifestos in crusades against liberalism or socialism but were also important documents in the evolution of *Sozialpolitik*. De Mun, Von Ketteler and Von Vogelsang were writers who advocated particular or general "welfare" policies : so did Heinrich Pesch, who has been singled out for special treatment by Schumpeter. Among Protestants also there was renewed call for a "social gospel". It is not without interest that Lohmann, who had advised Bismarck and went on to advise William II in the formulation of the far-reaching Labour Code of 1891, was a deeply religious man, the son of a Westphalian Lutheran pastor. Canon W. L. Blackley (1830-1902), the pioneer of old age pensions schemes not only in Britain but in other parts of the world and the founder of the National Providence League, was an honorary canon of Winchester Cathedral. On the Liberal side—and there was a close association in Britain between religious nonconformity and political liberalism—Seebohm Rowntree (1871-1954), one of the first systematic investigators of the facts of poverty, was a Quaker. The whole attack on the limitations of the poor law was guided, though not exclusively, by men of strong religious principles.

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(53) Dawson, *op. cit.* p. 35. This remark was made in 1884. Five years earlier the Emperor, referring to the anti-socialist law of 1878, had said, "a remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of socialistic excesses ; there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes". (quoted *ibid.* p. 110).

(54) J. H. Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, vol. III (1938), p. 445.

V

The complexity of the nineteenth-century background contrasts at first sight with the simplicity of the twentieth-century story. For a tangle of tendencies we have a "trend", a trend culminating in greater "order" and simplification. In fact, however, the twentieth-century story has its own complexities, which are now in the process of being unravelled. Professor Titmuss has shown, for instance, that Lloyd George's national health insurance legislation of 1911, a landmark in "trend" legislation, was the culmination of a long and confused period in which doctors had been engaged in a "Hobbesian struggle for independence from the power and authority exercised over their lives, their work and their professional values by voluntary associations and private enterprise". He has maintained that the legislation of 1911 can only be understood if it is related, as so much else in the twentieth century must be related, to the history of hidden pressures from established interests and a sectional demand for an "enlargement of professional freedom" (55). Many of the complexities of twentieth-century history certainly lie buried in the records of the network of private concerns and of professional groups which came into existence in the nineteenth century. There can be no adequate historical explanation which concerns itself in large terms with the state alone. Just as the administration of "welfare" is complicated in practice and can be understood only in detail, so the outline of "welfare state" legislation only becomes fully intelligible when it ceases to be an outline, and when it looks beyond parliamentary legislation to such crucial twentieth-century relationships as those between governments and pressure groups and "experts" and the "public".

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(55) R. M. Titmuss, "Health", in Ginsberg (ed.), *Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century*, p. 308. Cf. p. 313: "The fundamental issue of 1911 was not [...] between individualism and collectivism, between contract and status; but between different forms of collectivism, different degrees of freedom; open or concealed power."

Yet there are five factors in twentieth-century "welfare" history (other than warfare, one of the most powerful of factors) which are beyond dispute and dominant enough to need little detailed research. They are, first, the basic transformation in the attitude towards poverty, which made the nineteenth-century poor law no longer practicable in democratic societies; second, the detailed investigation of the "social contingencies" which directed attention to the need for particular social policies; third, the close association between unemployment and welfare policy; fourth, the development within market capitalism itself of "welfare" philosophies and practices; and fifth, the influence of working-class pressures on the content and tone of "welfare" legislation.

The first and second of these five factors can scarcely be studied in isolation. The basis of the nineteenth-century British poor law of 1834 was economic logic. That logic was strained when empirical sociologists, like Charles Booth (1840-1916) and Rowntree, showed that a large number of poor people were poor through no fault of their own but because of tendencies within the market system. They pitted statistics against logic by attempting to count how many people were living in poverty and by surveying the various forms that the poverty assumed (56). Prior to Booth's "grand inquest", Beatrice Webb wrote, "neither the individualist nor the socialist could state with any approach to accuracy what exactly was condition of the people of England" (57). Once the results of the "inquest" had been published "the net effect was to give an entirely fresh impetus to the general adoption of the policy of securing to every individual, as the very basis of his life and work, a prescribed natural minimum of the requisites for efficient parenthood and citizenship".

Booth's thinking about economics was far less radical than his thinking about "welfare", but Rowntree, who drew a neat distinction between "primary" and "secondary" poverty, the former being beyond the control of the wage-earner, went on to advocate specific "welfare" policies, ranging from old-age pensions to family allowances, public-provided housing to supervised "welfare" conditions in factories. The policies which he urged at various stages of his long life were, indeed, the main constituent policies of the "welfare state" (58). Like the "welfare state", however, Rowntree stopped short of socialism. He separated questions of "welfare" from questions of economic power, and remained throughout his life a "new Liberal". The main tenet of his liberalism was that the community could not afford the "waste", individual and social, which was implied in an industrial society divided "naturally" into "rich" and "very poor". Poverty was as much of a social problem as "pauperism". The roots of poverty were to be found not in individual irresponsibility or incapacity but in social maladjustment. Poverty, in short, was not the fault of the poor : it was the fault of society. Quite apart from "socialist pressure", society had to do something about poverty once it was given facts about its extent, its incidence (Rowntree drew attention to the cycle of poverty in families), its ramifications and its consequences. All facts were grist to the mill. They included facts not only about wages but about nutrition : subsistence levels could only be measured when nutritional criteria were taken into account.

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(56) C. Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London*, 17 vols. (1892-1903); B. S. Rowntree, *Poverty : A Study of Town Life* (1901).

(57) B. Webb, *My Apprenticeship* (1926), p. 239.

Sharp turns of thought about poverty were by no means confined to people in Britain. There were signs of fundamental re-thinking, allied as we have seen to "feeling" (59), both in Europe and the United States at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century (60). The survey method, which Booth and Rowntree depended upon, was capable of general applicability (61). The limitations of systematic "charity" were noted at least as generally as the limitations of unsystematic charity had been at the beginning of the industrial age. It is no coincidence that in Britain and Sweden, two countries with distinct "welfare" histories, there was keen debate about the poor law at almost exactly the same time. In Sweden the Poor Relief Order of 1871, with its checks on poor relief, was criticised by the Swedish Poor Relief Association which was formed at the first General Swedish Poor Law Congress in 1906. A year later the government appointed a committee to draw up proposals for fresh legislation governing poor relief and the treatment of vagrants. In Britain the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, which was appointed in 1905 and reported in 1909, covered almost all topics in social policy. The issues were clearly stated and both the social contingencies and the necessary policies of social control were carefully examined. Although new direct legislation was slow to come in both countries, there was much indirect legislation and in both countries there were demands for what Beatrice Webb called "an enforced minimum of civilised life" (62).

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(58) For Booth, see T. S. and M. B. Simey *Charles Booth, Social Scientist* (1960) ; for Rowntree, see A. Briggs, *Seebohm Rowntree* (1961). See also B. S. Rowntree and G. R. Lavers, *Poverty and the Welfare State* (1951).

(59) "In intensity of feeling", Booth wrote, " and not in statistics, lies the power to move the world. But by statistics must this power be guided if it would move the world aright" (*Life and Labour, Final Volume, Notes on Social Influences and Conclusion* (1903), p. 178).

(60) See *inter alia* C. L. Mowat, *The Charity Organisation Society;* K. de Schweinitz, *England's Road to Social Security* (1943) ; C. W. Pitkin, *Social Politics and Modern Democracies*, 2 vols. (1931), vol. II being concerned with France ; R. H. Bremner, *From the Depths; The Discovery of Poverty in the United States* (1956).

(61) See M. Abrams, *Social Surveys and Social Action* (1951) ; P. V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research* (1950) ; D. C. Caradog Jones, *Social Surveys* (1955).

The main threat to that minimum in the later twentieth century came from "mass involuntary unemployment". This, of course, was a world phenomenon which strained poor law and social service systems in most countries and presented a threat—or a challenge—to politicians and administrators. In Britain, which was the first country to introduce compulsory unemployment insurance (1911; greatly extended in 1920), the system of relief broke down under the stresses of the 1930s. Insurance benefits, linked to contributions, were stringently restricted, and while tussles about the "means test" were leading to extreme differences of outlook between socialists and their opponents, an Unemployment Assistance Board, founded in 1934, was providing a second-line income maintenance service, centrally administered. In Europe there was an extension of unemployment aid schemes, whether by insurance (the Swedes, for example, introduced state-subsidized unemployment insurance in 1934), "doles" or in certain cases "positive" state-run schemes of "public works". In the United States and Canada, where there had been entrenched resistance to government intervention in "welfare" provision, new legislation was passed (63), while in New Zealand, which had long lost its reputation as a pioneer of "welfare", there was a remarkable bout of state intervention after the return of a Labour government to power in 1935. The Social Security Act of 1938 contained a list of health services and pensions benefits which, while resting on previous legislation, were everywhere hailed as a bold and daring experiment. The Minister of Finance anticipated later "welfare" legislators in other countries by arguing unequivocally that "to suggest the inevitability of slumps and booms, associated as they are with affluence for a limited number during a period, and followed by unemployment, destitution, hardship and privation for the masses, is to deny all conscious progressive purpose" (64). According to the I.L.O., the 1938 New Zealand Act "has, more than any other law, determined the practical meaning of social security, and so has deeply influenced the course of legislation in other countries" (65).

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(62) The British controversy is well described in U. Cormack, "The Welfare State", *Loch Memorial Lecture* (1953). For Sweden, see The Royal Social Board, *Social Work and Legislation in Sweden* (1938).

(63) Mendelsohn, *op. cit.* ch. III: J. C. Brown, *Public Relief*, 1929-39 (1940); E. A. Williams, *Federal Aid for Relief* (1939); P. H. Douglas, *Social Security in the United States* (1939 edn.).

Twentieth-century social security legislation raises many interesting general issues—the relevance of the insurance principle, for example, the relationship between "negative" social policy and "positive" economic policy, and, underlying all else, the nature and extent of the responsibilities of the state. Insurance principles, actuarially unsound though they may be and inadequate though they have proved as instruments of finance at moments of crisis, have been historically significant. They removed the stigma of pauperism from a social service, reconciled "voluntary" and "compulsory" approaches to provision, and facilitated "public approval" of state expenditures which otherwise would have been challenged. They thus served as a link between old ways of thinking ("self-help" and " mutual help") and new. "Positive" economic policy was in the first instance, as in Roosevelt's America, the child of improvisation : its systematic justification had to await revolutions in political economy (Keynes and after) which accompanied shifts in social power. The difference in tone and content between two books by William Beveridge—his *Unemployment* (1909) and his *Full Employment in a Free Society* (1944)—is one of the best indications of the change in the world of ideas between the early and middle periods of the twentieth century. "Beveridgism", an important British phenomenon during the Second World War, had sufficient popular appeal to show that the world of ideas and the world of practical politics were not very far apart. For the intellectuals and for the public the magnification of governmental power—and the enormous increase in government expenditure financed from taxation—were taken for granted.

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(64) Quoted in W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. II. (1940), p. 275.

(65) I.L.O., *Social Security in New Zealand* (1949), p. 111.

The fourth and fifth factors are also related to each other. In all advanced industrial countries in the twentieth century there has been a movement towards "welfare" in industry—"industrial betterment" it was originally called—which has been accompanied by the emergence of philosophies of "human relations", "welfare management" and industrial and labour psychology (66). The movement has to be explained in terms of both economics and politics. A "managerial revolution", limited though it may have been in its economic effects, has accelerated the tendencies making for "welfare capitalism". The need to find acceptable incentives for workers, to avoid labour disputes and to secure continuous production, to raise output in phases of technical change and (more recently) to hold labour "permissively" in a period of full employment has often driven where "human relations" philosophies have failed to inspire. "Welfare", a word which was often resented by workers, when it was applied within the structure of the firm, was, indeed, used in a business context before it began to be applied to a new kind of state. Within state schemes of "welfare" employers have made, and are expected to make sizeable contributions. In France and Italy, in particular, obligatory social charges as a percentage of assessable wages constituted the main source of "welfare" expenditure (67). In the United States business rather than the state was, and is expected, directly to provide a network of "welfare" services. As in all such situations, the provision of "welfare" varies immensely from one firm (giant businesses are at one end of the scale) to another.

> In contrast to these countries, such as Great Britain, which appear to regard government (for reasons which have been stated above) merely as the most effective of several possible institutions for the administration of income security programmes or the provision of services, [...] a society like the United States that distrusts

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(66) See A. Briggs, "The Social Background", in H. Clegg and A. Flanders (eds.), *Industrial Relations in Great Britain* (1955); L. Urwick and E.F.L. Brech, *The Human Factor in Management*, 1795-1943 (1944); E. D. Proud, *Welfare Work, Employers' Experiments for Improving Working Conditions in Factories* (1916); E. T. Kelly (ed.), *Welfare Work in Industry* (1925); P. E. P., "The Human Factor in Industry" (*Planning*, March, 1948).

(67) P. E. P., "Free Trade and Security" (*Planning*, July 1957); "A Comparative Analysis of the Cost of Social Security" in *International Labour Review* (1953).

> its government is likely to seek to organise its social security services in such a way as to keep government activity to a minimum (68).

United States experience, in contrast to the experience described in other countries, shows that this likelihood has been converted into fact.

It is not accidental that the labour movement in the United States has showed little interest in socialism and that its leaders have chosen of their own volition to bargain for "fringe benefits" at the level of the plant. In most European countries, particularly in Britain and in Scandinavia, there has been a tendency for working-class pressures to lead to greater state intervention. In Britain nineteenth-century patterns of "mutual dependence" through "voluntary action", which impressed so many observers from Tocqueville onwards, have become less dominant, except in the field of industrial relations where they have very tenaciously survived (69).

As we have seen, the demand for state action has been related to the rights of citizenship, to equality as well as to security. During the critical period between the two World Wars, when economic and social conditions were very difficult, "welfare" measures were demanded and provided "piecemeal" with varying conditions of regulation and administration, "a frightening complexity of eligibility and benefit according to individual circumstances, local boundaries, degrees of need and so forth" (70). The Second World War, which sharpened the sense of "democracy", led to demands both for "tidying up" and for "comprehensiveness". It encouraged the move from "minima" to "optima", at least in relation to certain specified services, and it made all residual paternalisms seem utterly inadequate and increasingly archaic. It was in the light of changes in working-class life within a more "equal community" that post-war writers noted the extent to which the social services of the earlier part of the century had been shaped by assumptions about the nature of man, "founded on outer rather than on inner observation", on the "norms of behaviour expected by one class from another" (71). This period of criticism has already ended. The assumptions which shaped the "welfare state" have themselves been criticized (72), and radical political slogans have concentrated more and more on differences of income between "mature" and "under-developed" countries rather than on differences within "mature" countries themselves.

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(68) E. M. Burns, *Social Security and Public Policy* (1956), p. 274.

(69) For the nature of the nineteenth-century pattern, see J. M. Baernreither, *English Associations of Working Men* (1893). For industrial relations, see Clegg and Flanders, *op. cit.*

(70) R. M. Titmuss, *Essays on the Welfare State*, pp. 21-22.

(71) *Ibid.* p. 19.

It may well be that in a world setting the five twentieth-century factors discussed in this article will be considered less important than other factors—the total size of the national income in different countries, for example, and the share of that income necessary for industrial (as, or when, distinct from social) investment, or even, on a different plane, the nature of family structure. Is not the making of the industrial "welfare state" in part at least the concomitant of the decline of the large, extended "welfare family"? How far has the pressure of women (or just the presence of women voters) in industrial societies encouraged the formulation of "welfare" objectives? The historian does well to leave such large questions to be answered rather than to suggest that all or even the most important part of the truth is already known.

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(72) See A. Peacock, "The Welfare Society", *Unservile State Papers* (1960); R. M. Titmuss, "The Irresponsible Society", *Fabian Tracts* (1960); J. Saville, "The Welfare State" in *The New Reasoner*, No. 3, (1957).

ERIK BOETTCHER

Soziale Marktwirtschaft oder Wohlfahrtsstaat? Die deutsche Erfahrung

DIE Frage kann nach über einem Jahrzehnt in Deutschland praktizierter Marktwirtschaft überraschen, und sicherlich wird es viele geben, die ihre Berechtigung rundweg leugnen werden, nämlich zu prüfen, wieweit die Struktur der Marktwirtschaft schon von wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Elementen überwuchert wurde. Wir wollen nicht versuchen, das Problem exakt zu lösen, vielmehr geht es darum zu zeigen, daß hier überhaupt ein Problem vorliegt, dessen Bedeutung in der heutigen deutschen Sozialpolitik nicht recht erkannt zu sein scheint.

I. *Prinzipien der Sozialpolitik.*

Das ist umso überraschender, als gerade in Deutschland die theoretisierende Beschäftigung mit dem Gegenstand eher zu Hause ist als anderswo. Das was man hier unter Sozialpolitik versteht, gibt es überall in der Welt, ordnet es jedoch nicht zentral unter einen Begriff, sondern betreibt es unter verschiedenen Aspekten ohne theoretischen Zusammenhalt. Schon traditionell hat man sich daran gewöhnt, hier genau zwischen Versorgung, Fürsorge und Versicherung zu unterscheiden.

Die Versorgung umfaßt Maßnahmen für Bedienstete des Staates, also Beamte, für ausgediente — also solche, die ein bestimmtes Dienstalter erreicht haben —, für nicht dienstfähige — also solche, die vorzeitig krank oder invalide wurden — und für Angehörige, insbesondere Witwen und Waisen. Begründet wird die Versorgung mit der Treuepflicht des Staates, für jene und für deren Angehörige zu sorgen, die ihm ein Arbeitsleben lang gedient haben. Der Personenkreis ist genau festgelegt, die Leistungen werden in Prozenten der letzten Gehaltsstufe bemessen, die Finanzierung erfolgt aus

Archiv. europ. sociol., II (1961), 259-267.

allgemeinen Steuermitteln. Der einst beliebige »Gnadenakt« des Fürsten ist durch einen einklagbaren »Anspruch« fixiert.

Die Fürsorge kennt demgegenüber keinen beruflich fixierten Personenkreis, sondern orientiert sich an individuellen Notlagen. Die Höhe der einzelnen Leistung wird einerseits danach bemessen, wieviel zur Beseitigung der Notlage erforderlich ist, andererseits wird sie durch die von privater und und staatlicher Seite aufgebrachten Gesamtmittel begrenzt. Einen einklagbaren Anspruch gibt es nur auf Hilfe allgemein, nicht aber auf einen bestimmten Betrag : Es wird soviel und solange geholfen, bis der Hilfsbedürftige sich wieder selber helfen kann, wieder auf eigenen Beinen steht.

Die Sozialversicherung stellt den Versuch dar, das Institut einer privatrechtlichen Gefahrengemeinschaft in den Rahmen staatlicher Maßnahmen einzubeziehen. Eine Gefahrengemeinschaft bedeutet zunächst, daß viele mit relativ kleinen Beiträgen für Notlagen eintreten, die ein jedes Mitglied treffen können, aber nur für eine begrenzte Anzahl wahrscheinlich sind. Im Schadensfall kommt dann die Gemeinschaft für den Schaden des einen geschädigten Mitglieds auf. Als Altersversicherung leistet die arbeitende Generation für die nicht mehr arbeitende und erwirbt damit einen Anspruch für das eigene Alter, aus den Leistungen der folgenden Generation ernährt zu werden. Als sich das Kaiserreich vor die Aufgabe gestellt sah, etwas gegen die Armut der Fabrikarbeiterschaft zu tun, weil sie ein Erstarken der damals noch revolutionären Sozialdemokratie befürchtete, wählte sie den damals neuen Weg der Versicherung. Aus gutem Grund. Fürsorgerische Maßnahmen waren nicht gut möglich, weil die Armut der Arbeiter keine individuelle, sondern eine kollektive Notlage darstellte und die Integration der Arbeiter als Staatsbürger nicht durch Abstempelung als kollektive Fürsorgeempfänger noch weiter erschwert werden sollte. Andererseits konnte man die in privaten Unternehmungen beschäftigten Arbeiter nicht gut zu Versorgungsberechtigten ernennen. Von der privaten Versicherung unterscheidet sich die staatliche durch ihren Zwangscharakter, bis zu einer gesetzlich festgelegten Einkommensgrenze wird jeder Staatsbürger zwangsweise erfaßt. Das soziale Moment hat zwei Kennzeichen, die Zuschüsse zur Erhöhung des Gesamtaufkommens (Arbeitgeberbeiträge und Staatszuschüsse) und eine Umverteilung der Leistungen, indem Beiträge aus höheren Einkommen für eine Erhöhung der Leistungen an Versicherte mit niedrigeren Einkommen verwendet werden.

Diese hier skizzierten Unterscheidungskriterien sozialpolitischer

Maßnahmen sind als institutionelle Sicherungen des Staatsbürgers vor willkürlichen Entscheidungen der Exekutive anzusehen.

Daneben gibt es eine ausgebaute ethische Begründung für die Grenze, bis zu der staatliche Hilfe gehen darf, die allgemein im akademischen Unterricht benutzt wird und auf die sich Sozialpolitiker gleich welcher sonstiger Parteienbindungen unterschiedslos berufen.

Beliebtes Demonstrationsobjekt als einer analogen Situation ist die Fürsorgepflicht der Eltern gegenüber ihren Kindern. Sie habe zu enden, sobald die Kinder mündig geworden sind und sich selber ernähren können. Dabei sei nicht so sehr der Aspekt der Entlastung der Eltern wesentlich, als vielmehr der der Belastung der Kinder, falls die Fürsorge fortgesetzt werden müsse, da eine solche fortgesetzte Hilfe Indiz für einen Mangel, ja einen Makel sei. Sie würde ja doch nur notwendigerweise gehandhabt, wenn physische oder psychische Unfähigkeit zu einem »für-sich-selbst-sorgen-können« vorliege. Zugleich bestehe die Gefahr, daß eine zu nachhaltige, zu eindringliche Fürsorge die Entwicklung zur Mündigkeit verhindert und damit zur Persönlichkeit, die Würde in dem Sinne trägt, daß sie die Möglichkeiten zu eigener Freiheit wahrnimmt.

Auch der Staat habe entsprechend zu verfahren. Einerseits dürfe er sich seiner Pflicht, dem einzelnen zu helfen, nicht entziehen. Kennzeichen eines funktionierenden Gemeinwesens sei, daß alle für einen eintreten (das Solidaritätsprinzip als Begründung der Sozialpolitik). Andererseits habe auch der einzelne durch eigene Beiträge für das Funktionieren des Ganzen beizutragen, diese Pflicht dürfte ihm nicht genommen werden, er dürfe in ihrer Ausübung nicht behindert werden. Sozialpolitik solle nach Möglichkeit nur zur Erneuerung der Möglichkeit einer eigenen Leistung gehandhabt werden. Sozialpolitische Maßnahmen sollen dort beginnen, wo eine Eigenleistung noch nicht zu erwarten ist und enden, sobald sie wieder möglich ist. (Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip als Begründung des Mittelprogramms der Sozialpolitik). Denn nur so würde die soziale Mündigkeit des Bürgers zur Wahrnehmung der eigenen Freiheit bewahrt.

2. *Die Praxis der Sozialpolitik.*

Wir wollen uns hier nun nicht auf eine Diskussion darüber einlassen, ob das vorhin Gesagte richtig ist und ob es für die Praxis der Sozialpolitik ausreicht. Es sollte nur die herrschende Meinung ausgesprochen werden, und ich glaube nicht zu irren, wenn ich sage, daß im letzten Jahrzehnt die Konstruktion der Sozialpolitik in der rechtlichen Abgrenzung dreier Stockwerke, Versorgung, Fürsorge und Versicherung, verstanden wurde, wodurch eigentlich Überschneidungen und Verquickungen ausgeschlossen sein sollten.

Im Kaiserreich wurde mit der Schaffung des zusätzlichen Instituts der Sozialversicherung eine liberale Lösung der Arbeiterfrage angestrebt, die auch im Sinne der vorstehend umrissenen Begründung der Sozialpolitik eine Regelung versuchte, die — nicht fürsorgerisch — den Beitrag anderer (des Staates und der Arbeitgeber) bewußt auf ein allenfalls erforderliches Minimum beschränkte und die Integration der Arbeiter in den Staat durch Sicherung ihrer Existenz ohne Verletzung ihrer Würde anstrebte.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch von 1945 bestand in Deutschland eine weitverbreitete Stimmung gegen eine Bevormundung durch den Staat. Niederlage und Zerstörung hatten desillusionierend gewirkt, man hatte die vergangene Praxis totalitärer Politik bis zum Überdruß satt, wodurch bei der Neukonstruktion der Demokratie jene das Mehrheitsvotum der Wähler erhielten, die konsequent eine liberale Politik vertraten. Das Terrain auch für eine liberale Sozialpolitik neben einer liberalen Wirtschaftspolitik war also besonders günstig. Das Programm einer »sozialen Marktwirtschaft« kann man als eine Antwort auf diese doppelte Herausforderung ansehen. Wie kam es dennoch dazu, daß gegen die in der theoretischen Diskussion nicht bezweifelten Prinzipien der Sozialpolitik in der Praxis ständig verstoßen wurde? Ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit erheben zu wollen, seien nun folgende für schwerwiegend angesehene Erfahrungen aufgezeigt.

a) *Versagen des Versicherungsprinzips.*

Die Möglichkeiten des Versicherungsprinzips als Instrument der Sozialpolitik sind offensichtlich überschätzt worden. Konzipiert wurde es für das Institut der Altersrente, und hier hat es funktioniert, weil die Lebenserwartung eine schätzbare Größe ist, von der aus Beitragsaufkommen und Leistungsvolumen vorausgeschätzt werden können. Hierfür lagen schon genügend Erfahrungen von privaten Lebensversicherungen vor. Entsprechendes gilt auch für die Invaliditätsversicherung, denn trotz Verschiebungen durch die Entwicklung der Technik, bleibt der Umfang einer zu erwartenden Invalidität innerhalb von Fehlergrenzen doch vorausschätzbar.

Versagt hat die Versicherung erstmalig vor aller Augen als Arbeitslosenversicherung. Das Kaiserreich hatte sie als letzte Maßnahme nur geplant, erst die Weimarer Republik hat sie eingeführt. Aber in der Weltwirtschaftskrise erwies es sich, daß bei Anschwellen der Arbeitslosigkeit die Kassen der Versicherung sich bedenklich leerten. Wohl hatte die Versicherung sich in den Jahren davor bemüht, Kapitalreserven anzulegen, indem die Beiträge so hoch bemessen wurden, daß Überschüsse entstanden. Diese waren jedoch angelegt, teils in öffentlichen Gebäuden, die nicht veräußerlich waren. Sofern die Anlage über den Kapitalmarkt bei privaten Unternehmungen erfolgt war, konnte eine Kündigung der Kredite die betroffenen Unternehmungen nur in Liquiditätsschwierigkeiten bringen, und die dadurch erneut angewachsene Zahl von Arbeitslosen hätte den Zwang zur Beschaffung neuer Mittel bedeutet. Damit ist ein Todeszirkel bezeichnet, der im Rahmen einer Versicherung unlösbar ist, weil das Gefahrenmoment von externen Faktoren abhängt, die nur mit Mitteln außerhalb der Versicherung bekämpft werden können, nämlich denen der Wirtschaftspolitik. Die daraus gezogenen Konsequenzen waren einerseits notwendig, andererseits verderblich : um die schrumpfende Zahl der Beschäftigten nicht mit steigenden Beiträgen belasten zu müssen, damit die wachsende Zahl der Arbeitslosen ernährt werden konnte, erfolgte ein Rückgriff auf allgemeine Steuermittel. Damit aber wurde die Hilfe für Arbeitslose zugleich zu einem Instrument der Fürsorge.

Ein weiteres Versagen des Versicherungsprinzips erwies sich deutlich erst im letzten Jahrzehnt bei der sozialen Krankenversicherung. Krankheit ist kein eindeutig definierbarer Tatbestand, was im Grunde auch für Alter nicht zutrifft. Während aber gesetzlich festgelegt werden kann, von welchem Lebensjahr an ein Ausscheiden aus dem Beruf erfolgen soll (etwa 65 Jahre), so ist es unmöglich festzulegen, bei welchem Grad etwa eines Unwohlseins, einer Verletzung usw. ein Arzt aufgesucht werden kann. In einer Gefahrengemeinschaft wird Risikoausgleich aufgehoben, sobald eine zunehmende Zahl Versicherter sich bemüht, hier durch Inanspruchnahme ärztlicher Dienste, wenigstens den Gegenwert der Beiträge wiedererstattet zu bekommen. In dem Falle müssen entweder die Beiträge steigen bis zum wirklichen Wert einer jeden individuellen Behandlung, oder aber die Qualität der Behandlung, der verabfolgten Medizin muß gesenkt werden, in der Tendenz bis zum Wert einer Bagatellbehandlung. In dem hier Gesagten liegt die eigentliche Problematik der sozialen Krankenversicherung, aus dem ein Ausweg bislang noch nicht gefunden werden konnte. Hinzukommt, daß die Krankenkasse auch mit der Zahlung von Krankengeldern belastet ist, so daß auch hier die reine Versicherung mit fürsorgerischen Elementen verquickt ist.

b) *Unangemessene Anwendung des Versorgungs- und Versicherungsprinzips.*

Erheblich zu weiterer Vermengung beigetragen hat die Lösung der sogenannten Vertriebenenfrage. Sicherlich gehört es zu den Großleistungen der Bundesrepublik, daß es ihr gelungen ist, Millionen von Flüchtlingen und Heimkehrern in das Gefüge der Arbeitsbevölkerung zu integrieren. Es wurde aber der Weg eingeschlagen, für jeden neu auftretenden Tatbestand ein Sondergesetz zu schaffen. Bei der Vielfalt der Einzelregelungen wird die Höhe der Leistung überwiegend nach juristischen Gesichtspunkten bemessen. Es wird ein Verlust im Kriege oder durch die Vertreibung als Vorleistung deklariert, die entweder zu einem Versicherungs- oder einem Versorgungsanspruch führt. Hierbei ist die ursprüngliche Übersichtlichkeit des Systems verloren gegangen. Es wurden allein beispielsweise 109 verschiedene Kombinationsarten eines Mehrfachbezugs von Leistungen an Witwen geschaffen, und es ist schwer vorstellbar, daß damit noch etwas Sinnvolles erreicht wird. Es wird eine wachsende Streitmacht von Angestellten beschäftigt, um Anrechnungsbestimmungen anzuwenden, deren zusätzliche Aufgabe darin besteht, eine nach Sachverhalten gerechtfertigte Verteilung von Einkommen vorzutäuschen. Damit über Berechtigungen auf Mehrfachbezug von Leistungen keine übermäßig hohen Leistungen auf die einzelne Person entfallen können, sind in die einzelnen Gesetze Anrechnungsbestimmungen aufgenommen worden. Rund 30% aller Berechtigten erhalten mehr als eine Rente, was bedeutet, daß diese dann auf eine mittlere Höhe gekürzt werden. Sollen nun z.B. die Renten einer Gruppe erhöht werden, so kann das Vorhaben bei allen jenen nicht ausgeführt werden, die noch aus anderen Gründen eine Leistung beziehen. Sicherlich wollte man durch analoge Anwendung von Versicherung und Versorgung die psychologische Wirkung einer fürsogerischen Bevormundung vermeiden. Wird das aber wirklich erreicht, und wird nicht gerade so das Erlebnis öffentlicher Willkür vermittelt? Ganz abgesehen davon, daß Vielfalt und Kompliziertheit der Gesetzestexte, ihre häufige Änderung, es dem einzelnen unmöglich machen, sie fortlaufend zu verfolgen und Ansprüche geltend zu machen. So kann es immer wieder vorkommen, daß manche durch die feingesponnenen Maschen der Gesetze fallen und die Geschicktesten, die nicht immer die Bedürftigsten zu sein brauchen, belohnt werden.

Dabei ist zu bedenken, daß die Vielfalt der Regelungen gerade deshalb zustande kam, weil man der Vielfalt der menschlichen Nöte gerecht werden wollte. Aber man erkannte nicht : »Nur wo ein zentralisiertes, schematisiertes und technisiertes Informationssystem existiert, entsteht Spielraum für Ermessensentscheidungen, die dem einzelnen Menschen gerecht werden. Nur eine übersichtliche Bürokratie ist beherrschbar. Nur wer die Bürokratie beherrscht, behauptet sich ihr gegenüber. Eine wuchernde Bürokratie frißt jeden, ob er sie liebt oder haßt« (1).

c) *Unsoziale Eigentumspolitik.*

Die vorhin genannten Argumente betrafen eine Entwicklung, die die Klarheit des Systems, die einmal bestanden hatte, zu verwischen droht. Wir nehmen nun ein bereits genanntes Argument wieder auf und fragen nach seinen weiteren Konsequenzen. Die Arbeitslosenversicherung wurde vorhin als eine Institution beschrieben, die in Zeiten hoher Beschäftigung das Beitragsaufkommen zum größten Teil der Bestimmung entsprechend nicht zu verteilen vermag, während in Zeiten hoher Arbeitslosigkeit das Aufkommen nicht ausreicht. Auch die Alters- und Invalidenversicherung kumuliert in der Regel Überschüsse, da ein künftiger Ausschüttungsbedarf niemals genau vorausberechnet werden kann und man darum lieber mehr als zu wenig in den Kassen haben will. Wir sagten ferner, daß Teile — und es sind recht beträchtliche Teile — auf dem freien Kapitalmarkt für Anlagen bereitgestellt werden. Die Konsequenz dessen ist, daß Arbeitnehmer mit ihren Sozialbeiträgen Investitionen finanzieren, die nicht ihr Eigentum werden, sondern lediglich zum Anwachsen sowieso schon großer Eigentumsballungen weiter beitragen. Dieser Umstand und vor allem seine Tragweite scheinen erst in den letzten Jahren in das Bewußtsein verantwortlicher Kreise getreten zu sein. Es gibt zur Zeit eine große Diskussion über diesen Tatbestand unter dem Schlagwort der »Eigentumsbildung in Arbeiterhand«. Das Bemerkenswerte an dieser Diskussion ist, daß wieder nur nach zusätzlichen Lösungen gesucht wird (Volksaktie), nicht aber nach einer Rückkoppelung auf ihre Ursachen.

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(1) Hans Paul BAHRDT, »Förderung junger Menschen heute« oder »Rationalisierung des Studiums«, in *Deutsches Studentenwerk 1921-1961 Festschrift zum vierzig-jährigen Bestehen* (Bonn, 1961), S. 12-13.

3. *Unfreiwillige Wohlfahrtspolitik.*

Fassen wir nun zusammen, so scheinen folgende Schlußfolgerungen gerechtfertigt :

1. Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik sind in der Bundesrepublik auf zwei verschiedenen Geleisen betrieben worden. Was für den liberalen Grundcharakter der Wirtschaftspolitik verbindlich war, hat für die Sozialpolitik nicht gegolten, obwohl gerade hier die Anknüpfung an traditionelle Vorbilder möglich war und eine gedanklich-theoretische Gliederung hierfür parat war, zu der sich praktisch alle Verantwortlichen bereitwillig bekannten.

2. Die ursprüngliche Trennschärfe zwischen den traditionellen Institutionen der Sozialpolitik (Versorgung, Fürsorge und Versicherung) ist durch den Ausbau des sozialpolitischen Apparates fast vollständig verschwunden.

Daraus ergibt sich eine eigenartig paradoxe Situation, daß niemand in der Bundesrepublik eine wohlfahrtsstaatliche Bevormundung der einzelnen Bürger wirklich will, eine solche aber in zunehmendem Maß praktiziert wird. Die zweite Paradoxie ist darin zu sehen, daß es gerade der juristische Intellekt war, dem man nachsagt, daß es ihm vor allem auf klare Scheidung von Kompetenzen ankommt, und der doch im wesentlichen zur Vermengung einzelner Prinzipien beigetragen hat.

Vielleicht genügen für einen ersten Versuch die folgenden Hinweise.

a) Der »Hilfe-Gedanke« in der Sozialpolitik ist nur in der Grundsatzkonzeption enthalten, tritt jedoch — mit Ausnahme bei der Fürsorge — bei der Versorgung und bei der Versicherung in den Hintergrund. Der Staatsbeamte, der eine Rente berechnet oder einen Krankenschein ausstellt, fragt nicht nach einem Hilfebedürfnis, sondern lediglich nach einem Anspruch, den er allgemein nach der vorhandenen Rechtssatzung und nach der individuellen Vorleistung (gezahlte Beiträge, oder analog ausgelegte vergangene Verluste) prüft. Die Sozialgesetzgebung hat sich an

Gruppennotständen orientiert und hat sich vor allem bemüht, für Schalterbeamte leicht prüfbare Tatbestände in Rechtssatzungen zu liefern. Der juristische Sachverstand prüft gegebene Tatbestände (etwa auch gegebener Not) nach der vorgegebenen Struktur des allgemeinen Rechts und strebt Lösungen traditionell in diesem Rahmen, gegebenenfalls in seiner Erweiterung an. Eine Änderung des Rechts ist eine politische Frage, die ein Jurist (wenigstens in Deutschland) auch nur selten erkennt, wenn er einmal auf eine politische Plattform (etwa das Parlament) gestiegen ist.

b) Vielleicht liegt hier wirklich ein Ansatz für eine Erklärung, es kann aber nur ein Ansatz sein, denn unklar muß bleiben, warum das alles bisher widerspruchslos hingenommen wurde. D.h. an Widerspruch hat es nicht gefehlt, er kam aber stets von außerhalb der politischen Gremien, vornehmlich aus der Wissenschaft. So bleibt letztlich nur eine Erklärung, daß in der Bundesrepublik die Bildung einer politisch verantwortlich sich fühlenden Elite noch nicht erfolgt ist, die stark genug gewesen wäre, den Teufelskreis von vielen |Einzelproblemen und Einzelkompetenzen zu durchbrechen und in eine übergreifende Konzeption zu vereinigen, oder wenigstens von einer konstruktiven Idee her die Lösung in einem Zusammenwirken juristischer, ökonomischer und anderer Aspekte zu versuchen. Ein solcher Versuch, und ein sehr hoffnungsvoller, der zudem von der Breite der Bürger bejaht wurde, ist in der Konstituierung der Marktwirtschaft ja unternommen worden. Nun droht ihr eine einschneidende Behinderung durch die Sozialpolitik, und leider nicht nur durch diese.

JEAN-DANIEL REYNAUD

La Sécurité sociale en France : du conflit doctrinal à l'affrontement des intérêts

LES principes sur lesquels a été édifié le système français de Sécurité sociale ne se sont affirmés qu'après des débats longs et souvent violents. Avant le vote de la loi sur les assurances sociales de 1930, plusieurs années s'étaient écoulées en manœuvres et contre-manœuvres parlementaires. Les médecins s'alarmaient de la présence possible d'un tiers dans leurs relations professionnelles et économiques avec leurs clients. Le patronat calculait les charges nouvelles et une partie des employeurs rameutaient les sacrés principes du libéralisme économique : la sécurité, n'était-ce pas la mort de l'initiative? A l'intérieur même du monde ouvrier, la bataille faisait rage. La C.G.T.U. dénonçait le scandale de la cotisation ouvrière : les employeurs pouvaient payer ; elle criait à l'escroquerie devant la capitalisation qui devait permettre les retraites : on se servait des ouvriers pour renforcer le grand capital ; elle s'indignait que les employeurs fussent représentés dans les caisses (1). Enfin, les formes administratives n'étaient pas à l'abri du débat : la mutualité redoutait les caisses départementales et défendait son œuvre en même temps que ses principes. Les grandes forces politiques étaient mobilisées et faisaient appel, pour défendre leurs positions, à tout un appareil doctrinal.

La loi de 1930, comme celle de 1932 sur les allocations familiales, pouvait donc à juste titre apparaître comme une conquête ouvrière. Même si les grèves ou les démonstrations massives n'étaient guère intervenues, le résultat était dû pour une bonne part à l'action tenace, informée et patiente de la C.G.T. Les ordonnances de 1945, inspirées du programme national de la Résistance, s'appuyaient

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(1) Née d'une scission de la Confédération générale du travail, la C.G.T.U. appartenait à l'Internationale syndicale rouge.

Archiv. europ. sociol. II (1961), 268-283.

de même sur un grand mouvement politique et social et profitaient de l'effacement des forces de droite. La quasi-unanimité qui les accueillit (si on laisse de côté des divergences finalement secondaires) était celle d'un élan plutôt que d'un compromis. Et l'appui chaleureux de la C.G.T. pour l'organisation des caisses montrait bien le sens de l'effort accompli et les forces qui le soutenaient.

C'est le sort normal des réformes les plus controversées que d'apparaître, après quelques années, comme une institution indiscutable ; de ce qui a été l'objet de débats de doctrine, de ne plus prêter qu'aux discussions techniques et à l'aménagement des modalités d'application. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que la Sécurité sociale ne soit plus aujourd'hui attaquée dans son principe. « Personne ne conteste aujourd'hui la nécessité de la Sécurité sociale pour la protection des familles, la sécurité de la vieillesse, la couverture des risques professionnels, la défense et l'amélioration de la santé nationale. » C'est la confédération patronale qui le déclare (2). Peut-être cependant est-il intéressant de comprendre la signification de cet accord et la portée des divergences qui subsistent. Les doctrines se sont-elles rapprochées, y a-t-il eu des conversions ou le débat a-t-il finalement changé d'objet?

La question mérite d'autant plus d'être posée que les principes ne sont pas seuls en cause. Même quand il s'agit d'avantages concrets, les réactions semblent moins violentes aujourd'hui. La suppression d'avantages secondaires dans le régime minier avait été une des raisons, en 1948, d'une grève violente qui tourna à l'épreuve de force entre gouvernement et C.G.T. A la fin de 1958, le gouvernement prend une série de mesures touchant aux prestations du régime général (notamment une franchise semestrielle sur les remboursements pharmaceutiques et une réduction d'un sixième des allocations prénatales). Ces mesures ne peuvent être que très directement ressenties par les assurés et le plafonnement de certaines dépenses dans les deux premiers trimestres de 1959 prouve qu'elles ont été efficaces. Or, bien que le mécontentement soit vif (une partie au moins des mesures prises doit être rapportée au cours de l'année), le moins qu'on puisse dire est qu'il ne s'exprime pas de manière violente. La différence des conjonctures politiques est évidente. Mais suffit-elle à tout expliquer? N'y a-t-il pas aussi, plus profondément, un changement des attitudes à l'égard de la Sécurité sociale, dont il faudrait faire l'analyse?

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(2) CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANÇAIS, *Le problème de la Sécurité sociale,* mai 1961.

1. *La « fin des idéologies ».*

Un des plus vieux débats de principe concerne la valeur de la sécurité elle-même. L'argument peut prendre des formes diverses. Économique : la sécurité endort l'initiative, l'absence de risque (ou la diminution du risque) diminue l'ardeur au travail ; ou morale : la sécurité, c'est la disparition de la responsabilité individuelle, de la fierté de se suffire, de la prévoyance. La sécurité obligatoire crée la dépendance et son cortège de laisser-aller. Le *Welfare State*, n'est-ce pas l'extension universelle de l'assistance publique?

L'expression la plus ferme de cette thèse se trouve peut-être dans la bouche de l'Association médicale mondiale :

> Plus les pouvoirs publics se substituent à l'individu pour subvenir à ses besoins, plus le sentiment de sa responsabilité personnelle s'atténue. Imposer l'assurance à ceux qui ont les moyens de subvenir à leurs besoins, c'est léser les droits et idéaux de la minorité. C'est l'opinion de l'A.M.M. que les secours de la Sécurité sociale ne devraient être attribués qu'aux individus qui sont incapables de se les procurer eux-mêmes. Quant aux autres, ils doivent rechercher la sécurité dans une économie ou dans une assurance volontaire.

Le texte reconnaît, il est vrai, que peu de gens peuvent se suffire en ce domaine, le coût des soins ayant tendance à s'élever. Mais il reste ferme sur les principes, affirme la valeur morale de la cotisation de l'assuré, et ajoute même un argument d'ordre proprement médical : « le sentiment de responsabilité personnelle [...] est un facteur puissant dans la guérison de la maladie et le recouvrement de la santé » (3).

Un profane ne saurait se prononcer sur le dernier argument, bien qu'il ne nous semble pas évident que le sentiment de responsabilité personnelle qui est à la base de la volonté de guérir, soit fondamentalement le même que celui qui pousse à contracter une assurance ou à faire des économies. Sur le fond, en revanche, il faut souligner à quel point les positions extrêmes de ce texte (la Sécurité sociale y est réduite à un secours aux indigents, même si ceux-ci, dans l'état actuel de la science médicale, deviennent très nombreux) sont démenties par l'action même des organisations médicales. Si l'obligation est un mal en soi, que faut-il penser du régime français de retraite des médecins? L'adhésion n'y est pas facultative. Faut-il donc le condamner ou conclure que les médecins ne comptent pas au nombre de « ceux qui ont les moyens de satisfaire à leurs besoins »? Un sondage d'opinion a récemment demandé aux médecins des grandes villes ce qu'ils pensaient du principe des « avantages sociaux » offerts par les nouvelles conventions : 67 % y sont favorables, relève-t-on sans surprise excessive (4). Or juristes et médecins ont souligné à l'envi le caractère statutaire de ces « conventions », dont les conditions ne peuvent guère être discutées — et ce n'est pas du côté des médecins qu'on approuve l'adhésion individuelle. Il serait cependant hasardé de conclure que les médecins ont perdu le « sentiment de leur responsabilité personnelle ». Au vrai, le texte de 1948 n'est qu'une motion de congrès, qui n'engage guère la responsabilité réelle des organisations médicales. Elle ne semble pas, en tout cas, guider efficacement leur action aujourd'hui.

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(3) « Les douze principes relatifs à la Sécurité sociale », texte adopté par l'Association mondiale médicale à son congrès de Genève, 1948. Nous citons d'après le *Concours médical*, 25 juin 1960, p. 3355.

Le principe est-il mieux défendu du côté des employeurs? De manière plus nuancée, le rapport à l'assemblée générale de l'Union des industries métallurgiques et minières, une des fédérations patronales les plus importantes, regrette l'augmentation excessive de la part des salaires indirects entre 1938 et 1951. « Les salariés s'aperçoivent [...] que cette affectation, en diminuant la part de rémunération qui correspond à la qualification et à l'activité professionnelle des travailleurs, se trouve par là même créer une autre injustice, compromet le goût au travail et finalement se retourne contre l'élévation du niveau de vie des salariés eux-mêmes » (5). Mais l'argument ne se retrouve pas dans les rapports de l'U.I.M.M. des dernières années, ni dans le texte du C.N.P.F. que nous avons déjà cité. Est-ce parce qu'une partie au moins du salaire indirect, les allocations familiales, a augmenté moins vite que le salaire direct? Est-ce parce que l'élévation des rémunérations et l'ouverture de la hiérarchie depuis cette date ont rendu le danger moins pressant? Mais la charge totale n'a pas diminué, semble-t-il. Plus probablement l'argument traditionnel a perdu de son pouvoir de conviction et sans doute l'expérience même de l'expansion économique y a-t-elle contribué.

En fait, sous la forme où le présente le rapport de l'U.I.M.M.

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(4) Enquête par sondage sur la médecine urbaine, le *Concours médical*, 7 janvier 1961, p. 99.

(5) UNION DES INDUSTRIES MÉTALLURGIQUES ET MINIÈRES, *Assemblée générale du 15 mars 1951*, p. 46.

que nous avons cité, l'argument a déjà profondément changé. Il n'invoque plus le pouvoir de l'insécurité mais la diminution des avantages de l'effort ; non la disparition de la menace, mais l'affaiblissement des récompenses. Plus profondément, il ne discute plus le principe même de la sécurité, n'en fait plus, comme dans la bouche de certains théoriciens du libéralisme, le contraire de l'initiative. Aux principes abstraits de la doctrine qui s'opposaient aussi radicalement que l'esprit du bien et l'esprit du mal, la catastrophe ou le salut économiques, on substitue des motivations réelles qu'il s'agit de doser. On discute non sur la nature, mais sur le degré. Ce n'est plus une politique sociale qui est en cause, mais ses modalités d'application.

Il n'en est pas moins significatif que, même sous cette forme adoucie, l'argument ait disparu.

La Sécurité sociale n'est-elle qu'une nouvelle forme d'assurance, assouplie, élargie certes, mais obéissant aux mêmes principes, ou a-t-elle des traits fondamentalement différents? C'est le second débat de principe, plus récent, auquel elle a donné lieu. Débat feutré pour une part, car si la position des promoteurs de la réforme était clairement affirmée, celle des opposants l'était moins. D'un côté, on posait le principe d'une redistribution du revenu national ; le régime avait pour but de garantir la sécurité des salariés et les formes empruntées à l'assurance (comme les cotisations des intéressés) ne devaient pas masquer que ni l'ouverture des droits ni l'étendue des engagements pris n'y étaient définis de la même manière. De l'autre, on soulignait des difficultés économiques plus qu'on n'ouvrait le débat sur le fond. En fait, les arguments employés rejetaient implicitement l'idée même de redistribution. Il était rare qu'on l'attaquât de face.

Réunissant des esprits habitués aux règles du bilan et au critère de l'équilibre financier, les organisations patronales avaient quelque mal à concevoir un régime qui fixait ses dépenses, non d'après ses ressources, mais d'après les besoins des assurés. Non seulement l'ouverture des droits était trop libérale, mais les engagements pris étaient mal définis. On acceptait d'avance de payer des sommes qu'on savait énormes sans pouvoir préciser leur montant exact. Le déséquilibre entre ressources et emplois, le fameux « déficit » du régime dans ses premières années, semblait offrir à tous les yeux le scandale d'une entreprise mal gérée non pas tant pour des défauts minimes de direction que parce que le principe en était fondamentalement erroné. « On peut en effet craindre qu'en ayant substitué à la notion de couverture des risques celle d'une redistribution du revenu, qui ne comporte d'autre frein que la satisfaction de besoins eux-mêmes toujours susceptibles d'expansion, la Sécurité sociale ne porte en elle le germe de sa propre destruction. » Comment pourrait subsister « un système qui a aussi radicalement éliminé de sa gestion toute responsabilité quant à l'ajustement des dépenses aux ressources »? (6). Il faut donc envisager des réformes profondes et « réviser certains des principes qui ont été à l'origine de sa création » (7).

Dix ans après, l'argumentation semble avoir changé, dans son inspiration au moins. Il ne s'agit plus surtout de « ramener un équilibre dans le système » (8). Certes, pour la raison d'abord que cet équilibre est pratiquement établi : le déficit massif des premières années a disparu. Mais, à constater la croissance des dépenses de l'assurance maladie, on n'est pas assuré que le problème soit définitivement réglé et on pourrait ressentir les mêmes craintes pour l'avenir. Or ces inquiétudes s'expriment de manière différente.

Ce n'est plus de l'équilibre intérieur du régime qu'il s'agit mais de la place qu'il tient dans l'économie nationale. Quelle part des « gains de productivité » que l'on peut attendre dans les cinq années à venir peut être affectée à la Sécurité sociale? Il semble entendu que les dépenses croîtront. Il faut seulement qu'elles n'absorbent pas une part excessive des ressources. « Si la progression du revenu national peut assurer une indispensable élasticité, il n'est pas possible que la fraction du revenu national affectée à la Sécurité sociale soit constamment augmentée » (9).

Le langage est nouveau. Au minimum, il faut constater que les termes de la comptabilité nationale, à la différence de ceux d'une comptabilité d'entreprise, n'impliquent plus la réduction du régime de Sécurité sociale à une assurance et sont compatibles avec la conception d'une redistribution du revenu. On a remis la Sécurité sociale à sa véritable échelle. Bien plus, la revendication traditionnelle d'une fixation préalable des ressources prend dans ce contexte un autre sens. Il s'agit non plus d'une adhésion stricte aux principes de l'assurance et de l'équilibre entre cotisations et dépenses, mais de la nécessité d'une prévision et même d'un « plan de prospective sociale » : prendre « conscience de la croissance de certains risques », « tenir compte du dynamisme propre de chaque risque et fixer son aire raisonnable de développement », quitte à réviser, s'il le faut, ces prévisions, fixer des « objectifs précis et limitatifs » (10), cette exigence d'une politique sociale consciente n'ouvre pas, là non plus, un débat sur les principes, mais une négociation sur les objectifs. Dans ce cas comme dans les précédents, ce ne sont plus des conceptions différentes qui s'affrontent, mais des estimations de ce qu'il est possible et raisonnable de faire. La nature du régime n'est pas remise en cause ; on discute la part du revenu national qui peut lui être attribuée.

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(6) *Ibid.* p. 47.

(7) *Ibid.* p. 33.

(8) *Ibid.* p. 47.

(9) CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANÇAIS, *op. cit.* p. 2.

Sur les moyens d'action, la position patronale a moins changé. Séparation des risques d'abord (tout au plus reconnaît-on en 1960 que « la place respective faite aux divers risques [est normalement] conçue en fonction d'une certaine solidarité nationale » mais ce principe ne saurait être confondu avec la « solidarité artificielle » des risques). Ensuite, création d'unités de gestion responsables et ayant les moyens d'agir sur les dépenses. Cependant, l'intention de « rétablir des mécanismes susceptibles de sanctionner la qualité de la gestion » (11) semblait annoncer quelque « mutualisation » de la Sécurité sociale. En 1961, les « structures susceptibles de maintenir dans les limites prévues la réalisation des programmes » ne concernent plus guère que l'assurance-maladie ; et même dans ce cas, deux secteurs seraient distingués : celui des prestations obligatoires et le secteur libre « que les caisses pourraient proportionner à leurs possibilités ». Est-ce interpréter abusivement que de voir là une restriction progressive de l'attaque contre l'unité des risques et des caisses? Un point en tout cas semble acquis : la solution proposée se prête à une discussion technique. Comment concevoir la surcompensation des risques entre des caisses ayant un « secteur libre »? Le nombre des variables en cause permet-il de réaliser cette compensation en maintenant une gestion responsable, ou, si l'on préfère, les différences entre secteurs libres pourraient-elles n'être dues qu'à la qualité de la gestion et des contrôles?

Ces questions ainsi posées se prêtent à l'analyse et au calcul et la différence des principes invoqués s'efface devant la supputation technique des conséquences des mesures proposées.

Sur d'autres points encore, les oppositions de doctrine semblent s'être diluées en dix ans et transformées en différences de degrés. La généralisation de la Sécurité sociale en est un exemple : ses partisans ont dû admettre des régimes spécifiques et des régimes complémentaires (une uniformité valable pour l'Angleterre, où les salariés forment 90 % de la population active, n'est peut-être pas applicable en France) ; ses adversaires ont accepté et même parfois réclamé des régimes nouveaux. La Confédération des cadres tient encore à affirmer son attachement à « l'assurance » ; il faut se garder dit-elle, « de tout ce qui pourrait transformer [le régime] en système *d'assistance étatisé* » (12). Mais à étudier les réformes proposées (représentation des groupements professionnels de praticiens aux conseils d'administration, extension des pouvoirs de ces conseils, remboursement « raisonnable » des honoraires médicaux, moyens pratiques de diminuer les frais d'hospitalisation), il ne semble pas que la commission ait cherché à tirer beaucoup de conséquences pratiques de cette opposition tranchante.

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(10) *Ibid.* p. 3.

(11) UNION DES INDUSTRIES MÉTALLURGIQUES ET MINIÈRES, *op. cit.* p. 47.

Peut-on prendre une vue d'ensemble de cette évolution en dix ans? Il est clair qu'en ce court espace de temps, la Sécurité sociale a cessé d'être au centre des grands débats d'idées. Elle ne soulève plus ni les mêmes craintes ni les mêmes espoirs. Peut-être vaut-il la peine d'en relever les raisons.

D'abord, son existence même a suffi à démentir certains pronostics. La sécurité peut-elle tuer l'effort et l'initiative, la prime à la famille décourager le travail, l'assurance encourager l'absentéisme? Ces effets sont possibles ; peut-être même leur portée n'est-elle pas négligeable. Mais quelle est leur importance réelle dans la vie économique? S'il s'agit de la croissance, elle ne dépend qu'en faible partie de la stimulation que lui donne l'insécurité individuelle et familiale des salariés. Ni le progrès technique ni le taux d'investissement, facteurs beaucoup plus importants à long terme, n'y sont étroitement liés. Ils sont beaucoup plus sensibles aux variations de mécanismes institutionnels (par exemple, pour l'invention technique, d'une politique de la recherche scientifique ou des règles fiscales concernant les laboratoires industriels). L'effort de qualification des salariés dépend lui-même davantage des disponibilités et des attraits de l'enseignement. Dans un pays comme la France, il faudrait porter le salaire indirect à un niveau extrêmement élevé pour qu'il eût un effet sensible sur le développement économique.

Dans l'immédiat même, la perte de production que peut entraîner un relâchement de l'effort est fort peu de chose par rapport à ce que coûtent les fluctuations, même modérées, de l'activité économique. C'est la tâche d'un employeur que de chasser de son entreprise la « flânerie ». Mais, outre qu'il peut le faire et le fait souvent par d'autres moyens que l'insécurité, que coûte-t-elle au niveau national à côté du chômage? Si les prestations sociales contribuent à régulariser les cycles, l'avantage qu'apporte ce stabilisateur incorporé à l'économie est certainement très supérieur aux pertes d'efficacité qu'elles peuvent entraîner (13).

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(12) CONFÉDÉRATION GÉNÉRALE DES CADRES, *Conclusion du groupe d'études sur la réforme de la Sécurité sociale adoptées par le comité directeur lors de sa séance du 22 février 1960.*

Non seulement donc les « charges sociales » ne provoquent pas un affaissement sensible des ressorts de l'activité, mais elles ont une fonction de régularisation économique. Définissant par les prestations en nature une consommation affectée et hautement prévisible qui améliore l'état général de la main-d'œuvre et surtout garantissant par les prestations en espèces un minimum de consommation, elles se justifient peut-être autant (au moins à un certain niveau de revenu par tête) par leurs fonctions économiques que par leurs fins sociales.

Si les craintes s'apaisent, réciproquement les espérances se font plus rassises. La « politique contemporaine de sécurité sociale » n'a pas une extension indéfinie. D'abord parce qu'on a fait le plus urgent et qu'il est difficile d'inventer beaucoup de prestations nouvelles. Ensuite, parce qu'elle se heurte à des limites naturelles : l'indemnisation du chômage ne peut excéder une certaine durée ; au vrai, aucun régime d'assurance en ce domaine ne pourrait fonctionner très longtemps dans une crise grave. On peut garantir le chômage frictionnel ou technique ; on ne peut que très partiellement garantir un chômage structural ou cyclique, si l'amplitude de l'oscillation est grande. De même, la plus grande sécurité professionnelle repose sur la formation (et la reconversion en cours de carrière suppose elle-même le plus souvent une formation de base) ; mais l'élargissement de l'accès à l'instruction suppose des mesures différentes de l'indemnisation d'un accident. La politique de l'emploi, la politique de l'éducation, posent des problèmes plus complexes encore que la politique de sécurité sociale.

On pourrait assurément englober ces problèmes, sinon dans ceux de la sécurité sociale, au moins dans les tâches du *Welfare State.* Encore faut-il reconnaître que les méthodes applicables sont fort différentes : l'octroi d'une prestation ne décide pas du choix d'une école aussi facilement que de la consultation d'un médecin. L'action sur une économie où la planification n'est pas autoritaire est singulièrement plus incertaine que les résultats d'un système de retraites. Dans le domaine de la santé lui-même, à mesure que les soins sont mieux assurés, l'importance de la prévention grandit. Or les décisions de l'individu, son instruction, sa formation y jouent un rôle plus déterminant que pour les soins. S'il est possible d'éduquer, d'orienter et de rembourser, il est plus difficile de diriger et de planifier.

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(13) J. K. Galbraith a donné à cette argumentation une forme convaincante. Cf. *L'ère de l'opulence* (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1961), ch. VIII.

En d'autres termes, d'un côté comme de l'autre, la Sécurité sociale a pris peu à peu sa vraie place : elle est un élément, parmi d'autres, de la répartition du revenu national. Il est très probable que ses dépenses s'élèveront encore considérablement ; il est peu vraisemblable en revanche qu'elle innove beaucoup et que son principe soit de nouveau remis en question. Les débats porteront bien plutôt sur la fraction du produit national qui doit lui être affectée et sur la répartition de cette somme. Débats d'intérêts qui, bien qu'ils ne prennent pas la forme d'une compétition sur un marché, sont traditionnellement le tissu même de la vie économique.

2. *L'affrontement des intérêts.*

Le passage de l'opposition de principe à l'affrontement des intérêts n'implique pas nécessairement un apaisement des conflits. Bien que les guerres de religion soient généralement plus sanglantes que les rencontres des groupes de pression, celles-ci ne se réduisent pas au calcul rationnel qui permet la maximation des gains. Elles ont aussi pour objet de mesurer des pouvoirs et de les assurer. S'il est vrai que les conflits autour de la Sécurité sociale ont caractéristiquement perdu de leur passion et de leur violence dans la France de 1961, il ne suffit donc pas, pour l'expliquer, de l'affaiblissement des oppositions de principe.

Cet affrontement des intérêts, comment les assurés le ressentent-ils? Une enquête d'opinion que nous avions menée en 1958 apporte quelques lumières à ce sujet (14). Nous avions soumis à l'avis des interviewés deux stéréotypes empruntés aux polémiques encore toutes fraîches autour du régime : « Les charges sociales sont trop lourdes et gênent le développement de l'industrie française » ; « les avantages sociaux ont été entièrement prélevés sur les salaires ». Les deux formules représentaient l'une, l'argument couramment opposé à l'extension des prestations au nom des exigences de l'économie, l'autre, un argument couramment employé par les syndicats ouvriers pour défendre le régime et demander des avantages supplémentaires. Elles permettaient donc de vérifier dans quelle mesure les assurés prenaient parti dans ces polémiques et voyaient dans les institutions de Sécurité sociale l'objet d'un débat entre dirigeants de l'économie et salariés.

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(14) J. D. Reynaud et A. Catrice-Lorey, avec la collaboration de G. de Beauregard, *Les assurés et la Sécurité sociale, étude sur les assurés du régime général* (Paris, Institut des sciences sociales du travail, 1959), 2 vols.

Les réponses recueillies n'ont peut-être qu'une valeur limitée. A l'expérience, il s'est révélé qu'une bonne part des assurés (30 % dans chaque cas) ne pouvait ou ne souhaitait pas émettre un avis. Mais cette abstention apporte déjà un enseignement : même si elle est due à une faible information économique et à la difficulté de comprendre la portée de la question, elle n'en prouve pas moins que les campagnes menées de part et d'autre depuis plusieurs années sont loin d'avoir touché et encore moins convaincu la masse des assurés, et que leur opinion n'a pas été vraiment mobilisée.

En outre, ceux qui donnent une réponse ne semblent pas avoir ressenti d'opposition systématique entre les deux propositions. Assurément, cette opposition n'avait rien d'une contradiction logique : on peut de manière cohérente rejeter l'une et l'autre et même, quoique la position soit plus difficile à défendre, les approuver toutes deux. Mais il ne fait pas de doute qu'elles aient été employées en fait pour défendre des positions opposées ; l'ignorer, c'est bien refuser de prendre parti dans le débat. Or les assurés qui, soit approuvent les deux formules, soit, beaucoup plus souvent, rejettent les deux, sont au total plus nombreux que ceux qui, acceptant l'une et rejetant l'autre, donnent une réponse socialement cohérente.

Certes les groupes les plus aisés et, parallèlement, les cadres ou assimilés affirment plus souvent que les charges sont trop lourdes et rejettent plus souvent l'idée que les salariés les supportent. Conforme à leur rôle de responsabilité et à leur proximité des milieux dirigeants, cette opinion semblerait avoir la valeur d'une prise de position dans le débat. Mais comme l'on constate en même temps qu'avec le revenu s'accroît relativement et absolument le nombre des réponses « non cohérentes », il faut bien chercher une autre interprétation.

Elle est au reste bien simple. Si l'on compare ces distributions avec celles d'autres questions d'opinion on constate une liaison claire : l'acceptation de l'une ou de l'autre formule, et plus encore des deux, est le propre de ceux qui jugent moins favorablement la Sécurité sociale. Le bloc des non-non (les charges ne sont pas trop lourdes, les avantages sociaux ne sont pas prélevés sur les salaires) est celui des fidèles partisans. En d'autres termes, les assurés ont été sensibles non à la place de ces formules sur l'éventail politique, mais à leur aspect de critique du régime existant. Ceux qui l'apprécient le plus (15), très naturellement, rejettent les deux critiques. Autour d'eux, se situent des réserves de « droite » et de « gauche », plus sensibles à l'un ou l'autre des arguments (et des mécontents pour qui tous les arguments sont bons à accumuler, même s'ils s'additionnent difficilement). Mais le premier partage est entre satisfaits et moins satisfaits et la défense de l'institution ne se confond nullement, elle n'est même pas étroitement liée, dans l'esprit des assurés, à une prise de position dans le débat que nous leur avions soumis.

Qu'en conclure? Peut-être seulement que les thèmes proposés n'étaient plus d'actualité et que les vraies oppositions s'exprimeraient autrement. Peut-être aussi qu'il est assez difficile, même en admettant que la part de la Sécurité sociale dans le revenu national soit l'objet d'une rivalité, de dire entre quels groupes économiques existe réellement cette rivalité : entre employeurs et salariés, entre tous deux et les consommateurs ou même certains groupes de consommateurs? C'est tout le problème de l'incidence économique des charges de sécurité qui est ainsi posé et puisque les économistes sont loin d'y voir clair, l'opinion publique a quelque excuse d'être incertaine. Mais en tout cas le sentiment des oppositions d'intérêts entre employeurs et salariés à propos de la Sécurité sociale ne semble pas très vif. Après tout, ce n'est pas entre eux que ces questions se négocient et, si les employeurs expriment à ce sujet le point de vue des gestionnaires, ils ne détiennent pas le pouvoir final de décision ; si les syndicats défendent les besoins des salariés, ils ne négocient pas directement leur satisfaction. Les arguments n'ont donc pas la portée qu'ils prendraient s'ils appuyaient une action immédiate ou si l'on attendait à la fin de la discussion des résultats tangibles.

Est-ce à dire que les assurés s'en tiennent à la réalité immédiate de la caisse et des prestations et ne considèrent que de l'extérieur les grands mouvements d'attaque ou de soutien parce qu'ils font corps non avec les parties du combat, mais avec l'institution? Un autre résultat de la même enquête ne permet guère de soutenir cette interprétation.

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(15) Et ce sont plutôt les revenus moyens et élevés, ce qui explique l'augmentation, avec le revenu, des réponses socialement incohérentes. Nous ne donnons pas ici les résultats détaillés.

Les interviews datent de quelques semaines après le déroulement d'un grand débat qui avait occupé les pages des journaux et, semble-t-il, agité l'opinion : le « projet Gazier » voulait obtenir le remboursement réel à 80 % des consultations médicales et les moyens proposés avaient soulevé de vives protestations du corps médical. Le problème des remboursements était donc à l'ordre du jour. On pouvait vérifier d'autre part que les assurés le ressentaient vivement : le remboursement insuffisant des consultations venait, dans leurs réponses, en tête des défauts de l'assurance-maladie.

Il était donc tentant de leur demander à qui ils attribuaient la responsabilité de cette situation : les médecins demandaient-ils trop ou la Sécurité sociale ne remboursait-elle pas assez? Dans le débat en cours, prenaient-ils parti, et de quel côté? S'ils faisaient corps avec l'institution, le fait devait se mesurer à cette occasion. D'autant qu'ils ne partageaient pas systématiquement le point de vue des médecins : non seulement une forte majorité souhaitait le tiers-payant mais plus de la moitié d'entre eux ne voyaient aucun inconvénient majeur à une médecine de caisse ou à une médecine salariée par l'État.

Les résultats sont d'autant plus frappants : plus du tiers des interviewés refusent de se prononcer (35 %) et l'on ne saurait dire que la question est difficile à comprendre ou manque de portée pratique. De plus, les opinions qui s'expriment sont partagés : 38 % des assurés accusent les médecins et 27 % la Sécurité sociale. La majorité n'est pas massive et la minorité est substantielle. Et surtout, ces positions ne présentent pas une physionomie cohérente. Peu de différences selon le revenu ou la profession. Aucune selon les maladies que la famille a déjà connues. En bref, une dispersion de points de vue individuels plutôt qu'une opinion publique clairement structurée.

Certes la discussion en cours était très technique : la limitation des cas de dépassement des honoraires, les critères de la notoriété, et même la définition de deux secteurs médicaux, l'un à prix libre, l'autre à prix contrôlé, n'étaient pas des thèmes propres en eux-mêmes à éveiller les passions collectives. Mais, même si le détail de l'argumentation n'était pas à leur portée, les assurés, pour qui les résultats avaient un vif intérêt, auraient pu appuyer les positions des fédérations de caisses qui s'étaient clairement prononcées. On ne peut dire que ce soit le cas. Dans un débat, où leurs intérêts sont en cause, les assurés ne prennent pas de parti bien tranché. Ils attendent une conclusion en comptant les coups des adversaires mais ne se sentent guère tenus de prendre part au combat.

En d'autres termes, les assurés, alors même qu'ils jugent certaines prestations insuffisantes et souhaitent leur augmentation, alors qu'ils ne peuvent passer pour complètement satisfaits des avantages acquis, ne semblent pas se regrouper autour d'organisations ou même de ligues de force sociales. Leurs exigences semblent adressées à une autorité mal localisée et mal définie ; elles se réduisent à un fourmillement d'insatisfactions individuelles et ne se composent pas dans un mouvement social parce qu'elles ne s'orientent pas vers une action déterminée. Ne serait-ce pas qu'en abandonnant les conflits de doctrine, on n'a pas inventé les moyens institutionnels de défendre des intérêts, que les mécanismes d'action ne sont plus appropriés à la situation nouvelle?

Où se regrouperaient en fait les assurés? Autour des caisses elles-mêmes? Mais les caisses, organismes juridiquement privés, exercent un service public (et sous la tutelle de l'État). Elles peuvent s'efforcer d'être accueillantes pour l'individu, de lui faciliter ses démarches, de le guider et de le conseiller. Elles ne peuvent assumer la tâche d'une défense collective de ses intérêts car cette défense (qu'on proteste contre l'état des choses ou qu'on revendique du nouveau) serait dirigée en fait contre l'autorité de tutelle. La caisse n'est plus un groupement mutualiste cumulant la distribution des prestations et le ralliement des volontés ; et celles qui avaient voulu, au lendemain des « économies » de décembre 1958, alerter leurs affiliés ont été aussitôt rappelées à une plus juste conception de leur rôle. Au regard des assurés, ce sont des administrations, généralement considérées comme efficaces et compétentes, bien que la complexité des règlements ne facilite pas les relations, souvent même bien organisées pour remplir leur fonction, mais, comme toute administration, subordonnées à des règles strictes, et, en un mot, neutres.

La composition même des conseils d'administration semble faite pour dérouter l'opinion. Ils ne sont pas homogènes, ce qui pourrait à la rigueur donner à la caisse l'apparence d'une « maison de famille » et en tout cas évoquerait la tradition mutualiste dont les caisses ont hérité leur cadre juridique. Ils ne sont pas paritaires, ce qui obligerait, pour toute prise de position importante, à une véritable négociation et rappellerait des situations familières. Et comble de malheur, la division des voix des salariés est telle que la majorité, le plus souvent, ne sort pas du vote qui trancherait entre les centrales, mais des coalitions qui le suivent. Comme en outre, ils se sont mal résignés à leur rôle modeste et tiennent à traiter des problèmes législatifs sur lesquels ils n'ont pas légalement compétence, leurs prises de position, régulièrement écartées comme non pertinentes par l'autorité de tutelle, sont le type même des proclamations non suivies d'action.

Toutes ces difficultés aboutissent à un effet très simple pour l'opinion des assurés : ceux-ci ignorent en bonne partie la nature même des conseils d'administration. D'après l'enquête que nous avons citée, un peu plus de 17 % d'entre eux en connaît le caractère biparti ; un peu plus de 21 % savent qu'ils sont élus. Comme les chiffres précédents se recoupent, cela veut dire que 75 % des assurés ne connaissent ni l'une ni l'autre de ces caractéristiques. Les mêmes votent cependant aux élections et jugent en forte majorité (72 %) qu'il est important de le faire. Pour quoi donc votent-ils, puisque ce n'est pas, semble-t-il, pour des conseils d'administration qu'ils ne connaissent guère?

La réponse est facile à connaître. Il suffit de lire les déclarations électorales : les candidats proposent aux électeurs, le plus souvent sous la bannière d'une confédération syndicale, un programme de sécurité sociale pour les années à venir. Puisque les élus n'auront aucun pouvoir pour réaliser ce programme, il ne fait pas de doute que le vote est une pure déclaration d'opinion. On se compte et tout le monde lit ainsi les résultats : ils révèlent l'influence respective des grandes centrales.

En d'autres termes, le vote n'a pas pour but de désigner des administrateurs. C'est une manifestation de masse, une cérémonie d'opinion publique destinée à convaincre des instances lointaines de la détermination des assurés. Elle veut impressionner des adversaires mal définis, « faire pression » sur les pouvoirs. Mais si elle montre un attachement ou une inquiétude, elle ne se prolonge pas en action précise. Elle peut à la rigueur appuyer une position de principe, elle ne permet pas d'obtenir une part meilleure dans un partage, parce qu'elle ne sert pas directement à une négociation. Elle obtient des titres dans la presse et laisse à la tête des caisses des hommes qui mesurent la distance entre le programme qu'ils proposent et sur lequel on les a élus et leurs véritables moyens d'action.

Il n'y a donc finalement aucune contradiction entre le vif attachement des assurés à la Sécurité sociale et la faiblesse apparente de leurs réactions aux mesures qui la concernent et aux débats qui l'intéressent. Il ne s'agit plus aujourd'hui de revendiquer un principe, mais de discuter sur l'affectation d'une part du revenu national. Les moyens dont disposent les assurés, en tant que tels, sont à peu près impuissants à cette échelle. Ils peuvent se révolter, mais à moins de catastrophe économique (qui leur donnerait d'autres raisons d'intervenir), il est peu probable que les mouvements en arrière soient assez graves pour leur en donner l'occasion. C'est de négociation qu'il s'agit et, si les esprits y sont prêts, les moyens d'action manquent.

Resterait, bien sûr, à expliquer pourquoi les syndicats ou les partis politiques, qui ont justement vocation pour agir à l'échelle nationale, ne fournissent que très imparfaitement ces moyens, ce qui fait sans doute toute l'originalité de la situation française, notamment quand on la compare à celle de l'Angleterre. Le pluralisme syndical et la variété des partis ne suffisent pas à l'expliquer. Même si aucun ne peut prétendre parler au nom de tous les assurés, pourquoi plusieurs partis ne feraient-ils pas servir la défense des avantages sociaux à fortifier leur position et affermir leur clientèle? Ou plutôt — car ils le font tous en quelque mesure — pourquoi cette défense ne tient-elle qu'une place si modeste? Il nous semble que la réponse serait à chercher dans les difficultés qu'éprouvent les partis à agir sur une politique économique globale et même à placer leur action à cette échelle (la même remarque vaudrait a fortiori pour les syndicats, comme le montrent les problèmes d'une politique nationale des salaires). Mais pour élaborer cette réponse, il faudrait une sociologie politique de la France contemporaine.

T. H. MARSHALL

The Welfare State : A Sociological Interpretation

It is the business of sociologists to classify social phenomena and arrange them in categories. They base their operations on concepts which have been rigorously defined and purified to the point at which they resemble prime numbers. The practice has not unnaturally spread into that intermediate area of literature which can be called either popular sociology or intellectual journalism according to taste. But there it is used for tying labels round the necks of highly complex social systems—like "Welfare State", "Affluent Society" and "Meritocracy". This is likely to make the purist shrink and shudder. All generalizations are dangerous, and those cunningly expressed in tabloid form are the most dangerous of all. They pass into the language of common speech as familiar truths, instead of being quoted as propositions offered for discussion. One can hardly avoid using a term like the "Welfare State", and one cannot, when using it, introduce a qualifying parenthesis, since there is no room for parentheses in a catchword. One must either accept it or discard it.

It would be a great pity to discard it. Any catchword which has been widely used by people in speaking about their own society must tell us something about that society, for current beliefs about the contemporary world are themselves part of the situation to which they refer, like the self-portrait of an artist. Of course they must be treated with care and not be credited with possession of the ultimate truth. This should not be too difficult. More subtle is the problem of deciding exactly what it is to which they refer. When somebody points at the landscape and exclaims "it is beautiful", you know that he is expressing a genuine experience and you understand what he means, but you may not be quite certain what he is pointing at. Is it the shape of the hills, the colour of the fields or the effect of sunlight breaking through the clouds?

Arch. europ. sociol., II (1961), 284-300.

And he may not be quite sure himself. So it is with the Welfare State. We know that those who introduced the phrase and those who quickly adopted it were expressing a genuine experience and we can understand the sentiment they meant to convey, but we may still be in doubt what was the exact combination of circumstances in Britain in the 1940's which evoked that cry of "Eureka !" and what precisely they were pointing at when they emitted it. And this is a serious matter, because social phenomena, unlike museum pieces, do not retain unchanged the character they possessed when they were first labelled, and there is a chance that the label may be left on when it has ceased to be appropriate.

Professor Briggs, in his illuminating historical essay, is as much concerned with this question of identifying the object we are talking about as with that of assessing the significance to be attached to it. He explains—and with justice—that the Welfare State was not the culminating achievement of the lone efforts of the British Labour Party nor the result of the proddings of the Liberal conscience. He finds its origins in many streams which began to flow in the nineteenth century and became strong rivers in the early years of the twentieth. And he asks whether the end product, whatever it was, is still with us or was only flashed briefly on to the screen of our consciousness in the 1940's and early 1950's and is already passing away or changing into something else. That there have been important changes during the past decade is beyond doubt, but we cannot tell exactly what we have lost until we have decided what it was that we earlier acclaimed. The view has altered, but it may still be beautiful.

At one point Professor Briggs says that conservative social reformers like Ashley and Oastler would have considered the twentieth century breach with *laissez faire* more significant than the capitalist breach with the past in the Industrial Revolution. For from their point of view "the Welfare State was the true historic state". And the Fabians would have agreed with them. This raises two very important points. The first is the fundamental question whether we are justified in talking about social systems at all, and if so, in what sense. The second concerns the nature of the vital respect in which it is alleged that British society before the Industrial Revolution resembled British society after the Second World War.

Obviously the first of these questions is much too large to be seriously broached here, and all I shall do is to distinguish between three propositions regarding it. The first is that in all societies which are not in a state of chaos or dissolution social interactions take place which are sufficiently repetitive and predictable to be treated as constituting a social system. This does not imply that all parts of the system interact, nor that nothing happens that is not repetitive and predictable, nor that friction and conflict are not perpetually present somewhere, nor even that change is not taking place in the pattern of the system all the time. I consider that this proposition, or something like it, must be accepted if we profess to study human societies and not merely individual behaviour. The second proposition is that we can identify particular social systems as they occur in human history, and that this is a legitimate and helpful way of interpreting historical data. It implies, not merely that social life is normally systematic, but that particular systems take shape and become recognizable in the life of societies just as particular social situations take shape and are recognized in the life of individuals. If we are to discuss the Welfare State, we must, I think accept this second proposition either as a truth which we intend to illustrate or as a hypothesis which we intend to test. The third proposition is one about which we may well have more serious doubts. It is that, when we have identified particular social systems in their concrete historical settings, we can construct out of them concepts which are suitable for general application to any or all societies. It is very doubtful whether, or in what precise circumstances, this can safely be done, since social systems are deeply impregnated with the unique influences of the time and place in which they came into existence. It is wiser to speak about "feudalism" or "feudal society" than about "the feudal system". We can then conceptualize the elements of feudalism and use these concepts in comparing, say, the French feudal system with the English feudal system at specific dates. Similarly we can find useful concepts for the analysis of welfare policy, its measures and institutions, and use these to study the "British Welfare State" in the post-war period, and to compare it with the welfare systems of other countries. We can leave the question of "Welfare State" as a valid general concept till later.

It is the purpose of this essay to suggest some lines on which such a comparison might be attempted, especially with reference to England, France and Germany. I would begin by suggesting that the enquiry should be pursued at two levels. The first is the level of actual practice, of the objective facts about the social mechanism and the way it works. The second is the level of the subjective perception of the system in the minds of the people who have designed it, are operating it, or merely live with it. It involves the difficult question of consensus. If we postulate the existence of social systems, we must also assume that there is a fair measure of conformity to the norms of the systems in outward behaviour. We also realize that this degree of conformity would hardly be possible unless there were also a fair measure of accommodation to the norms in the realm of values and ideas. The second level relates to this accommodation of ideas, or consensus. The questions which particularly interest me are these : are there key points in a social system with regard to which consensus, if it exists, has a particularly profound effect, which may spread as an influence for conformity into areas where consensus in other respects is weak, or at least not explicit? And are there periods in the history of a society during which consensus at these key points is particularly strong? I am here using "consensus" to mean something more than mere passive acquiescence in the legitimacy of a social order. I am referring to an agreement as to the meaning of the measures and institutions concerned together with positive approval of them as vital elements in the social system.

The separate treatment of these two levels is likely to be helpful because international comparison is considerably easier at the first level than at the second, and full advantage should be taken of this before the complexities of the second type of comparison are introduced. But the enquiry will not be finished until the two results have been combined, since neither is fully intelligible without the other. At that point we can face the question whether there exists in any of the societies we are comparing a social system which has, so to speak, a distinctive, comprehensible or integrated personality. For that is the condition of affairs we presume to be present when we make use of a label like the "Welfare State". It is likely to be found, if ever, when an unusually well integrated mechanism is combined with an exceptionally strong consensus at key points, in an historical setting which favours the development of collective self-awareness or—to use the term which so often appears in the French story—solidarity. But we must begin at the beginning.

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If, as has been suggested, the British social system after the second World War resembled in some vital respect the social system before the Industrial Revolution, what is the clue to this resemblance? Professors Briggs and Boettcher both offer what is essentially the same answer, though with a difference in the use of terms. It is the relation between social policy and the free market. Professor Briggs defines a Welfare State as one "in which organized power is deliberately used [...] in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions", which can be briefly described as subsistence, security and "a certain range of agreed social services". The first two, he says, might be pursued by the Social Service State, but the third is different, because it aims, not at a minimum, but at an optimum. Prof. Boettcher uses the terminology current in German politics since the war and distinguishes sharply between the Social Market Economy and the Welfare State. The first refers to the policy of combining an essentially free market system with measures designed to preserve an acceptable social balance. It claims to avoid the defects both of pure *laissez faire* and of socialist planning by preserving the driving and directing forces of the market while making them operate in a social framework. The Welfare State, on the other hand, uses mechanisms which supersede the market. This distinction would leave us with a conception of the Welfare State too narrow to fit the British model, while Professor Briggs' phrase "effort to modify" seems too weak to cover all the measures we shall have to consider. If we intend to compare the welfare systems of different countries in search of a meaning for the term "Welfare State", we must include all the measures they have adopted either to influence, or to interfere with, or to supersede the free play of market forces in the interests of welfare. I think we can assume that the Welfare State must make use of all these methods.

Turning, then, to my first level of enquiry, concerned with the actual mechanism of social policy, we may begin with measures which strike at the very heart of the consumer market itself, without nevertheless wholly superseding it ; I mean measures like rationing, price control, rent restriction and the subsidies that accompany them. All countries have used these extensively in time of war and in postwar periods of reconstruction, but have gradually shed them thereafter. But some of them have survived for a very long time, and may even have left a permanent mark on the economy. In England subsidies are still an important feature in the economic system, but a somewhat obscure one, in the sense that most people know very little about them, and they are not held up for admiration as an achievement of the Welfare State. Housing subsidies and rent restriction are quite another matter.

Twentieth century social policy has put the family and the home in the centre of the picture, and has accepted the responsibility of providing houses for the people as one of special urgency. It is also a very difficult responsibility to discharge. Rents behave capriciously when left to the higgling of the market, and they may absorb an extravagant share of the family budget, while real estate is a province in which the contrast between the behaviour of the market and the interests of the public is generally held by the man in the street to be greater than anywhere else. Nevertheless it is hard to say which particular measures for coping with this problem have been permanently incorporated into the machinery of social policy. General rent restriction might in time be replaced by special allowances of the type given in England through National Assistance. But action to stimulate the building of houses is likely to continue as a part of either social or general economic policy. I lack the knowledge to make a comparison between the three countries on this point, and nothing is said about it in the preceding articles. But I would hazard the guess that the British system of subsidized building by Local Authorities, followed by letting at uneconomic rents to tenants chosen by reference to their needs and not their means goes further in the direction of not merely interfering with the free market but superseding it than corresponding measures in other countries. And I am sure that it is more hotly debated, and more loudly acclaimed by its supporters as an essential social service and a matter of principle not merely of expediency, than elsewhere.

As my second illustration I will take the area of social insurance, which in certain of its forms operates by compulsorily inserting conditions into contracts of employment, an invasion of the freedom of the market by which Dicey was particularly alarmed. Measures of this kind are used everywhere, but not always in quite the same way nor for exactly the same purposes. I suggest that three questions be posed about this field of policy. First, as to the uses to which social insurance is put ; secondly, as to the closeness with which public insurance copies the model of private insurance ; and thirdly as to the extent to which it is controlled and financed by the state.

As regards the uses to which insurance, or finance by compulsory contributions, is put, we may note that family allowances in France, and the more limited scheme in Germany, are both financed in this way, whereas in England the cost is carried by general taxation. This is interesting. Family allowances can be regarded as a form of supplementary wage, earned by labour and paid by employers. This was the first approach in France, and there was a faint suggestion that they represented a kind of employers' liberality and not merely an employers' liability. But France was also concerned about its declining birth-rate and looked to the allowances as a means of checking it. This political aim gave to the allowances the character of an extra-budgetary tax, or what has been called a "taxe parafiscale". Finally the emphasis came to be laid on the simple issue of family needs, and the allowances assumed the form of "une aide sociale à la famille", or a measure for the redistribution of income in order to maximize social welfare (1). In this sequence of events the method of insurance became less and less appropriate. It was odd to treat children as a risk, to be placed to the account of the employers, when they were being welcomed as a national blessing, and the coverage of the scheme had to be extended far beyond the limits of the employed population. But France has not wished to replace the form of insurance by that of a general welfare service, or kind of national assistance. England had no such inhibitions.

The second difference of importance in the use of compulsory insurance is that England and Germany have both introduced it for unemployment, though Germany hesitated some time before doing so, whereas France relies on state subventions to voluntary insurance schemes. Subsidized voluntary insurance may be said to assist the market, compulsory insurance to interfere with it and benefits financed out of taxes to supersede it. If, therefore, we regard supersession as a more thorough departure from the market principle than interference, France is closer to the market on both family allowances and unemployment than England. A third difference is that the medical service in both France and Germany are an integral part of sickness insurance, whereas in England they are quite separately administered. This point can more conveniently be taken later.

On the question of the degree of fidelity to the model of private insurance, I must confine myself to two or three points only. In France and Germany great emphasis is laid on the principle that social insurance is a mutual arrangement between employers and employed, and is administered by autonomous organs (e.g. the *Caisses* and the *Krankenkassen*) elected by the parties, though the corresponding bodies are nominated in the case of German unemployment insurance. This principle implies the limitation of the beneficiaries to employed persons and, although coverage has sometimes been extended, especially in Germany, to other gainfully occupied persons, the extensions are clearly defined and limited. Voluntary adherence may be allowed beyond these limits. For instance in German sickness insurance a man with his own business may join provided he does not employ more than two insured workers (2). In a bilateral scheme, presumably, men who are primarily employers cannot sit on both sides of the table. In the British tripartite plan of universal coverage, on the contrary, an employer while contributing to the insurance of his employees, must also fill up his own card as a self-employed person.

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(1) André ROUAST et Paul DURAND, *Sécurité sociale* (1960), pp. 417-423.

Another example is the linkage of contributions and benefits with the rate of earnings. In France and Germany (and commonly elsewhere) the basing of insurance on a percentage relationship with wages is regarded as a principle of fundamental importance, not merely of political expediency. It is expressed in the following comment of a German authority on the 1957 pension plan :

> Die Rente ist gerecht, weil sie individuell bemessen wird. Sie paßt sich dem Einzelfall an, weil sie die bei jedem Menschen unterschiedliche Lohn- und Gehaltsentwicklung während seines Arbeitslebens und die unterschiedliche Versicherungsdauer in ihrer Höhe widerspiegeln wird (3).

The same principle is praised by a French authority, not only because it is just, but because it provides an incentive to greater activity in the labour market :

> Ce système [...] a de plus l'avantage d'encourager les travailleurs à atteindre un niveau de vie élevé au cours de la vie active, en leur garantissant qu'ils conserveront, en cas d'incapacité de travail, des moyens d'existence en relation avec ceux qu'ils ont obtenus par leur travail personnel (4).

A first modest step in this direction has recently been made in the reform of the British retirement pensions, and a more far-reaching application of the same principle figures in the programme of the Labour Party.

My third and last example is the following. Private insurance as conducted in the market is normally concerned with a particular risk, and contributions and benefits are calculated in relation to this risk. Social insurance, fixing its attention on the needs of the individual citizen and his family, is easily drawn into comprehensive, or at least composite, insurance schemes which cover a collection of risks. The British system is highly integrated, the French markedly fragmented, in terms both of risks and of occupational classes, and the German comes somewhere between the two. In both France and Germany it is recognized that the urge to base policy on the concept of social welfare as the final goal is accompanied by a movement for the integration of schemes for protection against social risks. In French terminology "l'assurance sociale" covers certain specified risks, while "la politique de sécurité sociale" gives a general guarantee against all risks (5). In German terminology, the unification of different types of "Versicherung" in one scheme is a step towards a policy of "Versorgung", or direct care by the state of those for whom it has a special obligation (6). As we shall see, "Staatsbürgerversorgung", or treating all citizens as meriting the care previously bestowed by government only on its military and civil servants, is often considered to be the significant new element in the social policy of the Welfare State.

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(2) Paul Caesar, *Sozialversicherung* (1958), p. 65.

(3) *Ibid.* p. 91.

(4) Rouast et Durand, *op. cit.* p. 65.

My last question about social insurance concerns the administrative and financial functions of the state. I have already pointed out that in France and Germany the operative agencies are autonomous and self-administering, within the limits laid down by the government, whereas in England the state now administers the schemes directly through its own organs. At one time there were in France and Germany considerable local variations in the services rendered, just as there were in England under the regime of Approved Societies, but basic uniformity of treatment, with optional supplements, has gradually been imposed. As regards the financial contribution of the state, it is noticeable that in France and Germany the state is not a full partner in the insurance scheme, but stands outside and gives financial aid in the form of a block grant, or by allocating funds to specific purposes, sometimes drawing-them from ear-marked taxes. The British tripartite system reduces so much the resemblance to commercial insurance that it is often argued that a transfer of the whole burden to general taxation would not make any fundamental difference. It has been estimated that in the middle 1950's the percentage of the total amount devoted to social insurance and family allowances borne by the state was in Britain 26.5, in Germany 15.6 and in France 2.7 (7).

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(5) *Ibid.* p. 29.

(6) Hans ACHINGER, *Soziale Sicherheit*, p. 43.

(7) J. Henry RICHARDSON, *Economic and Financial Aspects of Social Security*, p. 67.

I have now looked briefly at measures for the control of market prices and at compulsory insurance. There is room to consider only one other type of action, namely the provision of a public social service, such as education or a medical service. The British people are very conscious that they have by no means eliminated market forces from their education system, especially the secondary schools, but they are proud of the fact that their National Health Service is, on the contrary, more completely governed by the principle of welfare than any other. It is available to all, in all major respects free for all, and offers the best service that is to be had with the resources at its disposal. It is financed almost entirely out of taxes, and is thus something that the community a sa whole provides for itself. In France and Germany, as already pointed out, the health service is the principal benefit offered by the sickness insurance scheme, as was always the practice of Friendly Societies and similar mutual benefit clubs. This means that the service is, in principle, limited to the insured and their families, and that the doctors are one step further removed from subordination to the organs of public administration than they are in England. In Germany they are paid on the basis of capitation fees, the total sum due in respect of the patients in a region being paid to the local association of doctors for distribution to its members. In France payment is made for each service rendered, which is more like what happens in private practice, and the patient must bear a proportion of the cost known as the "ticket modérateur". Either he pays the whole fee and recovers the balance, or he pays the amount of the "ticket" and the Caisse pays the rest. The doctors prefer the former arrangement, but the latter is spreading. The value of the "ticket" is calculated by reference to a tariff of fees but usually the tariff is lower than the fees actually charged so that the patient must pay more than the amount of the "ticket" (8). In this way the "market" prevails over the "welfare" principle.

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I have tried to show some of the lines along which a comparison could be made of the actual mechanisms of social policy in different countries, and I must now turn to my second theme, the interpretation of the system in the minds of government and people and the degree of consensus at key points in the social system. There can be little doubt that, in England, the first practical steps along the new road of social policy were taken in the first decade of this century, and the ideas which inspired them were developed some twenty to twenty-five years earlier. The crucial fact in the British story is that welfare operations in the nineteenth century were directed to the relief not of the poor but of the paupers, not of the needy but of the destitute. The pauper was marked off from his neighbours by a clearly defined status by which he lost his personal freedom and his right to vote. It was a sacred doctrine of the period that the relief of paupers must take place right outside the market and in a manner which could not interfere with its working. The British Welfare State represents the very antithesis of this conception, and it is because of this antithesis, which figured explicitly in the controversies of the early days, that its personality has become so clearly marked. The tradition in France was, I believe, different, perhaps because of the more prominent part played by the churches and the religious foundations for which relief of the poor was relief of neighbours and parishioners. The Mayor, as President of the *Bureau de bienfaisance*, was officially designated as "representative" of the poor and distributed the proceeds of private charity as well as the smaller municipal grants. An investigator in the 1890's noted that there was a "traditional horror of anything approaching the English system" (9). The German tradition was more like the English. Poor relief fell into the category of *Fürsorge* and was kept distinct, as Prof. Boettcher explains, from other forms of social policy, and it carried a stigma and loss of the franchise (10). But in neither country was there the intense reaction against the spirit of the poor law that marked the beginnings of twentieth century social reform in England. In both countries, in fact, relief to the destitute still has something of the multi-purpose character that distinguished the English poor law before it was finally broken up in 1929, but without its harshness. The French *aide sociale* provides much more than help in cash or kind to those whose needs are not fully met by other means. It includes services for the sick, the old, the infirm and the homeless administered by special administrative authorities. And the new German *Bundessozialhilfegesetz*, which replaces former federal legislation about *Fürsorge*, is equally comprehensive in scope. The results look almost like a sort of three-tier system of social categories composed of those above the insurance level, the insured, and those below, though one should not equate the last category with the former English concept of pauper. In the British system there has been an almost complete fusion as a result of the Beveridge principle of universal coverage, following the break-up of the Poor Law in 1929. Now everybody contributes and everybody benefits in a national scheme of mutual aid, with National Assistance as a supplement, not as an alternative. The system has much in common with the German concept of *Staatsbürgerversorgung* which was referred to above. It signifies that the life services of the ordinary citizen to the community are similar to those of the soldier or civil servant to the state and give rise to similar claims to care and protection. The idea emerges, as German writers explain, when social insurance departs so far from actuarial principles that it might just as well be transferred to general taxation, and when social assistance has been so fully freed from taint or stigma that it can be used wherever needed as a supplementary source of aid and not confined to any specific category of persons (11). At that point the fusion, or integration, takes place. The drift towards it is visible in Germany in the case of the refugees and in France in the case of family allowances. In England things have advanced far in this direction all along the line. Oddly enough Lloyd George, at the moment when he was preparing his social insurance measures in 1911, foresaw the time when they would pass away and be replaced by a different conception of the rights of the citizen. He wrote in a memorandum :

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(8) ROUAST et DURAND, *op. cit.* pp. 262-268.

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(9) Emily Greene Balch, *Public Assistance of the Poor in France* (1893), p. 79.

(10) Hans Richter *et alii*, *Die Sozialfürsorgerecht*, p. 9.

> Insurance necessarily temporary expedient. At no distant date hope State will acknowledge full responsibility in the matter of making provision for sickness breakdown and unemployment [...] Gradually the obligation of the State to find labour or sustenance will be realized and honourably interpreted. Insurance will then be unnecessary (12).

Only in the National Health Service has this hope been fulfilled as yet.

It is in this conception of the claims of all citizens, directed not at the state but at one another, that I find the consensus at the key point of the British Welfare State. It belongs to democracy more than to socialism, but the clue to its nature can be found in the history of socialist ideas and the reaction to them. The word was used very broadly in England at the turn of the century. It might refer to a revolutionary working-class movement, inspired by Marxism. In his brilliant book *The Condition of England* (1909) Masterman said of the upper class, or "conquerors", that

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(11) Peter Quante, « Grundsätze der Versorgung, Versicherung und Fürsorge », *in* Erik Boettcher (ed.), *Sozialpolitik und Sozialreform*, pp. 229-236.

(12) William J. Braithwaite, *Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon*, pp. 121-122.

> its fear to-day is Socialism; Socialism which it does not understand, but which presents itself as an uprising of the uneducated suddenly breaking into its houses (13).

But the threat was not grave enough to make socialism in all its forms an untouchable idea. It was a label that was attached to, and often accepted by, most groups of ardent reformers, like Tory Socialists, Christian Socialists, Radical Socialists and even on occasion Liberal Socialists. Joseph Chamberlain, having outlined the Radical programme of 1885, went on :

> I shall be told to-morrow that this is Socialism [...] Of course it is Socialism; the Poor Law is Socialism; the Education Act is Socialism; the greater part of municipal work is Socialism; and every kindly act of legislation by which the community discharges its responsibilities and obligations to the poor is Socialism but it is none the worse for that (14).

This is a crude and early form of the new approach, the essence of which was to abandon the notion of social assistance as something on the fringe of policy dealing with a small class of outcasts, and to substitute the idea that social policy was an integral part of total policy and was concerned with the normal needs of all, or nearly all, the members of the society. As a half-way house between the old and the new we meet phrases like that used by Bismarck when he spoke of "the right that men have to be taken care of when, from no fault of their own, they become unfit for work" (15). The implication is that in most cases the poor are to blame for their poverty, but that there are some who have no cause to be ashamed of having been reduced to a shameful state.

The next stage in the advance brings in the idea of solidarity, or social and political integration, and it asks for recognition of claims based on a lifetime of useful work for society. We can hear it voiced by Millerand in 1901 when he spoke of the "social debt" to the aged and went on :

> It is not possible [...] that the aged who have done their duty in working all their life should at the moment when they are no longer able to work be abandoned by the society which they served so faithfully (16).

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(13) C. F. G. Masterman, *The Condition of England*, p. 64.

(14) S. Maccoby, *The English Radical Tradition*, 1763-1914, p. 201.

(15) B. E. Shenfield, *Social Policies fo Old Age*, p. 103.

(16) C. W. Pipkin, *Social Politics and Modern Democracies*, vol. II, p. 174.

And this leads on to the statement by the French Minister of Labour in 1922, explaining a Bill for social insurance :

> The essential point is that society as a whole should, in a spirit of solidarity, assist the wage-earners to defend themselves against the dangers by which they are constantly threatened (17).

The call is for solidarity to protect one class in society from dangers which threaten that class alone, and which are inherent in the social order and cannot, apparently, be eliminated from it. We are reminded of an earlier example of a similar attitude found among the "Socialists of the Chair" *(Kathedersozialisten)* in Germany and expressed in the classic literature of *Sozialpolitik.* This, as Prof. Boettcher has explained elsewhere, was a cross between an academic discipline and a social policy which aimed, not at any fundamental change, but only at a correction of the defects of the contemporary capitalist system. It started from the conception of society as divided into groups or classes, and sought means for strengthening the weakest class, the wage-earners, in its struggle with the stronger class of employers (18). But the *Kathedersozialisten* were also for solidarity. Gustav v. Schmoller, their leading spokesman, said that the task of nineteenth century government was "to resolve the conflict between the fourth estate and the classes above it, and to reincorporate the fourth estate harmoniously into the organism of state and society" (19).

Have we now reached the point at which we can say that the British social system in the 1940's achieved a still closer degree of integration, that this was combined with an exceptionally strong consensus as to the meaning of the system, and that this is the explanation of the phenomenon we call the "Welfare State"? This is too large a question to be answered here in detail, and all I can do is to indicate some of the evidence which might be held to justify an affirmative answer. First, the legislation of the 1940's finally dismantled the old three-tier system of the independent, the insured and the paupers, and was greeted with acclamation for so doing. This has not yet happened elsewhere. Secondly, the inspiration which fired the minds of the public when they read the Beveridge Report was drawn from the principles of comprehensiveness and universality rather than from the principle of a guaranteed subsistence. Hubert Henderson maintained that these were very different principles, and in fact that there was no relation "other than a contradictory relation" between them (20). Subsistence, or the abolition of want, was the aim of the old system, to be achieved by insurance supplemented by the Poor Law, but universality was quite new. And, as we know, the guarantee of subsistence was never clearly embodied in the legislation, still less achieved in administration ; but the popularity of the Welfare State survived. Thirdly, the true symbol of the Welfare State was much more the National Health Service than social insurance, or even family allowances. In a recent enquiry it was found that 92% of the families questioned said that the Health Service had been of great help, and 82% said it had been of more help than any other (21). The Health Service has nothing to do with class relations, poverty, subsistence or the defects of the capitalist system. It typifies humanity fighting against natural ills, as medicine always has done, it suppresses the economic market and replaces it by a calculus of needs, and those who give are distinguished from those who receive, not by superior wisdom, better morals or greater wealth, but by professional skill and knowledge. This, I believe, is what it stands for in most people's minds. Fourthly, the Welfare State of the 1940's was accompanied by a period of relative industrial peace, which seemed to suggest that, for the time being, inequalities of income were accepted as intelligible and legitimate, in the framework of the social and economic system which had emerged from the common dangers and strivings of the war. But, if this is significant, then it must be equally significant that the truce was of short duration and soon yielded place to the annual battle over wage claims. And this brings me to my final point.

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(17) *Ibid.* p. 196.

(18) Erik BOETTCHER, *Sozialpolitik und Sozialreform*, chap. I.

(19) Gustav v. SCHMOLLER, « Die soziale Frage und der preussische Staat », *Preussische Jahrbücher*, XXXII (1873), p. 342.

Mention of the war reminds us of the important question of the historical setting of the various national welfare systems. The experiences of the three countries have been very different. France, says Professor Reynaud, emerged from the trials of the war with a new solidarity born of the resistance, and adopted social policy almost unanimously ; it was "un élan", and not a compromise. Since then the political scene has been greatly disturbed and the confidence in the wisdom of governments shaken. More than one measure has been defeated by popular or professional opposition. Now, says Professor Reynaud, the period of ideological debate is over, and the issues that provoke discussion are technical and not matters of principle. But it almost seems that this is not because a strong, positive consensus has been achieved, but rather because there is an almost apathetic acceptance of the mechanism of social security, even when it is not very well understood. This may be in part the result of the ever livelier interest shown in problems of economic development, in both the most advanced and the most backward areas of France. Germany, Prof. Boettcher tells us, reacted strongly against its experience of totalitarian government, and in fact against almost any governmental interference with the private affairs of the citizens. The mood was one of political and economic liberalism, and naturally of social liberalism also. The Social Market Economy was acceptable, but any move towards the Welfare State was regarded with suspicion. However, the pressure in that direction, associated in particular with the need to provide for the war victims and the refugees, could not be wholly resisted. The result has been, he says, confusion of theory and incoherence of practice. And Germany too, like France, has put its maximum effort into economic development.

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(20) H. D. Henderson, *The Inter-war Years*, p. 207.

(21) P.E.P., *Family Needs and the Social Services*, pp. 35-36.

In England the story was very different. Solidarity grew without a break through the war and into the first years of peace. The Beveridge Report was a best-seller because it offered, while the war was still in progress, a blue-print of what the nation was fighting for. British war aims were expressed in terms of social justice. The Welfare State could enjoy a ready-made consensus. But the crucial point is, I believe, that the Welfare State was born into a world of austerity—of rationing, price control, coupons, rent restriction, and houses requisitioned for the use of the homeless. It was not that these restrictions on the free market were regarded as good in themselves and desirable elements in the new social order. Some might be so and others not. But they provided as a background to the welfare legislation a society committed to "fair shares" and to a distribution of real income which could be rationally justified and was not the unpredictable result of the supposedly blind forces of a competitive market, in which everybody was entitled to take as much as he could get. It was as a part of this system of regulated consumption that the trade unions refrained from wage demands.

By the middle of the 50's the Austerity Society had passed away and the Affluent Society was taking its place. The restraints on self-enrichment and competitive consumption were removed, and sensational stories were told of astronomic salaries, limitless expense accounts, and fabulous speculative gains in real estate and elsewhere. Prices rose, wage demands became an annual event, and inflation deprived some of the welfare benefits of their original value ; the gap was filled by National Assistance. It was in these circumstances that the basic principles of the Welfare State came under attack. The main objectives of the attack were the principle of universality in social insurance, and the provision of certain welfare services free to all. It was argued that the distribution of a large volume of real and money income through a complicated system of public administration might be justified in times of scarcity, but in times of prosperity increased productivity should enable nearly all the people to meet nearly all their needs out of their own pockets and through the mechanism of the market, thus reducing free or subsidized welfare provisions once more to the level of a peripheral affair. "To continue applying it (the Beveridge principle) in 1960", said a Conservative M.P., "is to swallow the drug after the disease has gone", and Lord Hailsham asked whether a system of social services "determined by the spectacle of Victorian poverty and of under-employment between the wars" was the ideal system "for a society enjoying full employment in mid-twentieth century conditions". "We are not a nation of paupers", said Mr. Butler, "we are a nation of prosperity" (22).

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So it seems that the Welfare State as we knew it in the 1940's, or at least the consensus which sustained it, has been smothered by the Affluent Society. And perhaps we should conclude that France and Germany pressed on into the Affluent Society without ever pausing to establish a Welfare State. But this does not mean that British welfare measures will be scrapped. Much has been built which will undoubtedly endure. But there is need for a new model. Perhaps one feature of this model is foreshadowed in the graduated pensions scheme of the Labour Party, which mirrors the arrangements of private enterprise and sets out to beat it at its own game. Perhaps some of the public social services will become more like nationalised industries, trying to balance their budgets by means of contributions from their clients. Or perhaps failure to defeat inflation will cause a return to some of the restrictive measures associated with the period of austerity. Or perhaps, finally, we shall embark on one of those interludes which occur between the periods in which clear-cut social systems appear with recognizable personalities of their own.

(22) *Crossbow*, Autumn 1960, p. 25, and Summer 1959, pp. 57-58.

NOTES CRITIQUES

THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE ACADEMIC MARKET PLACE

THE first to set out in sociological terms the deep-seated "structural" problems of the university career in Germany was Max Weber (1). Addressing the students at the University of Munich in 1918, he painted a plastic picture of the great risks and poor rewards of the academic career. The possibilities of advancing to a full professorship, the only permanent position at a German university at that time, were entirely incalculable. First of all, research itself was a risky undertaking. Even the most competent scientist, faced with a most promising research project, could not be sure of making the original discovery to bring him fame and recognition. But apart from that, the appointment was dependent on the existence of vacancies; and if there was no vacancy not even the best man could hope to get a professorship. If there was a vacancy there were usually a number of equally suitable candidates to fill it, the majority of whom would have to be frustrated. Finally, politics, administrative chicanery, prejudice (especially against Jews) and nepotism played a great part in appointments, so that the able scientist, particularly if he was a poor teacher, had to resign himself to the possibility that the desirable positions would be given to mediocre incompetents.

In face of such odds, Weber concluded that science was not a career; no teacher could with a good conscience recommend *Habilitation* (the preparation of an advanced thesis which is usually the condition for the right of lecturing at a German university) to his students. Those who choose science must do so not as persons choosing a regular profession, but as prophets and visionaries choose their vocation: in full knowledge that only by supernatural grace can they succeed in this world.

Weber did of course perceive the alternatives to this charismatic role-type in science, which began to emerge during his lifetime: the regular bureaucratized careers which were developing in the various institutes attached to the university departments in the natural sciences, medicine and agriculture. There one could get an appointment as assistant and after a while one could expect to be moved up by degrees to a sequence of positions which insured a modest but secure livelihood and a measure of social prestige. But Weber rejected these bureaucratized research careers as a proper framework for original research. These state-capitalist enterprises—he thought—might increase scientific

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(1) Max WEBER, "Science as a Vocation", *in* H. H. GERTH and C. Wright MILLS, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 129-156.

Archiv. europ. sociol., II (1961), 303-314.

"production", but only by negating the individual scientist, by stifling his initiative and by preventing independent work and thought. A different "spirit" prevailed in these institutes from the ethos of the old-fashioned scientist who lived for his work alone. The director of the institute ceased to be a true scientist because he delegated vital functions to subordinates, while the junior had to engage in some specific, and usually marginal, aspect of the current research of his chief. Once so specialized, his main utility for the institute was in his narrow and specialized skill and there was little interest to give him a chance of broadening his experience. The scientist was separated from his means of production and we may add, following Weber's trend of thought, from his product as well.

Weber did not conceive of any alternative to the hopeless and hazardous way of *Habilitation* on the one hand and the secure, but scientifically sterile, research career in the institutes on the other hand. His view of the future of the universities was therefore pessimistic. He saw the process which he witnessed as part and parcel of some sort of soulless bureaucratization of the modern world which reduces and abolishes all individual initiative and enterprise.

On the same occasion Weber also paid passing attention to the state of college teaching in the United States. There teaching was of course a career. From the very beginning one was paid for one's work and there were good prospects for promotion. But, to his mind, the American professor did not occupy a scientific role. He provided a professional service and was paid for his efficiency in teaching rather than for original work. The union of teaching and science had been an unhappy one even in the German universities, but in America the former had completely stifled and smothered the latter. Essentially Weber pleaded to dissolve this union, and his passing reference to the French academicians can be interpreted that he might have approved the creation of paid positions of academicians as a material basis for scientific research.

A great deal of Weber's critical views on German and American universities is still accepted by many social scientists writing on this theme. The main conclusions of a survey of the present state of the German university professors could still be summarized more or less in Weber's own terms (2). There have of course been some changes. The *Privatdozent* who does not draw a salary from the university, yet devotes himself on a full-time basis to scientific research, has practically disappeared. Remuneration is given for both teaching and research within the university, while those who do not find employment within the university are no longer able to live "for science", in Weber's terms, but must seek their livelihood outside the university and are forced to live "off science". Even so, the academic profession in Germany has as a whole remained extremely restricted. The total academic personnel in German universities and higher educational institutions in 1953 was 7,668, nearly a third of whom were full professors (active or emeriti) (cf. Table 1).

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(2) Ilse Asemissen, Renate Frenzel, Dietrich Goldschmidt, Christian Graf von Krockow, Helmuth Plessner, *Nachwuchsfragen im Spiegel einer Erhebung*, 1953-55 (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Rupert, 1956), pp. 37-49; which is vol. I of Helmuth Plessner (ed.), *Untersuchungen zur Lage der deutschen Hochschullehrer* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Rupert, 1956), 3 vols.

TABLE 1

*Academic Staff of German Universities and other Institutions of Higher Learning, by Groups of Ranks; Germany 1864 to 1938 and Western Germany 1953 *.*

	1864	*1880*	*1900*	*1910*	*1931*	*1938*	*1953*
Total	1,474	1,903	3,409	4,463	5,899	5,453	7,668
Of this (full professors) :	723	941	1,404	1,688	2,384	2,164	1,929

* 1864 and 1880, Universities only. From 1900 to 1953, includes technical Institutes.
SOURCE : von Ferber, pp. 195, 210.

The university staff in 1953 was only 60 per cent larger in Western Germany than it had been in 1910, while the highest rank, full professor, increased only about 15 per cent. The number of universities and technological institutes has changed very little since 1910. The few changes which occurred were the result of political and territorial changes which occurred in the wake of World War I (the foundation of the Universities of Frankfurt a/M, Hamburg and Cologne and two technological institutes) and of World War II (Berlin and Mainz). The most important thing, however, which remained unchanged since Weber's days is the unique position of the German university professor. What growth in numbers there has been, was due mainly to the introduction of new disciplines ; but now, as before, it is the usual rule that one discipline has only one chair at any one university, so that the growth of the number of positions in any one discipline is severely restricted to the number of universities or equivalent institutions. Even the progressive specialization in science has not found full expression in the fission of existing disciplines, and new specializations are represented increasingly by the subordinate academic personnel. As a result there has been a relatively large expansion in the number of "associate" and "assistant" professors, *extraordinarii* and *Dozenten* whose specialized function effectively excludes them from advancement to a full professorship. A large portion of the salaried academic positions which have been created at the German universities has thus not been fully institutionalized in terms of the academic career, since this still remains oriented largely to the attainment of a full professorship. The long-term career prospects of entrants into the academic profession have therefore changed but little. In spite of recent improvements in the starting salaries of junior academic personnel, the long-term career prospects are still poor (3). Weber's prediction about the future of academic careers in Germany seems to have been fully realized.

Christian von Ferber's survey of the development of the academic staff 1864-1954 supplies the data on the changing composition of the German universities and other academic establishments, and provides historical-statistical documentation for the Weber-Plessner thesis. He traces in detail the process of hierarchization of the university departments and how this process is reflected in the individual careers of the scientists. At mid-nineteenth century the academic staff consisted mostly of full professors. Alongside these there was a group of habilitated *Privatdozenten* who had neither monopoly nor claim to vacancies arising among the "official" positions (professorships). The selection of professors was not restricted to the pool of *Privatdozenten*, but appointments were frequently given to practitioners and individuals who had distinguished themselves outside the universities without having habilitated themselves prior to their appointment to a professorship. In spite, or perhaps because of this, *Habilitation* usually led to a professorial appointment at a relatively early age. Sixty-six per cent of the individuals habilitated between 1850-1859 (average age at habilitation 28, 1850-69) eventually became full professors at a relatively early age : the average age at first appointment to full professorship during 1860-84 —i.e. when those who received their *Habilitation* in 1850-59 were promoted to professorship—was about 36-37. Even before the end of the century, however, conditions began to change. Increasingly the habilitated personnel at the universities became the sole reservoir from which professorial appointments were made. At the same time the average age at *Habilitation* increased (30 between 1890-1909) ; while the percentage of those who eventually became full professors declined to 53 per cent. Those who did make the grade had to wait longer for their appointment (ca. 12 years on the average), reaching the pinnacle of the academic career at the age of about 40 (4). The average age at *Habilitation* rose to 38,4 during 1950-54, and the average age at first appointment to full professorship to about 47 (5). In addition, the leap from *Privatdozent* to full professor became rarer and promotion became increasingly a matter of slow and laborious ascent through the grades of the academic hierarchy which began to interpose themselves between the two original status positions. The trend was already fully discernible toward the end of the nineteenth century and has since then become steadily more pronounced. Seniority and institutional connections have become as much or more important criteria for advancement as scientific brilliance and genuine achievement. Most of the creative years of the academic scientist are now spent in those "transitional" positions whose permanent tenancy has not yet become fully legitimized and the protracted occupancy of which still carries a faint stigma of "failure".

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(3) *Ibid.* p. 49.

(4) Christian von Ferber, *Die Entwicklung des Lehrkörpers der deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen*, 1864-1954 (Göttingen, 1956) [Vol. III of Plessner (ed.), *op. cit.*], pp. 81-82, 93-94.

(5) *Ibid.* pp. 155-56.

While the empirical data collected about developments in Germany seem to bear out Max Weber's views, those in America do not accord so well with his predictions. Weber described the American college professor as one "who sells [...] his knowledge and his methods for [...] money, just as the greengrocer sells [...] cabbage [...]" (6). The academic market-place, some aspects of which have been described recently by Caplow (7), is not the kind of market which Weber had in mind. The teacher does not own his own shop in which he sells his wares, but has rather to "sell himself" to one of a great number of institutions which "produce" not only teaching, but also research, scientific consultation, periodicals and books, football teams and quite a few other things. It is, therefore, not surprising that Weber is not mentioned in the genealogy of ideas about the American university which Caplow traces from Adam Smith, through Charles Horton Cooley, Logan Wilson, David Riesman, Jacques Barzun, W. H. Cowley, Charles H. Page and John S. Diekhoff (8).

Caplow's book does not attempt to provide a complete survey of the American University today comparable to the studies of Plessner and his associates. He only investigates the mechanisms and procedures by which vacant positions in American universities are filled, and refers for the description of the system as a whole to Logan Wilson's *The Academic Man* (9), published nearly twenty years ago, and to an unfortunately unpublished manuscript of W. H. Cowley. Wilson's book, although it describes the situation as it was in the nineteen-thirties, still retains its value as the most systematic and penetrating published description of the American academic profession. Caplow's work on university vacancies shows that basically American universities function both individually and as a system much in the manner described by Wilson, in spite of the immense expansion of higher education and research and some other changes which have taken place in the meantime.

Trying to summarize the implicit criticism of Wilson and the explicit one of Caplow, it appears that whatever malfunctions there are in the American universities they are the result of the way the system as a whole operates and, not as in Germany, of the internal structure of the departments. Universities and departments are in constant competition with each other for teachers and students, and funds and fame.

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(6) Max WEBER, *op. cit.* p. 149.

(7) Theodore CAPLOW and Reece J. McGEE, *The Academic Market Place* (New York, Basic Books, 1958).

(8) *Ibid.* pp. 7-17.

(9) New York, Oxford University Press, 1942.

This competition leads to the establishment of hierarchies of institutional and personal prestige. There is a tendency for prestige to become based upon easily discernible qualities, such as the quantity rather than the quality of publications, quantity rather than quality of Ph. D. degrees conferred, and the size rather than the intrinsic value of the research projects. The main problem is that the various criteria of prestige interact and in the end make it very difficult to evaluate scientific achievement and merit objectively. A scholar's academic reputation (and therewith his career-opportunities) are said to be too much a function of his institutional affiliation and too little the function of his individual merit. The university system does not really form one interconnected system of mobility but is divided into various "leagues". There is interchange of personnel within each "league" but little between the "leagues". The academic ranks are not of equivalent value in institutions belonging to the different leagues and this acts as a brake to mobility by reducing the size of the market facing the college teacher. Universities of lower prestige are unable to attract promising young scientists from high prestige institutions by offering high academic ranks since this may adversely affect their long-term career prospects. This is due to the customary procedure whereby the move from one university to another is made at least in the same grade, and often is accompanied by promotion. Acceptance of a full professorship in a lower prestige university may thus seriously jeopardize the professor's future chances for moving to a higher prestige university, a transition "respectable" only when he is offered there at least the equivalent rank to his previous one. Thus, it is argued, the flexibility of the system to move the right people to the right positions is highly curtailed by external criteria of prestige and rank.

The system is also said to be inefficient, or at least cruel, in the way it treats the professional scientist in search of a job. The candidate for an academic appointment operates in a "closed" market. He cannot simply canvass the institutions in which he is interested but must wait until he is approached with an offer. Once approached, usually through "personal influence", he must quickly state his rock-bottom conditions, since he knows that others are competing with him for the job. The university on the other hand can procrastinate, enquire far and wide and bargain for the best man at the lowest price. The spread of the "up or out" system for the lower academic ranks accompanied by the unwritten privilege of many a department that any of its members can blackball any candidate for new appointment, place a premium on intra-institutional advancement. Finally, since the market judges by simple external criteria of prestige and success, failure to secure re-appointment (even for reasons quite unconnected with professional qualifications) is stigmatized and diminishes the bargaining position of the scientist.

From these descriptions and analyses of the academic profession in two such different countries as Germany and the United States there emerges one common point. Science as a career seems to be something that is very difficult to institutionalize. Whether the university system is built on the model of European state bureaucracies, or whether it works like a competitive market, the criteria of evaluation used in the system tend to distort the purpose of scientific work. Seniority, bureaucratic power, and external signs of prestige become the criteria for appointment and promotion and there is very little to insure the recognition of real talent. Going by these descriptions, the scientist's career must be quite a frustrating one. In Germany one may be kept on "probation" until the age of sixty; this cannot happen in the United States but still, according to Caplow, one has to put up with low salaries and the vagaries of an irrationally working system of selection and promotion giving one practically no means for planning one's career while pressured continually toward improving one's position.

Criticism of an institution usually implies that there is a known alternative to the way it is functioning now. Indeed the existence of alternative ways of organization is assumed in Germany as well as the U.S. While, however, Caplow's suggestions for the improvement of the procedures for the filling of vacant positions in the universities are put forward as new ideas for the future improvement of an unsatisfactory situation which has been perhaps even more unsatisfactory in the past, in the German writings there is usually an assumption that there was a time during the nineteenth century when German universities functioned satisfactorily. The main difference between the present state of affairs and the lost "golden age" is the rise and decline of the institution of *Privatdozentur*. The independent, private scholar who pursued science as a vocation without having to live "off" science, whose image Weber conjured up before his students, is thought to have really existed in the 19th century. Unfettered by any obligations to teach, the *Privatdozent* is said to have exercised his right to lecture only out of genuine interest in the subject, and he was given this right in order to provide a healthy competition to the more conservative breed of state-compensated professor-officials. His task was supposedly to prevent stagnating orthodoxy from gaining a monopoly on "science" and the minds of the students. The only interest which connected the *Privatdozenten* to the university was that of the advancement of science. As if around every university there existed a semi-official academy of private scholars who by their idealistic work and example safeguarded the purpose or ideal of pure research at the university, and struck out boldly into new directions without considerations of existing authority, "[...] saying publicly what the professor as yet was thinking only very privately [...]" (10). Today, as pointed out above, the *Privatdozenten* have lost their independent status as "private" scholars and the title, to the extent that it still exists, refers merely to just a rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the universities; the role of the pure and independent scientist as he is once said to have existed has thus passed into oblivion.

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(10) v. Ferber, *op. cit.*

This indeed seems to have been an idyllic state of affairs. How perfectly it worked can be seen from some of von Ferber's data. The *Privatdozenten* who abjured the pursuit of a career but devoted themselves to science for its own sake, by some happy coincidence were nearly always called to university chairs at a fairly early age. Only some 16 percent of those habilitated between 1850-59 ended their university days as *Privatdozenten* (11). The remainder were snatched up by grateful curators and senates to expound their heterodox views as salaried official professors. Miraculously, the spirit of free inquiry and disinterested scientific research seemed to descend upon this group of scientists supposedly not concerned with career in curious waves. *Habilitationen* for disciplines which were just becoming obligatory subjects and for which new professorships were just being established were always plentiful, while once the available professorships were fully occupied in any one discipline, *Habilitationen* and "disinterested scientific research" migrated to other disciplines (12).

It seems, therefore, that the ideal of the German university so religiously adhered to in Germany and widely accepted elsewhere, mainly as a result of the enthusiastic writings of Abraham Flexner (13), was far removed from reality. The German universities indeed thrived during the nineteenth century, but not because they worked along the lines of their official ideology but in spite of it. Between 1820 and 1900, when the faculties and the departments in the modern sense were established, there was a keen and competitive market for the relatively few outstanding scholars in any field. There was a real promise in choosing science as an occupation; therefore many energetic, able and creative people chose it as their vocation. *Habilitation* for such people at that time must have been a challenging enterprise; it was both risky and promising. The freedom and independence of the *Privatdozent* was, therefore, not the result of abstract idealism which people possessing private wealth could easily afford, but of the superior bargaining power of the scientists due to the relatively numerous and valuable career opportunities available in the rapidly expanding system of universities.

Once however the period of establishment of new departments and new institutions of higher learning came virtually to an end, as it did in Germany since the beginning of this century, *Habilitation* became a highly problematic and *Privatdozentur* a highly inefficient institution. In fields where *Habilitation* became an accepted qualification for desirable positions outside the universities, e.g. clinical medicine, the training of habilitants could proceed without giving rise to serious difficulties. But in fields where no appropriate career-opportunities outside the universities existed to compensate for the diminishing chances of climbing up the academic ladder, there arose all those problems set out by most observers of the situation since the beginning of the century : the emergence of a number of semi-institutionalized university posts providing some sort of livelihood but apparently reducing the initiative and spoiling the enthusiasm of the young scientist, a general, widespread feeling of frustration and futility, stiffly formalized bureaucratic relationships unsuitable for creative work, and the stigma of failure for those who fail to obtain a full professorship. One wonders whether this process has not in the long run negatively affected the quality of entrants into the academic profession.

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(11) *Ibid.* pp. 81-82.

(12) Awraham Zloczower, *Career Opportunities and the Growth of Scientific Discovery in 19th Century Germany*, M. A. thesis, Department of Sociology, Hebrew University (Jerusalem, 1960). Unpublished.

(13) Abraham Flexner, *Universities, American, English, German* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1930).

About the actual conditions of the *Privatdozentur*, cf. in addition to the sources quoted in notes 10 and 12 Alexander Busch, *Die Geschichte des Privatdozenten* (Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1959), pp. 43-53, 109-141.

The main problem of the German academic profession is, therefore, that it stopped expanding some time at the beginning of this century or even slightly earlier. The unique sociological characteristic of German science in the nineteenth century was the rapid development of scientific careers. Private scholars with independent means were probably much more frequent in Britain and France than in Germany. What distinguished German science—and had probably a great deal to do with its distinction—was that it was the first to establish professional science (14). The *Privatdozent* was a person who chose science as a career then as now ; the difference is that then his career opportunities were good, so he could wait and choose the position where he could investigate and teach what he was interested in. Therefrom the image of the free researcher unfettered by institutional bonds ; today his career opportunities are bad, so he is told what to teach and investigate, and then scolded for not living up to the old ideal of science for science's sake.

Whatever the shortcomings of the scientific profession in the U.S., they cannot be due to the same causes as those of the German profession. As can be seen from the figures of Table 2, there has been a constant and rapid expansion of academic jobs in the U.S., and the figures would be even more impressive if we added other research positions. The academic career in the U.S.A. is still rapid, people are appointed to full professorships in their thirties and forties, and even assistant professorship, which is obtained much earlier, is a recognized part of the academic career. The immense difference between the opportunities of academic career in the U.S. and Germany becomes clear from the age

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(14) Cf. Joseph Ben-David, Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth Century Medicine, *American Sociological Review*, XXV (1960), 828-843.

TABLE 2

College Teachers in the U.S. from 1900 to 1950, by decades.

1900	*1910*	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1958*
29,000	45,000	62,000	105,400	146,900	246,700

SOURCE : George J. STIGLER, *Trends in Employment in the Service Industries* (Princeton University Press' Princeton, 1956), p. 108.

distribution of the academic personnel in the two countries. In the U.S. 46 percent of the academic teachers were less than 40 years of age, and only 20 percent were 50 or more (in 1950). The corresponding percentages for Germany were 10 and 55 per cent (in 1953) (15).

In view of this it seems that the impression which can be gained from reading the critical examination of the procedure of filling university vacancies in America is somewhat misleading. Any inefficiencies which may prevail in this respect in such a rapidly expanding system like the American, will not have the same meaning as similar inefficiencies have in a stable restricted system. The quality of a stable academic system depends entirely on the efficiency of the selection of successors. If the criteria for selecting successors in such a system will be anything but scientific excellence, then indeed the system will degenerate. Not so in an expanding system, since the quality of this depends only in part on the quality of successors to existing positions ; partly it will be determined by the quality of appointees to new positions.

In order to judge, therefore, the efficiency of the American academic system we ought to have a study, complementing the Caplow volume, about the creation of new academic departments and positions, about promotions of junior personnel where no vacancy exists, and on the policies of staffing newly created campuses and institutions. Another important study would be about the "mobility" of universities. It has been pointed out all too often that American colleges are strictly divided into "leagues" of different qualities and prestige (16). But universities do move up from one league to another, and, even more often, universities of relatively low standing decide to concentrate on a particular field and achieve real excellence in it.

As has been pointed out, unfortunately we do not have these studies, so we cannot know exactly how these things do happen. They do, however, happen, and since they do, they place the deficiencies of the

(15) U. S. Census of Population : 1950, *Special Reports, Occupationa .Characteristics*, PE Nº 1B, vol. IV, part 1, chapter B (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 1 B-37, table 4 ; PLESSNER (ed.), *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 126.

(16) WILSON, *op. cit.* pp. 160-164 ; CAPLOW, *op. cit.* pp. 75-76, 134-35, 152-55, 225.

American academic system diagnosed by its critics in a different perspective. Many of the imperfections of the market pointed out by Caplow, such as the "blackball" privilege, the excessive stress of "compatibility" and the need to avoid offending the feeling and the status of tenured department members do not arise at all when new fields are pioneered. It also might well be that the convention against soliciting positions does not pertain to individuals who really have something "new" to sell. Thus there is plenty of scope for recognizing and rewarding real talent, raising the quality of the personnel and introducing innovations, even if the procedures of filling vacancies seem to be designed to ensure the smooth functioning of existing departments rather than to foster excellence.

These considerations lead us to question one assumption (implicit or explicit) common to most of the students of universities in Europe or in America. They conceive of the university as an institution designed to discover the extraordinary talent and the innovator (the two are not necessarily the same !), create for them the kind of conditions which are most conducive to the development of their creativity, and at the same time make them teach young people who presumably can benefit from the contact with such outstanding minds. In reality an unknown, but probably very small part of the research carried out at universities (or anywhere else) will ever become part of the annals of science, and universities teach students whose I.Q's range from 110 to 160 or more, a few of whom may indeed become creative scientists, but many more of whom will become—at best—competent mediocrities in an immense variety of occupations. As far as research is concerned, we know that the situation had nowhere been any better in the past either. It is not known, of course, what were the intelligence quotients of university students fifty or a hundred years ago, but it is very unlikely that on the whole they were significantly higher than today.

It seems, therefore, that those who speak about universities very often forget the everyday work and life of these institutions (or at least of the very large majority of them). Passing reference is usually made to the fact that teaching of a high quality does not necessarily go together with research of similar quality (there is an excellent study which shows that some of the most efficient institutions in fostering scientific talent amongst students in America have been small liberal arts colleges which do not do a great deal of research) (17). Yet even this knowledge has not usually led to the conclusion that there may be a legitimate division of labour between academic institutions and that not all can be measured by the same standards of excellence. There is a widely accepted idea of the university according to which universities, even where there are hundreds of them, are always dealt with as self-contained organizations, and are all measured—and usually found deficient—by the highest standards of originality and excellence. Even if this is justified as an aim, it is an inefficient tool for understanding how excellence is actually achieved.

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(17) R. H. Knapp and H. B. Goodrich, *Origins of American Scientists; a study made under the direction of the faculty of Wesleyan University* (Middletown, Conn., University of Chicago Press for Wesleyan University, 1952).

The comparative historical material here surveyed, and much of what has not been included in this survey, show that no single university can be efficiently designed to ensure excellence. Ongoing organizations—and universities are no exception—have inherent (and necessary) tendencies to foster such qualities as loyalty, personal compatibility, administrative ability and leadership, none of which is necessarily accompanied by exceptional scientific talent. Originality and excellence are heavenly gifts which cannot be created and planned for. All that human organizations can do is to be receptive and flexible enough to accommodate for such gifts when given. In the great past ages of German science, or in the present great age of American science, the organizations have been both receptive and flexible, because they have been parts of rapidly expanding systems which saw an unlimited scope for science, and were not worried unduly that by "too rapidly" expanding science would lose its pristine purity (18). Under such conditions the tendencies of each individual organization towards routine mediocrity were counteracted by competition for new opportunities. Stagnation and decay set in as soon as academic systems decided to choose the path of restriction and made the preservation of their excellence and elite position their main concern. Mediocrities have not been less attracted to such elite institutions than to more expansive and democratic ones, nor were they less useful in carrying out their well established functions—including the careful fostering of the symbols of excellence. But creativity has thrived best wherever tasks and opportunities were plentiful.

JOSEPH BEN-DAVID and AWRAHAM ZLOCZOWER

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(18) With some qualifications these generalizations are probably true for the development of English, French and Russian science as well.

PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH ON RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

In this note, I shall discuss on the basis of a pilot survey now being analyzed (1) some of the issues raised by the concept of "relative deprivation" as a topic for survey research. In the first section, I shall deal with some of the theoretical considerations involved, and in the second with some of the problems of method.

I

The two related notions of relative deprivation and reference groups now command a very considerable literature, which I do not propose to review here (2). The basic insight (or truism) which underlies both is that a person's attitudes, values and motives depend on (or are a function of) the frame of reference within which they are conceived. Although the term "reference group" has passed into current use, it is clear that it need not in fact be a group which is the crucial referent; as several writers have pointed out (3), the referent may be anything from a single person to an abstract idea. Further, there is an important distinction between what have been labelled "comparative" and "normative" reference groups (4); a group may be either a source of standards or an actual standard in itself, and it may or may not be an enforcer of these standards. This distinction, however, is irrelevant to the notion of relative deprivation, where the important question is simply what is the referent by which the level of a person's aspirations and standards is set. (This referent may, of course, be either positive or negative, both in the case of membership and of non-membership

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(1) I am indebted to the Institute of Community Studies for support. I am also indebted for comments on earlier versions of this paper to Professors Herbert Hyman, T. H. Marshall and Hanan C. Selvin.

(2) The standard discussions remain Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Rossi, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behaviour" reprinted in Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* ^{2} (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957), pp. 225-280 and Herbert H. Hyman, "The Relation of the Reference Group to Judgments of Status", reprinted in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1953), pp. 263-270.

(3) Merton, *op. cit.* pp. 302-304; S. M. Eisenstadt, "Studies in Reference Group Behaviour, I: Reference Norms and the Social Structure", *Human Relations*, VII (1954), p. 213; Tamotsu Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives", *AJS*, LX (1955), p. 565; Ralph H. Turner, "Role-taking, Role Standpoint and Reference Group Behaviour", *AJS*, LXI (1956), p. 329.

(4) H. H. Kelley, "Two Functions of Reference Groups", *in* G. E. Swanson *et al.*, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* ^{2} (New York, 1952), pp. 404-414.

Archiv. europ. sociol., II (1961), 315-323.

groups) (5). Relative deprivation may then be broadly defined by saying that a person is relatively deprived when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or imagined time, as having X (whether or not they do have X), and (iii) he wants X (whether or not it is feasible that he should have X). "To be without Y" can, of course, be substituted where relevant for "to have X".

On the basis of this definition, we may say that the further the positive referent (or its equivalent) from a given person, the greater his relative deprivation. This, however, raises two further problems. First, there is no measure of social distance by which "greater" relative deprivation may be given a meaning ; and second, a "greater" deprivation need not necessarily be more intensely felt than a lesser one. These difficulties can only be answered by reference to the particular person's own standards. The intensity even of the most measurable deprivations may not correlate at all with their magnitude ; for instance, marginal differences of income within a family might be more deeply resented than greater external differences. Moreover, different people have very different pictures of the social structure of which they form a part, as has recently been shown for three European countries by Willener (6), Popitz (7) and Elizabeth Bott (8). It is only in terms of a person's own image of social distance that, for instance, a relative status deprivation may be seen as such. Of course, interpersonal comparisons are possible in certain cases, such as the percentage gap between desired and actual income ; but a great many relative deprivations are impervious to such treatment and must logically remain so. I shall later be suggesting a fourfold typology of relative deprivation, but I do not thereby wish to imply that either relative deprivation or social distance can be measured by any kind of continuous monotonic scale.

There are two sorts of non-relative deprivation which must be distinguished both from relative deprivation and from each other. The first, for which the term "absolute deprivation" is sometimes used, is that which underlies the notion of "primary poverty" ; that is to say, deprivation seen in terms of simple subsistence level (9). This notion, however, is not really very satisfactory. In the first place, there are cases other than at subsistence level where we wish intuitively to speak of a person as absolutely deprived ; an example would be deprivation of all social intercourse, although this is not necessary for survival.

(5) MERTON, *op. cit.* pp. 300-302 ; F. M. MARTIN, "Some Subjective Aspects of Social Stratification", *in* D. V. Glass, ed., *Social Mobility in Britain* (London, 1954), pp. 59-60.

(6) A. WILLENER, *Images de la société et classes sociales* (Berne, 1957).

(7) H. POPITZ *et al.*, *Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters* ² (Tübingen, 1961).

(8) Elizabeth BOTT, *Family and Social Network* (London, 1957), ch. VI : "Norms and Ideology : Concepts of Class".

(9) R. DAHRENDORF, *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society* (Stanford, 1959), p. 217.

Secondly, even in terms of food and health there can be no purely objective criterion of deprivation ; the standards both of the observer and of the person deprived may be equally likely to vary (10). It would perhaps be less ambiguous to use "absolute deprivation" for any noticeable lack, whether felt or not (for instance, we might wish to speak of a Mexican village as absolutely deprived of sanitation even if its inhabitants refused the offer of it). On the other hand, "absolute deprivation" could instead be used for any felt need not dependent upon comparison with another person or group (for instance, hunger). The choice of terminology is, of course, arbitrary. But it is important to distinguish the two types of non-relative "deprivation" ; first, objectively ascertained need, whether felt as such or not by the people concerned ; and second, affective deprivation, whereby people are only deprived (even non-relatively) if they feel that they are.

In addition, there are two further sorts of attitude to be distinguished from relative deprivation, both of which have been found in answers to questions in the pilot survey mentioned above. First, there are people (particularly older people) whose satisfactions are closely bound up with those of their children, and who, although they may feel relatively deprived on behalf, as it were, of their children, should not be called relatively deprived themselves. Of course, some aspirations on behalf of children do reflect a relative deprivation felt by the parents ; but these must be distinguished from cases where the parents share the relative deprivations (or satisfactions) of the children but are not themselves necessarily relatively deprived. The second and somewhat similar case is where a person feels disapproval of the existing social or economic structure without himself being relatively disadvantaged by it. It is quite possible for someone, whatever his picture of the social structure, to feel both that his own position within it is satisfactory and also that the relative positions of others are not what they should be. Once again, we may speak of relative deprivation as it were on behalf of others. But it would be incorrect in such a case to speak of the person as being relatively deprived himself.

Within the category of what may be properly labelled relative deprivations, there are obviously a great number of different topics which may be covered. A man may feel himself relatively deprived of anything from his pre-war salary differential to his neighbour's pretty wife, and he may have a whole range of different referents for his different deprivations. Moreover, both the referents and the deprivations will be liable to change over even quite a short period of time. It is thus evident that anything approaching a full analysis of a person's relative deprivations must take the investigator well beyond the scope of sociological analysis and into individual psychology. To map all of someone's relative deprivations would involve discovering the number

(10) P. E. P., "Poverty : Ten Years After Beveridge", *Planning*, No. 344 (1952), p. 36.

of dimensions in which he felt himself deprived, and the extent or intensity of his deprivations in each. The correlation matrix of a person's whole set of deprivations might, of course, factor analyze into a very few dimensions, but this is unlikely in many cases to be so. However, the usefulness of the concept in survey research is not limited to such exhaustive and intricate analysis. We may still wish to ask such broader questions as whether a particular social or economic deprivation is relative or not, how far the members of a given social group impute to other groups a situation which affects their own aspirations, what sort of person or group (if any) is taken as referent on a given topic, and so on. In particular, there are two very general dimensions in which a person may be placed and which may be applicable in large-scale survey research on a total social structure. The first is a person's satisfaction with his position in what he sees as his group; the second is his satisfaction with the position of what he sees as his group in the total social structure.

It is at once evident that these two dimensions are not intended to cover the whole range of a particular person's relative deprivations. I do mean to suggest, however, that these are the two principal sociological dimensions of relative deprivation. If we consider the respondents to a national survey in their capacity as members of the total social structure, then (whatever the topic in question) it makes sense to ask in terms of their picture of their social location whether they are relatively deprived in either or both of these dimensions. This applies to questions about general political and social attitudes just as much as to questions about specific economic needs. Indeed, it is possible simply to ask whether there is any general topic about which a given person feels relatively deprived, and, if so, with reference to what group (or person or past situation, or whatever it may be). Curiously little work seems to have been done on relative deprivation at the level of total social structures (although I shall be referring to two particular examples in the next section). In Britain, for instance, although much has been written on the social, economic and political effects of the welfare state, there have been few if any studies of the needs and attitudes of different groups as related to the social circumstances and images of society by which they may be shaped. Professor Titmuss, in his essay on "Social Administration in a Changing Society", has forcibly pointed out how important it is from a purely practical point of view to understand the effect of recent social and economic changes on the relative attitudes and deprivations of different social groups and their consequent patterns of social needs (11). Similarly, an understanding of people's relative deprivations as members of a group or class is likely to be crucial to the explanation of political behaviour; but little has so far been done beyond the topic of self-selected social status in relation to party preference (12). There may, of course, be considerable difficulties (some of which I shall mention in the next section) in precisely assessing the influence of relative deprivation as an independent variable acting on social or political attitudes. Its theoretical importance, however, is surely unquestionable.

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(11) Richard M. Titmuss, *Essays on "The Welfare State"* (London, 1958), pp. 13-33; Cf. Henning Friis, "The Application of Sociology to Social Welfare, Planning and Administration" in *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology* (London, 1959), II, pp. 66-67.

It would obviously be rash to hazard any ambitious theoretical generalizations on the basis of a small pilot survey. However, these few responses seem to show that it is fairly rare for people to take as a standard (and, in consequence, feel relatively deprived) what they see as the situation of a superior social stratum. If this is so, it may seem surprising in view of the degree of inequality, both of class and status, which still exists in contemporary England. But it could, on the other hand, be argued that it is precisely the awareness of these inequalities which reduces relative deprivation in reference to higher social strata; it may be that only where opportunity is believed to be equal do higher strata come to be taken as positive referents. This raises familiar general issues which I do not propose to embark on here. However, if it is true that it is in general membership groups by which people's social aspirations and standards are set, then the questions to what extent this holds good and under what conditions should be feasible topics for a national survey even if the material obtained is likely to be less explanatory than descriptive. In the next section, I shall consider some problems of method and discuss the proposed typology in more detail.

II

The typology can be best represented by a four-fold table, as follows:

		Satisfaction with position in own group	
		+	—
Satisfaction with position of own group in social structure	+	A	B
	—	C	D

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(12) E. g. Mark ABRAMS and Richard ROSE, *Must Labour Lose?* (Penguin Books, 1960), p. 18 (table 4).

I have labelled the four types simply by letter, for want of any satisfactory adjective to describe them, but some additional comment may make them clearer. Type A might be labelled "orthodox", being neither personally ambitious nor personally resentful of the existing social structure. If he is low in class- and status-situation we could label him "deferent" in Bagehot's sense (recently revived by R. T. McKenzie); if he is at the top, we could label him "boss". However, type A will also include the "altruist" or "prosperous radical" who, as mentioned in the previous section, would like to see the social structure altered without himself being relatively deprived. Type B, on the other hand, is likely to be the sort of "striver" described by Hollingshead and Redlich (13) as being less satisfied with his role and expecting more from the future than the stable person content with his situation as it is. Although not resentful of the existing social structure, he may still feel his personal resentment more intensely than type C, who although he compares the situation of his own group unfavourably with that of others is nevertheless satisfied with his position within it. Type C will exemplify the sort of lateral solidarity described within the working class by Hoggart (14), where an unambitious loyalty to class or occupational group is combined with the feeling that the class as a whole is relatively deprived. Finally, type D, whom we might describe as altogether disgruntled, will be the most relatively deprived of all, since he is not only resentful of the position of his group but also dissatisfied with his position within it.

There is one sort of person who needs separate comment, namely the person who must in some sense be regarded as altogether alienated from the social structure and who does not explicitly see himself as belonging to any group at all. Even in this case, however, I think that one does wish to speak of the person as being or not being relatively deprived. The complete recluse, no matter how cut off he may be from the rest of his society, must still be either satisfied or not with his situation. If his dissatisfactions do not depend in any way on comparison with others, we may fairly speak of him as not being relatively deprived; if, on the other hand, he has some picture of the way the rest of society lives and if this picture affects his own felt dissatisfactions, then we do wish to talk about his relative deprivation. Thus even the person most alienated from his society can still in principle be categorized according to the typology. If his alienation is of the form of retreatism and apathy, this is likely to place him with type A. If, however, he is both conscious and resentful of the rest of society or his class as a "them" opposed to himself, he may belong more properly with type D.

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(13) A. B. Hollingshead and F. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness* (New York, 1958), p. 105. The authors also comment that "strivers" identify in significantly larger numbers with a higher class.

(14) Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London, 1957), esp. ch. iii.

I do not mean to suggest that the "alienated" man is not importantly different from those who may fall more neatly into the categories. I do, however, mean to suggest that any member of a society can in principle be classified according to these two dimensions of relative deprivation.

Clearly, shifts from one type to another will be possible or indeed likely even over quite short periods of time, and if these could be ascertained they might well prove particularly interesting. Thus shifts from C to B might throw light on recent patterns of British voting behaviour ; or an oscillation between D and A might correlate with some independent measure of authoritarianism. To test such notions accurately, however, would require either panel data or purposively sampled trend data. But irrespective of changes, which could only be traced by an elaborate and expensive research design, it should be possible to obtain useful and interesting results from quite simple procedures of questioning and analysis. Out of previous work done on this topic, two particular studies suggest this : one by Hyman in the United States and one by Stern and Keller in France.

Hyman, in a well-known study of the value-systems of different classes (15), shows by secondary analysis of public opinion data how different strata in American society modify their occupational goals in accordance with their social position and their corresponding view of the opportunities open to them. The second study, by Stern and Keller, is the analysis of the spontaneous group references given by a small national sample in France (16). In this less well-known survey, which was carried out in the summer of 1951, the respondents were asked what they would consider a satisfactory standard of living for people like themselves. Despite the authors' plea, the study has unfortunately not been replicated elsewhere, but its results are suggestive as far as they go. Stern and Keller found few references to out-groups and little evidence of status-striving or class resentment ; and the study thus tentatively supports the hypothesis that in a society such as France, which is seen by its members as comparatively rigidly stratified, not many people feel explicitly relative deprivations although they may nevertheless be anxious to improve their absolute position.

These two studies both show how a very straightforward type of question, easily applicable in large-scale survey research, may elucidate the pattern of relative deprivation in a total society. However, as was suggested in the previous section, an accurate assessment of relative deprivation as an independent variable is likely to be much more difficult. In particular, it is bound to be beyond the scope of survey research to establish which of a number of referents is the crucial one for the attitude concerned (17). In a properly experimental situation, as in Hyman's original study (18) or the even earlier experiment by Chapman and Volkmann (19), an attempt at direct assessment will of course be feasible ; but in survey research, the different roles of relative deprivation as an independent and a dependent variable may be impossible to disentangle. Does a restricted frame of reference (and therefore a low level of relative deprivation) tend to reduce people's social and economic goals? Or is it because people's goals are restricted that their general feeling of relative deprivation is kept low? Presumably there is likely to be a reciprocal interaction, but survey data will not be adequate to elucidate the process in detail. There is also the risk of tautology if (to follow the example given) we take as an indicator of relative deprivation the stated goals of the people concerned ; but this is obviously avoidable in practice. Thus, we may test, for instance, whether the giving of predominantly in-group references correlates with an independent measure of satisfaction, or whether identification with a higher class or status group correlates with a right-wing political preference. Such correlations will not be a substitute for the explanation of the psychological processes which must be assumed to underlie them ; but they may still greatly enlarge our understanding of the national structure of social and political attitudes.

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(15) Herbert Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes : a Social Psychological Approach to the Analysis of Stratification", in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power* (Free Press, 1953), pp. 426-442.

(16) Eric Stern and Suzanne Keller, "Spontaneous Group References in France", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVII (1953), pp. 208-217.

The major practical difficulty is rather this : where the respondent gives no explicit group reference, it is impossible to be sure whether he in fact is conscious of no external referents or whether the questions used have merely failed to elicit them. Prompting must be more than usually suspect here. Moreover, survey-type questions on satisfaction or dissatisfaction are notoriously unreliable guides to attitudes as subtle as some that may be relevant. However, the problem need not be quite so intractable as this makes it appear, for the main question is simply whether or not a relative deprivation (as initially defined) is or is not cited on the topic or set of topics concerned. Both the intensity of the deprivation and the causal weight to be assigned to the referent given must be treated as separate questions. It is likely that relative deprivation should in this context be seen as the dependent variable : a person's picture of his social location may well be what restricts his relative deprivation in accordance with the aspirations he considers to be feasible. But the difficulties involved in establishing this do not make it illegitimate to categorise respondents simply by whether or not they articulate an explicitly relative deprivation. The problem of cutting-points is thus fairly straightforward. As long as it is clear that no attempt is being made to measure intensity, people may be described as being either relatively deprived or not; and this will be in terms of the referent given by themselves, irrespective of the role that should in fact be assigned to it in the underlying psychological pattern of their set of attitudes.

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(17) This difficulty appears to have been encountered in a recent American attempt to relate reference group theory to voting behaviour. See Norman Kaplan, *Reference Group Theory and Voting Behaviour* (unpubd. Ph. D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1955), abstracted in *Dissertation Abstracts*, XV (1955), p. 1458.

(18) See n. 2, above.

(19) Dwight W. Chapman and John Volkmann, "A Social Determinant of the Level of Aspiration", reprinted in E. E. Maccoby *et al.*, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*^{3} (New York, 1958), pp. 281-290.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning the implications of the proposed typology for comparative research. If by questions appropriate to different countries respondents in a national sample can be classified according to the proposed typology, then it becomes possible to compare the different national distributions of the four types. It might, for instance, turn out that the results could be arranged into an isotropic contingency table, or that the distributions as plotted in adjacent bar charts approximated to the shape of the normal (or some other) distribution. Even without such refinements, however, it seems worthwhile to suggest that relative deprivation provides an interesting and important theme for the cross-national comparison of social structures based on sample survey research.

W. G. RUNCIMAN

EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGY
AND THE AMERICAN SELF-IMAGE

I. *European Sociology and "the American Self-Image"* *.

It is clear that what one might describe as "the American self-image" has been influenced in many ways by memories of and comparisons with European societies. It would also seem likely that American sociology, especially in its formative years, bears traces of the ideas of European sociologists. But it sounds surprising to suggest that the ways in which ordinary Americans understand their own society have been influenced by the thinking of men on the other side of the Atlantic who called themselves, or who must be called, sociologists. And yet this astonishing possibility is a fact. While the "self-images" of European societies are generally far removed from what sociologists have said about them, Americans have often seized eagerly on the work of those European sociologists who seemed to provide them with justifications or simply with formulations of what they had felt all along. In this process of transfer and application, "European sociology" did not remain what it was in the old world, nor did its American recipients transplant it in its entirety. Relations between the two unequal forces, "European sociology" and "the American self-image", are complex and manifold. But relations there are, and it is this remarkable fact which justifies an inquiry that might otherwise be called both vague and vain.

"European sociology" is in fact a product of American sociology (1). In the early days of this discipline — perhaps I should say in even earlier days — there was Comte, and there was Spencer (apart from Tocqueville and Marx and a number of others who did not call themselves sociologists). When Durkheim established his school towards the end of the 19th century, something called "French sociology" came into being. At about

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* This paper was presented to the Annual Conference of the European Association for American Studies in Berlin, September 27-30, 1961. Its subject and style were determined by this occasion.

(1) When Karl Mannheim wrote his essay on "American Sociology" in 1932 (*Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*^{2}, London, 1959), he naturally confined himself to contrasting American and German sociology. In 1948, Edward Shils (*The Present State of American Sociology*, Glencoe, 1948) speaks of contrasting American sociology at times with "its French and German counterparts" (p. 4), at other times, with "its great European forebears" (p. 6). In 1960 L. and H. Rosenmayr refer, again quite naturally, throughout their discussion of the social background of American sociology (Introduction to German edition of R. and G. Hinkle, *Die Entwicklung der amerikanischen Soziologie*, München, 1960) to "European sociology", "sociology in Europe", or even "sociology in the old continent".

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the same time, Tönnies and Simmel achieved the same for Germany, Branford, Geddes and Hobhouse for England, Pareto for Italy, Steinmetz for Holland, and other founding fathers for other countries. By the end of the nineteenth century, an American school of sociology, vigorous and rapidly growing, had also sprung up, but it was not before the 1930's and, even more clearly, the 1940's that American sociology was generally admitted to have become a school with its own definite contours, virtues and vices. However, almost as soon as American sociology had been established or, perhaps, discovered as such in Europe, sociology everywhere else came to be thought of as united vis-à-vis the new out-group. Since that time, contrasting "American" and "European" sociology has become a favourite pastime of many critics of the discipline on either side of the Atlantic.

While it may be true that, in some European countries, sociological analysis displays certain features by which it is distinguished from the bulk of sociological research in the United States, I do not find the general notion of "European sociology" very useful for investigating European influences on American thought. In this paper, I shall be concerned not with the vague generalization of "European sociology", but with a number of individual sociologists from various European countries—Tocqueville, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Pareto, and others—and their influence on American sociologists as well as "the American self-image". By necessity, I shall have to be even more selective than American sociologists were in their reception of European social thought. I shall refer to a few outstanding figures of sociological thinking in Europe during the last century or so, but I am well aware that some of those not mentioned or mentioned only in passing—such as Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Schäffle, Sombart and Westermarck—as well as many lesser minds have been as influential as those whose work is discussed explicitly.

One principle of selection deserves however special mention, since it is probably a bias rather than a choice. On inspecting my material, I found that I had placed rather heavy emphasis on German influences on American thought. There are grounds to believe that on balance the influence of German sociology was in fact greater than that of sociologists from other European countries. As far as American sociology is concerned, not even Durkheim, and far less Pareto, equal Max Weber and Simmel in importance. The majority of the early American sociologists went to German universities as students : most of them, including Small, Ross, Ellwood and Park, to Berlin. Albion Small may be a biased witness himself, but his list of American scholars who had spent some time in Germany during the last decades of the nineteenth century is certainly impressive (2). Even in the inter-war years, there were a few American sociologists who, like Talcott Parsons,

(2) Cf. A. Small, *The Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), p. 325 sq.

studied at German universities. Thus, in so far as "European sociology" influenced "the American self-image" by way of American sociology, and especially in the period before the two World Wars, there may be some justification in bringing a German bias to the problem. But it is clear that in the last decades, influences from other countries have been at least as great, and that throughout, British experiences and British thought have exerted their less visible but more pervasive influence on the ways in which Americans looked at themselves and at the world.

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The idea of an "American self-image" is, if anything, even more metaphysical than that of "European sociology". It is sometimes asserted that the United States are an extremely uniform country, because people buy the same tins of vegetables, see the same films, drive the same cars, and wear the same clothes in Arizona and in Wisconsin, in Tennessee and in Massachusetts. Even if this were true, it would remain doubtful whether a Mormon merchant of Salt Lake City, a Negro plantation worker of Mississippi, the head of an ancient and wealthy Boston family, a Detroit automobile worker and a Stanford University student (to say nothing of the still innumerable component parts of New York City) really have the same view of their country, its past, its position in the world, and its goals. There is no society with a uniform "self-image", and there are many societies with more uniform "self-images" than the United States.

Is there then no such thing as an "American self-image" at all? Every group to which we belong, including the neighbourhood in which we live as well as the firm or organization in which we work, the clubs of which we are members as well as the country of which we are citizens, "means" something to us. Beyond being able to describe these contexts of our social existence, we tend to evaluate them, that is, to ascribe values to them. Our neighbourhood is "friendly", "quiet", "pleasant", our work "interesting", "hard", and so on. In so far as we cannot but ascribe such values to every one of our social contexts, what one might call "images " of these contexts are a necessary part of social life. Of course, not everybody has the same "image" of the same context. But it can be shown that in fact these "images" are social, and not individual values, and that they are therefore by no means random. Strictly speaking, we do not "ascribe" values to our environment in the sense of evaluating it in terms of our personal impressions and preferences. Wherever we go, we are more likely to evaluate our context in one way than another. There are valid values which impose themselves on us with the force of dominant opinions and norms. "Images" are as little "common" to total societies as are values or norms of any other kind ; their prevalence is always in fact a phenomenon of domination. But in the sense that there are dominant "images" in every society, these are part of the impersonal role structure just as other values are : we are expected to hold them, we grow into them, we are socialized to subscribe to them, we are subject to the sanctions of society if we deviate from them.

In this sense, there is indeed such a phenomenon as an "American self-image". It is more than what Americans think of themselves—that they regard themselves (as we know from a large-scale investigation several years ago) above all as "peace-loving", "altruistic", and "intelligent", but not as "cruel", "retrograde" and "domineering" (3). Interesting though these survey results may be, they are statistical averages and not social facts. We are here concerned not with what psychologists call "auto-stereotypes", but with such values as are characteristic of American society in that they are part of the dominant ideology of the country, that children are taught to believe in them, that they are the stock-in-trade of official self-interpretation, that he who does not agree with them thereby places himself automatically on the margin of American society.

The terms "image" and "self-image" have become rather fashionable of late, although one suspects that this fashion has not added either to their definiteness or to their usefulness. I can think of no better way of illustrating both what alternatives there are to these notions and how I propose to understand them than by quoting a paragraph from the Introduction to the collection of texts on *Modern American Society*, by K. Davis, H. Bredemeier and M. J. Levy :

> The most convenient approach to the problem of unity and disunity in American society has seemed to us to lie in the relation between *our system of values* as it is expressed in the *American ethos* and as it is reflected in the actual functioning of our society. Therefore, the book takes as its point of departure the *dominant values shared by Americans generally*, because these values, these *articles of faith of the American Credo*, furnish the main source of unity and cohesion in our society. Early in the book, the reader will find the *principles of American social philosophy* stated in their classic form, including such doctrines as free speech, individual initiative, political democracy, equal opportunity, and fair play. Although these have the ring of slogans, they give expression to *deeply rooted patterns of conduct* and social organisation which lie at the base of our institutional structure. Their nature and effects must be understood if American society is to be understood (4).

I have emphasized alternative expressions for what Is hall mean here by "the American self-image". I agree with the authors of *Modern American Society* that this national ideology has to be seen in relation to American social structure, and in this sense we are here at least indirectly concerned with some of the basic features of American society.

The objection may be raised that I have been rather rash to dismiss the survey method of asking people about their views of themselves and their country. How, if not by questionnaire surveys, can we find out what "the American self-image" is? What are the "dominant values shared by Americans generally", the "articles of faith of the American Credo"? Robin Williams, in his rather abstract attempt to apply Parsons' sociology to the analysis of *American Society*, has gone to some trouble in trying to devise a method which enables us to recognize social values. He deals at some length with empathy and observation, exchange values and sanctions, choice situations and the content of newspaper articles (and arrives at a strangely heterogeneous catalogue of American values including "success" as well as "humanity", "progress" as well as "adaptation", "rationality" as well as "nationalism", "democracy" as well as "racism") (5). But he need not have been so deliberately naïve, because, as Max Lerner has shown, whoever writes about American values today has many catalogues to choose from of both American and foreign extraction (6). What is more, these catalogues all agree in a number of important points. Thus, *democracy*, *individualism*, *rationality* are recurrent items on virtually every list of American values. A number of others may be added from authors not quoted by Lerner as well as from general impressions : puritanism or, as I shall call it here, *ethical capitalism*, *community*, *stability*. While these may not be as universally acknowledged as the first three, they seem equally general as guiding values of American society. Wherever we look—in American historiography, in the history of self-interpretations, in literary criticism, but also in school textbooks, and indeed in the everyday language of many Americans—we do not need questionnaires and interviews to know that these principles constitute basic features of "the American self-image". Indeed, few social systems of value in history can have been quite as explicit as the American Creed.

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(3) Cf. W. BUCHANAN and H. CANTRIL, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana, 1953).

(4) K. DAVIS, H. BREDEMEIER, M. J. LEVY, eds., *Modern American Society*^{4} (New York, 1958), p. VI.

There are many objections against catalogues of values such as the list of six prominent features of "the American self-image" suggested here. Most of these objections can, I think, be met, and we shall return to them presently. There is one criticism, however, which is evidently valid. Every list of this kind contains an element of arbitrariness. There is no knowing whether it is exhaustive, because there is no such thing as an exhaustive list of social values. Admittedly, the six elements of the American ethos mentioned above have been selected with a view to the subject of this paper. I am certain that there are important features of the ideology of American society both in the past and in the present which, because they have no evident relation to the ideas of European sociologists, will be left out of consideration in this essay. As far as any implicit analysis of American society is concerned, this is a serious shortcoming : the very fact that no foreign influences can be traced for these values, and that they are therefore "really American", may be taken as an indication of their importance. Thus we shall not refer to the ideology of the frontier, of spaces open for conquest, but also of chances of individual success, of the orientation to the future which was characteristic of many generations of Americans, and of all the optimism and activism that goes—or went—with these ideas. These are values which are indigenous American creations, and any attempt to trace them to European ideas, or even to search for *ex post* justifications in terms of European ideas, would be spurious. Thus our approach is frankly selective in this as in other respects.

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(5) Cf. Robin Williams, *American Society* (New York, 1951), ch. xi.

(6) Cf. Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization* (New York, 1957), ch. ii, sect. 5.

Actually, the indication of American values unrelated to European thought suggests another point which, although strictly speaking a conclusion, is in place at this early point in order to avoid from the outset any misunderstanding of our problem. Referring to "influences" of European sociology on the American self-image is a very misleading figure of speech. It would be quite unhistorical to think that any social norm, i.e. any value embodied in the institutions of a society, can be simply the result of an outside influence of whatever kind. Even in societies which were far more obviously subject to influences than the United States have been in the last two centuries (such as Soviet Hungary, or British India, or Spanish Cuba), only those values became norms which responded to indigenous requirements of the society in question. The statement that any system of thought has influenced the American self-image means no more than that it has provided Americans with terms in which to express what they felt, with ideas to justify their way of life, at best with stimuli to pursue certain goals which they had in any case—but it cannot mean that the American self-image or any part of it is a direct product of European sociology. If there had not been any European sociology at all, there would still be an American self-image, and it would still show the same basic features. If Spencer had never lived, Americans would still have been "rugged individualists". In so far as an influence of European sociology on the American self-image can be discerned, this influence concerns its formulation, and not its content or existence.

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To my mind the most serious deficiency of the notion of "images" and "self-images" is that they tend to be unhistorical. Consider the example of an orientation to the future as characteristic of the American ethos. Richard Hofstadter has given voice to a widespread sense of change when he said that today many Americans are looking not so much to the future, but to the past. Perhaps no more concise statement of the fate of this trait in the American self-image is possible than that of Hofstadter :

> When competition and enterprise were rising, men thought of the future ; when they were flourishing, of the present. Now—in an age of concentration, bigness, and corporate monopoly—when competition and opportunity have gone into decline, men look wistfully back to a golden age (7).

Nor are these changes merely minor variations on a persistent theme —as Davis, Bredemeier and Levy seem to think, because they look at American society as a functional social system :

> In a stable society, however, the ultimate values do not change. It is rather the means of carrying out these values that alter with the alteration of the conditions of life. The American value system has remained relatively constant while the country has become urbanized and industrialized (8).

I hope to be able to show that this is a quite unduly optimistic—or perhaps pessimistic?—view of American society, and that the "American self-image" has in fact undergone a very radical process of change. In any case, the changes of American values are rather more important than their stability—and it seems probable that when one thinks of societies in terms of self-images, stereotypes, national characters or functional systems, one may easily fail to comprehend the historical quality of human societies.

In looking over the recent descriptions and analyses of American society by foreign visitors, it is noticeable that many of them claim to have produced "a revision of the image of America". As one reads these books, however, one is often looking in vain for the fulfillment of this promise. It is not surprising, perhaps, that foreign observers are particularly hard pushed as far as recognizing changes in the American Creed is concerned. Even today, the foreign visitor to Germany may find all his stereotypes about the nationalist, militarist, industrious, romanticist German confirmed, while Germans who have lived through the last decades of change are above all struck by the decline of these vices. Similarly, it is not difficult—especially during one's first visit—to share virtually all of Tocqueville's experiences in the United States and believe that the Age of Jackson, of unadulterated capitalism, of Puritanism and grass-root democracy is still with us ; and yet this "Tocqueville experience" (if I may call it that) is as wrong as the discovery of Wilhelminian Germany in the Federal Republic of today. The traveller is, in relation to the country he visits, in a very unhistorical position ; for him, the past and the present merge into one "image" of which he cannot tell to what extent it is reality, reflection, or simply delusion.

The result is useless discussions between the visitor and his American friends about the question of whether things have really changed or not. It seems safe to assume that they have, and I shall therefore devote as much attention to the dynamics of the American ethos as to its apparently lasting features. The core of the following considerations consists of two sections in which I shall discuss, first, some of those elements of American self-interpretation which seem to have some relation to the work of European sociologists, secondly, some important ideas and concepts of European sociologists which, for reasons to be discovered, have never caught on either in American sociology or in American society. Contrasting these two is in itself a dynamic undertaking, since it allows us to measure what is (or was) in terms of what might be (or might have been). Within each of these sections, a historical sequence has also been established. If, in describing the American self-image, I begin with "democracy" and end with "stability", this sequence refers not only to the chronology of the European influences behind it, but also to developments in the United States. Thus seemingly contradictory traits of the American self-image may turn out to represent merely different periods of American history or different strata of American society. Moreover, it will be necessary to look at every single value and concept not as something given or lacking once and for all, but as a factor with its own dialectics. For every European sociologist who may be thought of as having influenced in one way or another the ideas of Americans about their own society, half a dozen American sociologists could be named who found that the borrowed ideas no longer describe the reality of American society. It would certainly be more correct to speak, not of "democracy" but of the transition from democracy to a mass society, not of "individualism", but of the decline of individualism to other-direction,' not of "ethical capitalism", but of the passage from ethical capitalism to a social ethic. Throughout the analysis, I have been guided by Robert Lynd's comment :

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(7) Richard HOFSTADTER, *The American Political Tradition*[11] (New York, 1959), p. v

(8) K. DAVIS, H. BREDEMEIER, M. J. LEVY, *op. cit.* p. 713.

> As one begins to list the assumptions by which Americans live, one runs at once into a large measure of contradiction and resulting ambivalence. This derives from the fact that these overlapping assumptions have developed in different eras and that they tend to be carried over uncritically into new situations or to be allowed to persist in long diminuendos into the changing future (9).

It seemed appropriate to try and connect the two central parts of this essay by some indication of the channels by which European sociology came to influence the American self-image. This involves above all some account of the interrelations of European and American sociology from the early days to the recent past. Today, these interrelations may almost be described as a conquest of European by American sociology ; and it would have been amusing to reverse the title question of this essay and examine the influence of American sociology on the European self-image. This would, however, have required a new and equally long investigation. In conclusion, some more general discussion of the pattern of influence in question, its characteristics, its effects and its value seem appropriate.

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(9) R. LYND, *Knowledge for What?*^{8} (Princeton, 1959), p. 59.

2. *The American Self-Image : Actual Traits and Their Changes.*

The American self-image is rather older than European sociology; in fact, by the time European sociology appeared, many of the traits of the image developed by the early settlers, the pioneers and the founding fathers were already on the decline. In some ways, the self-image with which we are here concerned is that of the 19th century and, more precisely, of the post-Civil War era. In this period, the influence of European sociology began, for the first time, to be felt in the United States; at this time also, a new and distinct set of American values emerged which was tied to the development of American capitalism, of urban centres, of a modern educational system, and of the institutions characteristic of industrial societies everywhere. As we survey this second American ethos—one that, as Lynd observed, developed far more "casually" than the first American Creed, i.e. the values underlying the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution (10)—it will increasingly become evident that it has today gone the way of its predecessor and is in the process of being succeeded by a third distinct set of dominant values of American society. The following discussion is thus the discussion of a value system on the way out or, at the very least, on the decline.

(a) *Democracy : Tocqueville.*

Clearly, the most profound and lasting single European influence on the self-image of American society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was and is that exerted by Tocqueville. In thinking of the imprint left by Tocqueville on American thought, one might in fact almost be tempted to retract what was said above about the indigenous character of American values and the *ex post* arrival of European influences. Would there be any American self-image at all without Tocqueville? In any case, Tocqueville's influence was and is extremely pervasive; it extends to political theory and literary criticism, sociological thinking and historiography. It is present even in writers who do not explicitly refer to Tocqueville's work; for many Americans today, *Democracy in America* is in fact America or, at least, America as it was until very recently. The historian and the political theorist will of course dispute any suggestion that Tocqueville was a sociologist, and that his influence therefore demonstrates the effect of European sociology on American thought. Certainly, Tocqueville the sociologist is but one facet of the man, and I have no desire to claim the whole man for a discipline the name of which is little older than *Democracy in America*. But it has to be admitted that the sociological side of Tocqueville was not his least important one.

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(10) R. Lynd, *loc. cit.* p. 63.

It is generally agreed that the most important idea bequeathed by Tocqueville to American self-interpretation, is the idea of democracy. "Democracy", of course, as Tocqueville understood it :

> Many important observations suggest themselves upon the social condition of the Anglo-Americans ; but there is one that takes precedence over all the rest. The social condition of the Americans is eminently democratic ; this was its character at the foundation of the colonies, and it is still more strongly marked at the present day (11).

What Tocqueville meant was not democracy in the sense of a competitive system of representative government, but equality ; however, by calling it democracy, Tocqueville gave the concept a decisive turn. Wherever the term "democracy" is used today, people tend to think of its American version too : of equality of citizenship rights, equality of social status, equality of manners and attitudes, social equality in every conceivable respect. What—we may ask—would have happened if Tocqueville had chosen (as he might have done before the dictionary of political discourse characteristic of our own century was completed) to describe this condition as "communistic", or "socialistic"? But he did not, and through him the American idea of democracy attained its meaning.

Today we have begun to realize that this may be a dangerous idea of democracy. Perhaps, the editors of *Modern American Society* are a little naïve when they say that "in order for the system to work, there must be social as well as political democracy " (12), equality as well as representative government. Tocqueville, with the urbane scepticism of the French conservative, saw a little further and formulated a political alternative resulting from the social condition of equality : either it "incites men to wish all to be powerful and honoured", or it "reduces men to prefer equality in slavery to inequality with freedom" (13). Equality is a dangerous ideal, because there comes a point at which the practice of equality leads to uniformity, and where the silent totalitarianism of uniform social norms and expectations by perfecting democracy in the sense of equality destroys democracy in the sense of liberty. It would not be entirely unfounded to describe the development of American society in the last century as one that has led, from a happy combination of liberty and equality, some way towards an egalitarian mass society in which it is hard for representative institutions to flourish (14).

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(11) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, *Democracy in America* (Vintage Books, New York, 1956), p. 48.

(12) K. DAVIS, H. BREDEMEIER, M. J. LEVY, *op. cit.* p. 696.

(13) A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, *op. cit.* p. 55 sq.

Many contemporary American sociologists are critics of their society, and they often measure its present condition in terms of Tocqueville's image. Thus David Riesman suggests that a widespread change from the inner-directed individual of Tocqueville's time to the other-directed atom of today has affected American politics. Edward Shils describes the "torment of secrecy", the destruction of privacy by such movements as MacCarthyism, as a result of the "strain of politics" in modern American society. William Kornhauser analyzes the ways in which the mass media of communication tend to influence individual decisions in modern American society. C. Wright Mills traces the decline of public opinion, and of the political public by social developments in the last century. All of these and many others are agreed that the idea of a happy equilibrium of egalitarian and liberal, or social and political democracy no longer corresponds to American reality (15). It might be added that this is due in no small part to the unexpected dialectics revealed by the Tocquevillean notion of democracy.

Tocqueville was far less interested in the United States than many seem to think today. His real concern was France, and with respect to post-revolutionary France above all the old problem of the relation between progress and stability, change and order. It is a curious fact that his solution of the problem (rather than, say, Marx's) turned out to be so very appropriate to the feelings of many Americans. Tocqueville was, by and large, a friend of stability and order. In the terms of his own century he must certainly be described as a conservative. The fact that he rather than other European social analysts exerted such an extraordinary influence on American thought, suggests a somewhat unexpected element of the American self-image which we shall encounter time and again, and which, with L. and H. Rosenmayr, one may describe as a "dynamic conservatism" (16). While it would be wrong to describe any generation of Americans as conservative to the point of wanting to stop whatever developments are under way, a mixture of accepting ordered progress but wanting to stabilize the *status quo* has been characteristic of many. For them, Tocqueville was a confirmation of their beliefs.

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(14) Cf. for an elaboration of this argument my essay "Democracy Without Liberty" in S. M. LIPSET and L. LOWENTHAL, eds., *Culture and Social Character* (Glencoe, 1961).

(15) The studies referred to in this paragraph are : D. RIESMAN, *The Lonely Crowd*^{2} (New York, 1953) ; E. SHILS, *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe, 1958) ; W. KORNHAUSER, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, 1959) ; C. Wright MILLS, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1959).

(16) L. and H. ROSENMAYR, *op. cit.* p. 14 *et passim.*

(b) *Individualism : Spencer.*

The influence of Tocqueville was lasting; even today there is no sign of its decline. By contrast, Spencer's impact on American thought must be called a vogue : it was relatively brief, but extremely intense. Spencer was almost a popular hero in the United States at a time when he was hardly known even in England, to say nothing of the European continent. Between 1860 and 1903, 368,755 volumes of Spencer's works were sold in the United States (17)—an incredible number which in itself suggests that here we encounter a very real example of the widespread influence of a system of thought. Early American sociology would have been unthinkable without Spencer : "I imagine that nearly all of us who took up sociology between 1870, say, and 1890 did so at the instigation of Spencer," said Cooley (18). But it is not only American sociology that owes much to Spencer. As Hofstadter says in his study of Spencer's influence in the United States : "Spencer's impact upon the common man in the United States is impossible to gauge, although its effects are dimly perceptible" (19). One instance of this impact which is often quoted is Mr. Justice Holmes' protest that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*"—a statement that clearly shows the significance of Spencer's work for the development of the American self-image.

Like Tocqueville, Spencer is for many also associated above all with one idea, that of individualism. And if it is true that "second only to democracy in describing our social system is individualism" (20), then Spencer is second only to Tocqueville in his impact. Individualism in Spencer's sense was a Darwinian concept. In this notion, liberalism, progress, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest had formed a powerful amalgam which found an immediate echo among the rugged individualists of a pioneer country (or one which still liked to think of itself in these terms). Individualism in this sense meant competition, and the justification of success in competition. It was an active notion, far removed from the comparatively passive, withdrawn private French type of individualism. In a way, the rugged individualism which found so welcome an expression in Darwinian thought was a rough American counterpart of the more urbane ideas of European liberalism. "American society saw its own image in the tooth-and-claw version of natural selection, and [...] its dominant groups were therefore able to dramatize this vision of competition as a thing good in itself" (21).

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(17) Cf. R. HOFSTADTER, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*^{3} (Boston, 1959), p. 34. Much of the following discussion of Spencer in America is based on this excellent study.

(18) Quoted by R. HOFSTADTER, *ibid.* p. 33.

(19) *Ibid.* p. 34.

(20) K. DAVIS, H. BREDEMEIER, M. J. LEVY, *op. cit.* p. 700.

(21) R. HOFSTADTER, *op. cit.* p. 201.

> Spencer's doctrines were imported into the Republic long after individualism had become a national tradition. Yet in the expansive age of our industrial culture he became the spokesman of that tradition, and his contribution materially swelled the stream of individualism if it did not change its course (22).

But it was not very long before Parsons could state that "Spencer is dead" (23), and it would seem that with him at least part of the individualist tradition had gone to the grave. There were at least two trends in American thought and social structure which, from the beginning, militated against Spencer's individualism, and in the last decades both have turned out to be extremely powerful. One is the tradition of socialist thought which in America, contrary to England where even the Fabians occasionally acknowledged their debt to Spencer (24), developed as a criticism of Spencer. Among sociologists, Lester Ward and Thorstein Veblen were its greatest early representatives (25); the New Deal signifies the social success of this school of thought. The other tradition is that of community, of wanting to be recognized and to merge with larger social groups; in so far as David Riesman is right in his analysis, the growing prevalence of the other-directed social character over that of inner-direction involves a replacement of individualism by community (26).

Perhaps not the least reason for the success of Spencer's "social Darwinism" in the United States was its reassuring capacity. "An age of rapid and striking economic change, the age during which Darwin's and Spencer's ideas were popularized in the United States was also one in which the prevailing political mood was conservative" (27). Once again, this was clearly a dynamic conservatism. If Spencer was right, progress was assured, and the ways Americans had chosen to get ahead were correct. Of course, in this process some had to fall by the wayside—but then, that was the inevitable price of evolution. The vogue of Spencer is almost a textbook example of the rise and fall of ideologies in society.

(c) *Ethical Capitalism : Max Weber.*

Americans have always believed that capitalism was not only a historically necessary and, perhaps, a socially useful way of running an expanding economy, but that it was also morally right. Whereas in Europe the word capitalism soon acquired a connotation of social criticism of the evils attending the introduction of modern industry, it is to the present day, and it certainly was before the depression of the 30' s a term proudly used by many Americans to describe themselves and their country. To some extent, this pride in capitalism could be justified by an ideology of Darwinian individualism. Bendix probably underestimates the importance of this motive when he says that "the values of 'social Darwinism' were developed by journalists and academicians", although he is certainly right in emphasizing, apart from individualism, the importance of "the virtues of character and the Christian mission of business enterprise" for the self-image of Americans during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century (28). For a long time, American capitalism had indeed an almost religious, and certainly a moral quality in the eyes of many Americans. It was associated with hard work, thrift, "worldly asceticism" as well as progress and an opportunity to prove one's worth and religious status in this world. Obviously,

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(22) *Ibid.* p. 50.

(23) T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*² (Glencoe, 1949), p. 3.

(24) This may however have been due to the close personal relation of Beatrice Webb to Spencer (for which see her *My Apprenticeship*, London, ch. 1) which is reflected even in Sidney Webb's writings. That Spencer had nothing in common with any kind of socialism is obvious; for an amusing illustration see the scene described by B. Webb, *loc. cit.* p. 29.

(25) Cf. Hofstadter, *op. cit.* p. 82, for an indication of where the explanation of the attitude of these two great figures of American thought may be sought : " Like Veblen, Ward felt a certain personal alienation from the dominant characters and opinions of American intellectual life [...]".

(26) Cf. section *e* below.

(27) R. Hofstadter, *op. cit.* p. 5.

> there are close relations present here with the Puritan tradition of the dominant Anglo-Saxon strata. For the positive evaluation of what is visibly useful, the equation of what is useful and successful with what is good, which furnishes the main yardstick of this bourgeois morality, is well known from Puritan thought (29).

The success of Max Weber in the United States testifies to his greatness, but it nevertheless transcends what one would expect with a man whose writings are as involved and difficult as those of Weber. Possibly one of the reasons for this success is that Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* described perfectly what many Americans had always felt to be one of the secrets of their own success. Of course, once again the "influence" came long after the event ; Weber merely expressed in a scholarly way what many Americans had thought and said for decades ; but judging from the echo of his work, it would certainly seem that his was the conclusive formulation of the idea that one (the American) form of economic activity had a great deal to do, and was perhaps even a result of one (the dominant American) religious tradition. Here as elsewhere, Americans managed to give an eminently concrete, simple and practical turn to extremely abstract, difficult and theoretical ideas : what was a cautious attempt at correcting some of Marx's more one-sided explanations for Weber, became an "evident truth" for those many Americans who even today talk of the "Protestant ethic" as if it was as immediately familiar and relevant to them as what happens in their homes (30).

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(28) R. Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York/London, 1956) p. 257 ; ch. v of this work is concerned with "managerial ideologies" and "images of man" in American industry.

(29) Ch. Lütkens, *Staat und Gesellschaft in Amerika* (Tübingen, 1929), p. 194.

(30) That Weber's analysis was "misunderstood" in this process of practical application (as many authors have claimed)

It is an understatement on the part of the editors of *Modern American Society* to say that "American Protestantism is an integral part of the American scene " (31). "American Protestantism", i.e. the system of moral and metaphysical beliefs in which economic activity, asceticism, worldly success, progress, political participation, infinite tolerance, and independence are perfectly integrated, is—or has been—probably the most pervasive single intellectual force in American thought. In religious terms, it was characteristic not merely of the original Puritans, but of the many later Nonconformist Protestant groups also, and even of large sections of the Roman Catholics (especially in so far as these originated from Ireland with her own unusually ascetic brand of Catholicism). In social terms, "American Protestantism" provided the basis for that unified moral religion which is probably the most effective force of integration in American society (32). But here again, significant changes have occurred in the last decades, and it must be doubtful whether the notion of ethical capitalism still has any real meaning in America. "To work hard, to live an orderly life, to have a name for integrity and fair dealing, not to spend one's substance in reckless display" (33)—these and other virtues may have been American realities, but today they are at best American dreams. What is left of "American Protestantism" is little more than that tendency to moralize which Williams rightly mentions as a trait in the American character (34). More specifically, in business what Bendix called "the changeover from the idealization of the 'strenuous life' to the idealization of 'human relations' " (35), and what Whyte described as the "decline of the Protestant Ethic" and the rise of a "Social Ethic" of getting along with others and not hurting anybody (36), have changed the scene radically. While the Protestant Ethic may be one of the factors responsible for the emergence of capitalism, capitalism does not appear, in its further development, very conducive to the survival of the Protestant Ethic.

(d) *Rationality : Max Weber.*

For Weber, the analysis of religion and the rise of capitalism was but one aspect of his most general theme : the origin of rationality in the West. Yet in the United States he was for a long time known

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is almost self-evident. Cf. G. Roth and R. Bendix : "Max Weber's Einfluß auf die amerikanische Soziologie", *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, XI (1959), p. 41 : "Many readers did not know that the *Protestant Ethic* was merely a preliminary study, and often believed that Weber had wanted to derive modern capitalism from the Protestant ethic [...]".

(31) K. Davis, H. Bredemeier, M. J. Levy, *op. cit.* p. 704.

(32) This fact makes the attention paid to religion as a force of integration by Parsons and his disciples (Davis, Williams, and others) understandable, and *vice versa.*

(33) H. Laski, *The American Democracy* (London, 1949), p. 27.

(34) Williams calls this trait the "moral orientation" of Americans, *op. cit.* p. 391.

(35) R. Bendix, *op. cit.* p. 335.

(36) W. F. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York, 1957), esp. ch. II, "The Decline of the Protestant Ethic".

only as the author of *The Protestant Ethic*. More than fifteen years passed between the translation of *The Protestant Ethic* by T. Parsons in 1930, and the appearance of the volume *Essays in Sociology*, prepared by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, after the last war (37). But the theme of rationality—multifarious as this term is in its meanings—has today come to be associated with Weber's name at least in American sociology and among all those vaguely influenced by sociological thought. Again, rationality was a notion that fell on fertile ground in the United States, and that, for this reason, immediately took on a much more practical turn than one would expect in reading Parsons :

> Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the conditions of the situation, and by means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science (38).

Rationality as a value in American society became associated above all with three spheres of activity central to American life : capitalism, science, and bureaucracy.

With respect to capitalism, Puritanism and rationality are very closely related. Charlotte Lütkens certainly has a case when she claims that "Puritan traditions and capitalist rationalism meet" in the choice of success as a standard of human value in society (39). The values of "achievement" and "utility" which Williams and other members of Parsons' school have so often emphasized as characteristic of American society, are similar examples of the premium placed on appropriate means to given ends in a "rational" society. This is not the place to discuss the more general problem of rationality in relation to capitalism ; accepting their definitions, however, it would certainly seem that Weber and Sombart have described a fundamental tendency of Western society, a tendency moreover, which has been more closely approximated by American society than by the industrial nations of Europe with their diverse traditions.

That there is also a relation between Puritanism and the development of modern science has been shown by R. K. Merton in his various historical studies of science in 17th century England (40). "The combination of rationalism and empiricism which is so pronounced in the Puritan ethic forms the essence of the spirit of modern science" (41). Whether or not this relation exists, science has certainly been accorded a very prominent place in the hierarchy of values of American society because it corresponds to "the rationalist-individualist tradition" of the country (42). In fact, the foreign visitor may often be struck by—to quote von Borch—an "excess of rationality", a kind of "overrationalization" in the United States (43) : even ancient and apparently natural human activities such as love, marriage, setting up a household, having and bringing up children and maintaining friendly relations with neighbours and colleagues are overburdened with allegedly scientific insights (of obscure "sciences" called "home economics", "human relations", etc.) which tend to create the very problems they claim to solve. Perhaps the fact that sociology has any significance at all for something as elementary as the self-image of American society is another illustration of an exaggerated belief in science. Certainly whoever has followed American reactions to the Russian successes in the conquest of space from Sputnik to Vostok II cannot fail to be impressed by the importance of scientific rationality for American thought.

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(37) For a history of translations of Max Weber's works, cf. G. Roth and R. Bendix, *op. cit.* n. 8.

(38) T. Parsons, *op. cit.* p. 58.

(39) Ch. Lütkens, *op. cit.* p. 187.

(40) Most of these, except for his book *Science, Technology and Society in 17th Century England* (Bruges, 1938), are now assembled in his *Social Theory and Social Structure*² (Glencoe, 1957).

(41) R. K. Merton : "Puritanism, Pietism, and Science", *ibid.* p. 579.

The phenomenon of bureaucracy, linked by Max Weber with the general force of rationality, provides a third illustration of the meaning of this value to many Americans. Interest in bureaucracy is, like the phenomenon itself, recent in the United States (44). In fact, the development of public and private bureaucracies contradicts in many ways the liberal values of early capitalist America. Here, however, Weber's association of bureaucracy and rationality helped many Americans to bridge the contradiction between their values and a rapidly changing reality : if bureaucracy too is an expression of the basic rationality of Western culture, it must be compatible with, or at least a legitimate successor of, the liberal individualism of the nineteenth century.

C. Wright Mills is not the only author who has shown that, underneath a cover of rationality, many forms of irrational behaviour have in fact developed. Nowhere is Weber's interpretation of modern social structure more problematical than in relation to bureaucracy. Bureaucracy may in fact be an extremely cumbersome and devious method of carrying out decisions and, in this sense, quite inappropriate to all ends other than that of concealing what is really happening at the top. There is also, in the United States as elsewhere, a revolt against science as exemplified, e.g., by MacCarthyism. Perhaps new forms of traditionalism have taken the place of rational social relations, so that today it would be more correct to diagnose a decline of rationality in the United States.

"Of all European scholars of the recent past, with whose theories American sociologists concerned themselves, Max Weber has obviously exerted the greatest influence in the last years" (45). The history of this influence has not yet been written; what first approaches there are, are quite insufficient and unconvincing. Moreover, it is an open question to what extent Weber has influenced not only American sociology, but American thought more generally. Here as elsewhere the sales of books and the number of references to them are not necessarily a very good index. As far as this influence goes, however, it is surprising to find that many Americans regard Weber as a progressive. In fact, Weber sometimes appears as something like the American substitute for Marx : an acceptable Marx, so to speak, who although radical in his convictions, yet never transgressed the boundaries of permissible radicalism. This is a very mistaken notion of Weber's political position. While he may have been relatively liberal in the context of the thoroughly backward political scene of Imperial Germany (with the "relatively" emphasized quite strongly), his success in the United States seems once again due to the essential conservatism of his approach. Bendix is certainly right in comparing Weber's views with those "of men like Alexis de Tocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt" (46). Like so many European sociologists, Weber contributed to a self-image of dynamic conservatism in the United States.

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(42) Cf. R. Williams, *op. cit.* p. 417 sq.

(43) H. von Borch, *Die unfertige Gesellschaft* (München, 1960), p. 183, p. 185.

(44) Cf. G. Roth and R. Bendix, *op. cit.* p. 44 sqq.

(45) R. L. Hinkle and G. N. Hinkle, *The Development of Modern Sociology* (New York, 1954), p. 92.

(e) *Community : Tönnies, Durkheim.*

It is no accident that Tocqueville began his examination of the social condition of America with what he called "the township", nor is it an accident that the first subject matter of empirical research in sociology was, in the United States, the community. A whole history of American sociology could be written—and has been written, by Maurice R. Stein (47)—by analyzing successive treatments of the community in American sociology. The English word "community" is ambiguous in its meaning. On the one hand, it signifies real social and administrative units, "townships"; on the other, it refers to a type of social relation closer than that established by contract, to "Gemeinschaft". Is it too far-fetched to believe that these two meanings, different as they are, are nevertheless closely related for many Americans? Is it too arbitrary to assume that the concern with communities —"townships"—in the United States has always been a search for community—"Gemeinschaft" — too? It would certainly seem that neighbourly relations with everybody are an important American value. And while Bergstraesser is right when he says that 'in the sense of Ferdinand Tönnies' distinction the neighbourhood neither represents the pure type of "Gemeinschaft" nor that of "Gesellschaft" (48), there is clearly an element of intimacy in the ideas of neighbourhood and community which is in contradiction to the anonymity of mass society characteristic of American life.

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(46) R. Bendix, *Max Weber* (Garden City, 1960), p. 453.

(47) M. R. Stein, *The Eclipse of Community* (Princeton, 1960).

(48) A. Bergstraesser, "Amerikanische und Deutsche Soziologie", in *Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung* (Freiburg, 1961), p. 197.

The dangerous distinction of "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" is probably the most influential sociological idea of all—not only in the United States, but everywhere. It is also an idea that has occurred to almost every early sociologist without there being any clear relations of dependence : while Tönnies' dichotomy, Durkheim's "mechanic" and "organic solidarity", Spencer's "military" and "industrial society", Cooley's "primary" and "secondary groups" (and similar distinctions by Comte and Simmel, Weber and Park) signify by no means the same, they all refer to the basic observation that human relations may be measured in terms of a continuum from intimacy to anonymity, from personal knowledge to abstract organization—and, often, from old to new, from good to bad. There is often an element of romanticism in this distinction, a Rousseauesque desire to return to the primordial ties of nature. Is it accident, again, that Tocqueville calls the township "the only association which is [...] perfectly natural"? (49).

The direct influence of the dichotomies of Tönnies and Durkheim on American thought are not easy to establish. Cooley who first introduced a distinction of this kind in the United States, had in fact read neither Tönnies nor Durkheim, but Schäffle (50). But when he accuses Spencer of lacking the "sympathetic qualities which are, after all, the only direct source of our knowledge of other people" (51), he certainly displays the romanticism of "Gemeinschaft" which is also present in his work elsewhere. According to Stein and others, Robert Park, the originator of the sociological community study in America, "was seriously influenced by Durkheim" (52). With a characteristically American turn of mind, "where Durkheim dealt with whole societies, Park was interested in communities" (53). But Park was also influenced, as so many early American sociologists were, by Simmel, and Simmel had explicitly dealt with the problem of communities. Also in Park's work, we find the concepts of "community" and "society" which are clearly translations of Tönnies' terms. Today, these notions are commonplace in American sociology (54), and widespread outside the more narrowly sociological literature.

But communities have changed in the United States as in Europe. The modern township is no longer "community" in any real sense. It is a huge, abstract and anonymous organization which satisfies few of the more personal demands of men. At best it might be described in the words of Max Lerner as "looser than 'Gemeinschaft', a word full of meaning which carries old inner ties in it. But it is also much more than a mere 'Gesellschaft' "(55). At worst, American society and its sprawling communities could be looked at as aggregations of masses of men whose every primary tie is endangered by the requirements of living in a mass society. As a result, the search for community in the United States has turned to other objects : in American sociology, to small group research in laboratories and in industry ; in American society, to the vogue of so-called conformism, that is, to the attempt on the part of many to prove that they belong by becoming indistinguishable from others.

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(49) A. de Tocqueville, *op. cit.* p. 62.

(50) Cf. the Introduction by R. C. Angell to *The Two Major Works of Ch. H. Cooley* (Glencoe, 1956), p. xi. See also R. Dewey, "C. H. Cooley : Pioneer in Psychosociology", in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*^{6}, ed. H. E. Barnes (Chicago, 1958), p. 834.

(51) Quoted by R. Dewey, *ibid.* p. 843.

(52) M. R. Stein, *op. cit.* p. 18.

(53) *Ibid.* p. 19.

(54) Cf. for a relatively early (and possibly influential) favourable exposition of them Parsons "Note on *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*" : *op. cit.* p. 686 sqq.

(f) *Stability : Malinowski and the Functional School.*

In the last few years, American sociology has been subjected to severe criticism of the moral and political implications of its image of society. P. Sorokin in his *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology*, C. Wright Mills in the *Sociological Imagination*, and a number of other sociologists including D. Bell, B. Moore, D. Wrong and others have charged the prevailing school of American sociological thought with a marked conservative bias (56). "Of late, this work has occurred less as an effort to know reality better than to serve a strangely conservative mood that has come to prevail among the image-makers" (57). This is evident above all in the school of thought which—myth or reality—has been called the Functional School. For the Functional School, human societies are social systems, every element of which renders a contribution to the maintenance of the delicate equilibrium of social structure. Equilibrium, or homeostasis, is the ultimate frame of reference of sociological analysis. As a tool of investigation, this model may or may not be useful, but is as such beyond reproach. However, it may be suspected that looking at society in terms of order, stability and integration also responds to a demand of American society in the middle of the twentieth century and at the same time reinforces the prevailing mood of the times. Thus sociology, instead of pointing to alternatives of development, revealing the imperfections of the present, and insisting on the reality of change, has become an ideology of complacency with the *status quo*, and a (however involuntary) tool of the powers that be.

The concern of the editors of *Modern American Society* (a book which has already gone through several editions) with the "functional adequacy" and the "fitting together" of the elements of American society ("A stable society is one in which the values of the people motivate them to behave in ways that meet the society's survival needs") (58) ; the insistence on the "concept of function" as "the decisive point of view" for understanding American society in Helmut Schoeck's analysis (59) ; Robin Williams' final chapter on "the integration of American society" (60) ; all these bear witness to the importance of the idea of stability for the values of contemporary American society. At the same time they give an indication of the history of this idea : all the authors mentioned are directly or indirectly disciples of Talcott Parsons, whose *Social System* is the sociological monument to the *immobilisme* of contemporary American thought. Parsons in turn adapted and elaborated ideas which he learnt while a student of Malinowski's in London in the 1920's. Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and the functional school in British social anthropology are probably the most important single source of the striking concern with order and integration in modern American sociology and society. Apart from the functionalists, but also through these, there is the return of the analogy of social systems and biological organisms—an unfailing sign of conservative trends in social thought. It was Parsons who claimed in his first book that Spencer was dead ; but it was Parsons also who revived, following Malinowski and the Functional School, in the terms of homoeostasis, structure, function, and system, the biological bias in sociological thought.

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(55) M. Lerner, *op. cit.* p. 584.

(56) The works referred to are : P. Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology* (London, 1958) ; C. W. Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York, 1959) ; D. Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York, 1960) ; B. Moore, *Political Power and Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1958) ; D. Wrong : "The Failure of American Sociology", *Commentary* (Nov. 1959). Cf. also my article : "Out of Utopia", *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1958).

(57) C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, p. 325.

H. G. Wells once ridiculed the idea of a sociological science because he thought that in fact "the creation of Utopias—and their exhaustive criticism—is the proper and distinctive method of sociology" (61). Functional theory has followed the advice of Wells only too closely, with the result that once again American sociology is in accord with the prevailing mood of the time, but lacking the imagination to transcend it. The world dominated by the ideas of stability and integration, since it is in fact not Utopia but a real world, is full of rather unpleasant surprises. Perhaps American society is just about to awaken to some of these. Fortunately, however, nothing is stable and lasting in human societies, so that the idea of stability though it is still in vogue will undoubtedly follow all other elements of the American self-image in due course and pass into history.

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(58) K. Davis, H. Bredemeier, M. J. Levy, *op. cit.* p. 702.

(59) H. Schoeck, *USA — Motive und Strukturen* (Stuttgart, 1958), p. 8.

(60) R. Williams, *op. cit.* ch. xiv.

(61) H. G. Wells, "The So-Called Science of Sociology", *Social Forces in England and America* (New York, 1914), p. 238.

3. *Patterns of Influence.*

Some American writers who were not sociologists nevertheless discovered European sociology for themselves. Thus, George Santayana reported to his teacher William James in 1887 :

> I have discovered a *Privatdozent*, Dr. Simmel, whose lectures interest me very much [...] He is a young man of a sickly and ascetic appearance who lectures on pessimism and on contemporary philosophy in its relations to the natural sciences. He knows his business like a German and likes to make a nice point (62).

Many American historians, especially in more recent years, also established their own very direct relations to European sociology; Richard Hofstadter is an outstanding example of this. Some of the very great whose works are at the same time readable, such as Tocqueville and, in his time, Spencer, did not need any intermediary to become widely known. But by and large we find, somewhere in the chain that connects the American self-image with European sociology, American sociology as a link. The influence of European sociology is first felt in American sociology; from there, it extends to students of sociology in the United States, and further to the "image-makers" (if indeed these are more than an imaginative invention of C. Wright Mills'). Thus, if we want to trace the channels by which European sociology influenced the formulation of the American ethos, we shall have to examine the history of the relation between European and American sociology.

In terms of their earliest beginnings, American sociology is a little younger than European sociology. But it would be quite mistaken to derive any patronizing attitude from this fact, for American sociology soon developed far more rapidly than its European counterpart and in its own specific direction. In fact, the foundation of the American Sociological Society in 1905 precedes that of sociological associations in many other countries, including that of Germany. In 1906, the American Sociological Society had 115 members, in 1919, over 700, in 1929, 1,812, and today, more than 7,000 (63). This development corresponds to the extension of college teaching in sociology from the time when W. G. Sumner "was probably the only teacher who used the term 'sociology' to describe a college course" (64) to the present, when there is no college without sociology courses and almost no student who is not at some time or other exposed to them. All historians of

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(62) Quoted by G. Roth and R. Bendix, *op. cit.* p. 38.

(63) Cf. R. and G. Hinkle, *op. cit.* p. 50.

(64) R. Hofstadter, *op. cit.* p. 70. Hofstadter is here referring to the 1880's.

American sociology are agreed that it has a specific character, and most are agreed on the description of this character too :

> There is also a practicality in the empiricism of American methods of sociological research which contrasts with the lofty and dignified sociology of, for example, nineteenth century Germany as the American politician contrasts with the European Emperors (R. Faris) (65).
>
> This practical care for sociality is the basis on which sociology as empirical research and applied science in its specifically American form could thrive (A. Bergstraesser) (66).
>
> Almost from its very origin as an academic discipline in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, American sociology distinguished itself from its great European forebears by its immersion in the first-hand experience of concrete situations (E. A. Shils) (67).
>
> It is extremely important that American sociology was, from the very beginning of its formulation of problems, concerned with questions which were at the same time " social problems", tasks which society had to solve and to which it felt committed. (L. and H. Rosenmayr) (68).

Nevertheless, the influence of European sociology on American sociology was, in its formative years, profound and complex. Of the complexity, the following statement about F. H. Giddings may give an indication :

> From Auguste Comte he derived the idea of the need for a basic or fundamental social science [...] From Darwin and Herbert Spencer he learnt that scientific social thinking, in turn, must be evolutionary thought [...] His conception of the " consciousness of kind" was derived mainly from Adam Smith's notion of reflective sympathy. He leaned heavily on Tarde for some of his social psychology, and his views of social constraint were affected by the conceptions of Darwin, Durkheim and Sumner [...] (69).

I have already mentioned that in this early period of American sociology it was above all the German tradition "which was to a considerable extent imported by American scholars of importance who studied in Germany" (70). Among the names to be mentioned here are above all those of Simmel, Tönnies, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Schäffle and Schmoller. There was also one German-born author, J. H. W. Stuckenberg, who is counted by some among the founders of American sociology (71). Second to the influence of German social scientists was that of the French school, and particularly of Comte, Tarde, and Durkheim. If we can follow R. Hinkle, the names have to be mentioned in this sequence, too, for "Durkheim never experienced the popularity and acceptance enjoyed by such foreign scholars as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Gustav Ratzenhofer, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Albert Schäffle, or Gabriel Tarde" (72). In fact, Hinkle claims, "during the period 1890-1917, few European sociologists were more generally disregarded and less enthusiastically received by American sociology than Durkheim " (73). By comparison with German and French, it is difficult to give any precise assessment of English influences on the formation of American sociology. That the impact of Spencer was considerable, we have already seen; apart from Spencer, Westermarck seems to be the only early English sociologist who exerted any notable influence before the First World War (74). But then, while sociology was late to develop in England, many of the fundamental stimuli of modern social science originated in Britain. The works of Adam Smith and Malthus, Darwin and Morgan were certainly as widely read and as influential in America as in Europe.

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(65) R. E. L. Faris "American Sociology", *Twentieth Century Sociology*, ed. G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore (New York, 1945), p. 538.

(66) A. Bergstraesser, *op. cit.* p. 198.

(67) E. A. Shils, *op. cit.* p. 6.

(68) L. and H. Rosenmayr, *op. cit.* p. 21.

(69) C. G. Northcott "The Sociological Theories of Franklin Henry Giddings"' *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, *loc. cit.* p. 744 sq.

(70) R. E. L. Faris, *op. cit.* p. 540.

(71) Cf. H. E. Barnes, "The Social and Political Theories of J. H. W. Stuckenberg", *An Introduction* etc., *loc. cit.* p. 805 sq. In the opinion of Barnes, Stuckenberg "suffered unmerited obscurity" because of his "lack of association with sociology in university circles".

After the First World War, American sociology entered a new period of development, and one that became decisive for the formation of a specifically American brand of sociological thought. In terms of European thought, this was almost a period of intellectual isolationism. In any case, the withdrawal of sociology to the universities of the Middle West (75) meant a complete re-orientation. "Schools of thought do not survive well in this stage of development" (76). In fact, it was in this period that the kind of American sociology emerged which, since Karl Mannheim first formulated these points in 1931, was criticized time and again for its "fear of theories", its "mistrust of philosophy", and its "lack of fundamental commitment" (77). It is a phase not without interest in the context of this paper. I mentioned above that there are many traits to the American self-image which have little relation to European sociological thought. It would seem that American sociology was in close agreement with these specifically American traits in the inter-War period. Empiricism, pragmatism, concern with specific social problems, the desire to extend the frontier—these are values which describe both American sociology and the American self-image in the 1920's, but which do not betray any influence of European sociology.

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(72) R. Hinkle, "Durkheim in American Sociology", *Émile Durkheim 1858-1917*, ed. K. Wolff (Columbus, 1960), p. 273.

(73) R. Hinkle, *op. cit.* p. 267. Might it not be true that Marx was disregarded even more generally? Hinkle's statement here would seem to be somewhat exaggerated.

(74) Cf. R. E. L. Faris, *op. cit.* p. 550. See also R. C. Angell's reference to Cooley's interest in Westermarck, *op. cit.* p. xii.

(75) This is described very well in the otherwise unimpressive study of R. and G. Hinkle, *op. cit.* part II. Cf. also R. E. L. Faris, *op. cit.* p. 546 sqq.

(76) *Ibid.* p. 546.

(77) K. Mannheim, *op. cit.* Mannheim also charged American sociology with ignoring the "sociology of knowledge"—a shortcoming that was soon remedied by the translation of Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* and the work of Louis Wirth.

However, in the 1930's and even more in the 1940's a new phase of interest in European sociology developed. This may have been the work of some individuals, such as Talcott Parsons with his great study of Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber, *The Structure of Social Action;* or it may have been the response to a period lacking in general ideas and theories; or again, it may have been due to the sudden influx of European scholars in the 1930's. In any case, it was at this stage that the "Heroic Age" of European sociology began to be recognized as such in the United States. Durkheim, Pareto and Weber were translated, and in G. Simpson, L. J. Henderson, and T. Parsons each of them found an American apostle. In their wake, other French and German sociologists of the early part of the century began to be read. Since at the same time, the first influences of American sociology were felt in Europe, this was in fact the beginning of the convergence of sociological research into one conception of the discipline—again, not without parallel in the political developments of the time.

One of the great channels of influence of European on American sociology was, of course, immigration. In their evaluation of *The Progress of the Decade* in sociology, S. M. Lipset and N. J. Smelser recently drew up a list of eight "major landmarks" of the development of sociology in the United States (78) : *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, by W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, Th. Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class*, the Lynds' *Middletown*, *Management and the Worker*, by F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, the great studies of *The American Soldier*, by S. Stouffer *et al.*, of *The People's Choice*, by P. Lazarsfeld *et al.*, and of *The Authoritarian Personality*, by T. W. Adorno *et al.*, and finally, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, by T. Parsons and E. A. Shils. Is there any other country where three out of eight "major landmarks" of any discipline could have foreign-born authors? It is hard to overestimate the influence of Central European immigration on American sociology in the last decades. Recently, S. Riemer listed no less than 37 clearly outstanding immigrant sociologists of the 1930's from Germany alone; and his list is incomplete (79). Nor was this immigration confined to Central Europe : Malinowski spent the last years of his life in the United States, Radcliffe-Brown taught for prolonged periods in Chicago, others were and are frequent guests. Whereas in the early period, European influence on American sociological thought was exerted in Europe, because it was part of the formation of an American intellectual to spend some time at a European university, today the situation is almost reversed. At least in sociology, it has become an indispensable part of professional training to spend a year in the United States. There can be no doubt that subtle changes of the balance of influence have attended this development.

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(78) Cf. S. M. Lipset and N. J. Smelser, eds., *Sociology—The Progress of a Decade* (Englewood Cliffs, 1961), p. v.

(79) S. Riemer, "Die Emigration der deutschen Soziologen nach den Vereinigten Staaten", *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, XI (1959), p. 100 sq.

It is hard to tell to what extent European immigrants have influenced the American self-image in the last thirty years. They have certainly played a considerable part among the "image-makers", but then the electrician does not make the electric current. It appears, however, that at present the influence of European sociology—however meagre its achievements may be in the post-Heroic Age—in the United States is rising. Once again, the importance of generalization and theory, and even of philosophy impresses itself on many. In so far as American sociology is an effective intermediary between European sociology and the American self-image, it may be surmised that we are entering a new period of change in which those features of European sociology which were but imperfectly received in the United States might gain in importance.

4. *The American Self-Image : Missing Traits and Their Prospects.*

There can be no doubt that the reception of European sociology in the United States was selective, nor can there be any doubt that the sample selected was not representative. American sociology displays what L. and H. Rosenmayr call "blackout phenomena" (80), and it shares these blank spots with the self-image of American society. Characteristically, those traits which are prominent in European sociology but have nevertheless played but a minor part in American thought, must be expressed not in terms of ideas (such as "democracy" or "individualism"), but as concepts—although the use of each of these concepts invokes a host of connotations and attitudes to society. Six such concepts, and their problematic role in American thought, will be discussed in this section : *class*, *violence*, *elite*, *revolution*, *history* and *intellectuals*. These concepts, all of which have at best an ambiguous place in American thought, might be associated with the names of European sociologists, too : among others, with those of Marx, Pareto, Mosca, Sorel, Landauer, Benda, Mannheim, Alfred Weber. But the attempt to associate any one of these names specifically with but one of the six concepts would be even more arbitrary than the association of names and ideas above.

In terms of the self-image of a society, what are "missing traits" from the point of view of the "official", the dominant ethos, are usually the values of minorities. In fact, the following discussion is a discussion of the ethos of the radical minority in American social thought and politics. Thus, the "missing traits" not only constitute a background that gives contours to the actual values of American society and their origin, but they also describe the contradictions inherent in American—as in any other—society. Those who employed the concepts discussed in this section, and adhered to the ideas with which they are associated, were deviants in their own society; but as deviants they may have contributed more to its development than the uncritical conformists.

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(80) L. and H. Rosenmayr, *op. cit.* p. 15 sqq.

(a) *Class.*

If Edward Shils were to rewrite his account of *The Present State of American Sociology* after thirteen years, one of the statements he would have to qualify would be that about class : "Neither class relations in the power sphere nor inter-class ascent and descent have been systematically studied by American sociologists" (81). Perhaps, in a subtle sense, this statement is still correct. But ostensibly a great deal of research has been devoted, in the last decade, to the subjects of class, status, and power, including social mobility between classes. There is the *Yankee City Series*, and several monographs by its main author, W. Lloyd Warner, including one on *Social Class in America;* there is R. Centers' study of *The Psychology of Social Classes;* there are numerous lesser studies of specific aspects of class and mobility; and there are two great summaries in the form of a Reader on *Class, Status and Power*, and a monograph on *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, both by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset.

However, the first thing that strikes the European student of American research in the field of class, is that it is lacking in the sense of urgency which is so evident in its European counterpart. In the United States, class is no more than one among other criteria of self-interpretation (and as such, it is clearly less important than, say, colour). This detached attitude is in part due to the fact that in America the concept of class underwent a radical change in meaning. Whereas in Europe, the notions of class, economic position and class struggle are quite inseparable, it does not sound at all peculiar to American ears to hear that "social class in America is not the same as economic class" (82) or to discuss Sumner's question of *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (83). There are, to be sure, influential American critics of this neglect of the economic aspects of class and the problem of class conflict. Several years ago, S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix published a profound critique of American studies of class and their underlying ideological bias (of conservatism) (84); C. Wright Mills never tires to remind his countrymen of the significance of class in the European sense for American society; earlier Robert Lynd presented both empirical data and analysis to underline the reality of class conflicts in America (85). But these men represent the very minority with which we are concerned in this section. So far, they have stood for what the American self-image is not; for the ordinary American, class is not a prime category of self-interpretation.

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(81) E. Shils, *op. cit.* p. 21.

(82) W. L. Warner, *American Life—Dream and Reality* (Chicago, 1953), p. 53.

(83) Title of one of Sumner's books, a "social-Darwinian classic" (Hofstadter, *op. cit.* p. 8).

(84) S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "Social Status and Social Structure", *British Journal of Sociology*, II (1951).

The place of class in American society and social analysis is of course part of the more general problem of the impact of Marxism on American thought. This is a problem that defies simple generalisations, even if they are as cautious as that of L. and H. Rosenmayr: "There is nothing in the USA that could correspond to the flood of political, historical and sociological discussion of Marxism in Europe between 1860 and 1930" (86). What about the discussion of the role of the state or of early American socialism? Even the early meetings of the American Sociological Society were dominated by discussions of acute "social problems" and of solutions offered for them (87). All that can confidently be said is that the influence of Marx was inferior to that of many other European social scientists, including Tocqueville and Spencer, Simmel and Weber. In so far as there was any influence at all, it usually consisted in more or less violent reactions against Marx. "The study of social classes", state S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "has suffered in the past from the proclivity of social scientists to react against the influence of Marx" (88). This may be true for the United States, but it is utterly incorrect for Europe. In Europe, social science and, one suspects, the self-image of many societies, have been influenced by Marx more than by any other single social scientist. In the United States Marx seemed, for a long time, simply not applicable; and when people tried to apply his thought to American problems more recently, they violated a taboo of American values.

Perhaps the question of why all this is so is the same as Sombart's famous question: *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States*? In a letter to Weydemeyer in 1852, Marx acknowledged that "in the United States, bourgeois society has not yet matured", and that the class struggle is therefore not yet apparent (89). But of course, Marx thought that this was merely a matter of time. Half a century later, Sombart argued along much the same lines. He saw four reasons for the absence of socialism in the United States: the standard of living of the workers, the "democratic" character of American society, the unauthoritarian character of employer-worker relations, and the significance of geographical and social mobility for working-class life (90). However,

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(85) Cf. *White Collar* (New York, 1956) and *The Power Elite* by C. Wright MILLS; *Middletown* (New York, 1929) and, above all, *Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937) by R. and H. LYND.

(86) L. and H. ROSENMAYR, *op. cit.* p. 16.

(87) Cf., e.g., L. COSER, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (London, 1956), p. 15 sq.

(88) S. M. LIPSET and R. BENDIX, *op. cit.* p. 151.

(89) Letter by Karl Marx to Josef Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852.

(90) This is the briefest summary of Sombart's brilliant analysis, *Warum gibt*

Sombart concluded his analysis with the prediction "that all the factors which have held up the development of socialism in the United States to the present day are in the process of disappearing or being reversed, so that in all probability socialism will grow to full bloom in the Union during the next generation" (91). It would take a lot of sophistry to prove that Sombart's prediction has come true. Fifty years later, it would in fact still seem valid that "although social classes are rank orders placing people and their families in higher and lower orders, they do not permanently fix the status of either the individual or his family in America" (92). At the same time, the very fact that Sombart's prediction once appeared reasonably plausible points to the existence of a strand in American history which, although neglected by sociology and public consciousness, has left its imprint on contemporary American society.

(b) *Violence.*

One of the reasons why the "undeveloped areas" (to quote Shils) (93) of American sociology as well as the American self-image can be described more accurately in terms of concepts than of ideas is that they refer to factual conditions of American society rather than to its ideology. It is no secret (at least to a "European sociologist") that social values do not always reflect the factual substratum of the society in which they are held ; they may also conceal it by presenting an image of order and beauty where there is in fact disorganisation and ugliness. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to the role of violence in American society. One of the first impressions that strike the foreign visitor to the United States even today is the amount of violence characteristic of American life. Crime statistics (even if they are occasionally inflated by police chiefs who want to increase their budgets), the incidence of fighting in public places, the atmosphere of political struggles as well as of competition in business and between individuals are curiously in accord with the prevailing emphasis on "action" in television plays and films. As Laski said more than a decade ago : "The American tradition is one in which veneration for law is at least equalled by the widespread habit of a violence which disregards the habits of law" (94). Laski tried to explain this too : "Partly, that violence is the inevitable accompaniment of a frontier civilisation [...] Partly also, the violence derives from the mixture of races and philosophies out of which, at so swift a pace, America has emerged. It is connected very directly with the fact that it was so easy, if the law was put aside, to make one's way to wealth on so immense a scale [...]" (95). But looking at

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es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus? (Tübingen, 1906), cf. esp. pp. 124-142.

(91) W. Sombart, *op. cit.* p. 141 sq.

(92) W. L. Warner, *op. cit.* p. 54.

(93) Cf. E. A. Shils, *op. cit.* p. 52 sqq.

(94) H. Laski, *op. cit.* p. 31.

(95) *Ibid.* p. 31 sq.

American sociology, or at the American self-image, one would not think that violence really plays so large a part in American life— unless the very absence of any recognition of violence testifies by the laws of psychoanalysis, to its significance. That Americans have been hesitant to interpret their own society in Marx's terms of class and class struggle, we have seen. Few American authors refer to Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* (and when I recommended the book to some American graduates in sociology, I found them deeply shocked after reading it). Simmel has played a considerable role for many of the early American sociologists, but the chapter of his *Sociology* concerned with conflict was translated only a few years ago (96) ; and one not untypical author adds to his reference to Coser's discussion of Simmel's theory of conflict the apology that he "should have been, but was not familiar" with this theory (97). Coser himself has some interesting comments to offer on the neglect of conflict in American sociology (98). In its formative years, he claims, conflict was in fact recognised as a source of progress. But since the 1920's, the study of conflict was increasingly neglected. This was due, Coser believes, to changes in the position and self-image of American sociologists, and especially to their increasing association with public bureaucracies, as well as to "the fear of social conflict and the call to unity which seems to pervade much of the current intellectual trends" (99).

Conflict is of course not necessarily violent. It is possible to approve of conflict and to disapprove of violence. In the United States, however, there seems to be so much disapproval of both, and so much insistence on "love of peace", that doubts must be raised about the "rationality" and the viability of the American self-image at this point. Where democracy is understood to mean representative government, it is invariably also understood to mean conflict. Wherever, on the other hand, consensus, stability, and unity are over-emphasized, a society becomes very vulnerable to the really disruptive effects of internal strife. If it were not for that thin but important stratum of American intellectuals who, throughout the last decades, have kept the Hobbesian solution of the Hobbesian problem of order alive, American society would be even harder pushed today in its efforts to cope with what potential and actual violence there is in its structure.

(c) *Elite.*

The student of American sociology cannot but realize that a number of names of outstanding European sociologists—including those of Sorel, Pareto, Mosca, Michels—are, if not exactly taboo, yet mentioned comparatively rarely and often apologetically. Where they are referred to, it is frequently secondary and minor aspects of their works which are quoted, although all four have by now been translated, and there are excellent monographs by American authors on at least two of them (100). One of the reasons for this comparative reticence is understandable : all these authors were, or were said to be, associated with Italian fascism. It seems to me, though, that there is another reason, and one that is not only less justifiable, but also left implicit. Sorel, Pareto, Mosca, Michels were all concerned with the phenomenon of elites, of ruling classes, their emergence, circulation, and impact on society. As with class in general, however, so it appears to be with ruling classes in particular. It is, as Meisel expresses it, "the American majority opinion : ruling classes may exist in Europe, or in Asia, but it cannot happen here" (101). This is an old American belief which Laski traces back to "the victory of Jefferson in the great election of 1800" which "meant that the idea of an America would triumph in which the notion of an *élite* to whom government was confided would have no place" (102). Obviously, elites are incompatible with the American idea of democracy : where all are equal, the chosen few have no place. Yet the silence about the concept of elites in American thought is suspicious (103).

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(96) G. Simmel, *Conflict*, trans. K. H. Wolff (Glencoe, 1955).

(97) Thus J. H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class* (Ann Arbor, 1958), p. 424, n. 64.

(98) In ch. 1 of his study of conflict, *op. cit.*

(99) L. Coser, *op. cit.* p. 28.

The belief that one is ruled by a small group of men who monopolize the reins of power is an element of the self-image of many, if not most European societies. In European sociology, however, this image occurs in the main with authors who have to be described as conservative in their political orientation : from Vilfredo Pareto to Raymond Aron. It is characteristic of radical social and political theory in Europe to insist on the role of the many (discarded as passive "masses" by Mosca and Pareto) in the shaping of history. Not even Marx was an elite theorist in any meaningful sense. These positions are curiously reversed in the United States. Here, it is the radicals who are preoccupied with the notion of elites, and assert the existence of a "leisure class" or a "power elite", for by these assertions they contradict every valid value of their environment (104). If C. Wright Mills is right —many an American seems to tell himself— then everything one has thought about one's country must be wrong ; therefore, Mills cannot be right. And yet, a lingering suspicion remains that he may be right after all—and it is difficult to cope with this fear if one has avoided looking at society in terms of ruling elites at all.

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(100) These monographs are L. J. HENDERSON, *Pareto's General Sociology* (Cambridge, 1935), and J. H. MEISEL, *op. cit.*, with the subtitle "Gaetano Mosca and the Elite".

(101) J. H. MEISEL, *op. cit.* p. 360.

(102) H. LASKI, *op. cit.* p. 9.

(103) There is an apparent contradiction between my thesis that the concept of elite has been neglected in American sociology and A. Brodersen's statement ("Strukturprobleme der heutigen amerikanischen Gesellschaft", *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, vol. IV, 1959, p. 40 sq.) : "Concepts like "ruling class" were so far [...] usually avoided in American sociology. Instead another concept was adopted much more eagerly and used almost indiscrimately for almost every kind of structural analysis. I am thinking of the concept of elite." Brodersen's first statement shows that we are agreed in principle ; as to the latter, Brodersen fails to present enough evidence to substantiate it, although he has a point in so far as there are a few authors who try to do to the concept of elite what American sociology did to the concept of class : reduce it to a neutral and rather sterile meaning.

Between Mills' "elite to end all elites", as Meisel nicely puts it (105), and the watered-down concept of elite employed in, say, the Hoover Elite Studies (which are in any case not concerned with the United States but with the rest of the world) (106), there is a notion of governing elites which is indispensable at least to the sociologist's, if not to every citizen's understanding of society. The belief in the common man becomes Utopian, if it is not associated with recognition of the realities of power under whatever social and political conditions (107). Whether C. Wright Mills is right or not in his assertion of a homogeneous power elite removed not only from the public eye but also from a parliamentary control in the United States, he has, I think, done his countrymen a great service by reminding them of an aspect of European sociology which has so far found dangerously little resonance in American self-interpretation.

(d) *Revolution.*

In a sense, the three *lacunae* of American values discussed so far in this section converge in the concept of revolution. In any case, European analysts and theorists of revolution were always concerned with elites, classes and violence. Once again, however, American scholars have managed to give a phenomenon, which is ostensibly the same as that studied by their European colleagues, a strikingly different interpretation. For a long time, Americans thought of revolution—i.e. the American revolution—as an event involving no more violence than the Boston Tea Party, carried on by the active masses of the population, and leading to the establishment of a classless democracy. Only recently has this idyllic notion of revolution been put to the test, and found somewhat lacking. The Russian Revolution and its numerous successors in our own century have caused many Americans to revise their own happy view of this phenomenon. And while American society was, in the nineteenth century, rather well disposed to the idea of revolution, American reactions to present-day Cuba suggest that in this respect too, the last decades have been decades of change. Thus the role of the notion of revolution for the American self-image is above all an illustration of the decline of the American Creed of the nineteenth century.

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(104) For a discussion of elite theories and theorists in America cf. J. H. Meisel, *op. cit.*, "Conclusions".

(105) *Ibid.* p. 360.

(106) The "elite studies" of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University provide excellent data on German, Soviet and other political leaders; but the concept of elite employed by them is devoid of any meaning.

(107) It is unfortunate from this point of view, that C. J. Friedrich, the author of *The New Image of the Common Man* (Boston, 1950), should be "fairly representative of the American majority opinion" (J. H. Meisel, *op. cit.* p. 360).

Raymond Bruckberger, a French traveller to the United States, markedly less perceptive and equally markedly more romantic than his great predecessor a century ago, has recently restated the old American view of revolution in all *naïveté*. In his book (which is characteristically entitled *La République américaine* in the original, *Images of America* in the English and *Amerika — Die Revolution des Jahrhunderts* in the German version) he claims : "More than of the political sovereignty of a people, the most perfect expression of which is a revolution, one can say of every genuine revolution that it originated from God, but comes to light in the people and can only be fulfilled by the people" (108). The American revolution, of course, was a "genuine revolution" (as was, no doubt, the French), and one that is outstanding because "it happened in the sphere of social principles, of the mutual rights and obligations of men and nations" (109). It is the little attribute "genuine" that distinguishes Bruckberger from most Americans of the last century : nowadays, one has to reckon with events called revolutions but characterised by force and unfreedom, rather than "social principles". Perhaps no other study signifies the turning point of American thinking about revolution as well as Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution*. Ostensibly Brinton is trying to formulate a theory of revolution that applies to the English as well as the French, the American as well as the Russian case. In fact, however, he finds himself arguing at great length that whereas the English, French and Russian revolutions may have involved a Reign of Terror and a post-Thermidorean dictatorship, the "American revolution" was spared this terrible fate (110). Thus it would seem that there are "good" and "bad" revolutions, and that the "American revolution" is one (the only?) example of a "good revolution". Might it not have been rather more in keeping with Brinton's theoretical intent to abandon the popular interpretation of the attainment of independence by the Thirteen States as a revolution and call it by its proper name, a war of independence? But perhaps Brinton did not want to go quite so far in destroying the traditional self-image. Since his book was first published in 1938, the theme of revolution has played a decreasing role in American social science. Even in 1948, Shils could point to "the study of revolutions" as one of the "undeveloped areas" in American sociology (111); today, it is hardly ever mentioned at all.

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(108) Quoted from the German version of R. L. BRUCKBERGER, *Amerika — Die Revolution des Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt, 1960), p. 101.

(109) *Ibid.* p. 60.

(110) Brinton puts his case rather cleverly in the following way : Having discussed the rise to power of "Cromwell, Bonaparte, Stalin", he adds the — clearly rhetorical — statement : "Indeed, in the Federalist period in the United States, there were Jeffersonians ungrateful enough to suggest that Washington was a perfectly good example of the tyrant born of revolution" (*The Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. ed. New York, 1957, p. 218). In fairness it must be added that Brinton has asked himself whether the American revolution is really a case in point, and although he has decided that it is, he has not done so without reservation.

Of course, the role of revolutions in national self-images is always ambivalent. When L. and H. Rosenmayr refer to the American tradition as one of "revolution incarnated in law" (112), they describe what is in fact by necessity characteristic of all societies deriving their values from a revolution. It is inevitable that a process of what Max Weber called *Veralltäglichung*, of reducing the exceptional to everyday dimensions and thereby destroying its dynamics, sets in with respect to the memory of revolutions. From this point of view, the fate of the concept of revolution in American thought is perhaps not altogether surprising. On the other hand, the abandonment of the sweet American notion of revolution in face of the harsher reality of comparable events in the contemporary world, and the corresponding neglect of those European sociologists who had placed great emphasis on the study of violent and radical social and political change, accord well with the growing prevalence of a somewhat anxious conservatism. For the dynamic conservative of the nineteenth century it was possible to combine the ideas of the revolutionary origin of American society and of its organic stability in one system of values; for the worried conservative of our own times, the idea of revolution involves so many frighteningly explosive connotations that he prefers to interpret his own society entirely in terms of integration, community and stability.

(e) *History*.

"An awareness of history is always a part of any culturally alert national life; but I believe that what underlies this overpowering nostalgia of the last fifteen years is a keen feeling of insecurity", wrote Hofstadter in 1948 (113). Many modern observers are agreed that Americans are as conscious of their political tradition as any other people. But it must remain doubtful whether this concern with the American past involves any deeper understanding of the historicity of all human societies including that of America. To refer to "history" as one of the blank spots in American national consciousness, cannot mean that Americans show no interest in their own history; the contrary is true. It can and does mean, however, that interest in the past does not lead, in America, to an appreciation of the changeability of all things human. America is perhaps the only country in the world in which there are many who believe that Utopia can come true. This

(111) E. A. Shils, *op. cit.* p. 53.

(112) L. and H. Rosenmayr, *op. cit.* p. 13.

(113) R. Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition*, p. v.

is understandable, since so many Utopias so nearly came true in the United States. At the same time, it is a very unhistorical way of looking at reality.

The absence of historical consciousness in American sociology is a frequent complaint of its critics. Thus C. Wright Mills devotes a whole chapter to the "uses of history" in his *Sociological Imagination* in which he charges American sociologists with producing too many "a-historical" studies (114). More than a decade earlier, E. A. Shils had regretfully stated that "American sociologists are notoriously deficient" with respect to historical knowledge (115). More recently, and more specifically, M. Stein concluded that "American sociology, unlike its European counterpart, has always displayed impatience with the ineradicable historicity of much sociological data" (116). The relations between sociology and history are complicated even when they are good, and there is no use denying that similar objections are quite familiar to European sociologists too. Nor is it easy to tell what historically conscious sociological research would actually look like—for what is meant by this demand must obviously be more than that the history of every phenomenon under investigation is taken into account in the analysis of its present condition. Perhaps, the point of the criticism of a-historical sociology as well as of the thesis that history is a blank spot in the American self-image is really not a matter of merely recognising change, but of recognizing it for what it is—a force uncertain in direction which may turn good to bad and bad to good, which is somewhere beyond the possibilities of human control, and which has to be reckoned with wherever we deal with social data. In this sense, I would say that many Americans, sociologists and otherwise, have failed to come to terms with history.

(f) *Intellectuals.*

No subject has been debated more passionately by American intellectuals in the last decades, than that of American intellectuals. The persistence of this debate is all the more remarkable since there is really very little disagreement among its participants. Everybody—that is, of course, every intellectual—seems to agree that intellectuals in the United States are hard done by, suffer from low social and economic status, exert no influence whatever on American politics, and are generally ignored by society, if not attacked by the prevailing values of "anti-intellectualism". Agreement on these points is so general, and is so much a role expectation of the American intellectual, that S. M. Lipset's essay on "American intellectuals, their politics and status" came as a real shock to many and broke a sacred rule (117).

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(114) C. W. Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, ch. VIII.

(115) E. A. Shils, *op. cit.* p. 53.

(116) M. Stein, *op. cit.* p. 95.

(117) S. M. Lipset, "American Intellectuals, Their Politics and Status", *Political Man* (Garden City, 1960).

Lipset claims that, first, the status of American intellectuals is by no means as low as most of them like to believe, that, secondly, they exert considerable influence on their society, and that, thirdly, in pretending to be undervalued by their society they betray a sneaking sympathy for the very aristocracy of rank which they fight in their explicit political convictions. But shocking as it may have been to many of those concerned, to the (more or less) impartial outside observer Lipset's essay has done much to clear the somewhat misty air over the problem of American intellectuals.

It seems clear now (as indeed one would have expected to find), that the position of intellectuals in American society was different at different times. At the height of the rugged individualism of capitalist expansion, there was no place for intellectuals in American society. Unlike the situations in those countries which have belatedly started to develop an industrial economy, an autonomous bourgeoisie dominated the American scene, and its values explicitly denied the luxury of useless activities such as thinking, writing, painting, and the like. N. Birnbaum thinks that he can trace this period in American politics too : none of the presidents between Jackson and Th. Roosevelt "was an intellectual, not even Lincoln ; in the staff of none of the presidents, including that of Lincoln, was the number of intellectuals of importance ; none of them was influenced or indeed unsettled by general ideas" (118). More recently, there arose a new vogue of anti-intellectualism, culminating in the McCarthy persecutions, the object of which was (and still is, to some extent) the alleged "leftism" of intellectual politics. At the same time, intellectuals have taken an active part in American politics under at least three presidents—Wilson, F. D. Roosevelt, and now Kennedy—and they have never lost their importance since the first World War. Thus, Lionel Trilling's general statement that in "American culture"—the self-image of the country—"there exists an opposition between reality and mind and [...] one must enlist oneself in the party of reality" (119), is at best partly correct, for especially in the last decades there have been many who enlisted in the party of mind and have not done badly in the process.

Not only are there important differences in the position of American intellectuals over time, but at any one time this group is also by no means as homogeneous as its members would have the outside world believe. Throughout his article, Lipset takes the fact to be conclusively proven that American intellectuals have been consistently "leftist" in their political orientation ; but towards the end he suddenly suggests that very recently, in the last few years or so, there has been a vogue of conservatism among intellectuals everywhere, including the United States. In this, he is by no means alone ; N. Birnbaum, for example, but also E. Shils and R. Hofstadter and many others share this view. The trouble is, however, that half a century ago more radical social scientists—say, Lester Ward or Thorstein Veblen—felt much the same about their contemporaries, and that probably radicals everywhere find the present unbearably slow-moving and conservative. Very likely, the truth of the matter is that at any one time there are conservative and radical intellectuals. Their distribution may change, but as a social group or stratum the intelligentsia is probably less uniform than any other group, if only because so many of its members are "free-floating" in the sense of having broken with their ascriptive and primary ties. Thus the analysis of the position of intellectuals has to go beyond all too simple generalizations.

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(118) N. BIRNBAUM, "Die Intellektuellen in der gegenwärtigen Politik der Vereinigten Staaten ", *Zeitschrift für Politik* (1957), p. 126.

(119) L. TRILLING, "Reality in America", *The Liberal Imagination* (Garden City, 1957), p. 8.

Social scientists are no exception to this pattern. But—and this is why I have included in the present analysis the subject of intellectuals—as we survey the history of American social science, and especially of American sociology, a remarkable fact emerges. Throughout the history of American sociology there were those who felt committed to a better future and those who were by and large satisfied with the present. There were—to use Merton's unfortunate, but symptomatic terms—the "rebels" and "retreatists" who wanted to change the basic values of their society as well as the accepted means for their realisation, and the "innovators" who were content with minor adjustments of reality to the undisputed values of their society (120). In America, however, unlike other countries, the latter constituted, from the beginnings of Sumner and Small and Giddings and others, the overwhelming majority of the sociological profession (121). Lipset rightly quotes Geiger's statement which applies to all European countries :

> Of all groups in the intelligentsia, the social scientists are most sensitive to the power dimension in society, and also the most exposed to the attacks on intellectual freedom by those in power [...] Therefore, we can expect that [...] a significant number of social scientists [...] would be attracted to the left in one or another of its forms (122).

By this standard, only a few American social scientists could be called social scientists ; or, more precisely, many American social scientists are not really intellectuals at all. American sociology began with the concern with "social problems", and with devising ways and means to solve these problems. Explicit or implicit "social engineering" is a persistent feature of American sociology. The continental European division of "sociology" and "social policy" as university disciplines has never been introduced in the United States. As a result, American sociologists have tended to orient themselves to policies of improvement : improvement of enterprises and prisons, cities and schools, hospitals and slums, etc. etc. By this very orientation, they have come to be "innovators", agents of the adaptation of social reality to the values from which it has deviated, "dynamic conservatives". It is clear that in this context the tradition that leads from Ward and Veblen to Lynd and Mills is a marginal tradition, and that the profession does (and did) all it can to dissociate itself from the imaginative few who can think of other values than those embodied in the *status quo*.

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(120) Cf. R. K. MERTON, "Social Structure and Anomie", *Social Theory and Social Structure*^{2} (Glencoe, 1958).

(121) This is why not only the relation between Sumner and Spencer, but also that between Small and Schmoller is so significant : In Germany, Schmoller was a representative not of "sociology", but of "social policy" *(Sozialpolitik)* which was the theory of Bismarck's dynamic conservatism. German sociology developed in active opposition to this school of thought.

(122) Th. GEIGER, *Aufgabe und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 1949), p. 124.

We are here concerned with European sociology and the American self-image ; in this context, we do not have to decide whether American intellectuals in general have tended to be conservative or progressive. However, American sociologists have a special relevance for our problem. In so far as European sociology has been at all influential in the United States, American sociology has been an important intermediary. I have tried to show that in this traffic a number of concepts and ideas have been more or less systematically neglected, although they played and continue to play a prominent role in the thinking of European sociologists ; the concepts of class, violence, and elite, the ideas of revolution, of history, and of the intellectual as "rebel". If our analysis of American sociology is at all plausible, it provides an explanation for this consequential neglect. American sociologists have, apart from a small "intellectual" minority marginal to the group, failed to absorb those ideas of European sociologists which threatened their undisputed acceptance of the values of their society. They have thereby rendered their society the dubious service of apparently protecting it from some of the more unsettling ideas of modern times.

5. *Conclusion : the Radicalism of Order and the Conservatism of Progress.*

We have travelled some distance in our attempt to survey the points at which European sociological thought and the values of American society do in fact meet or might have met. Unfortunately, we have had to travel too quickly to cast more than a passing glance at most of the relevant points—so that now one rather feels as if we have "done" our subject but not gained very much in the process. I have to ask the reader's indulgence therefore if the conclusions to be drawn from our journey seem rather less than proven by the argument presented in the main body of this paper.

The first conclusion indicated by our analysis of the inter-relations of European sociology and the American ethos in the last century or so is that there are in fact such interrelations. Although it is doubtful whether any aspect of the American self-image may be described as the result of the theories and analyses of any European sociologist, including Tocqueville and Spencer, there seems little doubt that American writers, historians, social scientists and "image-makers" have made generous use of the ideas of some European social scientists to express what they felt to be the values of American society. In so far as this is the case, the effect of European social thought itself expresses one of the major values of American society : it is an example of the fusion of science and life characteristic of a country in which "rationality" (in virtually all of its many meanings) is a cherished ideal. There were and are many societies in history satisfied with less explicit, and less well-founded self-images.

But while European sociology has in this sense been influential, its influence has also been selective. Not everything in European sociology has been taken over indiscriminately, nor is what has been taken over a representative sample of European sociological thought. Somewhat closer knowledge of the principle guiding this selection is perhaps the most important result of our deliberations. Allport once said that European psychological theories, when imported into the United States, all took on a more dynamic turn than they had had in Europe. The opposite is true of sociological theories. In selecting European sociologists and their works for use in the formulation of social values as well as in the development of sociological theories, Americans have greatly preferred such theories and concepts as fitted in with their prevailing orientation of dynamic conservatism, and have neglected those aspects of European sociology which might be interpreted to have more radical implications. In this way, Tocqueville has been received rather than Marx, Spencer rather than Pareto, Max Weber rather than Sorel, Tönnies and Durkheim rather than Mosca and Michels. Within the work of the chosen few, the same selective principle has been at work, so that certain very general ideas, such as those of class and class conflict, of violence, of elite, never played a considerable part either in American sociology or in American thought more generally. Instead, the ideas of democracy, of individualism, of ethical capitalism, of rationality, community and stability were chosen, because they served well as ideological foundations of the American reality.

In terms of this selection, a majority and a minority opinion, or dominant values and dissenting attitudes must be distinguished both in American society and in American sociology. The latter are, in traditional terms, the radicals. They demand, in essence, a tidier

America, that is, a society in which new values become the guiding principles of a new order. It is not always clear what these new values should be. One of the characteristics of dissent is that it is expressed in negative rather than positive terms. Thus the dissenters charge their society with systematically neglecting its seamy side, with pretending to be classless when in fact it is a class society, with pretending to be "democratic" when in fact it has as powerful an elite as any other country, and so on. The dissenting minority in American sociology often points to those European sociologists who have not been well received in America as the most important and instructive thinkers. If we compare the frequency of references to eleven more or less arbitrarily selected European sociologists in typical works of a "radical" and a "moderate" in American sociology (123), the following sequences emerge :

"Radical"	*"Moderate"*
K. Marx	M. Weber
M. Weber	E. Durkheim
H. Spencer	K. Marx
E. Durkheim	G. Simmel
V. Pareto	B. Malinowski
G. Mosca	A. de Tocqueville
A. de Tocqueville	V. Pareto
G. Simmel	G. Sorel
G. Sorel	F. Tönnies
F. Tönnies	H. Spencer
B. Malinowski (not quoted)	G. Mosca (not quoted)

I offer these catalogues here for what they are worth. It is evident that they do not differ as much as one might expect; this is largely due to the fact that I have not been able to find a single work by a "conservative" in which Marx, Pareto, Mosca were referred to at all, so that comparisons would have been difficult. It is also evident that the examples are not really samples, and that one has to be very careful in drawing any conclusions from them. With these reservations, however, we may say that the differences in emphasis are considerable. (They are, in fact, even more pronounced if the names are "weighted" by the number of references to each of them). While both authors—being outstanding sociologists—know the European literature, it would appear that for the first, some authors are considerably more important than for the second. There is only one author who manages to command respect in both the majority and minority groups : Max Weber. This is a phenomenon worth pursuing in another context ; it does, however, testify, among other things, to the ambiguities in Weber's political orientation (124). While the desire of the dissenting minority in American thought to create a "tidier" order in which new principles determine new structures is characteristic of radicals everywhere, American "conservatives" are clearly different from their European counterparts. Hofstadter, having quoted a statement of Sumner's, comments : "We may wonder whether, in the entire history of thought, there was ever a conservatism so utterly progressive as this" (125). The comment may, I think, be generalized to apply to American sociology and, in fact, American society in its entirety. If throughout this paper I have claimed and tried to demonstrate that the prevailing mood of American values has been conservative, and that European sociology has been influential in the United States to the extent to which it fitted in with this mood, I did not mean to assert that this conservatism involved an idea of the complete stagnation of all things social. Just as functional theory is concerned with a "moving equilibrium" rather than a stationary one, American values are characterised by the desire to preserve progress rather than to preserve any particular state of affairs. But this attitude is nonetheless conservative for its progressiveness. As with stationary conservatism, some notion of society is regarded as given, and every attempt is made to maintain this notion. In any case, this is an attitude ill prepared for radical change, such as changes in the rate or direction of social development. Like every conservatism, that of American values is vulnerable to the exigencies of history, and betrays traces of anxiety and insecurity.

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(123) The works in question are C. W. MILLS, *The Sociological Imagination*, and R. K. MERTON, *Social Theory and Social Structure*. It is perfectly clear that the overwhelming majority of American sociologists is more "conservative" than Merton, but it seemed unfair to compare Mills' book with, say, one of the standard college textbooks, since these are so much inferior in quality.

It is perhaps understandable that the values of American society bear the mark of conservatism. Every society is held together by values which glorify the existing state or trend of affairs. As Mills says : "Perhaps the most cherished national images are sentimental versions of historical types that no longer exist " (126). It is less understandable that American sociology has, by and large, been characterized by these values, too. At a number of points in our considerations we have tried to explain this somewhat surprising phenomenon : in terms of the concern of American sociologists with "social problems", in terms of their involvement in "public bureaucracies", in terms of the more general problem of why there is no socialism in the United States. It is part of the social position of American sociologists, and of the prevailing values of American society, that what had often been highly abstract ideas and esoteric arguments in European sociology, were put to extremely practical uses in America. Thus, Weber's complicated analysis of the interrelation of Calvinist doctrine and the capitalist economy has become a widely used slogan to provide American capitalism with the halo of religious sanction. Spencer's *Social Statics* was serialized in popular journals and read by many who elsewhere hardly ever read at all. Possibly, one of the reasons why some other ideas of European sociologists were not adopted in the United States is that they were less susceptible to this kind of widespread currency.

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(124) Cf. for a highly instructive discussion of these ambiguities the contradictory articles in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, XIII (1961).

(125) R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism* etc., p. 8.

(126) C. W. Mills, *White Collar*, p. xiii.

American values have undergone considerable changes since the formative years of American society. The self-image with which we were here concerned was already at least the second in American history: the one, that is, which came into being in the post-Civil War period. In the course of the last century or so, this image too has changed a great deal. The ideas of democracy and, even more so, of individualism no longer come naturally in describing contemporary American society. Instead, community and stability have become romantic goals of American social life. When the system of values discussed in the first part of this paper emerged, American capitalism was just beginning its course; today, the United States like many other countries have entered a stage of economic and social development which can no longer be justly described as capitalist. Although one may feel that the success of books like *The Lonely Crowd, The Organization Man*, and *The Hidden Persuaders* in the United States refutes the very theses they propound, there can be little doubt that there is something in the changes analysed by Riesman, Whyte and Packard, and that these changes have affected the American ethos. If it was not for the experience of earlier failures in prediction by European students of the American scene, I might be tempted to conclude that in the foreseeable future the influence of the minority in American sociology, and of its values in American society, is going to rise. As it is, I cannot say this without a note of scepticism, for this prediction sounds rather like that of Sombart's about the coming American class struggle. Without doubt, the history of American society, in the future as in the past, is quite capable of refuting even seemingly well-founded predictions.

There is one last comment which seems in place in this context. As far as the interrelations of American and European sociologists go, the Americans are—as I have intimated before—the active party today. With respect to the values of American society and European countries, the same might be said (although there are important differences between the various European countries as to the degree to which they have been influenced by American values). I shall not be suspected of supporting the rather superficial thesis of the "Americanization" of Europe if I say that there are quite a few European societies for which community and stability and a prevailing mood of conservatism have also come to be characteristic. There is, both in sociology and in social development, a kind of convergence of traditions in the West. I am not sure, however, that the point towards which these traditions appear to converge is the most desirable system of values. "Community, Identity, Stability" are the catchwords of Huxley's *Brave New World*. In order to avoid this sorry state of affairs we shall have to keep awake both the sociological and the liberal imagination on either side of the Atlantic.

RALF DAHRENDORF

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